



ACTA 2019

UNSETTLED PROBLEMS AFTER THE 1919 PEACE CONFERENCE

Military Conflicts and Diplomatic Negotiations

*45th International Congress
of Military History
18-23 August 2019
Sofia, Bulgaria*



INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF MILITARY HISTORY
BULGARIAN COMMISSION OF MILITARY HISTORY

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2020

Editors:

Jordan Baev

Dimitar Minchev

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Редакционна бележка

След като в периода 2012-2016 в България се проведеха успешно три годишни конгреса на Международната комисия по военна история, през август 2019 г. Българската национална комисия по военна история отново бе организатор на поредния световен конгрес на военните историци.

В работата на 45-ия конгрес по военна история взеха участие 102 делегати и гости от 30 държави от Европа, Северна Америка, Азия, Близкия изток, Африка и Австралия. Академичната програма бе организирана в 18 паралелни научни сесии и седем заседания на ръководните органи и подкомитети на Международната комисия по военна история. Подобно на предходните международни конгреси по военна история беше организиран и един докторантски семинар с трима участници. Допълнително за чуждестранните гости бе предвидена богата културна програма, която ги запозна с хилядолетното историческо и духовно наследство по българските земи. В заключителния ден на конгреса се проведе и церемонията по награждаване на млади военни историци. Годишната награда на името на първия президент на МКВИ проф. Андре Корвизие бе връчена на Адам Сторинг от Великобритания.

В настоящия том с конгресни материали са включени получените в установения срок окончателни варианти на 51 доклада на делегати от 25 държави. В него намират място различни гледни точки и интерпретации за междувоенния период след края на Първата световна война, последователно представени чрез многообразието от проблематични и географски обособени тематични кръгове.

Editorial note

After three successful Congresses of the International Commission of Military (ICMH) in the period 2012–2016, held in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian National Commission of Military History (BCMH) organized again in August 2019 the XLV world Congress of the military historians. 102 delegates and guests from 30 countries in Europe, North America, Asia, Middle East, Africa and Australia attended the Congress in Sofia.

The academic program was organized into 18 parallel academic panels, together with seven sessions of the leading bodies – committees and subcommittees of the ICMH. Similar to the previous international congresses of military history, a doctoral seminar was organized with three participants. For the foreign participants there was organized a rich cultural program, which made them familiar with the historical and spiritual heritage in the Bulgarian lands. At the final day a ceremony for the Corvisier Prize Award for young military historians was organized, received this year by Adam Storting from Great Britain.

The current volume of Congress proceedings contains presented the final versions of 51 papers of the delegates from 25 countries, which were received according to the regulations. Different viewpoints and interpretations, presented consequently through the diversity of problematic and geographic thematic circles, covered the interwar period after the end of the First World War.



Република България
Президент

**ДО
ПОЛК. (О.З.) ПРОФ. ДИМИТЪР МИНЧЕВ
ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛ НА БЪЛГАРСКАТА
НАЦИОНАЛНА КОМИСИЯ ПО ВОЕННА
ИСТОРИЯ**

Уважаеми полк. (о.з.) проф. Минчев,

Изключително ми е приятно да Ви поздравя с организирането на XLV-я годишен конгрес на Международната комисия по Военна история.

Комисията под егидата на ЮНЕСКО е най-авторитетният международен форум за сътрудничество между историците и изследователите на Военната история в дух на приятелство между народите. Дейността на Комисията е от изключително значение за авторитетно осветляване на редица спорни исторически събития, с което допринася за преодоляването на немалка част от съществуващите противоречия между страните на тази основа.

Версайският договор от 1919 г., отбелязал приключването на Първата световна война и замислен да постави край на тежките противоречия между воюващите държави, за съжаление причини нови такива. Стогодишнината от подписването на договора е чудесен повод за един съвременен прочит на историята по отношение неговата подготовка и последиците върху засегнатите държави и света като цяло. В редица региони на света и днес все още се чувстват последиците от действието на Версайската система от договори.

Надявам се научните доклади, които ще се изнесат, да допринесат за изясняване на спорните моменти в историята.

Пожелавам успех на конгреса!

19 август 2019 г.

**Румен Радев
ПРЕЗИДЕНТ НА РЕПУБЛИКА БЪЛГАРИЯ
И ВЪРХОВЕН ГЛАВНОКОМАНДВАЩ
НА ВЪОРЪЖЕНИТЕ СИЛИ**

Republic of Bulgaria
President

TO

Prof. Col. /Ret./ DIMITAR MINCHEV

CHAIRMAN OF THE BULGARIAN
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY
HISTORY

Dear Prof. Minchev,

I am extremely pleased to congratulate you with organizing the 45th annual congress of the International Commission of Military History.

This Commission, under the auspices of UNESCO, is the most prestigious international forum for cooperation between historians and scholars of military history in a spirit of friendship among nations. The Commission's activity is crucial for the authoritative coverage of a number of controversial historical events, thus contributing to overcoming a considerable part of the existing contradictions between the countries on this basis.

The Versailles Treaty of 1919, which marked the end of World War I and intended to put an end to the grave contradictions between the belligerent states, unfortunately caused new ones. The 100th anniversary of the signing of the treaty is a great occasion for a contemporary reading of history regarding its preparation and its effects on the countries concerned and on the whole world. The effects of the Versailles Treaty system are still being felt in many regions of the world today.

I hope the scientific reports that will be presented will help to clarify the controversial moments in history.

I wish success to this Congress! 19 august 2019

(signed)

Rumen Radev

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA
Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces



MINISTER OF DEFENCE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA

19 August 2019

Sofia, Bulgaria

**TO
THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE XLV CONGRESS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
OF MILITARY HISTORY**

DEAR LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

Allow me to welcome you to Sofia and to Bulgaria on behalf of the Ministry of Defence and on my own behalf. I am proud of the fact that Bulgaria was honored for the fourth time to be the host of this high and competent international forum with the participation of scholars and researchers from all over the world.

A century after the end of the World War I, mankind still continues to look for its lessons and moral messages. The war that had to end all wars turned out to have no precedent in human history. Not only several empires collapsed after it, antihuman ideologies sprang into existence.

Instead of solving mankind's problems, the war made humankind face new challenges and unpredictable consequences. I sincerely hope that at this Forum, you will fruitfully and objectively interpret from different perspectives significant and substantial topics of the post-war history of Europe and of the world, which, I believe, will develop further and enrich the achievements the military history has made so far, and will contribute to eliminating the so called "gaps" in our understanding of human history.


The modern intellectual should be capable of probing into the consequences of the war projected in its modern dimensions, thus forming adequate social reflections. Let this congress turn into a forum of exchange of ideas and concepts,

into an incubator for generating new research topics and horizons, into a field of launching new international projects, and of course, last but not least, into a venue of mutual knowledge, understanding and establishing dialogue between the representatives of different countries.

Welcoming one more time your endeavor, and feeling profound respect and gratitude for your dedicated activities, I would like to thank you for your presence here, and I wish effective and fruitful work to all participants.

**DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
FOR PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY
AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA**

KRASIMIR KARAKACHANOV

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'K. Karakachanov', written over the printed name.

INAUGURAL SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF ICMH

Prof. Massimo de Leonardis

Your Excellency the representative of the President of the Republic of Bulgaria, Your Excellency Dr Krasimir Karakachanov, Minister of Defence, Col. Prof Dimitar Minchev, President of the Bulgarian Commission of Military History,

Ladies and Gentlemen, Mesdames et Messieurs, Signore e Signori, Señoras y Señores, Meine Damen und Herren, Uvazhaemi dami i gospoda, the foundation stone of the Central Military Club, hosting our Congress, was laid in 1895. In that period over all Europe the military, and in particular the officers, formed an elite, enjoying a prominent position in the State and society. It was well deserved, because the armed forces were the pillar which had obtained and guaranteed the independence.

I remember that some years ago, during one of my previous visits to Bulgaria, I was interviewed by a lady journalist of the military television. Her opening question was quite baffling: “Professor, during history there ever was a war which solved any problem or had a useful purpose”? I started my answer saying: “Madam, I remind you that without wars neither your country nor my own would exist as independent Nation States”. So it is perfectly understandable that in many cities there are military clubs hosted in fine buildings like this one, which was paid by the Officers’ association and is one of the prestigious locations for cultural events in Sofia.

I need not to rehearse once again the reasons why the ICMH Congress is organized for the fourth time in 8 years in Bulgaria, because these are well known and have been explained various times. Here and today we must only express gratitude to our Bulgarians hosts for Sofia 2019, after Sofia 2012, Varna 2014 and Plovdiv 2016. I would in particular thank Mr. Krasimir Karakachanov, Minister of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria, Mr. Ivo Antonov, Director for “Social Policy and Policy on Military Patriotic Education” and Chairman of the Congress’ Organising Committee, and of course our long-time friend Col. Prof Dimitar Minchev, president of the Bulgarian Commission of Military History.

Personally, it is my sixteenth visit to Bulgaria since 2009, more or less evenly divided between engagements connected with ICMH and other cultural links depending from my role of Professor of History of International Relations. Certainly you have noted that today I wear a medal with ribbon and a badge. Actually, I share General de Gaulle’s opinion, who once said: “*on ne demande pas les décorations, on ne les refuse pas et on ne les porte pas*” (“you don’t ask for decorations, you don’t refuse them and you don’t wear them”). But today I could not comply with the third rule, because I am deeply honoured for having received last May from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences the Marin Drinov medal with ribbon and from the ministry of defence the Decoration of honour 1st rank and I feel gratefully obliged to wear these decorations in this opening ceremony.

As an Italian, let me recall that 2019 marks 140 years of diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and Italy. The Italian Ambassador will attend our closing dinner on Friday evening; today his deputy is sitting here in the front row. Some years ago, Mr.

Francesco Calderoli was one of my students at the Master in Diplomacy and Sofia is his first post abroad. Also at the Congress of 2012 the then Deputy Chief of Mission was a student of mine.

This year's general theme has a solid connection with that of last year in Israel, a Congress we all remember with great satisfaction. In 2018 we discussed *The Creation of New States and the Collapse of Old Empires in the XX Century*, this week we will focus on *Unsettled Problems after the 1919 Peace Conference: Military Conflicts and Diplomatic Negotiations*. Actually the collapse of old Empires after the First World War created a number of problems, some of which were not settled at the Paris Peace Conference.

In this centennial of the Peace Conference, dozens of conferences have been organized on that subject; actually, our Congress preferred not to rehearse once again that topic and choose instead to investigate the problems left open by the peace conference.

I will just make few considerations on the peace conference: "This is not peace. It is an Armistice for twenty years", this was the comment made by Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch on the signature of the treaty of Versailles¹. Not differently, in his first encyclical *Ubi Arcano Dei Consilio* of 22nd December 1922 Pope Pius XI described the treaties of Paris as an "illusory peace, written only on paper"².

However, the motivations of these two similar opinions were different. The inter-allied Commander didn't discuss the severity of the treaty but the weakness of the clauses to enforce it. On the contrary the Catholic Church talked of a "false peace", with which the "seeds of new wars" were being sown, just because it considered it harshly punitive and unjust.

Actually, historians charge the failure of peace to different factors. Some accuse the revengeful inspiration of the treaties, others the weakness of the guarantees for the preservation of peace, others still, point out to factors not connected with the peace conference or subsequent to it, first and foremost the neo-isolationism of the United States. French famous diplomatic historian Pierre Renouvin, stressed "the contrast existing between the strictness of some clauses and the lability of the guarantees provided for their enforcement"³.

An Italian diplomatic historian, Augusto Torre, confirmed the opinion of Field Marshal Foch: "The treaty of Versailles and those following it did not establish a peace but a truce. The deliberations of 1919 proved to be more fleeting and ephemeral than those of the Congresses of Vienna, of Paris in 1856 and of Berlin"⁴.

In any case, neither the formal end of the hostilities, on 8th November 1918, after the previous armistices on other fronts, nor the signature of the peace treaties meant the end of bloodshed. In 1919 in an electoral speech in Dundee, Winston Churchill remarked that "Europe and a greater part of Asia were in a welter of anarchy". "Total

¹ Quote in W. S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, I, *The Gathering Storm*, Cambridge Mss. 1948², p. 7.

² https://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19221223_ubi-arcano-dei-consilio.html, n. 21.

³ P. Renouvin, *Il trattato di Versailles*, It. ed., Milano, 1970, p. 122 [my translation].

⁴ A. Torre, *Versailles. Storia della conferenza della pace*, Milano, 1940, p. 427 [my translation].

war had left behind all kinds of detritus that had to be cleared away”, is the comment of Churchill’s biographer Lawrence James⁵.

A German-British historian, Robert Gerwarth, in his book *The Vanquished. Why the First World War Failed to End, 1917-1923*, writes that, during the years from the official end of hostilities until the treaty of Lausanne of July 1923, “post-war” Europe, was the most violent place in the world, calculating that during those five years the victims of armed conflicts in the Old Continent were much more than four million, which is a figure higher than the casualties suffered in total by the United Kingdom, France and the United States during the Great War. Gerwarth comments that even not exaggerating the “rehabilitation” of pre-war empires shared by many historians it would be difficult to maintain that post-imperial Europe was a better and safer place in respect to that of 1914. The title of the Italian edition of this volume possibly is even more telling: *La rabbia dei vinti. La guerra dopo la guerra* (The wrath of the defeated. The war after the war)⁶.

As a matter of fact, if the majority of territorial disputes saw the confrontation between winners and losers, some territories were contended between new States both emerging as victors from the conflict, as in the cases of *Vil’njus/Vil’na/Wilno* and *Cieszyn/Těšin/Teschen*, claimed respectively by Lithuania and Poland and by Poland and Czechoslovakia. The use of names in different languages for the same town reflects the complexity of the historical and ethnic local situation.

With John Horne, another scholar, Gerwarth also edited a collection of essays titled *War in Peace. Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War*. The introduction opens recalling that until 1923 peace in Europe was shaken by revolutions, counter-revolutions, ethnic strife, pogroms, war of independence, civil wars and inter-states conflicts. Civil wars and inter-state conflicts were inter-connected and bloody as during the Thirty Years’ War in the XVII century⁷.

One or more of these types of armed violence affected Russia, Ukraine, Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, Austria, Hungary, Germany, Anatolia and Caucasus. Ireland saw a war of independence and a civil war. The Finnish civil war followed the independence from Russia of the former Grand Duchy of Finland, part of the Russian Empire; in six months it provoked more than 36,000 casualties, 1% of the national population.

The main wars between states were fought between Greece and Turkey and between Bolshevik Russia and the reborn Poland (*Polonia restituta*, restored Poland is the name of a high Polish honour), which refused the frontier proposed by the Entente. After alternate events, Poland prevailed and moved towards East its borders with Russia.

⁵ L. James, *Churchill and Empire: Portrait of an Imperialist*, London 2013, pp. 120-21.

⁶ R. Gerwarth, *The Vanquished. Why the First World War Failed to End, 1917-1923*, London 2017. Italian edition *La rabbia dei vinti. La guerra dopo la guerra*, Bari 2018² (see pp. XII-XIII, XVI).

⁷ R. Gerwarth-J. Horne (eds.), *War in Peace. Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War*, Oxford 2013. Italian edition *Guerra in pace. Violenza paramilitare in Europa dopo la Grande guerra*, Milano-Torino 2013, p. 1.

Turkey was the only defeated State which managed to change the peace treaty imposed to it at Sèvres in August 1920. Sèvres had been signed by the Ottoman Empire, while the treaty of Lausanne of July 1923 was concluded by the government of the rising Republic of Turkey, proclaimed on the following 29th October, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Between the two treaties, a war was fought between Turkey and Greece; the latter had to renounce all its pretensions on the Turkish territory. Civilians suffered greatly in this conflict and the treaty of Lausanne involved a massive exchange of populations between the two States.

The conference of peace dissolved without having agreed the frontier between the Kingdom of Italy and the new born Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later from 1929 Yugoslavia). The issue was settled through diplomatic negotiations between the two countries, firstly with the treaty of Rapallo of November 1920 and then with the treaty of Rome of January 1924. Even if there was no military confrontation between Rome and Belgrade, victims were provoked. In September 1920 the poet soldier Gabriele D'Annunzio leading the so called "legionaries" had occupied the town of Fiume (in Croat Rijeka) where he established a *de facto* "Regency". To implement the treaty of Rapallo, which created the "Free State of Fiume", the Italian government intimated the surrender to the legionaries, who resisted. Twenty-five regular soldiers, twenty-six legionaries and 53 civilians died.

I mentioned this particular problem because it saw the action by para-military troops, the legionaries, who were deserters from the Italian Royal Army and civilian volunteers, a phenomenon which received a new impulse in the post-war years. In Germany they were called *Freikorps*, and played a key role in the Baltic States during their struggle for independence.

The year 1923 was a turning point, which marked a general end of hostilities and disputes. However, in August-September of that year took place the Corfu incident, a diplomatic and military crisis between Greece and Italy, triggered when on 27th August the Italian General Enrico Tellini, heading a commission of the League of Nations to resolve a border dispute between Albania and Greece, was murdered on Greek territory, in Zepi, on the road between Ioannina and Kakavia, along with four members of his staff. Italy sent an ultimatum to Greece and, unsatisfied with Athens' answer, on 31st August a squadron of the Italian Royal Navy bombarded the Greek island of Corfu and landed some thousand troops; Airplanes aided in the attack. The bombardment provoked a number of casualties among the Greek population.

The treaties agreed at Locarno and signed in London on 1st December 1925 seemed to definitely end the post-war period and inaugurate an era of peace. However, Poland was not all happy about these agreements. Col. Józef Beck, future foreign minister, ridiculed the treaties saying: "Germany was officially asked to attack the east, in return for peace in the west", while Marshal Józef Piłsudski, the "father" of the nation, would say that "every honest Pole spits when he hears this word [Locarno]"⁸.

The culmination of the illusions that "collective security" might guarantee peace

⁸ M. Brecher, *The World of Protracted Conflicts*, Lanham, MD 2016. p. 204; P. S. Wandycz, *France and Her Eastern Allies 1919–1925: French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno*, ACLS Humanities E-Book, 2008.

was symbolically and deceptively marked by the Briand-Kellogg pact of August 1928. It pretended to abolish wars and was signed by 62 States; only 5 States did not accede to the treaty. Curiously enough Barbados signed the treaty in 1971. Scottish Historian Sir Denis William Brogan comments: “The United States, which had abolished the evils of drink by the Eighteenth Amendment, invited the world to abolish war by taking the pledge. The world, not quite daring to believe or doubt, obeyed”⁹. Alas, the pact lacked any enforcement clause, and in the long run the effect of this declaratory diplomacy was simply to abolish declarations of war, as it happened after the Second World War.

The inter-war period saw a turning point in 1929, opening a decade which precipitated a new war. I will not talk about this period also because most of the papers concern the twenties. Almost 60 papers will be presented, by scholars from 33 countries, 4 of them not yet members of ICMH: Australia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Serbia. I welcome all participants and I wish all of us a successful Congress in every aspect.

Many thanks for your attention, merci beaucoup pour votre attention, molte grazie per la vostra attenzione, muchas gracias por su atención, Vielen Dank für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit, mnogo blagodarya za vasheto vnimanie.

⁹D. W. Brogan, *The French Nation, 1814-1940*, London, p. 267

Monday, 19 August

L'ESPAGNE ET LA PREMIÈRE GUERRE MONDIALE: PARTICIPATION ET CONSÉQUENCES

Col. (Ret.) Manuel García Cabezas (Spain)

Introduction

Lorsque l'on parle de l'Espagne dans la période de la Première Guerre Mondiale, la première idée qui vienne souvent à l'esprit est l'affaire de la grippe espagnole¹. Par contre, on connaît peu de la participation des autorités et individus espagnols dans les événements de 1914 à 1919. Dernières investigations ont clarifié ces participations.

Le gouvernement espagnol déclara le 7 août 1914 la première neutralité officielle de l'Espagne dans le conflit mais, malgré cette déclaration de neutralité, la Grande Guerre eut une forte répercussion sur la vie économique, sociale et culturelle de l'Espagne. La société se divisa en germanophilies et alliadophilies qui tout au long de la guerre eurent un affrontement dialectique et politique.

La première semaine d'août 1914, quand la mobilisation commença dans les principales capitales de l'Europe, les premières sensations en Espagne furent d'incertitude et de préoccupations envers les dérivations de l'éclatement du conflit. Quelques jours plus tard, la déclaration de neutralité proclamée par le gouvernement d'Eduardo Dato apaisa relativement cette sensation.

Les pays neutres devinrent une partie substantielle du conflit, aussi bien du point de vue économique et commerciale qu'en ce qui concernait la propagande des états belligérants. L'économie fut énormément touchée et elle constituera le cadre dans lequel les conséquences eurent de répercussions les plus directes. Pour les entrepreneurs la neutralité inaugura une "époque fantastique". Nonobstant, ce fut également une période marquée par l'inflation et la crise de denrées, qui firent vivre des notables difficultés aux secteurs populaires.

Le monde de la culture expérimenta aussi des notables mutations pendant la guerre. Avec une militance importante de divers personnages, les disputes intellectuelles se déployèrent au rythme de l'apparition de la figure de l'écrivain journaliste comme Ortega y Gasset ou Eugeni D'Ors. La presse ne cessa de couvrir le conflit en étroite relation avec la politique.

À travers ces manifestations politiques et culturelles la division entre alliadophiles et germanophiles devint un élément notablement présent dans les campagnes électorales municipales et provinciales. Tous ces éléments finissent par éclater en 1917. L'impact de l'entrée des États-Unis, le wilsonisme et la Révolution russe s'associent à une complexe situation politique et sociale pour donner forme à une crise qui brise le système de la Restauration où les revendications sociales et

¹ La grippe qui faisait mourir millions d'individus en 1918 avait pour origine probablement la Chine "virus père") et les États-Unis(pour sa mutation génétique),et elle, est due à une souche (H1N1) de grippe qui s'est répandue en pandémie de 1918 à 1919. Selon l'historien Niall Johnson les plus grandes pertes ont touché l'Inde (18,5 millions de morts, soit 6 % de la population), la Chine (4 à 9,5 millions de morts selon les estimations, soit 0,8 à 2 % de la population) et l'Europe (2,3 millions de morts, soit 0,5 % de la population).

autonomistes s'associent. C'est au cours de ces années que se produit la consolidation de l'anarchisme plus l'essor du socialisme et le républicanisme.

L'impact militaire ne sera pas négligeable. Ces processus-là convergent avec une lutte pour le contrôle de la mer avec la férocité des campagnes sous-marines le long des côtes espagnoles.

Situation diplomatique de l'Espagne en 1914.

Il semblait que pendant les dernières années du XIX siècle, l'Espagne s'avait penchée vers la Triple Entente à travers d'un accord de 1887 avec l'Italie (même connu comme "pacte secrète"). Mais pendant la première décennie du XX la diplomatie espagnole s'accommoda plutôt aux intérêts français à cause de notre commun destin au Maroc. Pourtant, tant que l'influence germanique sur la vie politique et sociale de l'Espagne continuèrent (notamment dans la vie militaire), en 1914 la diplomatie et les intérêts officiels espagnols étaient étroitement liés aux ceux des français².

En 1914 le roi espagnol Alfonso XIII était la tête couronnée d'une monarchie constitutionnelle mais la politique intérieure et extérieure était fortement influencée par la personnalité et les actes du roi. Le roi Alfonso avait de liens familiaux avec presque tous les rois européens et sa famille plus proche avait des racines divisées; sa mère était autrichienne mais son épouse était une princesse britannique. Alors la famille royale montrait la même division que la société espagnole à l'heure de se déclarer favorable aux alliés ou aux pays de la Triple Entente. Tous les deux partageaient leurs penchants à moitié entre les deux parties belligérants.

La participation de l'Espagne dans la I G.M.

L'Espagne: champ de bataille des espions et diplomates.

Au cours de la I Guerre Mondiale l'Espagne va devenir le champ de bataille des réseaux d'information des pays belligérants. La France réalisa le plus grand effort et situa son activité de recherche de renseignements dans les secteurs et villes plus stratégiques, spécialement sur le littoral dans le but d'obtenir des renseignements notamment sur les sous-marins allemands mais aussi de diffuser de la propagande. La poste de Madrid surveillait la capitale et coordonnait l'ensemble des Services de Renseignement (SR).

L'ambassade allemande, dirigée par le prince de Ratibor, créa aussi un service de renseignement divisé en quatre sections. La section du Service Politique-Militaire-Naval, dirigée par les attachés naval et militaire, se consacra aux affaires intérieures et réalisait un discret service de surveillance dans les hôtels les plus importants de Madrid et Barcelone amis aussi au Maroc où soutenait les rebellions du Raisuni et Abd al-Malik (qui recevaient aussi l'aide des Ottomans). La Section de Propagande contrôlait et subventionnait la presse espagnole. La troisième activité concernait les affaires commerciales qui s'y intéressait déjà au cours de l'après la guerre pendant laquelle était prévue une croissance de la Allemagne dans des secteurs comme le

² Il faut mentionner que la Reine (Régente) Maria Cristina était d'origine autrichien et elle s'occupa du trône de 1885 à 1902. Les accords hispano-français sur le Maroc commencèrent en 1902 et se conclurent avec les négociations de 1912.

ferroviaire ou le minier (en particulier, tout ce qui concernait le wolfram). La quatrième section du *Nachrichtendienst* était le Service Sud- Américain.

Sur le littoral et dans les ports, le service allemand développait quatre activités fondamentales: contrebande, communications radiotélégraphique d'information, l'approvisionnement des sous- marins et le sabotage occasionnel des navires marchands ennemis. Le ravitaillement des sous-marins à partir de petites flottes de bateaux avec des équipages locaux, organisé par l'enseigne de vaisseau Wilhem Canaris, fut structuré en huit secteurs contrôlés par la Marine et très semblable à la distribution de la surveillance française sur les côtes espagnoles.

Le travail le plus important fut celui des espions et saboteurs allemands car le Reich avait des multiples raisons d'attaquer les intérêts des Alliés en Espagne. D'après Canaris, ce type d'opérations intéressait surtout l'attaché naval Karl von Krohn; cet individu essaya même d'introduire des charges explosives dans les navires allant de Santander et Bilbao au Royaume Unie ou même d'introduire produits contaminants contre le bétail à travers des "flacons de savons".

Le rôle des femmes dans l'espionnage méritait un chapitre à part, que je ne vais pas entamer: seulement signaler que les femmes eurent un rôle fondamental³. Voici quelques exemples. La danseuse érotique Margaretha Macleod Zelle, connue comme Mata Hari, fut une espionne au service des allemands. Après avoir tenté de jouer un double jeu maladroît, elle fut trahie par ses supérieurs ce qui mènerait à son arrestation le 13 février et à son exécution le 15 octobre. Pour détruire le mythe de Mata Hari, les français créèrent l'aventurière Marthe Richard (devenue maîtresse de Von Krohn) qui tenta de transporter des germes d'anthrax en Argentine mais, suite à un accident de la route à Madrid, son identité fut révélée à la presse française dans l'été 1917 et elle dû rentrer précipitamment en France.

Un scandale majeur d'espionnage fut le cas du commissaire de police à Barcelona Manuel Bravo Portillo, soupçonné d'être espion au service de l'Allemagne pour un salaire de 3000 pesetas par mois. Le scandale autour de l'action de Bravo Portillo conduisit à la promulgation d'une loi contre l'espionnage et la défense de la neutralité, qui établissait des amendes et des peines de prison pour les agents au service de puissances étrangères et des sévères mesures de censure.

L'héritage de l'espionnage de la Grande Guerre fut très tortueux pour l'Espagne parce que les réseaux impliqués dans ces activités donnèrent lieu aux groupes des pistoleros qui furent les acteurs principaux de la violence qui se produisit après la guerre dans le domaine social et du travail, prélude de la dictature de Primo de Rivera et de la guerre civile.

L' action humanitaire d'Alfonso XIII⁴.

Une des participations les plus directes de l'Espagne dans la I.G.M. est l'intervention humanitaire du roi Alphonse XIII et la création, par décision personnelle,

³ Pour en savoir plus voir DIAZ PLAJA, Fernando, (2004), *Mata-Hari*, Barcelona, Edit. Planeta.

⁴ Pour en savoir plus sur cette affaire voir PANDO, Juan, (2010), *Un rey para la esperanza: la España humanitaria de Alfonso XIII*, Madrid, Edit. Temas de hoy.

d'un Bureau de la Guerre Européenne dans son cabinet privé. Avec plus de 200 000 archives conservées dans les collections du Palais Royal, des archives sur l'aide à Henri Pirenne, Maurice Chevalier ou Roland Garros⁵ sont conservées, ainsi que des demandes de Rudyard Kipling ou de Giacomo Puccini.

Bien qu' incomplets, les dossiers témoignent le travail humanitaire considérable accompli par la plus haute autorité espagnole en faveur de nombreux cas, difficiles à résumer. Certains sont très émotifs⁶. Bref, il suffit de rappeler que plus de 70 personnes furent libérées de la peine de mort, que beaucoup d'autres furent regroupées avec leurs familles et que beaucoup d'autres améliorèrent leurs conditions de vie dans les camps de concentration. De toutes les nationalités.

En plus de la création du Bureau de la Guerre Européenne, Alfonso XIII dirigea une offensive diplomatique de neutralité active. Les ambassades et légations espagnoles en Europe déployèrent des nombreux efforts, généreux et efficaces dans les limites du possible, pour humaniser les séquelles et les malheurs de la guerre. Parmi les fonctions les plus importantes figurent la protection des intérêts de certaines nations dans les pays du côté de l'ennemi; chercher des nouvelles de soldats disparus; d'échanges de prisonniers ou de rapatriements de civils et de soldats; de la délivrance de passeports temporaires et d'autres documents. Les visites de légats, militaires et diplomatiques, dans des camps de prisonniers furent très importantes pour informer sur les conditions de vie des soldats emprisonnés en territoire ennemi.

Par ailleurs, Alphonse XIII dirigea personnellement certaines actions diplomatiques visant à obtenir le pardon des condamnés à mort ou à améliorer les conditions de vie des soldats et des civils dans les pays occupés. Y inclus des efforts pour sauver la vie du tzar Nicolas II.

Son travail fut récompensé à plusieurs reprises par des visites d'État, des décorations et des lettres reçues au palais. Des exemples clairs furent aux occasions des visites royales à Verdun et Paris en 1919 et les visites en l'Italie et la Belgique en 1923, ou le roi espagnol fut l'objet de remerciements et d'éloges⁷.

Les évènements en Guinée.

L'Espagne se trouvait dans la côte africaine du Golfe de Guinée depuis la fin du XVIII ème siècle et leur possessions comprenaient une partie continentale (le Rio

⁵ En février 1916 l'aviateur Roland Garros était prisonnier au camp de Zorndorf (Allemagne). Il envoya une carte à l'ambassadeur de l'Espagne à Berlin en demandant d'aide humanitaire. À l'occasion d'une visite des officiers espagnols J. Ordavás et A. Vallejo, en visite humanitaire au camp des prisonniers d'Ingolstadt, ils reçurent une demande de soutien d'un capitaine français; il s'appelait Charles De Gaulle.

⁶ Quelques exemples. Une lettre disait. "*Majesté, pardon par oser de vous écrire, mais une mère peut tout; c'est bon d'être une reine, mais être une mère est plus importante; et plus douce*". "*Je ne suis pas espagnol; mais je suis de votre deuxième patrie: l'humanité*"; "*Quand il y a un désarroi chez mon village, toujours il y a quelqu'un qui dit: écrivez au Roi de l'Espagne*".

⁷ À l'occasion de la visite royale à Amberes, le roi Alfonso XIII reçut les remerciements du bourgmestre de la ville, Adolphe Max, qui avait été rapatrié grâce à l'intermédiation du roi espagnol. En 1920, le roi Alfonso reçut la Médaille militaire de la république française de la main du maréchal Joffre.

Muni) et des petits îles et îlots tout au long de la côte (dont la principale était l'île de Fernando Poo). A peu près 26 mil km².

En 1914 la Guinée espagnole était entourée par des colonies françaises (Gabon), belges (le Congo), britanniques (Nigeria) mais aussi la colonie allemande du Cameroun (Kamarones). Le conflit des puissances européennes aussitôt arriva en Afrique et une opération des belges, français et britanniques mirent en déroute les troupes allemands au Cameroun.

Les forces allemandes au Cameroun sont battues et le 1er janvier 1916 Yaoundé, la capitale du Cameroun, tomba et près de 60.000 personnes -militaires et civiles, allemands et natives- croisèrent la frontière de la Guinée espagnole et sont accueillis comme réfugiés dans divers camps d'abord dans le continent et après (à cause des pressions des puissances alliées) à l'île de Fernando Poo. Parmi les réfugiés se trouvèrent même le gouverneur allemand au Cameroun, Mr. Karl Ebermayer, et le chef des troupes coloniales, le colonel Zimmermann. En mai, les vapeurs espagnols *Cataluña* et *Isla de Panay*, escortés par le croiseur *Extremadura*, emmenèrent 792 civils et militaires en Canaries et le 5 May ils arrivèrent tous à Cádiz. Le personnel militaire fut distribué 200 à Alcalá de Henares, 217 à Pamplona et 380 à Zaragoza. En Guinée restèrent 60 officiers et sous-officiers allemands plus près de 20 mil militaires et accompagnants camerounais.

L'appui à cette foule de gens exigea au gouvernement espagnol un grand effort, y inclus l'envoi, pour la première fois, des troupes espagnoles pour renforcer la surveillance et le soutien des camps de réfugiés, malgré le mécontentement des autorités alliées qui craignaient une offensive espagnole en faveur de la colonie allemande. Les derniers contingents de réfugiés quitteront l'île de Fernando Poo en 1920.

Les participations des espagnols dans la guerre.

Une autre participation directe de l'Espagne dans le conflit européen de 1914 c'est l'enrôlement des citoyens dans les rangs des armées confrontées. Toutefois cette participation ne se produisit pas en masse, même quand on arriva à dire que jusqu'à 12.000 catalans lutèrent dans les rangs de la Légion française. En réalité, le chiffre probable des séparatistes enrôlés dans la Légion française tourna autour du millier, dont seulement une quarantaine pourrait être considérée comme nationalistes. Bien d'autres espagnols s'enrôlèrent dans les armées combattants: d'anciens officiers expulsés de l'Armée Espagnole, de soldats qui avaient des comptes à régler avec la justice ou même des jeunes qui s'opposaient au recrutement forcé que signifiait le fait d'aller à la guerre du Maroc.

L'action sous-marine.

La Première Guerre Mondiale abattit les frontières entre états en guerre et neutres, en invalidant les lois de la guerre selon les Conférences de La Haye de 1889 et 1907 et la Déclaration de Londres (1909).⁸ La lutte pour les communications maritimes

⁸ La Déclaration de Londres établissait une différence entre articles de contrebande absolue (usage militaire), contrebande conditionnelle (selon son usage civil ou militaire) et les produits libres. Les droits des pays neutres conditionnèrent la définition légale de la contrebande de guerre: des produits dont le commerce en cas de conflit pouvaient être saisis par les états en guerre.

donnerait un exemple clair de la nature totale d'un conflit dont l'impact fut visible en Espagne.

La rivalité maritime parmi les belligérants arriva bientôt aux ports espagnols. Les moyens diplomatiques, l'espionnage et les divers flottilles de blocus tâchèrent d'empêcher la contrebande et le commerce de biens vers et en provenant des pays en guerre (ce qui toucha des éléments critiques pour l'industrie nationale, comme par exemple les produits chimiques indispensables pour l'industrie textile). La confiscation des biens espagnols en haute mer devienne rapidement habituelle et les organisations commerciales et les patrons espagnols demandèrent aussitôt protection⁹.

Grace aux progrès techniques, la guerre sous-marine allait devenir l'instrument allemand pour contrecarrer le blocus naval et commercial des Alliés. Plus de 12 millions de tonnes de marchandises furent coulées dont un tiers environ dans la Méditerranée (si bien la marine italienne ayant été l'une des plus touchées). L'hiver 1915 fut le point d'inflexion avec la campagne dans le Nord de l'Atlantique, mais 1916 montra que la Méditerranée occidentale était une basse d'opérations idéale contre la logistique alliée.

Pendant la grande offensive de 1917, les sous-marins les plus létaux de classe U menacèrent la "route espagnole" qui allait de Gibraltar- Barcelona-Gênes. Les allemands déclarèrent la "guerre à outrance" pour mettre la Triple Entente en déroute avant la mobilisation des États-Unis. Les bateaux coulés ne furent pas coulés simplement fruit des attaques; les navires étaient obligés de naviguer en convoi, en éteignant leurs feux pour ne pas être détectés, ce qui provoqua des accidents comme celui du Cavour près des côtes catalanes.

La guerre sous-marine stimulait aussi le déploiement de l'espionnage dans les ports espagnols par besoin de renseignements sur les navires et les routes des bateaux et pour apprivoiser en carburant et en vivres les sous-marins et leurs équipages. En février 1917, le gouvernement de Romanones régla l'usage des réseaux télégraphique afin d'éviter les communications avec les sous-marins. Beaucoup des espagnols collaborèrent dans des tâches d'espionnage et ravitaillement, y compris des commissaires de polices et des capitaines de ports.

Un cas spécial avec l'implication d'un sous-marin arriva en février de 1916 quand le roi Alfonso suggéra à l'attaché militaire allemand, Ernst von Krohn, de faire venir de l'Allemagne une délégation en sous-marin pour renforcer sa prédisposition neutre. Le sous-marin choisit fut le navire étoile de la flotte de Pola¹⁰ le U-35, commandé par Lothar von Arnault de la Perière, le commandant de sous-marin plus renommé de la flotte allemande avec 194 navires et 453.716 tonnes coulés. L'U-35 entra le 21 juin 1916 dans le port de Cartagena, malgré la surveillance des bateaux alliés, dans le but propagandiste de transmettre les remerciements du Kaiser pour l'accueil des allemands du Cameroun en Guinée espagnole. La presse allemande décrivit le

⁹ Pendant la guerre de 1914-19, les allemands coulèrent plus de 2,5 millions de tonnes marchandes des pays alliés et neutres, dont le 30% dans la Méditerranée. (GARCÍA SANZ, Eduardo 2014).

¹⁰ Pola: ville (croate) et port base des sous-marins allemands dans la Méditerranée.

voyage comme un succès mais les Alliés se plaignirent énergiquement et réclamaient une indemnisation pour la destruction de bateaux alliés¹¹.

Les conséquences de la Guerre Mondiale en Espagne.

Les conséquences économiques et sociales.

En juillet 1914 la bourse de Paris écroula dès la déclaration de guerre de l'Autriche-Hongrie à la Serbie. Certains tentèrent de spéculer avec des actions du chemin de fer, liées à des sociétés françaises et avec l'effrontement des titres français certains ne purent payer le découvert. Soudain tous les flux traditionnels du commerce, des échanges financiers, des migrations furent interrompus. Les pays en guerre expulsèrent des milliers d'espagnols: plus de 42.000 franchirent la frontière en quelques jours. La panique financière qui se produisit quand la guerre éclata "arriva à provoquer un arrêt forcé du travail de 20 ou 25 pour cent, en moyenne de la population ouvrière" consignait en 1915 un inspecteur du travail.¹² Ceux qui détenaient un capital n'osaient pas acheter ou vendre; en quelques jours il semblait que l'argent avait disparu de la circulation.

L'économie mondiale s'inversa. Les grandes puissances européennes détournèrent tous leurs industries vers les besoins du front, mais elles en avaient besoin de plus. Et c'est ainsi que l'économie espagnole prit une excitation fiévreuse et les industriels, financiers et agriculteurs commencèrent à gagner bénéfices impensables jusqu'à alors. L'industrie textile catalane vécut son âge d'or ce qui entraîna une demande de main d'œuvre qui procurera aussi une vague d'immigrés de la campagne vers les grandes villes industrielles. La production agricole tripla presque entre 1913 et 1917. L'extraction de houille fut sur le point de doubler quand il apparut une demande extérieure inexistante jusqu'à alors et que l'intérieure s'accrut avec la suspension des importations de l'Angleterre. L'industrie chimique eut une activité notable mais ne put pas répondre à toutes les demandes malgré tout le travail réalisé. Entre 1914 et 1918, les exportations de fer et d'acier brut doublèrent celles de la période 1910-1913. Le besoin d'approvisionner le belligérants fut que 52 compagnies maritimes furent créées entre 1917 et 1919. Mais tout cela provoqua des effets collatéraux: le prix de l'énergie augmenta, la recherche de sources alternatives et le développement de l'industrie hydroélectrique s'intensifièrent.

Après les premiers moments de panique la banque vécut une expansion inconnue jusqu'à alors: le nombre d'organismes doubla entre 1916 et 1920. Les grands investisseurs internationaux retirèrent leurs capitaux des pays en guerre et l'or et les devises arrivèrent à flots en Espagne: la Banque d'Espagne accrut ses réserves d'or de 720 millions en 1914 à 2,554 milliards en 1921 et devint la quatrième banque centrale

¹¹ Quand la guerre se termina, il y avait attrapés en Espagne 70 navires avec pavillon allemand et 25 austro-hongrois. 79 GARCÍA SANZ, Eduardo 2014.

¹² D'après un rapport de l'Instituto de Reformas Sociales. *Informes de los inspectores del trabajo sobre la influencia de la Guerra Europea en las industrias españolas durante el año de 1915*, Madrid: Minuesa de los Ríos, 1916.

du monde par sa volume de réserves. En plus, la peseta s'apprécia et commença à voyager à l'étranger.

La Grande Guerre apporta un flot de richesse, mais celle-ci ne fut pas répartie de manière égale. La production de produits haut de gamme entra en crise et il en fut ainsi des vins mutés et moelleux ou de la culture d'oranges dont le prix chuta de 10 ou 12 pesetas par millier à 2 pesetas. Le bâtiment se paralysa par l'augmentation de 50 pour cent du prix des poutres en fer qui étaient avant pour la plupart belges ou allemandes. Par ailleurs, certains aliments et d'autres biens vinrent à manquer et les produits de base montèrent en flèche. Même si les salaires augmentèrent le résultat fut que le coût de la vie augmenta de manière démesurée.¹³ Les gouvernements tentèrent de mitiger la tendance en suspendant l'exportation d'aliments ou de charbon mais les mesures proposées ne furent vraiment respectées et la solution finale n'arriva pas.

La combinaison entre l'inflation et la manque de produits intensifia le conflit social. Une vague de protestations commença déjà en 1914 et frappa tout le pays de différentes manières. Les nombres de grévés annuelles passa de 200 en 1913 à environ 400 en 1919. En 1916 les deux grands syndicats convinrent un appel à la grève générale qui eut lieu le 18 décembre avec grand succès ou même les militaires et fonctionnaires organisèrent de comités de défense pour revendiquer la récupération du pouvoir d'achat. Tous ces malaises aboutiront à la grève générale d'août 1917.

La Grande Guerre s'acheva le 11 novembre 1918 et la bulle de l'économie espagnole explosa. Les secteurs qui avaient le plus grandi pendant la guerre connurent une crise de surproduction et, entre 1919 et 1929, plus de 6.000 sociétés furent dissoutes. Le chômage augmenta en particulier dans le textile, la métallurgie et les branches de l'industrie minière comme le charbon.

Mais si on peut parler de crise on ne peut pas assurer la récession parce que d'autres secteurs comme la banque, la chimie et l'électrique consolidèrent leurs positions et impulsèrent le développement économique et l'accumulation de capital. En fait, le PIB réel ne décrut même pas en 1921, l'année la plus difficile.

Les nationalismes.

Le début et la fin de la Grande Guerre conféraient au principe des nationalités une visibilité politique inusitée. Les mouvements nationalistes espagnols prirent bonne note de l'occasion pour leurs revendications, en particulier les catalanistes républicains et radicaux mais pas tous dans le même camp.

La campagne de propagande menée par les catalanistes républicains autour des "volontaires catalans" fut un bon exemple. La proclamation du principe d'autodétermination par les révolutionnaires russes et les "Quatorze Points" du Président Wilson donnèrent aux catalanistes radicaux une certaine légitimité, malgré l'échec de la mise à l'épreuve de l'épisode de la révolte irlandaise de Dublin à Pâques 1916. C'est ainsi que différents secteurs nationalistes, et en particulier les séparatistes – très minoritaires à l'époque – crurent que la guerre était une grande occasion de

¹³ La hausse salariable fut inférieure à l'inflation et les travailleurs perdirent du pouvoir d'achat : entre 1913 et 1918, l'indice de prix s'éleva de 100 à 218 et celui des salaires seulement de 100 à 125.

renverser la monarchie espagnole et de la transformer en une république fédérale ou confédérale espagnole, voire plus, d'une Ibérie qui inclurait Portugal.

La présence proactive des nationalismes politiques espagnols à l'étranger furent finalement bien plus modestes même quand ils devinrent l'objet des désirs des services de renseignements et l'appui des quelques secteurs politiques européens. Des nationalistes vasques et catalans participèrent à la IIIème Conférence des Nationalités et présentèrent un plaidoyer en faveur de l'autonomie de leurs régions.

Malgré les petits succès -ou plus bien les grands échecs-, les nationalismes radicaux prirent un grand essor après la guerre jusqu'à l'instauration de la 2ème République espagnole quand les catalans, les vasques et les gallegos réussirent à obtenir des statuts d'autonomie, largement travaillés et apparemment jamais suffisants.

Les nationalismes radicaux continueront à convoiter la vie politique espagnole d'après-guerre jusqu'à 1939. Les nationalistes catalans déclarèrent l'"état catalan" trois fois pendant le régime républicain espagnol (1931-1939).

L'anarchisme.

L'anarchisme européen a été historiquement minoritaire, excepté en Espagne. L'anarchisme, malgré ce que l'on croit généralement, a fait peu de victimes. Excepté en Espagne pendant la Guerre Civile¹⁴.

L'anarchisme en Espagne est introduit en 1868 de la main de Giuseppe Fanelli, qui venait de la part de Bakounin. Rapidement des groupes anarchistes s'organisèrent en Cataluña et se mêlèrent avec la lutte syndicale. En 1910 la CNT est née même quand son expansion est lente et discontinue et en compétence avec la UGT. En 1927 est créé la FAI.

L'anarchisme espagnol appartient à la branche communautaire qui confie à l'action de masses pour arriver à la révolution. Même quand peu nombreux, l'anarchisme espagnol jouera un rôle politique et syndical de plus en plus important jusqu'à 1939. Il connaît son essor principal entre 1917 et 1921 et après durant la période 1931-37 quand il arriva même à mettre des ministres dans le gouvernement de la République.

La dictature de Primo de Rivera.

Le déclin du système libéral politique en Europe et la naissance des mouvements radicaux – fascisme, nazisme, dictatures- aura sa consécration en Espagne avec le gouvernement du General Primo de Rivera, qui s'empara du pouvoir en 1923, supprimera la constitution et des droits politiques et dont la chute entraînera la monarchie Borbón en bénéfice de la république.

¹⁴ L'anarchisme sera derrière la mort du président français Carnot(1894), l'impératrice Isabel d'Autriche (1898), du roi Umberto d'Italie (1900) et du président américain McKinley (1901). Les anarchistes seront les instigateurs et ou les protagonistes de l'assassinat de trois présidents du Conseil de Ministres (Dato, Canalejas et Maura) mais aussi d'attentats contre les rois et même d'attentats moins sélectives comme une bombe dans le théâtre du Liceo de Barcelona.

Des conséquences militaires. Les événements au Maroc. Alhucemas(1925).

Il va de soi que la Guerre Mondiale attira un grand intérêt dans les armées espagnoles. Immédiatement son déclenchement, les autorités militaires espagnoles envoyèrent des commissions aux divers champs de bataille pour étudier les déroulements des combats et pour en informer¹⁵. Tout ce travail sera versé sur un journal édité par l'État Major intitulé *La Guerra y su preparación*, apparu en 1916. Sur l'aspect doctrinal, les expériences de la grande guerre pour l'Armée espagnole vont se manifester dans un nouveau règlement militaire qui sera publié en 1925: *Reglamento para el empleo táctico de las Grandes Unidades*. La nouvelle doctrine pour l'emploi des unités terrestres espagnoles stimulait une plus moderne utilisation du feu (artilleur) et de la manœuvre, claires conséquences de la guerre mondiale.

Les intérêts français et espagnols étaient mélangés au Maroc depuis les premières années du XX siècle. Pendant la Guerre Mondiale, les allemands essayèrent de déstabiliser le pays avec la contrebande d'armes et le soutien direct et indirect d'espions en soutien de chefs insoumis à la domination française et espagnole¹⁶.

Suite à une rébellion majeure dans la partie marocaine sous contrôle espagnol, les gouvernements espagnol et français se mirent d'accord pour terminer avec l'ambition du chef Abd el Krim; en 1925 un contingent terrestre espagnol, appuyé par des navires français, débarque dans la baie de Alhucemas et fait succomber les rebelles après une âpre lutte. Abd el Krim s'est rendu aux français qui lui déportent dehors le Maroc.

Conclusions. Vers la guerre civile.

La seule chose pratique que l'Espagne entraînera de son effort dans la Guerre Mondiale sera, peut-être, son inclusion dans la nouveau-née Société des Nations. La vie politique espagnole changea définitivement après 1919 par des raisons intérieures mais aussi à cause de la nouvelle situation politique et diplomatique européennes.

Les mouvements émergents en forme d'anarchisme, communisme et même fascistes prirent un grand essor et choqueront avec l'ancien fond politique espagnol jusqu'à le final affrontement : la guerre civile espagnole (1936-39).

Peut-être le prélude d'une autre guerre civile européenne: la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale.

¹⁵ Pour en savoir plus voir Revista de Historia Militar, n° 59 (1985). Seulement rappeler que des missions furent envoyées en Allemagne, en Austro-Hongrie, en France, en Bulgarie et en Portugal. Dans ces commissions seront inclus des personnages bien connus du moment où qui deviendront personnages historiques. Pour en citer, les généraux Berenguer, Burguete et Primo de Rivera; le capitaine médecin Gómez Ulla et Vallejo-Nájera; où même l'aviateur Herrera Linares, qui sera bien connu par son projet pour arriver à Lune.

¹⁶ Sur la guerre d'espions et contrebande au Maroc pendant la période Guerre Mondiale, voir GONZÁLEZ CALLEJA, Eduardo 2014; pages 202-217.

INTERVENTIONS ALLIÉES DURANT LA GUERRE D'INDÉPENDANCE EN LETTONIE 1918-1919

Prof. Dr. Jean-David Avenel (France)

La Lettonie a été au cours des années 1918 et 1919 la proie d'une guerre qui mit en présence les armées soviétique, allemande et lettone appuyée par une escadre conjointe franco-britannique et au terme de laquelle elle obtint ce que les historiens locaux appellent la première indépendance, la seconde datant de 1991 à la suite de la dislocation de l'Union soviétique.

L'objet de cette communication est de décrire le déroulement des opérations militaires qui ont abouti à la signature du traité de paix avec la Russie le 11 avril 1920 (traité de Riga) et avec l'Allemagne le 21 juin de la même année.

Nous présenterons dans un premier temps la situation du pays après la proclamation de l'armistice du 11 novembre 1918 avant de montrer comment l'indépendance fut concrètement obtenue aux dépens de l'Allemagne et de la Russie grâce à l'intervention des puissances alliées.

* * *

Les défaites successives des armées russes face à leurs homologues allemandes en 1914, puis en 1915 et en 1916, avaient placé la Courlande, tout comme la Pologne et ce qui constitue l'actuelle Lituanie, sous le joug des Puissances centrales ; le front s'étendait alors sur plus de 1 200 kms de la Mer noire au golfe de Riga. La Courlande et son principal port, Libau (Liepaja), faisaient partie du *Land des Oberbefehlshabers Ost (Oberost)*, administration militaire qui bénéficiait d'une large autonomie par rapport au gouvernement allemand et gérât son propre budget. Alfred von Gossler était le chef de district de la Courlande. De son côté, le général russe Potapoff, en réponse aux inquiétudes des représentants lettons à la Douma face à une occupation possible de Riga, décida d'autoriser la formation de deux bataillons lettons commandés par des officiers lettons. Ils obtinrent quelques succès militaires, ce qui permit la création d'une armée de volontaires lettons (oukase du 13 juillet 1915).

La révolution de février 1917 qui mit fin au régime impérial encouragea les revendications indépendantistes dans l'ex-empire. En Lettonie, un congrès, constitué dans la partie non occupée par les armées allemandes, demanda au prince Lvov de permettre la création d'une administration spécifique pour le pays. Son successeur, Kerenski, en reconnut l'existence légale et un parlement provincial fut élu le 4 septembre 1917 alors que l'armée allemande investissait Riga et le reste du territoire letton. L'administration allemande instaura deux assemblées locales, où siégeaient les représentants de la noblesse balte d'origine allemande et favorable au rattachement à l'Allemagne, à Riga et à Jelgava.

Les organisations nationalistes lettones constituèrent un Conseil national provisoire à Valka (18 novembre 1917) et proclamèrent l'indépendance. Enfin, l'Union des soviets de Lettonie se réunit à Valmiera en novembre 1917 et forma un gouvernement soviétique que le *Sovnarkom* (gouvernement soviétique russe mis en place par le congrès panrusse des soviets) reconnut en décembre.

Le traité de paix du 3 mars 1918 (traité de Brest- Litovsk) entérina l'occupation par l'Allemagne de la Courlande, de la Livonie et de Riga. L'allemand fut déclaré langue officielle et un Conseil national formé de 34 barons baltes, de 11 lettons et de 13 estoniens fut mis en place : la région devenait un Etat unique rattaché à l'Allemagne. Les députés du Conseil national provisoire émigrèrent à Stockholm mais une opposition clandestine d'installa dans le pays occupé ; elle était composée de démocrates libéraux et de bolcheviks soutenus par leurs homologues russes.

* * *

L'armistice du 11 novembre 1918 rendait caduc le traité de Brest-Litovsk, que l'Entente n'avait au demeurant pas reconnu ; le *Sovnarkom* le dénonça immédiatement. Profitant du retrait allemand et de la faiblesse des institutions locales, l'Armée rouge, en l'occurrence ses XIV^e, XV^e et XVII^e armées, aida les bolcheviks lettons, estoniens et lituaniens à mettre en place des gouvernements amis en décembre 1917 et en janvier 1918.

A cette époque, le général Van der Goltz, qui avait appuyé les armées finlandaises de Mannerheim lors de leur offensive victorieuse contre les bolcheviks finlandais entre mars et mai 1918 et qui se trouvait à Libau, disposa d'une autonomie assez grande par rapport au nouveau gouvernement allemand occupé à lutter contre les communistes de son pays. Elle lui permettait de réaliser son objectif qui était de maintenir la présence allemande dans la région malgré les injonctions des Alliés.

Ces derniers, en effet, y poursuivaient deux objectifs, à savoir y éliminer la présence allemande et interdire l'accès à la mer Baltique à la nouvelle république soviétique. Pour ce faire, l'Entente délégua ses pouvoirs à la Grande-Bretagne pour agir dans la région en novembre 1918 et une escadre fut chargée à la fois d'empêcher la flotte russe de la Baltique (*Baltflot*) de sortir de son port d'attache, Cronstadt, et d'évacuer les troupes allemandes dans l'attente des négociations sur le sort des Pays baltes à la Conférence de la Paix. Clémenceau, qui voulait éviter une trop importante hégémonie britannique dans la région, envoya, dès novembre 1918, une escadre dans le golfe de Riga ; elle était composée de cinq croiseurs et de neuf destroyers accompagnés de cinq autres navires. Des missions militaires interalliées aux effectifs réduits mais efficaces et respectées débarquèrent dans les trois Pays baltes : elles obtinrent la mise en place d'un cessez-le-feu entre les armées estonienne et allemande après la bataille de Cesis (juillet 1919) et obligèrent les soldats allemands à retourner dans leur pays par voie terrestre. Un corps expéditionnaire français occupa Memel, le principal port lituanien.

La situation politique en Lettonie au lendemain du 11 novembre 1918 était donc la suivante :

- le parti social-démocrate des travailleurs lettons et les partis nationalistes rejetaient la domination russe ou allemande quels que soit les régimes politiques en place dans ces pays. Ils voulaient instaurer la République et disposaient d'environ 700 soldats et officiers en majorité allemands et regroupés dans la *Baltische Landeswehr* qui avait été formée peu avant l'armistice de novembre 1918. Carl Ulmanis forma un gouvernement en novembre 1918 et demanda l'aide des Britanniques pour évacuer

les soldats allemands de la VIII^e armée du pays. Les premiers navires mouillèrent à Riga le 18 décembre ;

- le parti bolchévique soutenu par le Sovnarkom dont des membres intégrèrent l'Armée rouge lorsqu'elle envahit le pays en décembre 1918. Composé en majorité d'ouvriers, il œuvrait pour l'instauration d'une République socialiste ;

- les barons baltes et leurs partisans qui souhaitaient le maintien de la domination allemande et de leurs privilèges dans le cadre d'un protectorat allemand. Le commandant de la VIII^e armée, le général von Esdorff leur était favorable ;

- les Russes conservateurs regroupés dans le Conseil russe de l'Ouest et dont l'armée composée d'anciens prisonniers de guerre peu motivés était sous le commandement du comte Pavel Bermond-Avalov, un aventurier sans expérience militaire. Ces "Russes blancs" qui refusaient le démembrement de l'empire s'opposèrent toujours aux autres partis. Les puissances alliées les avaient soutenus après la signature du traité de Brest-Litovsk puisqu'ils s'opposaient à la Russie soviétique devenue à leurs yeux alliée de l'Allemagne. Ils les abandonnèrent progressivement en raison des échecs militaires qu'ils subirent, de leur incapacité à s'unir face aux bolcheviks et de leur refus de reconnaître les nouveaux Etats créés après la révolution de 1917.

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Trotski ordonna en décembre 1918 l'envoi de troupes de la VII^e Armée rouge à Riga qui fut investie le 3 janvier 1919. L'amiral Sinclair, commandant en chef de l'escadre britannique et représentant du Conseil suprême allié, demanda à von Esdorff de déployer ses troupes face à l'Armée rouge pour en empêcher la progression. Ce dernier refusa mais fit revenir en Lettonie des volontaires allemands en leur promettant des terres et les intégra à la *Baltische Landeswehr* ; il en résulta que les soldats lettons se retrouvèrent en minorité. Le général von der Goltz prit le commandement, envoya les soldats du bataillon letton fidèle à Ulmanis et commandé par le major Fletscher sur le front ; les volontaires allemands de la *Eiserne-Brigade* du major Bischoff, l'escadron de volontaires Knesebeck et le 1^{er} régiment de Uhlans de la garde aidés par les 700 hommes de la compagnie russe du comte Lieven assuraient le maintien de l'ordre. La *Landerswehr* était donc un ensemble hétérogène dont les responsables avaient des objectifs divergents : les Lettons se battaient pour l'indépendance du pays, les Russes pour évincer les Bolcheviks et reconquérir l'empire, les Allemands pour conserver la mainmise sur la Lettonie en vue d'en faire une colonie et de restaurer la puissance de leur pays.

Von der Goltz passa à l'offensive à la mi-février et obligea l'Armée rouge mal organisée et mal commandée à abandonner la Courlande et le sud du pays un mois plus tard. Le Conseil suprême allié commença alors à s'inquiéter des progrès allemands et de l'occupation allemande qui promettait d'être durable du fait de l'afflux de volontaires. L'escadre franco-britannique bloqua le port de Mitau interdisant le ravitaillement de von der Goltz. Ce dernier fit en représailles renverser le gouvernement letton légal le 17 avril et confia le nouveau à Needra, pasteur d'origine allemande, le 27.

Le renversement du gouvernement reconnu de Karlis Ulmanis fit que van der Goltz devint l'ennemi numéro un des Alliés ; une escadre comprenant trois destroyers américains, trois destroyers britanniques et quatre avisos français vint mouiller devant Libau pour protéger Ulmanis qui se trouvait à bord du navire letton *Saratov*. Une mission militaire française dirigée par le colonel du Parquet débarqua le 20 mai. Pendant ce temps, van der Goltz lança une nouvelle offensive qui lui permit de reprendre Riga à l'Armée rouge le 22 mai et de dégager la capitale grâce à l'action de 800 soldats lettons de la *Landeswehr*. Les Allemands occupèrent Riga où ils menèrent une politique de répression contre les bolcheviks lettons et exécutèrent plus de 500 civils. Ils poursuivirent leur marche vers le nord du pays et se heurtèrent à l'armée estonienne qui les repoussa et les obligea à se replier à Riga le long du fleuve Dvina. L'armistice signé le 3 juillet précisait que les missions alliées assureraient l'administration de Riga où s'établit Ulmanis et son gouvernement après l'arrestation de Needra.

Le conflit prit alors un caractère antiallemand ; von der Goltz, qui ne respectait pas les conventions signées avec les Alliés remplaça les soldats de la VIII^e armée peu motivés par des volontaires venus d'Allemagne et attirés par les promesses de terres. Il y en eut plus de 23 000 en juillet 1919 dont 12 000 se trouvaient à Mitau avec l'artillerie allemande, environ 36 canons légers et dix canons lourds.

Le colonel britannique prit le commandement de la *Landerswehr* et commença à l'épurer des éléments allemands pour en faire une véritable armée lettone en juillet. De son côté, le gouvernement Ulmanis forma une armée lettone avec les prisonniers revenus dans leur pays tout en continuant à s'appuyer sur les éléments lettons de la *Landerswehr* du fait de la lenteur des rapatriements. Elle fut équipée d'armes britanniques qui arrivèrent en septembre.

Le navire français *Aisne* et un destroyer britannique mouillèrent devant Riga le 12 juillet pour protéger le gouvernement Ulmanis tandis que les missions militaires commençaient à négocier le retrait des 80 000 soldats allemands en octobre. La lutte contre l'Armée rouge dont les effectifs s'élevaient à moins de 10 000 hommes passait au second plan et ce d'autant plus que le *Sovnarkom* proposa d'entamer des négociations de paix. Les Alliés obligèrent le gouvernement allemand de retirer le commandement de ses troupes à van der Goltz ; fut remplacé par Bermond-Avalov dont les troupes furent intégrés aux éléments allemands de la *Landerswehr* pour constituer l'armée des volontaires de l'Ouest dont l'état-major se trouvait à Mitau. Elle fut divisée en deux corps. De leur côté, les forces lettones de l'ex-*Landerswehr* furent regroupées en trois divisions.

Devant cette nouvelle situation qui aurait pu permettre à l'Allemagne de retrouver son influence dans la région, les Alliés décidèrent d'intervenir militairement : la division navale britannique de la Baltique sous les ordres de l'amiral Cowan, qui comprenait huit navires, et son homologue française sous les ordres du capitaine de vaisseau Brisson, qui en comprenait six, se regroupèrent au large de Riga.

Bermond-Avalov lança son offensive sur Riga depuis Mitau le 8 octobre et ses troupes atteignirent le sud de Riga le 10 malgré la résistance des soldats lettons du colonel Alexander. Il ordonna le bombardement de la capitale malgré l'ultimatum

envoyé par Cowan et menaça de prendre à revers les soldats lettons en traversant le fleuve Dvina. L'ultimatum ayant expiré le 15 octobre à 13h15, les navires britanniques et français placés sous le commandement de Brisson, Cowan se trouvant dans le golfe de Finlande, pénétrèrent dans la Dvina et pilonnèrent les positions de Bermondt-Avalov dont les canons tiraient plus de cent obus par jour sur Riga. Les Britanniques eurent neuf morts et six blessés au terme des combats qui se terminèrent le 3 novembre à la suite du débarquement de deux compagnies de soldats lettons appuyés par le *HMS Dragon* à Jurmala. Malgré une forte résistance des soldats allemands de l'armée russe de l'Ouest, les soldats lettons réoccupèrent le territoire aux mains de cette dernière et arrêterent leur progression à la frontière avec la Lituanie le 30 novembre. L'armée russe de l'Ouest fut dissoute, les soldats allemands rentrèrent dans leur pays et les 5 000 soldats russes furent internés.

Le traité de paix avec la Russie fut signé le 11 avril 1920 à Riga et ratifié le 3 septembre. La définition de la frontière avec l'Estonie fut réglée par le traité du 19 octobre 1920, celle avec la Lituanie le 27 septembre. L'établissement des relations diplomatiques avec l'Allemagne date du 21 juin.

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RADICALIZATION AMONG DANISH WAR VETERANS OF THE BALTIC INDEPENDENCE WARS IN 1919

Prof. Dr. Mikkel Kirkebaek (Denmark)

In June 1919 the Versailles treaty was signed, marking the end of World War I. But not everywhere in Europe the fighting stopped. In the Baltic countries, the so-called independence wars continued, in an effort to secure national independence for the Baltic people. Involved in this heavy fighting were a number of foreign volunteers, including a Danish corps of 200 volunteer soldiers, who returned home to Denmark in the autumn of 1919. In doing so, the Danish volunteers joined the millions of men who returned from the frontlines in 1918-1919, to be re-integrated in civil society.

The majority of soldiers in the World War and the conflicts derived from it did not want to return to the battlefield or the line of fire. However, there was a group of veterans who chose to carry militarism with them into the political system after the war. In Germany alone, between 250,000 and 400,000 individuals became organized in some 120 violence-prone Freikorps – and they gained great significance. Several historians, including renowned German-American historian George L. Mosse, have put forward the so-called “brutalization thesis”. According to Mosse, the appearance of the many European extreme-right movements could be explained by the brutalization that had taken place during the war.

But it is often difficult to draw a direct line between war and subsequent political and paramilitary radicalization. Nevertheless, it is possible to point to some interesting patterns. Using the Danish corps as a case study, this paper examines which radicalization tendencies could be traced among the Danish volunteers after their return from the wars in the Baltic.

The questions which this paper attempts to answer are:

- Which radicalization tendencies can be traced among the volunteers?
- Was there a connection between war participation and the ideological and militant radicalization?
- How did the veterans legitimize the need for militant methods and anti-democratic changes?

Based on the Danish case studies, the question of radicalization is put into a broader perspective by comparing it to veteran movements from other participants in the Baltic independence wars: Estonia, Latvia, Finland and Germany.

About the Danish corps ...

But let us start at the beginning. Why were there Danish volunteers in the Baltic independence wars? And who were the Danish volunteers?

Early in the morning on March 26th, 1919, a Danish military force of 200 men boarded the Finnish steamer ”Merkur” (Mercury), which was anchored in Copenhagen harbour. Shortly after, it set its course for the inner Baltic Sea. The name of the unit was the “Danish Baltic Auxiliary Corps”, and the destination was the former Czarist Russia, where a savage civil war had been raging since the revolution in 1917. It was the goal of the corps to help the self-proclaimed new states Estonia and Latvia in

their military struggle for national independence. But its unofficial goal was to curb the spread of Bolshevism before it could reach Denmark – the organizers of the corps wanted to defend Denmark against Bolshevism on foreign soil, so to speak.

The Danish corps was organized as a private army, financed and deployed by a group of Danish nationalists and anti-Bolshevists, including several prominent Danish businessmen. More than 2000 Danes had been joined the corps, but financial issues meant that only 200 men ended up going to Estonia. All the soldiers were volunteers, and the group was far from homogenous. But most of the troops were poor workers from Copenhagen, who saw military service as a way of making a living. More than half of the corps had no military training at all, and hardly any had any combat experience. So the bulk of the troops were not motivated by ideology.

Even though the deployment did not happen in any official Danish capacity, it was accepted unofficially by the Danish government, which turned a blind eye to the illegal recruiting. The Danish force was equipped with modern weapons, and carried considerable firepower. The corps participated in three military campaigns in Estonia, Latvia and Russia in 1919. The fighting was exceptionally savage, and left permanent scars with the soldiers.

What did the Danes experience on the frontlines in the Baltic?

Denmark had not participated in World War 1, so the Danish volunteers came to the Baltic without any combat experience. To begin with, they were stationed with the Finnish volunteers in Tallinn. The Finnish volunteers had arrived to Estonia earlier than the Danes, and most of them were veterans from the Finnish civil war in 1918. In the eyes of the Danes, the behaviour of the Finns in Tallinn was very violent. The Danes witnessed the Finnish volunteers shooting in the barracks, fighting among themselves and killing a civilian person. When the Danes got to the front, the situation was no less brutal. Together with Estonian, Latvian and Russian white forces, the Danes experienced the savage warfare which included shooting down prisoners of war, public hangings and violence against civilian ideological opponents. In terms of radicalization, it is interesting to observe in the letters of the volunteers how the Danes react to the events in the Baltic with initial surprise and rejection, but quickly adapt to the norms of the battlefield. For example, the Danish volunteers execute a boy whom they suspect of passing information to the Bolsheviks, and they participate in physical punishment of prisoners. Obviously, executing “spies” and beating prisoners was not part the Danish volunteers’ training from home. So it is clear that the six months the corps spent fighting in the independence war had brutalized them. The question is, of course, whether the brutalization and the violent events would affect the political lives and activities of the volunteers after returning home? In other words:

Is there a link between the war participation and paramilitary, radical and violence-prone “Freikorps” which emerged in Denmark and Europe in the 1920s?

The question is extremely difficult the answer. If we turn from the Danish volunteers for a moment and view the question in a broader perspective to include the World War of 1914-1918, it can be established that the majority of the soldiers who

fought in World War I returned to civilian lives after the war, and most of them did not want to return to the battlefield or the line of fire. However, there was a group of veterans who chose to continue their militarism in the political systems after the war.

Several historians – including the prominent German/American historian George L. Mosse – have presented so-called “brutalization theses”. According to Mosse, the many radical-right movements which emerged in Europe after World War 1 can be explained by the brutalization which took place during the war in 1914-1918. It is difficult, however, to draw a direct line between war and subsequent political and paramilitary radicalization. Germany, for example, experienced a surge in paramilitary activities after the World War, whereas Great Britain did not. Finland was not part of the World War and its atrocities, and yet the following civil war in Finland in 1918 was conducted with an unprecedented brutality and with extensive use of terrorism. Similarly, the ferocious fighting in the Baltic in 1918-1920 was followed by a period of peace and democracy in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. So, the patterns are ambiguous.

Commenting on Mosse’s brutalization thesis, the German professor of history Robert Gerwarth argues that it was not the World War, but the years immediately *after* the war that led to radicalization. This was especially visible in border areas – the so-called “shatter zones”. The Paris conference had not yet determined the borders in Europe, so these areas became battlegrounds for many extremely violent paramilitary activities, which were often directed at “unwanted” civilians, without any government control, and with many clashes (in terms of ethnicity and ideology) which had not been widespread during the World War. This ethnic and ideological cleansing of opponents, looting and abusive behaviour had a radicalizing effect. So it was not the hard but “well-regulated” fighting during the World War that radicalized, but rather the irregular ethnic and ideological warfare in border areas that had a radicalizing effect. Here, the wars in the Baltic states may serve as an example. The brutalization was particularly evident when looking at the Bolsheviks, who applied their experience from the red terror of the civil war as a model for exercising power in the Soviet. So Mosse and Gerwart represent two different explanations to the rise in paramilitary activities in the time after World War 1.

Regardless of how much value is ascribed to the various brutalization theses, the independence wars in the Baltic arguably did not leave its participants unaffected. The Danish participants, at any rate, were not.

The Danish volunteers and post-war paramilitary activities.

Directing our attention back to the Danish volunteers in the Baltic independence wars, the tendency is quite clear: In Denmark, the Baltic volunteers came to form the core and vanguard of a number of radical-right movements in the 1920s. So there is a clear link between war participation and subsequent paramilitary activity in the case of the Danish volunteers. To many Danish volunteers, then, participation in the Baltic independence wars became a starting point for a militant political activism upon returning home to Denmark. In that respect, it is worth reminding ourselves that many of the volunteers had left Denmark without any military background or

training. Nevertheless, a very large number of Danish veterans took part in various paramilitary activities and organizations in the years after the war. That was hardly surprising. The volunteers did not exactly return empty-handed from the fighting in the border areas. One of the volunteers explained in a newspaper article shortly after returning home that all manners of political opinion had been present in the corps, but concluded: "... but we were all in agreement on one thing when we went home: Bolshevism is not only a mistake, but a cancerous tumour to civilization and culture". So an ideological hatred towards Bolshevism had been stirred in the Baltic, but also the will to fight the Bolshevik ideology. But many volunteers had their doubts that democratic society possessed the necessary willpower and stamina to withstand and defeat the spread of this lethal "disease", the consequences of which they had already experienced first-hand in the Baltic. Many of the Danish volunteers, who had fought in Estonia and Lithuania to help fulfil the Balts' burning desire for democracy, did not actually want it themselves when they returned home. In fact, many volunteers ended up fighting for their native country to be led in anti-democratic and anti-parliamentary ways. The returning veterans were battle-hardened in ways they had not been when they left the country – and they were conscious of it. A volunteer noted the following halfway through the campaign: "When we return home, we shall easily strike anyone who slander us to the ground". It was not the Danish corps which promoted these militant tendencies. It was the Russian revolution and the fear of Bolshevism. But the Danish volunteer corps and the wars in the Baltic intensified the armed anti-Bolshevism and provided the volunteers with access to the military and violent experiences which they carried with them into the political and paramilitary struggle in their home country. The fight against Bolshevism did not end just because they left the frontlines. It was not a political power struggle, like World War 1 had been, but rather an ideological war which knew no borders, and which could, and should, therefore be waged at home as well. In Denmark, the veterans from the Baltic took leading roles in establishing armed anti-Bolshevik paramilitary corps such as *Nationalkorpset* ("The National Corps") who marched through the streets of Copenhagen wearing combat uniforms, trained for military combat and sought to establish hidden arms reserves.

The ability of Bolshevism to topple and take over the mighty Russian empire had shaken the foundations of European political order. To the Danish volunteers, the success of the Socialist Democratic Party - culminating with its election victory in 1924 – was seen as tangible proof that socialism and Bolshevism was gaining a foothold in Denmark. Perceived in the same way was an attempted communist coup in Tallinn the same year. So in this way, a fear of the spread of Bolshevism legitimized a militant and radical move to the right as the only way of self defense. Here, the Danish volunteers became parts of a larger pattern in which German, Finnish and Swedish volunteers, returning from wars in the border states in 1918-1920, let militant anti-communism unite with anti-parliamentary tendencies.

Of course, the move to the right was also a tendency of the time, in which authoritarian regimes emerged from north to south in Europe in the years after the World War. But there was also a more specific anti-parliamentary movement

emerging directly from the veteran circles in the countries that had taken part in the independence wars in the Baltic. This was the case in for example Germany, Finland, the Baltic countries and Russian white emigrant circles.

Veteran organizations from the independence wars came to play a political role in the 1920s in Finland and the Baltic countries, among others. The German volunteers who had fought in the Baltic were equally quick to gain attention in their home country. The German Weimar government and others looked with concern upon the returned “Freikorps” veterans, who were often disillusioned and battle-hardened. These corps constituted a large and powerful military force, posing a potential political and military threat to the Weimar government, which was weakened and faced with challenges. Many of the German volunteers were severely hardened and radicalized by the ruthless fighting in the Baltic. The “Freikorps”-movements, which were very visible throughout the 1920s and 1930s, as well as other militant and political right-wing nationalist “resurrection-movements”, were drawing heavily on the political and military experience of the so-called “Baltikumers”, when the wish for German resurrection was being organized and carried out. And many Freikorps-volunteers found their way to the nazi movement in Germany during the 1930s. The basic elements of nazism was already present in the volunteer fighters from the Baltic: Militarism, anti-semitism, anti-communism, a willingness to employ violence and “drang nach osten”.

Many Danish veterans from the counter-revolutionary wars in 1919-1920 also found themselves in nazi circles, and several of them gained posts in the top leadership of the Danish nazi party. This is hardly a surprise. In an account of the political struggles in his life, one Danish volunteer wrote: “This is an account of my entire participation in the fight against International Communism in the years 1919 to 1945.” The inclusion of the volunteer’s own activism is interesting. The volunteer describes one coherent period of time, ranging from the time in Estonia in 1919 until his imprisonment when he was a prominent leader of the Danish nazi party in 1945. The wars in 1919-1920 and 1940-1945 were not separate events in the mind of the volunteer, but rather a coherent whole where the events of 1919 formed the beginning of a chain of related events, all circling the same: The militant and ideological battle against Bolshevism.

Conclusion

This paper argues that war participation gave the Danish volunteers access to militant and violent experiences which they brought with them into the political struggle in their native country. So, in Denmark the Danish volunteers from the Baltic came to form the core and vanguard in a long row of far-right and anti-democratic movements in the 1920s. To many volunteers, the war in the Baltic was not an ending, but rather a beginning of a long-term anti-democratic and paramilitary career. From a democratic point of view, the volunteers became one of the Unsettled Problems after 1919.

WAR THEORY IN EUROPE AT THE END OF THE GREAT WAR

Col. José Romero Serrano (Spain)

1. Introduction

When the war ended in 1918, cites Michael Howard, the territories east of the Rhine River were in turmoil. Germany was going to cede strategic provinces to its neighbours; Austro-Hungary to decompose along the lines of its 25 nationalities; Russia continued the fighting in the form of a civil war sustained by foreign contingents; Turkey broke down as an Empire into protectorates and new countries; Poland re-constituted itself; the Balkans redefined, Italy widened; the situation was quite unsettled. However, seen in perspective, geopolitical chaos found accommodation, at least temporarily in light of Wilson's Fourteen Points, the Peace of Versailles (1919) and subsequent treaties.

The outcome of the Great War led all the European military schools (world-wide too) to reconsider the way in which *war* had been transformed, to ask themselves which strategies were the most suitable, and which procedures would prevail in tactics. In one word, to figure out how future wars were going to be fought.

This essay elaborates on the three levels of the conduct of war. Most countries in the world looked at the thoughts of the most famous strategists and military commanders. Among them, and not by chance, we cite Ludendorff, Svechin, Liddell Hart, and Foch; that is, a German, a Russian, an English and a French.

Theories developed by the most notable military thinkers became doctrine in the European armies. We bring here their main findings.

In the field of warfare, the immediate reflection came from General Ludendorff by means of "My Memories of War" (1920) and "The Total War" (1935). But he does not stop at the concept of total war (linked to the people-military cohesion and economy), he also explores the strategy, military organization and tactics, the three levels in which he, as a commander, participated.

At the next level, strategy, we meet the renowned military chronicler Liddell Hart. His book "The Strategy of Indirect Approach" (1929), opposed to the frontal and direct confrontation, was considered in most military circles.

Aleksandr A. Svechin had to combine the reality of a huge country, the eternal Russia, with a revolutionary model which imposed offensive premises on strategy. Among his works we highlight "Strategy" (1926).

The third level is represented by a professor of applied tactics, Marshal Foch, who offers the key to victory in his books: "The Conduct of War" and "The Principles of War", written about 1904, but revised and expanded on later editions.

Finally, we must not forget that these studies of "European war" overlapped with those that many European powers developed in "small or colonial wars", especially France and England, but also Italy and Spain. We also acknowledge the land-focused orientation of this essay.

The thesis of this essay is while War and Tactics were similarly understood, Strategy was seen differently by the four writers.

2. Erick von Ludendorff (1865-1937): War and Victory

Total War

The adjective *total* in war tends to be understood correctly: everything intervenes and everything is affected by the phenomenon of war, nothing escapes from its influence. In a certain sense it is opposed to *limited war* that was commonplace in the 18th century and where the objective, the space, the duration and the intensity were graduated.

A definition is given by the author when he says:

“Total war, which embraces all fields of life, requires the action of a leader who is decisive in all domains and whose will and presence are the only authority¹”.

Even in the very organization of his book he infers part of its meaning: Chapter one begins with the “character” of and the last one closes with “the general in chief”. The essence of the first is its popular character, the participation in war of the population as a whole; the second refers to the “man who leads the total war for the preservation of the life of his people²”.

It is interesting to observe this sense of conservation and defence, that he repeats several times: the objective of war is “the salvation of the popular community and the racial soul of the people”, stressing that “politics must be subordinated to the interests of war³”.

In another section he adds a nuance:

“War and politics serve the preservation of the people, but war remains the supreme expression of racial will. [...] Politics will stay docile to the service of war, for both have but one end: the preservation of the people⁴”.

There is no doubt that a totalizing factor is the unity of people and army, becoming one and the same thing:

“The army has its roots in the people, from which is an integral part; in total warfare, the army will measure the physical, economic and psychic forces of the people⁵”. This “soul cohesion” ultimately “decides this struggle for life”.

He repeats it later: “[It is] in the popular community (*volk*), where the centre of gravity of total war falls⁶”.

Nevertheless, the observance of Ludendorff goes even further, it is mystical. The politics, the people and the direction of the war are based on: “the formation of community life according to the racial knowledge of God⁷”.

Ludendorff, along with his second wife Matilde, believed in an esoteric Germanic meaning of God:

“The German knowledge of God which safeguards the character of the Germanic

¹ *La Guerra Total*, Ed Pleamar, Buenos Aires (ARG), 1964, p.154

² *Ibid*, p.153

³ *Ibid*, p.165

⁴ *Ibid*, p.22

⁵ *Ibid*, p.23

⁶ *Ibid*, p.46

⁷ *Ibid*, p.43

experience of God and affirms the psychic cohesion of our people, tries, like every religious experience, to achieve the preservation of the people and also [...] of the discipline of man for the instruction of the army...⁸”.

In short, the soul cohesion of the people, as we have said, is the basis for total war and directly related to the racial background and the aforementioned religious belief.

These thoughts appear in other pieces of his works. In “My memories of war” they are already written in a straight way:

“In addition to the struggle against the armed forces of the enemy, the other struggle against the spirit and vital force of the enemy population was unfolded”.

The author goes, as expected, into the German tradition. It begins with Frederick the Great (18th century) and his determination to lead the war; Clausewitz and his idea of *absolute war*, close as it is to total war; Moltke the Elder, for being inspirational for the offensive and decisive battles; Schlieffen, master of operational strategy (envelopment) and the detailed study of war.

If we have talked of war, it is inevitable to speak of peace; for Ludendorff a peace of victory.

“The great and supreme goal of peace could only be achieved by vigorous warfare¹⁰”.

However, his fears about the outcome of the war and the incoming revolution within Germany change his mood:

“The idea of coming to peace was, at last, stronger than the will to fight for victory¹¹”.

It was in the spring of 1915, when attempts to reach an agreement or armistice between the parties began. For the author, however, any peace could only materialize the gains on the battlefield, and these were translated in the west into the occupation of Belgium (a kind of protectorate) and 10 rich provinces of northern France, and in the east to reach the imaginary line that goes from Riga to the mouth of the Danube. These limits came close to the German aspiration of the *Mittleeuropa*, the German interior space between France and Russia.

In short, as he himself said: “the palm of peace is not a weapon against the sword¹²”.

Strategy

Based on Clausewitz himself, the first duty of the strategy of total war is to annihilate the enemy.

The problem of the Germans remained the same as in the eighteenth century, fighting on two fronts, maintaining two armies, where the transfer of forces between them was complicated. Its only advantage was its central position.

⁸ Ibid, p.38

⁹ *Mis recuerdos de guerra*; Trad Manuel Montoliu; Industrias Gráficas Seix y Barral Herms, S.A., Barcelona, 1920, p.14

¹⁰ Ibid, p.16

¹¹ Ibid, p.17

¹² Ibid, p.16

Ludendorff already knew of the possibilities of nations in arms to extend war to unwanted limits. The Franco-Prussian war (1870-71) had detected it already; people in arms offering an “extreme resistance” could undermine the effectiveness of an occupying army. Therefore, the first duty of the armies was to conduct offensive actions to defeat the enemy armies and to convene an advantageous peace. Germany, like all other nations, wanted to do so.

The way Moltke and Schlieffen had taught to win in battle consisted in enveloping the enemy forces and forcing them to surrender. Frederick the Great had already done so at the battle of Leuthen, at tactical level. Moltke (the younger) tried it in August 1914 at the operational level. He was close to success, but he was stopped at the Marne River.

Ludendorff tried also to perform another great operational manoeuvre in 1918, with 200 divisions, playing the last attempt for victory, with the well-known outcome. In fact, it was 8 August 1918 when a modern allied counteroffensive with battle tanks and aviation caused serious losses to the Germans breaking their morale. He claimed it as “the black day of the German army”.

Tactics

Ludendorff is a tactical-minded man, as he demonstrated in Tannenberg (1914), *the perfect battle*. He says: “the outcome of the battles decides the outcome of the war. The battle is the most important action of the war¹³”.

Perhaps, for this reason, he wanted to drive the five spring offensives in 1918 as the succession of five tactical battles. In short, it is the breakthrough and envelopment in large spaces that culminate in successive tactical confrontations to defeat and persecute him, transforming enemy’s retreat into absolute defeat.

In his opinion, the war of trenches is “a deformation of the very principle of the war”, although the fortification of borders is an element of capital importance.

Another notable concern is to include air and naval forces into his works; Once air superiority has been achieved, there is a clear vocation to support land troops. Once victory has been achieved, the objective of the aviation will become the enemy territory.

A tactical corollary is the observance of the principles of war. The author explains some of them in different paragraphs as the will to win, the initiative, and the speed of execution¹⁴.

The conduct of war, organization and economy at war.

For the author, the ultimate responsibility of a commander-in-chief is the conduct of war:

“The war that faithful Marshal von Hindenburg and I had to lead since we took over the supreme command of the Army (29 August 1916) [...]”¹⁵

¹³ *La Guerra Total*, p.99

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p.142

¹⁵ *Mis recuerdos*, p.13

And it openly criticizes the interference of the political level in the conduct of operations. The General Staff, as we know, formed an executive chain of command parallel to the aristocratic line.

In the realm of military organization, the importance of the Division-type unit as a “strategic unit of the army” stands out. This in turn is grouped into army corps, army and army groups. Mobilization provides the complementary troops to complete them. These groupings will be oriented towards their intended areas of employment.

Finally, the war economy is a novel factor that previous authors had neglected. Now, all the energies and resources of the nation are oriented towards war to nourish the units and the population, and the author is able to quantify it.

In short, we retain from Ludendorff that phrase of the beginning: War and Victory; the total war needs the direction of a single chief and only one desired outcome: victory.

3. Aleksandr Svechin (1878-1938): annihilation and attrition.

W. Pintner¹⁶ comments that since the victory in Poltava (1709) over the Swedes, Russia has been a great power and from then on it has developed a genuine “Russian school of the art of war”. Suvorov and Kutusov (18th and 19th centuries) have been its precursors, although the Crimean War was a break for its continuity. D. Milutyn led the military reforms in the last quarter of the nineteenth century although Russian social decline was reflected in the military defeats against Japan (1905) and the Germans and Austrians (1917).

In the interwar period, Russian military thinking led by Funze, Svechin and Tujachevski re-emerged, but under a new strategic reality: The Russian Revolution. Curiously enough, Russia continued to look, as from the 19th century onwards, towards its western colleagues to find the foundations of the art of war.

Svechin himself, a Russian officer who joined the Bolshevik side, whom they called “the Russian Clausewitz”, aligns himself with the Prussian officer when he defines war as a social phenomenon, and stresses the impossibility of reducing war theory to eternal truths and universal principles of military application. The task of a military theorist was not to prescribe, but to “instill habits for clear thinking¹⁷”. Here, Svechin positions himself clearly towards the principles of war. He is convinced of the validity of military history to stimulate and develop a criterion but not to memorize principles valid for all circumstances.

War, Strategy and Tactics at the age of Revolution

Svechin brings together his reflections in “Strategy” and “History of Military Art”, both written in the 1920s. Of course, our interest is to know how he interprets the concepts of war, strategy and tactics, upon the Great War’s tenets, but here we insist to add a determining factor: The Russian Revolution and subsequent civil war.

¹⁶ P. Paret and others, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Princeton, 2001, p.354

¹⁷ David R. Stone, *Misreading Svechin*, The Journal of Military History n.76 (Jul 2012), p.685

Particularly, in my previous studies, I put it this way:

“The Russian Revolution incorporated a new political and revolutionary component into the strategic context [...] The civil and revolutionary war had provided a totalitarian and offensive imperative that only a few, Svechin and Trotsky himself, dared to debate, arguing that the war of attrition provided more alternatives and was better identified with the Russian popular and economic base than the war of destruction; that the offensive and the defensive were only forms of manoeuvre that play in combination, and priority must stick with initiative and the aggressive spirit; and that in any case, each war is different and entails its own logic and not the rigid application of a single model -in the line of Moltke-. Stalin settled the controversy by sending Svechin to the gulag (1931) and Trotsky to exile¹⁸”.

The question was that, according to the Marxist view and Engels’ own idea, the revolution should provide its own style of war, and this could not be far from the offensive and the war of destruction.

But for Svechin it was not a matter of choosing or dictating that the war of attrition was superior to that of annihilation or destruction, or that the offensive was superior to the defensive, but rather that both were distinct approaches to military operations.

Stone extracts the following reflection from the book “Strategy”: “Military actions can take various forms: destruction and attrition, defense and attack, maneuvering or positional warfare¹⁹” and it is the political leader who, in consultation with military strategists, must prioritize those actions.

In its analysis, the destruction is simpler, it brings to the field of operations the questions of strategy: annihilate the enemy’s forces in a single blow, making the strategy something superfluous. However, attrition implies a subtle game of successive limited hits making the enemy play his options, using more time, more space, using a more complex strategy. We use this strategy when we cannot end the war directly, and precisely the characteristics of modern warfare (feeding of the battle, the operational pauses and the enormous resources made available to the combatants) make almost impossible to think of the first model. Besides, certainly, geography, climate, even Russia’s own style of waging war, advise for this second model, which is not opposed to the Marxist vision of war, according to him.

Svechin also understood the offensive and the defensive as “a dialectical unity”. He was an evolutionist, let’s say, a Delbruck reader, who thought that, in questions of war, there were no constants and that everything was in permanent change.

Svechin and the Great War

Svechin was one of the authors who most successfully explored the definition of operational art as the intermediate level between tactics and strategy, although he did not pay much attention to the mobility at war that others, like Tujachevski, did.

Svechin devoted a study to the great Brusilov offensive of May-June 1916 on

¹⁸ José Romero, *Las Jornadas del Coronel*, Universo de las Letras, Sevilla, 2018, p.224

¹⁹ Stone, *Misreading*, p.628

the south-western front. This successful offensive, on a broad front and launched simultaneously on several points, was carried out by four armies (8, 11, 7 and 9, from north to south) and managed to penetrate deeply into the Austrian front, very close to Lvov (objective).

However, in Svechin's opinion, despite undoubted tactical success, Brusilov was unable to transfer it into the strategic (or operational) field, as he separated the army carrying the main effort (the 8th) from its deep target and distracted forces into secondary actions on its flanks.

This study suggests the character of Svechin, not dogmatic, capable of supporting both a strategy of attrition and destruction, as might have been the case with this offensive which could ultimately have taken Austria out of the war.

4. Sir Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970): the strategy of indirect approach.

Liddell Hart served as a young officer in the Great War, as part of the British Expeditionary Force. He was wounded twice. He quickly stood out as a thoughtful man on military matters, an avid reader of military history and a refined writer on the great commanders in war.

Interestingly, L. Hart is not an author who delves into the subject of war as a concept. It seems as if it were inherited, as a phenomenon that has already been studied from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz and Moltke, and did not need any further interpretations. He accepts the obvious reality presented to him: war as instrumental to sort disputes out at the international arena.

Strategy

His best-known work is "Strategy: The Indirect Approach" (1929), published by Spanish Defence Publications in 1989 based on later editions by the author (which covers the Second World War). The book resembles to a text on military history (from the classical world to the end of WW II) with a final theoretical part on strategy.

His thesis is simple and straight. According to his own analysis and after examining 30 conflicts and 280 campaigns, only 6 of the latter were decisive according to a "direct approach", in the hands of Alexander, Napoleon and Moltke.

"The indirect approach is by far the most promising and economic form of strategy²⁰".

L. Hart believes on the value of history as a teaching for war, as a "practical experience". After a thorough analysis he comes to think that "through the ages, effective results in war have seldom been achieved unless the approach has been so indirect as to ensure the opponent's unpreparedness to face it. This indirect character has most of the times been revealed in the physical, and always in the psychological sphere. In strategy, the path that takes the most turns is usually the shortest²¹".

He precisely states:

²⁰ L. Hart, *Estrategia de Aproximación Indirecta*, PD, Madrid, 1986, p.151

²¹ Ibid, p.31

“In most campaigns the dislocation of the psychological and physical equilibrium of the enemy has been a vital prelude to success in the attempt to overcome it²²”.

We pick up his idea of direct and indirect approach, which implies for the former the confrontation of the strong to the strong, in a bet that seeks decisive results in a single blow, while the latter seeks to dislocate the enemy in secondary fronts, against the weak points, through limited and successive actions.

The Theory of Strategy is based on an acute observation on two differentiated levels: general or superior strategy and military strategy.

The first relates it to “politics in action” and its function is “to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or a group of nations, towards the achievement of the political objective of the war²³”.

When he speaks of resources (“all”) he refers to economic, military and moral resources, so it is understood that he speaks to us of a concept close to total war.

Pure or military strategy places it in the “art of the general”, but while “the horizon of the former (military) ends with war, the general strategy goes further, to the peace that follows war²⁴”.

The differentiation of levels is important, he quotes, because when the same sovereign exercises both this factor is not important (Frederick the Great, Napoleon), but when they are separated, which is normal, the division is the way to limit military power. For this reason, he agrees with Moltke on the idea of (military) strategy:

“The practical adaptation of the means made available to a general to achieve the intended objective”.

Although he nuances it in his own words:

“The art of distributing and applying military means to achieve political purposes²⁵”

And it clarifies the relationship and hierarchy of the two levels, which Ludendorff would undoubtedly criticize:

“The government, which formulates war policy and has to adapt it to conditions that often change in the course of war, can rightly intervene in the strategy of a campaign, not only substituting a command on whom it has lost confidence, but also modifying its objective according to the needs of its war policy”.

And this is where he advises adopting a limited objective strategy as an alternative, “wearing down the enemy’s forces, stinging them to weaken rather than engaging in risky blows²⁶”.

Between Tactics and Strategy

Part of the study of strategy and tactics is linked to the Principles of War, “a few truths that seem to be so universal and so fundamental that they can be qualified as axioms”.

²² Ibid, p.31

²³ Ibid, p.309

²⁴ Ibid, p.310

²⁵ Ibid, p.309

²⁶ Ibid, p.308-09

In his vision, “the principles of war, not just one principle, can be summed up in one word: concentration [...] True concentration is the result of calculated dispersion²⁷”.

Own dispersion will force the dispersion of the enemy to cover all fronts which allow us to concentrate in the weakness we have identified; This sequence is fundamental in the thought of L. Hart. The author identifies eight principles, six positive and two negative, which are “applicable both to tactics and strategy” in general.

At this point we must review the concept of tactics; Liddell Hart defines it this way:

“When the application of the military instrument leads to real struggle, the preparations for the struggle and the control of direct measures are called tactics²⁸”.

Observations on the Great War

L. Hart dedicates a chapter to the strategy of the WW I. For our interest, related to this section, he analyses the latest German offensive that we already know:

“The German plan was distinguished by a more thorough and ambitious search for tactical surprise than in any previous operation [...] Ludendorff had not grasped the importance of the tank and had not developed it in time. But, in addition, the infantry was trained with new infiltration tactics, whose guiding idea was that head troops should explore and penetrate the weak points of defense, while reserve troops were there to support success, not to fix failure”.

The author believes that Ludendorff is convinced that “tactics have to be analysed before mere strategic objectives, which it is useless to pursue them unless tactical success is possible”. This idea is paramount and corresponds to what we have already seen from the German general. He will only pursue as much as tactics allow, but there is an element of contradiction here. The infiltration tactic seeks by definition the line of least resistance, what Hart called “the torrent of expansion”. This new approach to tactics should also have an indirect approach to strategy, but this was not the case and the plan failed. Many commented that Ludendorff “focused on tactical success at the expense of strategic objective”, but Hart believes that:

“The real mistake is that Ludendorff was not able to put into practice the new principle he had adopted in theory, that he had not grasped [...] that he wasted too many reserves in trying to remedy tactical errors, and hesitated too much in making decisions that would have exploited his tactical successes²⁹” [to make them strategic].

The final development of the events is known:

“The moral blow that the initial surprise of 8 August hit the German command had been completed and became decisive with an indirect approach in a very distant theatre: the allied offensive on the Thessaloniki front³⁰”.

This was followed by the Austrian collapse in Italy (Vitorio Venneto), the collapse of Bulgaria and the renewal of the frontal attack in France, with Marshal

²⁷ Ibid, p.320

²⁸ Ibid, p.309

²⁹ Ibid, p.190-91

³⁰ Ibid, p.200

Foch maintaining the initiative and fighting the enemy to the end. On 29 September, Hindenburg and Ludendorff decided to request an armistice. Germany was going to accept demanding terms when it was signed on 11 November.

5. Ferdinand Foch (1851-1929): The primacy of Tactics.

Liddell Hart is one of the authors who dedicates a monographic study on marshal Foch. Foch was born in the south of France and buried in the Invalids in Paris. He influenced enormously the strategic discourse on the first third of the 20th century.

Foch is a writer who admirably reflects on theory which was endorsed by his command on the battlefield. He was an outstanding professor at the School of War in the subject of “Strategy, Military History and Applied Tactics”.

His two best-known works come from those years: “The Direction of War” and “The Principles of War”, written in 1903/1904 and reissued well into the 1930s. Later on, as a brigadier general, he became the director at the same centre (1907).

His intellectual references, of course, are Napoleon, Clausewitz and Moltke, although he includes quotations from other great writers and commanders.

The National War

In those early years of the twentieth century, Foch, as Moltke and Ludendorff did, explores the effect of all-out warfare, which he refers as “all trance” (*a outrance*), national warfare:

“The glory of Gambetta (Minister of the Interior and War in the Third Republic) lies in having understood that the centre of the strength of a State is not its capital, but the nation itself, with its resources of all kinds [...] the glory of Gambetta consists in having organized on these bases the national war, the fight at all trance³¹”.

Of course, this reference has to do with what Moltke maintained and it was that “the centre of the power of a State rests in its Army and in its capital” so it was necessary to defeat the French army in battle, seize Paris and “throw on the other side of the Loire the remains of the defeated army”.

The Battle

Foch’s fundamental contribution is the battle. Battle is at the centre of war, campaigns, strategy and tactics. In fact, “The direction of war” is nothing else than the manoeuvre for battle.

“The modern war knows only one argument: the tactical fact, the battle, for which it demands all the forces asking the strategy to take them there³²”.

In the preceding paragraph, we note the lesser importance he attaches to strategy as opposed to tactics, which we will discuss later in the Principles of War.

³¹ Ferdinand Foch, *La Dirección de la Guerra*, Ed Franco-Ibero-Americana, Paris, 1920, p.14

³² Ferdinand Foch, *Los Principios de la Guerra*, Ed Franco-Ibero-Americana, Paris, 1920, p.51

“The modern war in order to reach its ends (i.e. impose its will on the adversary) only knows one means: the destruction of the organized forces of the enemy³³”, and where? in battle.

“Battle is the act of war to defeat the adversary and to claim victory as its final end³⁴”.

Battle is also central to campaigns: “A campaign is a series of strategic acts that lead separately towards a great battle”.

The Principles of War

Foch firmly believes in a theory of the art of war:

“The art of war has a theory and its principles, otherwise it would not to be art³⁵”.

Execution (as Napoleon said) is above theory. However, understanding of military history is paramount. This is the reason why he also maintains that “war is a science, which uses strategic principles”.

In the 1918 version, Foch quotes that this book (The Principles of War) remains entirely valid, since its objectives endure:

“The principles must be followed in order to command the troops in campaign” and the teachings to “guide the spirits towards the solution of the various problems of the war by means of an intellectual gymnastics based on history”.

It defines principles as “undeniable truths, insufficiently established in their nature and in their application”.

There is a Theory of War that first involves principles: Economy of forces, freedom of action, free disposition of forces, security, etc...

The principle of economy of forces is “the art of employing all resources (organized in a system of forces) at a given time, and on a particular point³⁶”.

The notion of freedom of action as “the safeguard of our spirit of active (and intellectual) discipline”. The notion of security dominates both strategy and tactics.

As a corollary, the one which unites the French people, national war and victory, is their conviction in the principle of *the will to fight and win*, faith in triumph.

Strategy is understood in its traditional form of the art of the general: “only the generalissimo makes art, strategy in the full sense of the word; others do nothing but tactics, prose³⁷”.

Strategy is provisions, provisions for bringing armies into battle; however, it insists that “tactical action becomes the elemental rule of war”, and within tactics, fire superiority is the most important element of combat.

In short, Foch is a professor convinced of the primacy of tactics and the validity of the principles to apply in the conduct of war.

³³ Ibid, p.293

³⁴ Ibid, p.293

³⁵ Ibid, p.10

³⁶ Ibid, p.54

³⁷ Ibid, p.103

6. Conclusions

War is understood as a violent phenomenon, which is not questioned (inevitable) and reaches a totalizing dimension. Ludendorff calls it *total* and it is popular (*volk*), Svechin moves within the Marxist revolutionary concept, L. Hart admits it as an instrument in the politics of power, Foch understands it as national, *a outrance*. They all believe in war as the most dramatic experience in human life.

The strategy is linked to the enveloping (outflanking) manoeuvre in Ludendorff, to a combination of attrition and destruction in Svechin (focus on the former), to the indirect approach in L. Hart, to the decisive battle in Foch.

The primacy of tactics, the centrality of battle in war, the superiority of fire and the war of material, is commonplace in all of them.

By large, these ideas are captured by the European national military doctrines and the syllabus at the War Schools.

THE PRESENCE OF ENTENTE FORCES IN AUSTRIA, 1918–1920

Prof. Dr. Erwin A. Schmidl (Austria)

This paper intends to give an overview of a little-known subject: the presence of Entente forces in Austria after the end of the First World War.

By the late summer of 1918, it was clear that the Central Powers had no chance of winning the war, despite their successes on the Eastern front. Following the failures of the German spring offensive on the Western front and Austria-Hungary's 'Piave offensive' against Italy in June 1918, both Germany and Austria-Hungary eventually sought armistice agreements, offering withdrawals to the frontiers of 1914, but these peace feelers were rejected. Instead, Entente forces advanced on the Western front as well as in South-eastern Europe. The offensive on the Macedonian front forced Bulgaria out of the war in late September. On 24 October, the Italian army – reinforced by British and French contingents – attacked as well. On 30 October, the Ottoman Empire concluded a ceasefire agreement with the Entente at Mudros.

By that time, not only had the military situation become desperate for Austria-Hungary, but food and ammunition supplies for the armed forces were also becoming more and more meagre, and the average body weight of soldiers had fallen to below 50 kilos. Moreover the multi-ethnic empire was beginning to disintegrate. In his 'Peoples' Manifesto' of 16 October 1918, Emperor-King Karl (1887–1922) proposed restructuring at least the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy on a federal model, but this was too little and too late. Between 28 and 31 October, parliamentary assemblies in Prague, Agram (Zagreb) and Vienna declared the formation of the new states of Czecho-Slovakia; the State of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs; and German-Austria. The Poles in Galicia sought unification with the Polish state re-established in 1917, whilst the Ruthenians (Ukrainians) living there hoped for the establishment of a new Ukrainian state. Hungary announced its separation from Austria at the end of the month, recalling all 'Hungarian' troops from the Italian front in view of the impending Entente advance from the south.¹ On 31 October, Karl handed the Austro-Hungarian Navy over to the new State of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs.

For about two weeks, parallel structures existed. The Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian government continued to function until 11 November, whereas the new states already started to exert their powers by late October, and 'national councils' or other government bodies took over the administration on the provincial levels. Two days after the abdication of Emperor Wilhelm II in Berlin on 9 November, Emperor Karl renounced his participation in the 'affairs of state' for the Austrian parts of the Monarchy (commonly called 'Cis-Leithania' after the small River Leitha separating Austria and Hungary), but he carefully avoided the term 'abdication'. This

¹ As the Austro-Hungarian Army was among the 'common' elements of the Dual Monarchy, it was not possible to identify 'Hungarian' units apart from those that had been components of the Hungarian territorial forces, the *Honvéd*. In practice, some units recruited predominantly from the lands of the Hungarian Crown followed the recall order. Cf. Manfred Rauchensteiner, *Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburgermonarchie 1914–1918* (Wien – Köln – Weimar: Böhlau, 2013), p. 1036f.

was followed on 13 November by a similar declaration concerning Hungary. On 12 November, the parliament of the Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy held its last session in Vienna, not setting a date for reconvening. In the afternoon, the Republic of German-Austria ('as part of the German Republic') was formally proclaimed, having already been in effect since 31 October.² Emperor Karl withdrew to Eckartsau Castle near Vienna, eventually leaving the country in March 1919.

The Armistice Agreement at Villa Giusti, 3 November 1918

The Austro-Hungarian armistice commission headed by General Viktor Weber Edler von Webenau (1861–1932) was formed in late October and eventually arrived at Villa Giusti near Padua (which doubled as a guest house for the Italian government). Instead of entering into negotiations with representatives of the Entente powers, as expected, the commission was presented with a harsh ultimatum that it finally signed on the evening of 3 November. The armistice took effect at 15:00h on 4 November. As the Austro-Hungarian High Command had already informed the troops of the imminent armistice on 3 November, most Austro-Hungarian units stopped fighting the same day and retreated, whilst the Italian forces continued to advance. As a result, some 380,000 Austro-Hungarian soldiers went into captivity during the final hours of the war.³

The provisions of this ceasefire included the immediate cessation of hostilities, the total demobilization of the Austro-Hungarian Army, and the evacuation not only of all Entente territories occupied, but also the withdrawal from South Tyrol, Friaul (Friuli) and the Dalmatian Coast, i.e. the territories the Entente had promised Italy as the reward for joining the war under the Treaty of London ('Patto di Londra') of 26 April 1915. In addition, the armistice agreement stated: 'The Allies shall have the right of free movement over all road and rail and waterways in Austro-Hungarian territory [...]. The armies of the associated powers shall occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary at such times as they may deem necessary to enable them to conduct military operations or to maintain order.'

The Presence of Entente Forces in North and East Tyrol

Whereas it was fairly obvious that the southern part of Tyrol, the 'Trentino' with a clear Italian-speaking majority, would become part of Italy, this was less clear for the central part now known as 'South Tyrol' ('Alto Adige' in Italian). This region was predominantly German-speaking. According to the 1910 census, 89 per cent of the 251,451 inhabitants spoke German, 3.8 per cent Ladin (a Romance language related to Friulian and Swiss Romansh), and only 2.9 per cent Italian. Nonetheless, and despite all efforts to the contrary, South Tyrol was occupied and eventually annexed by Italy. (Even today, there are still 62 per cent Germans, 23 per cent Italians, and 4 per cent Ladins.) By contrast, the remaining parts of Tyrol – from then on known

² For the establishment of German-Austria, see Wilhelm Brauneder, *Deutsch-Österreich 1918: Die Republik entsteht* (Wien – München: Amalthea, 2000).

³ Rauchensteiner, *Der Erste Weltkrieg*, p. 1048f.

as North and East Tyrol – were to remain parts of Austria, but Entente troops were stationed there as of mid-November 1918.



<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tirol-Suedtirol-Trentino.png>

Source: Based on de:Bild:Gesamttirol.png, Wikimedia Commons.

Following the armistice, Italian forces slowly advanced into the Trentino and South Tyrol, occupying Trento (Trient) on 4 November and Bozen (Bolzano) four days later. As a supplementary protocol to the armistice agreement had stated that as of 15:00h on 4 November ‘the Italian and associated troops will refrain from advancing beyond the line reached at that time,’ it was important for the Italians to reach the new borders promised to them in 1915 by that deadline. In reality, however, the occupation of these territories took several days longer.

Both the policy of the Italian government and the military, and the reactions of the local population differed according to regions. In the Trentino, sections of the mainly Italian population had supported the Austro-Hungarian war effort, whilst others had supported unification with Italy. Thousands of Trentino Austrians had served in the Austro-Hungarian forces; others had volunteered to join the Italian army. Probably best known among them was Cesare Battisti (1875–1916), a geographer and a Socialist deputy both in the Austrian parliament and the Tyrolean diet, who volunteered to serve in the Italian army, was taken prisoner in 1916 and executed for high treason under particularly humiliating circumstances. In general, the inhabitants of the Trentino found it not too hard to adapt to Italian rule.

For the mainly German-speaking population of South Tyrol, however, the situation was otherwise. Regardless of the ethnic composition of the population, Italy sought

to establish the main chain of the Alps, i.e. the watershed between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic or the Black Sea, as the new frontier, as had been promised by the Entente in London in 1915. It must be stated, however, that the Italian military government generally endeavoured to establish fair rule in South Tyrol in late 1918 and 1919. The military opposed the drastic ‘Italianization’ measures advocated by nationalist elements such as the notorious Ettore Tolomei (1865–1952). Until mid-1919, when the terms of the Paris peace treaties became known, most Tyroleans south and north of the Brenner Pass (Passo del Brennero) still hoped to avoid the partition of their province. Only by 1919, it became clear that the transfer to Italian rule would be permanent, and German South Tyroleans would have to adapt to their new masters. It has to be stressed, however, that the large-scale and brutal efforts to ‘Italianize’ the province did not start immediately, but only took place in the 1920s and 1930s, in Fascist times.⁴

Although Italy had no intention of annexing North and East Tyrol, Italian forces crossed the Brenner Pass in mid- November 1918. In the meantime, following the signing of the armistice on 3 November, German troops had moved into North Tyrol on 6 November, even crossing into South Tyrol two days later, as a precaution against an Entente thrust into Southern Germany from the south. They were initially welcomed by the local population as a stabilizing factor. This attitude soon changed when many locals feared that the presence of German troops might lead to renewed hostilities. They were soon withdrawn, however, following the Bavarian revolution on the night of 7 November.

In the following days, Italian troops slowly advanced across the future borders into North and East Tyrol. The leading reconnaissance elements reached Innsbruck, Tyrol’s capital, on 12 November, and larger units entered the city on 22 November. Italian III Corps established its headquarters in Innsbruck, with up to 22,000 men under its command. Token Italian contingents were also present in East Tyrol. In addition to the Italians, one British and one French battalion were deployed to North Tyrol at the end of November – partly because British and French forces were present in Italy in significant numbers and partly to emphasize the overall Allied nature of the military presence there. Thus, one infantry battalion of the London-based Honourable Artillery Company was dispatched to Imst (west of Innsbruck). In February 1919, the Londoners were relieved by a battalion of the 22nd Manchester Regiment.⁵ A French battalion was sent to Schwaz (east of Innsbruck).

Despite the ‘hostile image’ created by wartime propaganda, the population apparently approved of the presence of Entente forces in Austria, even of the Italian ones. One reason for this was that a military presence was seen as a stabilizing factor, another that Entente troops assisted with the supply of food. In general, most

⁴ For a more detailed study of these events, cf. Marion Dotter / Stefan Wedrac, *Der hohe Preis des Friedens: Die Geschichte der Teilung Tirols 1918–1922* (2nd ed. Innsbruck – Wien: Tyrolia, 2019).

⁵ See <https://www.austrianphilately.com/brits-in-tirol/index.htm> for some information about the British units.

Italian, British and French soldiers behaved correctly, and there were few incidents.⁶ Whenever Tyrolean girls entered into relationships with Italian soldiers, they were ostracized by the local population. In some cases – when children resulting from these relationships had dark skin or black hair – harassment continued well into the next generation.⁷

Interestingly enough, Entente garrisons were confined to the major settlements in the Inn valley, and Italian troops rarely approached the Bavarian borders. Not even in April 1919, at the time of the Munich Soviet Republic, were Italian troops deployed to the frontiers. Maintenance of law and order was entirely left to the Austrian police and gendarmerie, which, like the local administration, continued to serve loyally during the transition period from the Imperial to the Republican system. The Italians did not even interfere with the establishment of a new Austrian military force, the *Volkswehr*, in their occupation zone. In 1919, when the terms of the peace treaties became known and people realized that South Tyrol would eventually be annexed by Italy, demonstrations and services of mourning deploring the loss of South Tyrol were held throughout the country, but the Italian (and other Entente) occupation forces refrained from intervening. Their presence in North Tyrol, and in Tyrol's capital city of Innsbruck in particular, also served to gather intelligence regarding affairs in South Tyrol.

Austria (the name 'German-Austria' as well as joining Germany had been forbidden by the Entente powers) signed the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye (called 'peace treaty' by the Allies, and 'state treaty' by Austria) on 10 September 1919. Ratified by Austria on 25 October, it took effect on 16 July 1920. South Tyrol was in due course formally annexed by Italy. As the situation stabilized, the presence of Entente troops was reduced in 1919, and the last contingents were withdrawn in late 1920.

The status of South Tyrol remained an issue of contention. Hitler and Mussolini agreed on transferring sections of the German-speaking population from South Tyrol to Germany in the 'Option Agreement' of October 1939, but many Germans remained (or returned later). Resistance against enforced 'Italianization' became violent in the 1960s, and it was only in 1992 that Austria and Italy declared that the issue had been resolved – an agreement paving the way for Austria's accession to the European Union in 1995.

The Disputed Regions in Czechoslovakia and Slovenia

The newly-established German-Austrian Republic laid claim to all mainly German-speaking areas. Apart from today's Austria and South Tyrol, these included

⁶ This assessment is based on a study of local police records and other sources conducted in the course of a seminar at Innsbruck University earlier this year. I am indebted to Mag. Dr. Gertraud Zeindl, MMag. Bernhard Mertelseder, MA, and Mag. Roland Sila as well as to Astrid Baur, Aurelia Kundmann, Christine Lentsch, Sandra Pfister, Dietmar Riedl, Michael Stedile, and Konrad Pölzl for their assistance and input.

⁷ Cf. Martin Lahner, 'Der Feind in der Heimat: Die Erfahrungen der Nordtiroler Zivilbevölkerung mit der italienischen Besetzung' (1918-1920) (MA thesis Innsbruck 2012).

the German-speaking border regions of Bohemia and Moravia (later known as the Sudetenland) as well as areas in what is now Slovenia.

In many towns in western and northern Bohemia and Moravia, the people – mainly German-speaking – expected to belong to German-Austria, but Czech forces intervened. These were ad-hoc formations assembled from returning Czech-speaking soldiers, former (mainly Serbian and Russian) prisoners of war, and local volunteers, often from the Czech nationalist *Sokol* sports organizations. The issue arose as to whether it was legitimate to oppose them by force. As the Czecho-Slovak National Council (in exile) had been recognized by the Entente as the legitimate representation of the Czecho-Slovak people, the Czechoslovak Legions established by the French and Italian armies were considered as Entente forces, enjoying freedom of movement under the provisions of the ceasefire, but this was not so clear for local groups. Eventually, the protests in German-Bohemia and German-Moravia were crushed by the new authorities, and the German-Austrian administration as well as the weak German-Austrian forces stationed there had to withdraw.

A similar situation existed in southern Carinthia and southern Styria, with a mixed population of Germans and Slovenes. In this case, towns frequently had a higher percentage of German speakers than the surrounding countryside. (This was true of other regions as well. In Trieste, for example, there were more Italian-speakers among the inhabitants of the city, whilst the environs were mainly Slovene-speaking.) When the municipal authorities of Marburg (Maribor) in southern Styria advocated adherence to German-Austria, a local Slovene volunteer force raised by a former Austro-Hungarian officer, Major Rudolf Maister (1874–1934), took action in late November. Acting on behalf of the State of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, newly-created by southern Slavs living within the borders of Austria-Hungary, these paramilitary forces were not, at first, considered Entente troops. They acquired this status, however, when Serbian Regent Alexander (later King Alexander I, 1888–1934) proclaimed the unification of Serbia (already including Montenegro) with the lands of the independent State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs into a united Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes on 1 December.⁸ (This new country, formally called the SHS State, was colloquially always known as Yugoslavia, but was officially named so only in 1929.)

By then a general, in late 1918 and early 1919 Maister and his paramilitary forces moved further north, occupying the towns on the northern bank of the River Mur (now forming the Austro-Slovenian border) in Styria, and advancing into southern Carinthia as well. The authorities in Vienna and Graz (the capital of Styria), fearing that the Entente might restrict the supply of food for starving German-Austria, specifically forbade resistance. Nonetheless, local defence units were formed in Carinthia and Styria, augmented by volunteers from other parts of the country. In Carinthia, they were at first successful in repulsing the Slovene forces, but when SHS forces launched a new offensive in April 1919, they had to retreat. By then, however, conflicting

⁸ The establishment of a Yugoslav Kingdom had been envisaged by the Serbian 'Niš Declaration' of 7 December 1914 and the 'Corfu Declaration', signed by Serbian politicians as well as representatives of Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs living in Austria on 20 July 1917.

territorial objectives between Italy and the SHS Kingdom forced the Entente powers to intervene, ordering SHS troops to retire from the Carinthian capital of Klagenfurt (Celovec). Italian troops occupying the Carinthian Kanal Valley (Val Canale, close to the present point where the borders between Austria, Italy and Slovenia meet) also maintained garrisons in western Carinthia, similar to their military presence in North and East Tyrol. Eventually, southern Styria became part of the SHS State, but Slovenian/Yugoslav troops had to withdraw from the northern banks of the River Mur. In southern Carinthia a plebiscite carried out under international supervision resulted in a clear majority in favour of Austria in October 1920.⁹

Austria's New Borders

In due course, armistice commissions and other representatives of the Entente powers took up residence in Vienna and other places in Austria. Steaming up from the Black Sea, British gunboats were present on the River Danube, some of them going even as far as Vienna. The Entente representatives in (German-) Austria did not interfere in internal politics, however, contrary to events in Hungary.

Hungary had declared its withdrawal from the Dual Monarchy at the end of October 1918, and Emperor Karl, in Hungary King Károly IV., had relinquished his participation in Hungarian state affairs on 13 November 1918. He spent the winter of 1918/19 in Eckartsau Castle near Vienna. A guard detachment under British Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lisle Strutt (1874–1948) was present at Eckartsau, accompanying the monarch on his journey into exile in Switzerland in March 1919. Meanwhile, the Hungarian Democratic Republic had been declared on 16 November 1918, followed by Béla Kun's (1886–1938) Hungarian Soviet Republic in March 1919. Fighting started in upper Hungary (now Slovakia) as well as against Romania, which had occupied Transylvania at the end of the war. Although it was initially successful against the Czechoslovak forces in Slovakia, the Hungarian Red Army was defeated by Romanian and French forces in the east (the promised assistance from Soviet Russia having failed to materialize). On 4 August, Romanian forces entered Budapest. Internal fighting between 'Red' Communists and 'White' forces continued, and the 'Red Terror' of Kun's days was followed by the 'White Terror' of the anti-revolutionary forces. Thousands were murdered in this period, and the Kun government was finally supplanted by a Social Democratic one. Field Marshal Archduke Joseph August (1872–1962) briefly resumed the function of regent that he had already performed in October 1918. He was succeeded by Rear Admiral Miklós Horthy de Nagybánya (1868–1957), the last commander of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, who was to rule Hungary until 1944. The country became known as the landlocked kingdom without a king, ruled by an admiral without a navy.¹⁰

The mainly German-speaking western parts of the country, now the Austrian

⁹ Erwin Steinböck, *Die Kämpfe im Raum Völkermarkt 1918/19* (= Militärgeschichtliche Schriftenreihe 13, Wien: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1969); Erwin Steinböck, *Die Kämpfe um Radkersburg und im steirischen Grenzraum 1919* (= Militärgeschichtliche Schriftenreihe 47, Wien: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1983).

¹⁰ Catherine Horel, *L'Amiral Horthy: Régent de Hongrie* (Paris: Perrin, 2014).

Burgenland, eventually were occupied by Austria in late 1921, under the terms of the Paris Peace Agreements. Only in the city of Sopron (Ödenburg) and the surrounding villages, a plebiscite was held under international supervision on 14 and 16 December 1921, with the result that Sopron remained part of Hungary.¹¹

The borders of the Austrian Republic finally achieved their present form when in October 1924 Italy agreed to withdraw from the town of Thörl-Maglern (Vrata-Megvarje in Slovene, or Porticina in Italian) in Carinthia, where an Italian garrison had been stationed for almost five years. On 13 November, the Italians retired to the present Austro-Italian border. Despite its mainly German and Slovene population, however, the neighbouring town of Tarvis (Tarvisio in Italian, Trbiž in Slovene), remained Italian.

Concluding Remarks

The war and the peace agreements led to more than three million German-Austrians living outside the Republic of Austria. The strategic and political goals of the Entente powers and the newly-created nations had prevailed over ‘the freest opportunity to autonomous development’ that had been promised to the peoples of Austria-Hungary in US President Woodrow Wilson’s (1856–1924) ‘Fourteen Points’ of 8 January 1918. The peace agreements were perceived as unjust and opposed by many Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians. This eventually helped the Nazis come to power in Germany in 1933, and in Austria in 1938. Likewise, feeling oppressed by their new masters, many Germans in Czechoslovakia turned to the Nazis in the 1930s, and welcomed the transfer of their regions to Germany by the Munich Agreement of 1938 as ‘liberation’ from Czech rule. It was only after the Second World War, as a consequence of the brutal ‘ethnic cleansing’ that occurred during and after the war, that the countries of Central Europe became ethnically more homogenous.

Austria regained independence in April 1945, with no changes to the pre-1938 borders.

¹¹ Gerald Schlag, *Aus Trümmern geboren: Burgenland 1918–1921* (= Wissenschaftliche Arbeiten aus dem Burgenland 106, Eisenstadt: Burgenländisches Landesmuseum, 2001).

TRYING TO MAKE SENSE OF THE GERMAN FREIKORPS AND IT'S INFLUENCE ON GERMAN HISTORY AFTER WWI

Col. (Ret.) Willard Snyder (USA)

The Freikorps played an important part in the history of Germany during the post World War 1 years. They certainly played an important role in suppressing the Communist movement in Germany and also in the 3rd Silesian War, culminating in the Battle at Annaberg in May 1921. They were also active in the Baltic nations.

Although there are several accounts of the German Freikorps they mainly fall short in describing the reasons for the Freikorps and whether this type of organization could conceivably arise again.

In order to better understand the underlying causes and situations of the Freikorps one must approach it from the German point of view at the time. This means trying to understand the historical setting which gave rise to the Freikorps. Unfortunately some histories have interpreted the Freikorps as "Freebooters". Perhaps a more accurate translation would be a "Free Corps" which does not have the negative connotation or association that "Freebooter" does.

The members of the Freikorps were mainly of the generation of the late 1880's and 1890's although there were also more senior members. This generation grew up in Imperial Germany. Although Napoleon I had conquered Germany initially, 1814 changed all of that. 1814 was the "Befreiungs Krieg" (Freedom War) and, incidentally, the origin of the award of the Iron Cross for gallantry in combat. Additionally, the war of 1870 had been successfully completed and Bismarck had been relatively merciful to Napoleon III's France – even though they were the one who declared war on Germany. The young generation of the 1880's and 90's were surrounded by veterans of the Franco - Prussian War. Friends and perhaps family may well have even participated in it. Alsace - Lorraine became German. Reparations were minimal and France went on with its own history – as recounted by its own veterans and historians. The history the German youth of the time learned, agree with it or not, was the German version. The German Reich of the time had colonies all over the world and managed them fairly well by the standards of the time. In the German society of the time, "bunds" and "vereins" (what we would understand as groups, clubs or associations) were the norm. The studenten bund, shutzen bund (shooting/marksmanship club), jaeger verein (hunter's association), Kreiger vereins (veterans associations) and so on were both common and an accepted way of daily life. The youth and their parents were very proud of Germany and proud of their history and traditions.

WWI came and, given their background, the general population was for Germany and consequently supportive of both the military and this war. As we know, the war was devastating for nearly all concerned. The French lost huge numbers and traveling through France today, particularly in the smaller towns and villages, you are constantly reminded of the sacrifice by the memorials with the names of the locals who did not come back inscribed on them. The English suffered enormously as well. However, it was really the Americans, who only entered in 1917, who actually tipped the balance

so that Germany had no realistic hope of winning. American losses, in comparison to the French and English, were not nearly as severe. Even so, the Germans did not surrender. President Wilson presented his 14 points for a peace settlement and, realistically or not, the Germans largely believed that these 14 points, even if not adopted in their entirety, would form the basis of any armistice and treaty. Added to this, elements of the German Navy mutinied, with Communism as their cause. The British Navy had effectively blockaded German sea commerce and food was in short supply. Consequently Germany signed an armistice with the actual treaty and its' specific terms to be created subsequently at Versailles.

The Versailles Treaty was the official end of WWI. It created new countries, and new boundaries in both the Middle East and Eastern Europe, however there were other aspects which, apart from historians, are not well understood today. The Treaty of Versailles is critical to understanding what followed and for that understanding we must look at the treaty from the German point of view. Whether or not one personally agree with the German view at the time, you still need to understand the mentality and psychology of the time as well as the actual terms and how they came to be in order to understand how the Freikorps arose. At this point it is important to realize that all of the participants have now passed away. Today, there are no surviving members of the Freikorps, the diplomats who were at Versailles or of the Government individuals from 1919 - 30. Therefore we are obliged to rely on secondary sources for our research into these times.

As far as the Germans were concerned, they had not lost the war. There was an armistice and their troops returned home with their arms the Navy had betrayed their country and there was major unrest as various factions struggled for power. There were no real negotiations with the Germans at Versailles, but between the allies as they argued among themselves over the German reparations, colonies to be seized, and territory to be occupied. Then the Treaty was imposed on the Germany and the German people. This became known as the Diktat (Dictate) from Versailles and the Schandvertrag (Treaty of Shame), nothing about a negotiated treaty is even implied.

The Communists were prepared and took advantage of this period of unrest and they staged armed revolution in Munich, Berlin, Hamburg, and other major cities. Chief among these were the Spartakusbunds, Workers and Soldiers Councils and the Red Guards. Countering the Communist participants were units of the local veterans formed around, for the most part, former Army officers who often lent their names to the groups. Other groups were led by former officers and had taken other names. Patriotism, duty, military honor, and love of the Fatherland was a prominent theme in recruitment and motivation. "Bund Oberland" became one of the most prominent Freikorps organizations. To be fair, veterans also played their part in the Communist organizations. Because the troops came home with their arms (recall that the Army did not surrender) Germany was awash with small arms from the military. These were the weapons of the revolution and the Freikorps. The allied nations stood by and watched this unrest and revolution, taking no active part at all. Ultimately, the Communist revolutionaries were put down. In their ranks were such notables as Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht and Wilhelm Pieck. In what was essentially

open warfare in the cities, and given the experiences of the veterans (on both sides) during the war, it is hardly surprising that compassion was a rare commodity on both sides. In Silesia, the Poles were unsatisfied with the boundaries decreed by Versailles and occupied land which was essentially German. The Allies would not intervene. The Freikorps mobilized and moved into the area and the situation culminated in the battle for a small hill at Annaberg in May 1921. The Freikorps prevailed and subsequently there was a monument and theater erected there to commemorate the battle. After WWII the monument was destroyed however the open air theater exists today. Annaberg remained a part of Germany until 1945 when, in accordance with the Potsdam agreement, it became a part of Poland. Annaberg was commemorated by the IIIrd Reich and to have participated in that battle was a mark of distinction in the IIIrd Reich. Such IIIrd Reich notables as Sepp Dietrich, Heinrich Himmler, Ernst Roehm, Edmund heines, Rudolf Hess, Reinhard Heydrich

, Wilhelm Canaris and Wilhelm Keitel were all Freikorps veterans which lends credibility to the Freikorps as a precursor to the IIIrd Reich.

There is a considerable discussion of brutality by members of the Freikorps. It should be remembered that the Communists drew their supporters from the same groups of veterans as the Freikorps. In essence there was a civil war in Germany and compassion and mercy are not notable in civil wars. This civil war was no exception. Brave young men on both sides sacrificed their lives for the cause they believed in.

The Freikorps is also alleged to have been the fore runner of the Nazi party and certainly many of its veterans became party members. This was an organization which had over a 500,000 members and there were 103 Freikorps units and formations in Jan 1919. The Freikorps was instrumental in the so called Kapp Putsch – which failed. A consequence of this Freikorps sponsored take over attempt was the gradual dissolution of the organization. Hans von Seeckt became head of the Reichswehr and many of the Freikorps members joined it. Certainly its members contributed to the Reichswehr – which became the Wehrmacht. However they were also resisters to the Nazi organization. Wilhelm Canaris is an example. Ernst Roehm and Edmund Heines were executed in 1934 in the Night of the Long Knives” Dr. Richard Steidle, one of Freikorps Oberland founders, died as an enemy of the Reich in Buchenwald in 1940. Hermann Erhardt (Brigade Erhardt) and Gerhard Rossbach (Freikorps Rossbach) were both anti Nazi, suffered imprisonment but survived the war. Gustav Noske (sometimes considered as the father of the Freikorps) was suspected of being involved in the 1944 plot to kill Hitler was imprisoned in 1944 but survived the war.

The Freikorps played an important role in the postwar German political scene, however its’ existence was short lived as it only lasted a few years. It’s history is subject to interpretation and has been controversial. As with so many large organizations, selection of a few members or notables does not define the entire organization. It was, a mixed bag, largely patriotic to Germany, composed of mostly battle tempered veterans and trying to do what they viewed as right for Germany at the time.

There are a number of resources available for further research and reading. I have drawn from the following and it should be noted that they also have many additional resources.

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WAR AND PEACE – THE ÅLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE 1917–1922

Prof. Dr. Lasse Laaksonen (Finland)

The Åland Islands – between Finland and Sweden – has always attracted foreign powers. During wars and conflicts Åland has had – and will be – a strategic position in the Baltic Sea region. During the so-called Finnish War (1808–1809) Sweden lost Finland to Russia. It was already clear in the peace process that Finland would be part of Russia. But the question of Åland was different. Sweden wanted to keep the Åland Islands. The Russians refused and stated that “Finland without Åland is like a bag without a lock”. Result was that Finland – included Åland – became an autonomic part of the Russian Empire. During the Crimean War (1854–1856), the Anglo-French fleet operated in the Baltic Sea. The fleet destroyed fortification of Bomarsund on the Åland Island. The Crimean War ended with the Treaty of Paris in 1856. The treaty confirmed the demilitarisation of the Åland Islands, although Åland remained under Russian rule.¹

When the First World War broke out, Russia strengthened its presence on Åland. The biggest threat in the Baltic was the German fleet, Russian forces returned to the islands and began to fortificate. With heavy weapons, the Russians protected their fleet, and tried to prevent landings. Russia reassured Sweden that its troops were only temporarily on Åland. At the same time, however, it asked France for support to change the status of the islands. Military success of Germany in the Baltic Sea affected to the foreign policy of Sweden. Sweden had an interest in reorganizing the status of Åland. Connections between Germany and Sweden made the Entente nervous. Russia informed Sweden of its willingness to negotiate an agreement of Åland.²

The position of Finland was weak. The autonomy of the Grand Duchy was reduced. Russification measures had begun at the end of the 19th century. Finns reacted strongly against the Russification policy. Some Finns left to Germany for military training during the First World War. The aim of these, so called Jägers, was to liberate Finland from the rule of Russia.

It was agreed, between Sweden and Russia, that the Conference on Åland issue should be held in Stockholm. However, Emperor Nikolai II lost his crown in February 1917. The autonomy of Finland was restored. The municipalities of the main island of Åland made a statement in early autumn 1917. They called for Åland to join Sweden. Since absence of the smaller islands of Åland archipelago, the statement was not completely covering.

When Finland declared independence on 6 December 1917. The Senate of Finland included the Åland Islands as part of the state. One reaction for this, on the Åland Islands, was Ålands Vänner (Friends of Åland). The unofficial association,

¹ Freds fördrag 1812. *Freds fördrag emellan Hans Maj:t Kejsaren af Ryssland och Hans Maj:t Konungen af Sverige, afhandlad och slutit i Fredrikshamn den 5/17 september 1809 och ratificerad i St. Petersburg den 1/13. October. Frenckell Åbo 1812*; Jussi T. Lappalainen, Lars Ericson Wolke ja Ali Pyllkkänen: *Suomen sodan historia 1808-1809* (Hämeenlinna 2008) 270-272.

² Aarni Lehti: *Baltian kuvermenttien ja Suomen merkitys Venäjän keisarilliselle laivastolle v. 1856-1914 with an English Summary*. Ekenäs 2003, passim.

which was established, took the task of organizing a referendum on the status of Åland. Again, only a limited number of people were responsible of the decision. All municipalities were not represented in decision making of Ålands Vänner.³

The independence of Finland, *de facto*, required recognition from other countries. But the Scandinavian countries, the Entente Powers and the Central Powers, first required that Soviet Russia would recognize the sovereignty of Finland. The Bolsheviks had seized power in Russia only a few weeks earlier. The situation in Russia was very unstable, the former Empire was in the middle of Civil War.

Representatives of the Senate of Finland traveled to St. Petersburg shortly before the end of the year 1917. When Lenin recognized the independence of Finland, Sweden and Germany followed with recognitions. On the Åland Islands, however it was suspected the strength of Finnish sovereignty. The situation in Finland was fragile and the social atmosphere was very thence. The Civil War broke out between the Whites and the Reds in January 1918. The Reds took over Helsinki and Southern Finland.⁴ However, on the Åland Islands the Reds had no support. When the Civil War of Finland broke out, there were more Russian troops than the Finnish counterparts. The Russian vessels located in the main ports of Finland. The Russians remained inactive and did not start to support the Reds. The presence of the Russians on the Åland Islands, affected to different speculations. The people of the Åland sought support from Sweden to get rid of the Russian troops. The press in Sweden reacted spectacularly. In February 1918 it was written about "The Reign of Terror on Åland." Despite of "the news" in the press, Sweden kept tightly its neutrality. The Swedish politicians did not sent troops to Åland.⁵

A Swedish expedition went to the Åland Islands to provide humanitarian aid. The expedition wanted to evacuate their citizens from the islands and protect the people of Åland from violence. At the same time, the Åland Islands came the White Finns. Commander-in-Chief of the White Guards, General Mannerheim refused separation of Åland from Finland. The White government of Finland relied on the question of Åland Islands to Germany. From Germany returned the Finnish Jägers at the end of February 1918. At about the same time the Germans landed on the shores of the Åland Islands. The Russian troops were disarmed and captured. The situation on the Åland islands calmed down and humanitarian aid was no longer needed. The Finnish government demanded, without success, Sweden to withdraw its troops from Åland. During the Civil War, the people of Åland did not suffered battles, unlike people in Finland.

On 3 March 1918, in the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Germany and Soviet Russia had agreed on the destruction of fortifications of the Åland Islands. It was also

³ Martin Isaksson: *Carl Björkman, Ålands första lantråd* (Borgå 1988) 90-92.

⁴ Anthony Frederick Upton: *Revolution in Finland 1917-1918* (Minnesota 1980) passim; Erik Heinrichs: *Mannerheim Suomen kohtaloissa I. Valkoinen kenraali 1918-1919* (Keuruu 1957) passim; Lasse Laaksonen: *Mistä sotakenraalit tulivat? Tie Mannerheimin johtoon 1918-1939* (Keuruu 2011), passim.

⁵ Martin Isaksson: *Ryska positionen Ålandskaja* (Ekenäs 1983) 150; *Finlands Beskickning N:o 3782, Stockholm den 21 juni 1918. Reports by Finland's missions abroad in 1918-1945*. The Archives of the Ministry for Foreing Affairs of Finland, Helsinki.

agreed that the military status of the islands had to be decided later, when also Finland and Sweden would be in the negotiations.⁶

The Finnish Civil War ended, with assistance of German troops, to the victory of Mannerheim and the White Army at the Spring of 1918. The Svinhufvud government announced that the fortifications of Åland will be demolished, if Sweden withdraws its troops from the islands.

The Government of Finland established the Province of Åland in June 1918. For Separatists this solution was not enough. A separatist delegation visited the Swedish Minister of Naval Affairs in Stockholm and complained that “*the people of Åland do not want to get involved in Finnish disorder*”. Although the Minister of Naval Affairs supported annexation of Åland to Sweden, he nevertheless preferred calmness. The question come back later. It came out that on Åland were a significant number of Russian weapons, the Minister urged the separatists to establish a shooting club.⁷

The regent of Finland, P. E. Svinhufvud, resigned when Germany lost the war. General Mannerheim succeeded to the power. Mannerheim had good connections with the Entente Powers. This concerned minds in Sweden and on the Åland Islands. Sweden and Åland were increasingly seeking contact with each other. The Åland Islands declared their “unshakable” will to join with the Kingdom of Sweden.

Regent of Finland, Mannerheim, visited King of Sweden, Gustav V, in Stockholm in early 1919. On the conversations Mannerheim made a strong reference to the historical criteria: “*We Finns still like Åland as part of Finland, as it has always been. Sweden has its right to demand security for its capital, which would be possible in the form of guarantees that would prevent Stockholm and Sweden from attacking via Åland*”.⁸

General Mannerheim presented a Finnish-Swedish co-operation to defend the Åland Islands. Gustav V did not accept this suggestion. Sweden was afraid that co-operation would diminish its neutrality. Sweden, without notifying Finland, tried to raise the issue of Åland in the Versailles Peace Conference.⁹ There was also a separatist delegation from Åland. However, the question of Åland was not on the agenda. In the summer of 1920, the Finnish authorities arrested two separatist leaders of Åland. These separatists were sentenced for preparation of treason.

The law on the autonomy of the Åland Islands legislated on 6 May 1920. It got negative reception on the islands, which once again asked for help from Sweden. At this point Sweden, for the second time, tried to get the issue to the tables of the Peace Conference of Versailles.¹⁰ In Finland, the General Staff was already preparing plans against a possible Swedish invasion. A memo in case of war was written. In July, the

⁶ Isaksson, *Carl Björkman, Ålands första lantråd*, 128-129.

⁷ Isaksson, *Carl Björkman, Ålands första lantråd*, 122-124.

⁸ G. Mannerheim: *Muistelmat I* (Helsinki 1951) 406-408.

⁹ Bertil Stjernfelt: *Ålandshav och öar – Brygga eller Barriär? Svensk-finsk försvarsfråga 1915-45* (Karskrona 1991) 45-49.

¹⁰ For example, *Finlands Beskickning N:o 1521, Stockholm den 12. Juni 1920*. Reports by Finland's missions abroad in 1918-1945. The Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki.

first President of the Republic of Finland, K. J. Ståhlberg, confirmed the instruction for defending the Åland Islands against the Swedish attack.

At the initiative of Sweden, the Great Britain raised the question of the Åland Islands in the League of Nations. The position of Finland in the world organization was much weaker than that of Sweden, which was an internationally respected state, which had maintained its neutrality during the First World War. Although, Finland received support. Especially Japan, one of the four members of the League Council, spoke on behalf of the Finns.

The dispute of the Åland Islands between Finland and Sweden was resolved in the League of Nations on 27 June 1921. The decision was that the Åland belong to Finland. The most important criterion was the historical connection between Finland and Åland. The status of demilitarisation was confirmed and this agreement got international guarantees.¹¹ The Åland Agreement was the first European international treaty directly through the League of Nations. Finland, together with nine other states, guaranteed the non-fortification and neutrality of the Åland Islands. A little later, Finland even legislated laws, which granted the separate status of people of Åland.

The League of Nations, established under the Versailles Peace Agreement, received a lot of criticism. The peace organization lost its significance at the latest when the Second World War broke out. The solution to the question of the Åland Islands is one of the successes of the League of Nations, which remains the basis for the status of the islands. Although there are a large number of autonomous regions in Europe, only Åland has been designated as an autonomous and demilitarized area by an international treaty.

¹¹ *The Council of League of Nations, decision N:o 42/24th June 1921 and its annex 27th June 1921.* The library of the Parliament of Finland, Helsinki. See also, for example *Legation de Finlande N:o 1617, Stockholm 23.6. 1920, Finlands Beskickning N:o 1642, Stockholm den 29. Juni 1920 and Finlands Beskickning, Stockholm N:o 1521, den 28. October 1920.* Reports by Finland's missions abroad in 1918–1945. The Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki.

CARABINIERI MOBILE BATTALIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

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Introduction

The public order after the First World War (IWW) is still a field of research not yet studied by many perspectives. The aim of this paper is to show you the root causes, the analysis of the Carabinieri General Headquarters, little experience on the ground driven by facts and some considerations at the end. My studies on this topic started some years ago, when I discovered few files proposing the building up of a Carabinieri stable mobile force for public order. I have the opportunity to thank the Italian Centre for Police Studies (cepoc.it) for the support the Centre gave to me¹.

During the Giolitti's Era, before the IWW, public order was faced more by Carabinieri and City Guards than the Army. The idea behind was to reduce the use of guns and to maintain the public order riots and resolution under the responsibility of the prefects, meaning that the general situation was under control of the government rather than delegates the generals². During the fascism, the phenomenon was reduced again because Mussolini decision to transform the bands of beaters in a para-military force he called *Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale*³.

The end of the First World War for the Carabinieri

At the end of the World War, about 19.500 Non Commissioned Officers and Carabinieri and about 500 officers lived the experience of the trench life. Since 1917,

¹ As a reference, Livio Antonielli e Claudio Donati (a cura di), *Corpi armati e ordine pubblico in Italia (XVI-XIX sec.)*, Rubettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2003 and all the books published after the seminars and congresses since that.

² See Giorgio Rochat, Giulio Massobrio, *Breve storia dell'Esercito Italiano*, Einaudi, Torino, 1978, pp. 37-43, p. 269 e A. Saccoman, *Il Generale Paolo Spingardi Ministro della Guerra 1909 – 1914*, Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito – Ufficio Storico, Roma, 1995, p. 73.

³ The foundation of the M.V.S.N. as a political tool in the hands of the fascism limited strongly the deployment of the Law Enforcement Agencies and the Armed Forces as far as the fascist government decided to suppress, especially for political reasons, the *Corpo della Regia Guardia di P.S.* (R.d. 31 dicembre 1922, n. 1680, “*riforma ed unificazione dei corpi armati di polizia*”) and then the partial transferring of the personnel in the *Arma dei Carabinieri Reali* and then the foundation of the *Corpo degli Agenti di P.S.* few years later (R.d. 2 aprile 1925, n. 385), reorganising the Public Security civil servicemen (R.d. 5 aprile 1925, n. 441). On the activities of the *Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale*, Gian Luigi Gatti, *Verso un esercito volontario del Regime: la Milizia*, paper presented in the congresso of military history organised by the Italian Commission of Military History “*Le Forze Armate e la Nazione italiana 1915-1943*”, Roma 22-24 October 2003, COMMISSIONE ITALIANA DI STORIA MILITARE, *Le Forze Armate e la Nazione italiana (1915-1943)*, Roma, 2004, but printed by Agenzia Industria Difesa – Stabilimento Grafico Militare Gaeta in 2005. G. Rochat, G. Massobrio, *Breve storia cit.*, p. 213. With a broader perspective on the Carabinieri mobile units deployed for public order, Rosario Castello, *Breve riflessione di carattere storico sui battaglioni mobili carabinieri*, in *Rassegna dell'Arma dei Carabinieri*, A. LII, n. 2 (aprile/giugno) 2004, pp. 89-99. The author offers an overview of the Carabinieri battalions from 1920 to 2004.

the need for a new and robust number of Carabinieri led to a decision to enrol the so called “Carabiniere ausiliario” (auxiliary Carabinieri). This new first rank in the Corps was recruited among Army troops (from private to corporal) to support the great effort of the Corps in the field of Military Police on the front and the ordinary police in the Country.

Those 12.000 (and then other 6.000) members of the Carabinieri, together with other causes, pushed the Corps to a more strong militarization at the end of the World War. So, I think that it is possible to propose a conceptual division between who served on the front and the others who remained committed in the ordinary police duties because different mindsets.

Furthermore, another episode had great importance for the Italian Army (and in a different way for the Carabinieri): the march of Ronchi and the crisis of Fiume, when small units and soldiers and officers decided to disobey and to become a part of the “Reggenza del Carnaro” experience under the orders of Gabriele D’Annunzio, a very well known poet who fought during the World War⁴.

The aftermath of the World War

The first two years after the end of the war were really difficult for the Italian society, both for the political and social fights leading the journalists to call this period the “biennio rosso”⁵. Many confrontations between workers and farmers against entrepreneurs and landlords and many troubles in the public order field had the Carabinieri, the other police forces and the Army as well in between. General strikes were proclaimed in Emilia-Romagna, and violence erupted in the provinces of Bologna and Modena, with public order confrontations in the cities of La Spezia, Campoligure and Chieti and all over the country after the Versailles treaty signature. Violent riots were organised by extremist parties (left and right movements) and during 1919 many clashes erupted in Novara, Milano, Brescia, Roma, Piombino, Viareggio, Cosenza and Venice, in many areas of Puglia and in Piedmont. In 1920, in Milan, during revolution attempt the Brigadier (NCO) Giuseppe Ugolini was killed after denying the request to give his guns to the rebels (gold medal for military bravery “in memory”). Other revolt attempts led to hard confrontation between political armed groups and Carabinieri; in La Spezia, during an assault to Regia Marina ammunition depot, Carabiniere Leone Carmana was able to defend alone the depot till the arrival of other friend forces (gold medal for military bravery)⁶.

So between 1919 and 1921, the Italian internal situation was represented mainly with the clashes between socialists and fascists. The Interior Ministries of that period

⁴ Luigi Emilio Longo, *L'Esercito italiano e la questione fumanica (1918-1921)*, Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito – Ufficio Storico, Roma, 1996, 2 voll.

⁵ For a better understanding of the connections between Armed Forces and police forces in the period 1919-1922 and for some issues on public order, MIMMO FRANZINELLI, *Squadristi*, Mondadori, Milano, 2003 and JONATHAN DUNNAGE, *The Italian Police and the Rise of Fascism: a case study of the Province of Bologna, 1897-1925*, Praeger Publishers, Westport (CT), 1997, specifically pp. 117-146.

⁶ Scuola Ufficiali Carabinieri, *Storia dell'Arma*, Roma, 2001, pp. 125-6.

were unable to guarantee a normal and safe situation on the territory even though they opposed many actions to the political violence proposing the parties dissolution in case of new clashes⁷.

As a consequence of the governmental incertitude, of the political violence and in general of the difficulties for police forces to face a new threat in the public order field, the Carabinieri were much more involved in the fights: “233 special operations as police force, during riots, fights, strikes and so on during which 43 Carabinieri died and 474 were wounded. For military bravery, the king gave 2 gold medals, 55 silver and 62 bronze medals and other hundreds of recognition awards”⁸.

During the same period of time the Interior Ministry in 1919, Francesco Saverio Nitti decided to establish a new police force called “La Regia Guardia per la Pubblica Sicurezza”. This decision led to a strong confrontation between the Interior Ministry and the Commanding General at that time, Lieutenant General Luigi Cauvin, who resigned at the end of the year to protest against the Ministry decision to create a “copy-paste” police corps as the Carabinieri but fully under the control of the political masters of the Interior Ministry.⁹

The Carabinieri mobile battalions: a new force

Immediately after the 4th November 1918 armistice, the Carabinieri General Headquarters proposed to establish a new unit, the mobile battalion. In the document, the Carabinieri commanding general stated to establish those units composed by permanent and auxiliary Carabinieri with NCOs organized on 4 companies (one of them on bicycles) deploying them: 2 in Turin, Milan, Florence, Rome and Naples; 1 battalion in Genoa, Verona, Bologna, Ancona and Palermo¹⁰. In 1919, one year after the first document, The Carabinieri General Headquarters wrote again to organise the mobile battalions with fast and strong transport and weapons, able to move quickly and to face every possible actions coming from the rioters such as during insurrections. Because of the means and equipments, those units could be deployed as light infantry units. The efficiency could be provided by moral and physical preparedness together with reinforcing the weapons training and driving the vehicles, providing them machine-gun sections - armoured cars - tanks – special trucks able to block roads¹¹.

So, deploying those battalions with a heavy mechanization could be the first mean to block any insurgency. The Carabinieri General Headquarters underlined, on

⁷ See the editorial column “Spigolando tra Decreti e Circolari” in *Fiamme d’Argento*, a. II, n. 1 – gennaio 1922, pp. 31-2.

⁸ Scuola Ufficiali Carabinieri, *Storia dell’Arma* cit., pp. 125-6.

⁹ Pier Paolo Meccariello, *Storia della Guardia di Finanza*, Le Monnier, Firenze, 2003, p. 148.

¹⁰ Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico del Comando Generale dell’Arma dei Carabinieri (d’ora in poi AUSCC), Documentoteca 126.4, lettera datata 7 dicembre 1918 avente ad oggetto “Provvedimenti per la sistemazione dei comandi e dei quadri degli Ufficiali dell’Arma dei Carabinieri Reali” indirizzata al Ministero della Guerra – Segretariato Generale – Divisione Stato Maggiore – Sezione 3a.

¹¹ AUSCC, Documentoteca 1592.6, promemoria datato 25 agosto 1919.

the other hand, that the units could be deployed for natural and human disasters to support the population¹².

So finally on 30th March 1919, the Commanding General, Luigi Cauvin, signed the first operational document for the establishment of the Carabinieri mobile battalions.

The strength of each battalion was on 782 personnel officers included. The battalions could be splitted into smaller units (companies, platoons and squads). The smallest unit was the squad based on 12 Carabinieri including the commanding NCO. In the training it was included theory and practice of public order and how to deal with the citizens during the riots.

Officially, the Carabinieri mobile battalions were established in 1920 with the royal decree n. 451 of 20th April and the following ministerial decree dated 2nd May 1920 with the instructions how to organize them. In the last decree, it was stated that the mobile battalions were established essentially to give to the central political authority a qualified force able to face important and improvised situation of public order.

So the battalions were deployed in the provincial capitals such as Turin (2 battalions), Alessandria, Genoa, Milan (2 battalions), Verona, Treviso, Florence, Bologna, Ancona, Rome (3 battalions), Naples (2 battalions), Bari, Palermo, Catania. All over Italy was covered by the battalions area of intervention, with the exclusion of the Sardinia Island where the Carabinieri were allowed to use their cadets of the small depot located in Cagliari.

The most important insurrections: Ancona and Fiume

It is very clear that the decision to establish such as strong Carabinieri units was strictly connected with the fear of the so called “biennio rosso” (red biennium) with the predominance of actions led by socialists, anarchists and other left wing parties aiming to change the state fighting in the streets. The reality was completely different because two most important phenomena were organised by some units and officers of the Army in those years: the Ancona event and the most serious event of Fiume.

To summarize both the events, in Ancona between 26th and 28th June 1920 an entire bersaglieri battalion mutinied in the Villarej barracks just before the departure for Albania¹³.

During those days the Police commissioner tried to manage the situation and the Carabinieri mobile battalion was deployed to face the soldiers. Entire residential districts with workers and manufacturers supported the soldiers and the clashes broke out.

The mutineers started using armoured-car and then they shot to the Carabinieri wounding an NCO and 4 Carabinieri and killing the Carabiniere Luigi Macchioni. A police agent was also killed during another riot in the city. The same day a police delegate and a NCO of the Regia Guardia were killed. In another clash in the afternoon

¹² *Ibidem*.

¹³ AUSCC, Archivio Storico, Fondo Museo Storico, Serie Archivio Storico, faldone 2 (collocazione provvisoria), cartella 1920, rapporto giudiziario n. 2390 datato 4 luglio 1920 indirizzato “all’Ill.mo Sig. Procuratore del Re”.

a Carabinieri NCO, maresciallo Umberto Antei, was killed together with a soldier and an officer of the 93th Infantry Regiment.

The day after, a unit of the Regia Guardia coming by train from Rome was blocked with the use of machine-guns. An officer was killed and two guardie wounded. The fights continued for all the day and only on 28th the situation came under control. Some patrols and searches were fruitful. Many guns and ammunitions were discovered in some rural areas around the city.

For Fiume, the situation was much more complicated by the position of Gabriele D'Annunzio. He established the so called "Reggenza del Carnaro" to rule in Fiume and surroundings with the support of single soldiers, sailors, NCOs and officers and small units as well, like Granatieri di Sardegna and Arditi platoons, who left the Army and the Navy to join him¹⁴.

The Italian government after the failure of the talks with D'Annunzio moved to a concrete action in front of the international community.

So, the Carabinieri mobile battalions, "Roma I", "Milano" e "Napoli I" together with Alpini battalions "Aosta", "Vestone" and "Edolo" encircled the city¹⁵.

In the Christmas day the Italian governmental units moved against the defence of the city after some D'Annunzio Arditi attacked Carabinieri and Alpini. Some Carabinieri and officers were wounded and killed. At the end of December D'Annunzio resigned. On 31st December an agreement was reached. An important historian summarized the event: "The most important crisis of the Italian Army finished. The needed fights to conclude the event ended with 25 dead and 139 wounded soldiers, the General Caviglia called "painful expiation". The D'Annunzio losses were few less. In the following months the Army, as requested by the Fiume Government, guaranteed the public order in the city. Its presence in Fiume will continue till the annexation of Fiume to Italy"¹⁶.

It is crystal clear that the Carabinieri mobile battalions were able to perform the tasks received but it is important to keep in mind that the original idea was to deploy them against the "red risk"; in reality, they were deployed against the events led by left movements but the best professional results were against Italians troops mutinies such as in Ancona and in Fiume.

Public order, the "marcia su Roma" and the end of "Liberal Italy"

In 1922, the first Mussolini government started to reorganize the power in Italy, moving prefects all around Italy and obliging many of them to retire with the support

¹⁴ See VINCENZO GALLINARI, *L'Esercito italiano nel primo dopoguerra 1918-1920*, Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito – Ufficio Storico, Roma, 1980, pp. 138-150 e pp. 179-195. L. E. LONGO, *L'Esercito italiano* cit., vol. primo, pp. 518-559.

¹⁵ V. Gallinari, *L'Esercito italiano nel primo dopoguerra* cit., p. 188.

¹⁶ "La più grave crisi che avesse compito l'Esercito italiano è così terminata. I combattimenti necessari per giungere alla sua conclusione, che il generale Caviglia chiamò "dolorosa espiazione", costarono ai reparti regolari 25 morti e 139 feriti. Appena inferiori furono le perdite dei dannunziani. Nei mesi seguenti l'Esercito sarà chiamato dalle autorità dello Stato fiumano a mantenere l'ordine in città. La sua presenza a Fiume continuerà poi fino all'annessione di Fiume all'Italia", V. Gallinari, *L'Esercito italiano nel primo dopoguerra* cit., p. 195.

and collaboration of the Italian ruling class and using all the State bureaucratic apparatus¹⁷. The guidelines of the government to the prefects led to a quick disruption of the workers movements after the violent actions of the *squadristi*¹⁸.

In the same time, Marshal of Italy Diaz, the Duke of Victory, asked Mussolini to guarantee the army new legislation, in a way that the reorganization was perceived as a high hierarchy goal¹⁹. So the Armed Forces left more “democratic” positions to maintain more strong right positions; the new posture guarantee an enlargement of officers’ positions and as a consequence the careers slowed down in mid-long term²⁰.

The gran consiglio del fascismo, a sort of a board with the most important fascist leaders under the guide of Mussolini proclaimed the establishing of the *Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale*, a new structure under the so called duce enrolling the fascists who previously were the black shirts that beaten opposition parties leaders and workers.

With that decision on 28 December 1922, few weeks after the so called “marcia su Roma”, fascists put their hands on the Interior Ministry: the Regia Guardia was dismantled, the MVSN was considered as a new armed force guaranteeing the public order and the public security together with the Law Enforcement Agencies; one of the quadrumviri²¹, general Emilio De Bono, was double-hatted as Police Chief and Militia Commander²²; 3 days later, with the royal decree 31st December 1922, n. 1680, the number of the mobile battalions decreased from 18 to 12 and at the end of the following year only 3 remained organised, 2 in Rome and 1 in Sicily.

Conclusions

At the end of the First World War the Arma of Royal Carabinieri seems to change posture from a more related position as a full law enforcement agency to a more robust public order organisation more “military” then before the war. Furthermore, the need to recruit new Carabinieri and officers let many combatants to enrol in the Carabinieri reinforcing the new approach to public order with more robust military posture.

Many Carabinieri were killed in action during many confrontations with members of different political movement or parties, putting the Arma in the middle of the political confrontation but with limited guidance from the political power.

¹⁷ Ernesto Ragionieri, *La storia politica e sociale* in *Storia d'Italia*, vol. 12 – Dall’Unità a oggi – Dall’Italia fascista all’Italia repubblicana, Giulio Einaudi Editore, Torino, 1976, pp. 2123-4.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ Giorgio Rochat, *L'esercito italiano da Vittorio Veneto a Mussolini (1919-1925)*, Laterza, Bari, 1967, republished in 2006, pp. 461 e 463. P. Pieri – G. Rochat, *Pietro Badoglio Maresciallo d'Italia*, Mondadori, Milano, 2002, pp. 343-346. Rochat noted that “Diaz aveva impostato un ordinamento [...] tale da “sistemare” tutti gli ufficiali in soprappiù”, G. Rochat, *L'Esercito italiano in pace e in guerra – studi di storia militare*, RARA, Milano, 1991, p 25.

²⁰ PIERO DEL NEGRO, *Condizione Militare*, in SOCIETÀ ITALIANA DI STORIA MILITARE, *Storia Militare d'Italia 1796-1975*, Editalia, Roma 1990, p. 66.

²¹ The quadrumviri were the four men who led the so called “marcia su Roma”, Emilio De Bono, Italo Balbo, Michele Bianchi, Cesare Maria De Vecchi.

²² E. Ragionieri, *La storia politica e sociale* cit., p. 2127.

After the so called “marcia su Roma”, the fascists decided to cancel one of the most perceived enemies: the Regia Guardia conceived as a political enemy because of the strict connections with the willingness of the Interior Ministry of that time.

The Milizia took position working as a political armed force and as a police force as well; so the Carabinieri battalions were not more useful for public order now in the hands of the prefects and of the fascists. The following years till the 30s, officially the Carabinieri were considered by the fascists, but unofficially their courses of actions had been reduced and a new police force in 1925 was established under the power of the Interior Ministry.

So, one of the most important professional experience for the police forces finished between 1922 and 1925 when fascists took progressively all the political leverages leading Italy to the dictatorship.

The experience of the liberal state ended.

THE 1919 PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE AND NEW PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

Prof. Dr. Nikolay Nikoiforov (Russia)

As you know, any war ends in peace. However, only the winners in the First World War for the first time utilized a practical approach to creating a new world order that would serve stability and prevent new military calamities. Therefore, even before the formal end of the war, the ruling circles of the future victorious powers came to the conclusion that it was necessary to create just such a system of international relations that would not only consolidate and strengthen their leading role on the world stage, but also protect them from dangerous upheavals in the future, as well as provide them with some control over the situation in Europe and the world.

The Paris Peace Conference (January 1919 – January 1920) developed the conditions of the Versailles Peace Treaty, which was signed on June 28, 1919 by Germany, on the one hand, and the “Allied and United Powers”, on the other. The Treaty entered into force on January 10, 1920, after it was ratified by Germany and the four main allied powers (Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan). The US Senate, under the influence of isolationists, refused to ratify the treaty because of their reluctance to join the League of Nations. In exchange for the Paris Treaty, in August 1921 the United States concluded a special treaty with Germany, which was almost identical to Versailles Treaty, except for the articles on the League of Nations. The Chinese government also did not sign the Treaty, thus expressing a protest against the transfer of its Shandun province to Japan. The Treaty was not signed by Soviet Russia either. Thus, from the very beginning the key point of the entire security system was endangered, while according to the Versailles Treaty, it supposed the cooperation of the victorious states.

The conditions of the Treaty were very hard first of all for Germany. They put her in a separate, humiliated position, assigning her a secondary role in Europe. Germany had to give up almost 13% of its pre-war territory.

Upper Silesia passed to Poland, which also got a direct outlet to the Baltic Sea and the territory around city of Poznan (the “Polish Corridor”). The city of Danzig (Gdansk) was declared a free city, the city of Memel (Klaipeda) was transferred to the jurisdiction of the victorious powers (in February 1923 it was annexed by Lithuania). The question of national ownership of Schleswig, the southern part of East Prussia and Upper Silesia was to be resolved by a plebiscite (the northern part of Schleswig passed in 1920 to Denmark, part of Upper Silesia in 1922 to Poland). Alsace-Lorraine (in the borders of 1870) returned to France. The left bank of the Rhine and the 50-kilometer zone along its right bank received the status of demilitarized zone.

The original Polish lands on the right bank of the Oder, Lower Silesia, most of Upper Silesia and other territories remained with Germany. Saar passed under the control of the League of Nations for 15 years, and then its future was to be decided by a plebiscite.

The main economic consequences for Germany from the Treaty were as follows. The victorious powers wanted to limit her economic opportunities by taking her colonies. However that led to the opposite result. There even more increased the

discrepancy between a rather high level of development of the German economy and the after-war weakness of her position in the world market, as well as in the fields of capital investment. By the way, that was one of the main contradictions that led to WWI. It was precisely the desire of the German financial and industrial circles for the free export of capital that was not satisfied, and their struggle for a leading role on world markets and their “place under the sun” would inevitably sharpen in the future.

Thus, the founding fathers of the Versailles system laid a great “economic” mine under the basis of the building of “just and lasting peace”.

The Treaty imposed great military restrictions on Germany, reduced the size of the German army (Reichswehr) to 100 thousand men, and Navy – to 6 battleships, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers and 12 torpedo boats. Germany was forbidden to possess offensive weapons, and her General Staff was dissolved. Production and import of weapons was prohibited. Germany was to pay 31,5 billion dollars of reparations, while 5 billion were to be paid immediately in cash or in kind.

France was to receive a significant amount of coal in compensation for the Germany destruction of the mines in Eastern France during the occupation. German foreign assets of \$7 billion were arrested and sequestered, and many German patents were taken.

The system of peace treaties developed within the framework of the Paris Peace Conference caused new territorial and ethnic disputes and conflicts, especially between small states of Central and Southeastern Europe. The declared right of peoples to national self-determination in reality came across serious obstacles. On the one hand, there were various interests and rivalries within the Entente bloc, and on the other – contradictions of ethnic and territorial nature between nations that had previously been part of four collapsed empires: Russian, German, Austro - Hungarian and Ottoman.

As a result of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Austria recognized the separation of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, part of Polish territories, made territorial concessions in favor of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Saint-Germain Peace Treaty). Western Galicia was annexed by Poland. Bucovina, and later, in 1920, Bessarabia passed to Romania. Hungary lost Transylvania and the eastern part of Banat, which were annexed by Romania. Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus became part of Czechoslovakia (the Trianon Peace Treaty). The defeated Bulgaria also lost part of the territory: a part of Macedonia was ceded to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; Western Thrace was put under the jurisdiction of the “main Allied powers,” but soon was ceded to Greece; Dobrudja was ceded to Romania (Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine). The conditions of the peace treaties, instead of promoting the establishment of a new international order, on the contrary, contributed to its destabilization.

Thus, the principles of restoration of historical justice and reparations, declared by the victorious powers, placed Germany and its allies into the rank of humiliated and punished states.

The universal international organization created by the Versailles system – the League of Nations did not justify the hopes placed on it. The Charter of the League of Nations did not provide for any effective measures against those states that violated generally accepted norms of international law and showed aggressive aspirations.

ALLIED MANDATE TO LAND THE HELLENIC ARMY IN SMYRNA (MAY 1919): AN IMMINENT WAR

Dr. Efpraxia Paschalidou (Greece)

Immediately after the Moudros Armistice in October 1918, and in view of the upcoming peace conference, there were intense activities of delegations in Paris. All victorious countries, whether great or small, strived to seize as much territory as they could. The participation of Greece in the final attack on the Macedonian front entitled the claim to fulfill national aspirations and demands. Greece, however, had to struggle against conflicting interests and the resolutions already accomplished by the Great Powers. In order to understand the decision for deployment of Greek troops in Asia Minor, in early May 1919, it is essential to take a close look at the political and historical background, state the geographical conditions of the region, and, of course the agreements which were concluded during the First World War between the Entente countries.¹

The Allies wanted to have Italy on their side in order to relieve the Russians at the Eastern front; in April 1915 the London Agreement was signed and among numerous territories, Italy ought to obtain a just share in the Mediterranean. "If France, Great Britain and Russia occupy any territories in Turkey, in Asia, during the course of the war, the Mediterranean region bordering on the province of Adalia ...shall be reserved to Italy". When Rome was informed about the successful conclusion of the Sykes-Picot agreement, intense pressure began on the Italian share in Asia Minor. Therefore the issue was discussed in April 1917 at the railway station of Saint Jean de Maurienne at the French-Italian border, where it became clear that Italy demanded the sanjak of Smyrna, as well. All the agreements during the Great War were dominated by the imperialistic ambitions of the Great Powers. The Hellenic ambitions towards Asia Minor were used as bait for the Greeks in order to draw them into the war, but they were never concretized, not to mention in writing. Neither Greece nor the other small states were co-players, until United States entered the war and a new view of the situation was added. In January 1918, the United States President Woodrow Wilson presented his fourteen points peace plan, where he held the view of self-determination of the nations, dealing with the Ottoman Empire:"The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire, should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities

¹ Among countless editions, basic bibliography contains the following: D. Dakin, "The Diplomacy of the Great Powers and the Balkan States, 1908-1914" in: *Balkan Studies*, vol. 3, no. 2, 1962, 327-374, E. Driault – M. Lh  ritier, *Histoire Diplomatique de la Gr  ce depuis 1831    nos jours*, 5 vols. (Paris 1925/6), A. F. Frangulis, *La Gr  ce: son Statut International, son Histoire Diplomatique*, 2 vols. (Paris 1934), M. Hanley (Sir), *The Supreme Control at the Paris Peace Conference* (London 1946), E. M. House – C. Seymour, *What Really Happened at Paris: The Story of the Peace Conference, 1918-1919* (New York 1921), K. Rendis, *Helliniki Eksoteriki Politike, 1919-1922 [Hellenic Foreign Policy, 1919-1922]* (Athens 1924), H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, 6 vols. (London 1920/4), A. J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey* (London 1923), G. Vendiris, *He Hellas tou 1910-1920 [Greece of 1910-1922]* 2 vols. (Athens 1931).

which are now under the Turkish rule, should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity to autonomous development...”.

This statement outlined a rational argument for the “Great Idea”, Greece’s “Megali Idea”, which shaped the country’s foreign policy through the whole nineteenth century. The aim was the re-erection of the Byzantine Empire and the uniting of all ethnic Greeks living in the region, into one state; since great parts of the diaspora Greeks lived in the Ottoman Empire meant a conflict with it. The Megali Idea was a dream and each attempt to realize it would mean the use of force and war, which Greece could never win without allies. Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, when the war broke out in 1914, had seen a chance to realize the Great Idea by joining the Entente. Especially since the autumn of 1918, the majority of Greek people were claiming enthusiastically that Greece should obtain Northern Epirus, the Dodecanese, Thrace and Western Asia Minor, claims justified by demographical data, according to which there were Greek majorities in all the areas demanded. Regarding the expansion in Asia Minor, the basic weakness of the Greek position was that Italy and France were fundamentally opposite, because they themselves had territorial ambitions there.²

The Greek aspirations at the end of the war were communicated to the Foreign Office in London, in mid September 1918, for the upcoming Peace Conference, as following: a. the restoration to Greece of Macedonia, b. the annexation of Northern Epirus within the limits of the occupation by the Greek troops in October 1914 with the consent of the Powers and the concurrence of Italy, c. the annexation of the Dodecanese and Eastern Thrace which, though purely Greek, were still in the occupation of foreign powers, but of which the annexation would not raise any point of vital international importance, d. the annexation, in the event of total or partial dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, of those districts of which the majority of inhabitants was Greek; or, alternatively, local autonomy for the areas in question; the return of Greeks from Asia Minor to their homes and the restoration of their properties. There was no mention for the northern Aegean islands, since it was taken for granted that the Entente Allies would cede them to Greece.

The omission of Cyprus was understandable, since Venizelos wished to avoid offending the British. Certain officials in London were in favor of ceding Cyprus, but they were fiercely opposed by the Colonial Office, the Treasury and, most of all by the Military, Naval and Air Staffs. Cyprus might in the future afford Britain the means of countering the effects of a hostile French, Italian or German naval base on the coast of Southern Asia Minor and Syria, and it might also become a base for landing or aircraft operations on the mainland of Asia Minor. The most important consideration, however, was that, so long, as it remained in British hands, it could not be used against Britain. Italian prospects in Asia Minor had become less bright. The British had pointed out that while Italy under the 1915 Treaty was entitled to concessions in the Ottoman Empire, corresponding to those to be obtained by Britain and France, her claim to special influence in Smyrna was entirely dependent upon the

² Publication based on the archives of the Hellenic Army General Staff and the respective editions in Greek: Hellenic Army General Staff/Army History Directorate, *A concise history of the participation of the Hellenic Army in the First World War, 1914-1918* (Athens, 1999).

arrangement of Saint Jean de Maurienne, which was at that time of no validity, owing to lack of Russian consent following the Bolshevik take-over. The 1917 Agreement carried no legal obligation it nevertheless constituted a record of the intention of the Allies which could not be ignored.

Following the signing of the Moudros Armistice,³ Italy was invited to discuss with Britain, France and the United States the future of the Ottoman Empire; it was stated that the provisions of the 1916 and 1917 agreements no longer appeared “suitable to present conditions”, however, the 1915 Treaty “remained in full force and effect”. The Italians sensed similar difficulties with the French, who still hoped that the United States would extricate them from the embarrassment of having to denounce the validity of the secret treaties. In the face of this deteriorating situation the Italians began to plan the occupation of parts of the Anatolian coast from Smyrna to Adalia. After Greece had joined the Allies, the Italianisation of the Dodecanese islands had been intensified and there were indications that the Italians would probably claim Rhodes and Kos, as being Turkish, and surrender the other islands, as being more definitely Greek. Articles 17 and 18 of the Armistice, however, which stipulated the surrender of Turkish officers and occupied ports in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, gave Italy the pretext to continue the occupation of the Dodecanese until Turkey had complied with these terms. In spite of Italian tenacity, however, accentuated and complicated by Greco-Italian relations over Northern Epirus and Asia Minor, it was generally accepted that the Dodecanese and the other Aegean islands should become Greek, with the possible exception of Imvros and Tenedos. Where eastern Macedonia was concerned, Greeks had good reason to be optimistic: clause (1) of the Bulgarian Armistice of September 1918 had stipulated the immediate evacuation of Greek and Serbian territories occupied by Bulgaria. The Macedonian question was never to be examined at the Peace Conference, which was not to be concerned with pre-war settlements.⁴

In January 1919 Venizelos had a chance to make the French well disposed to Greece; Lloyd George and President Wilson already favored him. The Allies were tired of the war and one of the first aims of the politicians had been to demobilize the millions of the armed forces. This quickly led to a sensitive lack of forces in the Near East region and they were forced to seek for auxiliaries. When, in January 1919, French troops refused to land at Odessa in Ukraine, Venizelos offered to send some Greek units there.⁵ Though Greece had not any interest in the region, two divisions were sent, while the sole motive for this decision was to pull the French in order to push the Greek aims through, on the Paris Conference.

³ E. Paschalidou, “An Armistice, an Expedition and a dubitable peace; reappraisal of the Hellenic orientations in late 1918”, International Congress of the Strategic Research Institute and the Institute of History Belgrade: *The End of the Great War: Military Operations and Peace Treaties* (25-26 September 2018, Belgrade).

⁴ N. Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece at the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, Institute for Balkan Studies-175 (Thessaloniki 1978) 63-65.

⁵ Detailed analysis in: Hellenic Army General Staff/Army History Directorate, *To Hellenikon Ekstrateutikon Soma eis Mesimvrinin Rossian [The Hellenic Expeditionary Force in Merieval Russia], 1919*, (Athens 1955).

Already in December 1918, the Greek delegation in Paris submitted a memorandum to the Peace Conference for the crucial Greek issues; the arguments raised were historical and geographical, based however on the prevalence of Greek populations, in accordance with the proclamations of the Allies and the Fourteen Points of President Wilson. In late January 1919, American experts submitted a report to the Conference, dealing with the Greek territorial claims: Northern Epirus should be given to Greece, but as regards to Smyrna, they, prophetically, wrote: “Although an alternative Greek area is shown in the Smyrna region, it is not part of this recommendation that it be assigned to Greece. The arguments for such assignment have been scrutinized with great care, and it is felt to be unsafe from every standpoint, commercial, strategic and political, to give Greece a foothold upon the mainland of Asia Minor. [...] To give her a foothold upon the mainland, would be to invite immediate trouble”. The Foreign Office was of the opinion that a Greek presence in Asia Minor was preferable to an Italian one. However, British officials stated – and predicted – that Smyrna and its hinterland should not be separated from Turkey, as this would deprive Anatolia of its main outlet to the Aegean and of an important portion of its railway system; it would also place a larger Turkish population under Greek rule, and, consequently, give to the Turks a just cause for resentment, creating a source of continual unrest, possibly culminating in an organized attempt by the Turks to re-conquer that territory.

Greece became a topic of negotiations of the Supreme Council in early February, while, for a couple of months, the sentiments in the Hellenic delegation varied from disappointment to satisfaction and euphoria.⁶ April 1919 was a month of rising tension in Western Asia Minor while the Greek Government was not unaware of the gravity of the situation. Turks and Greeks were ready to spring at one another at the slightest provocation and the local British authorities believed that should Smyrna go to Greece, the Turks would carry out a wholesale massacre of Greeks, especially in the countryside. Italian aggression, however, complicated the situation further, since future landings were likely to provoke decisive Greek action in Smyrna. They had already increased their naval strength in Smyrna and the Greeks, so as to counteract these moves, sent to Smyrna the battleship *Averoff*, carrying secretly a landing corps “for any eventuality”.⁷ The territorial demands were submitted to a committee of experts of the Powers, in order to investigate whether the Greek claims were justified and in agreement with the principle of nationality. The representatives of Great

⁶ Published sources and the minutes of the Paris Conference where the Greek issue is presented and the statements are copied hereafter in the text (selection): U.S. Department of State 1919 (ed.), *Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States of America: The Paris Peace Conference*, 13 vols. (Washington D.C. 1942-1947), *Conférence de la Paix, 1919-1920, Recueil des Actes de la Conférence*, Partie IV “Commissions de la Conférence (Procès Verbaux, Rapports etc Documents, C, Questions Territoriales, 5, Commission Chargée d’Étudier les Questions Territoriales Intéressant la Grèce”, (Paris, Imprimerie Nationales, 1923), Paul Mantoux, *Les Délibérations du Conseil des Quatre, 24 mars-28 juin 1919*, 2 vols. (Paris 1955), E. Venizelos, *La Grèce devant la Congrès de la Paix* (Paris 1919), E. Venizelos, “Hemerologio kai Grammata ston Repoule, 1918-1920” [Diary and Letters to Repoulis, 1918-1920], *Tachydromos*, 788-802, (Athens 2 May-28 August 1969).

⁷ Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece at the Paris Peace Conference*, 200.

Britain and France agreed that Greece should obtain a piece of Asia Minor, which, however, would be smaller than what Venizelos had demanded. The United States representative was totally against. The Italians refused to discuss any demands, since in Saint Jean de Maurienne the region had been conceded to them, and that had priority. Progressively, the Americans showed signs that they would agree if the Greeks got a limited zone in Asia Minor, but the Italians held on their position until April, when Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando left the Conference, strongly protesting about the unresolved Fiume and Dalmatia issue. In Paris, the Greek delegates had recovered their optimism after the Americans had withdrawn their objections to a Greek zone in Asia Minor. The day after the Italians left the Conference, Venizelos informed Athens that it was urgently necessary that the personnel for the administration of “new lands” should be ready. Nevertheless, he was anxious if the Allies attempt to compensate Italian losses in the Adriatic with concessions in Asia Minor, an idea which, though meeting with Wilson’s disapproval, had been put forward by Lloyd George on 8 April. He had expressed concern over the Italian plans to Lloyd George and Wilson, but although they had given him “assurances of comfort and support”, they did not warn him of any intention to authorize a Greek landing in Smyrna, to which, indeed, most of their experts were opposed. Nevertheless, a general feeling was growing – particularly within Greek and pro-Greek circles – that, by trying to steal a march on Asia Minor and by leaving the Conference, the Italians were possibly precipitating an issue of the Asia Minor question favorable to Greece.⁸

In mid April, Lloyd George, Wilson and Clemenceau, had discussed reports that Italian warships were either at, or were, approaching Smyrna. Venizelos had communicated to Lloyd George reports of further Italo-Turkish cooperation and had requested that the Allies should send vessels to Smyrna in order to show Italy that they were not prepared to play her game. This the Three decided to do. They were also informed that the Italians had brutally suppressed, on Easter Sunday (7 April), a tumultuous demonstration by the inhabitants of the Dodecanese islands of their wish to be united with Greece. Lloyd George declared that this incident was only part of a general plan of Italian action in the Easter Mediterranean.⁹ Clemenceau agreed that military and naval experts should be consulted once again about the redistribution of the occupation zones and the number of necessary forces. At the next meeting, however, Wilson declared that the United States could not send troops to Asia Minor, as they had not, and never had, been at war with the Ottoman Empire. At that juncture, news reached the Peace Conference that the Italian delegation was due back in Paris; exploiting his colleagues’ strong discontent with Italian behavior, Lloyd George suggested that they should be chastised while they were away. The Italians, with their absence, helped the Greeks more than they knew; the – remaining – Great Three decided that the Hellenic Army should land in Smyrna. Lloyd George stated: “We must allow the Greeks to occupy Smyrna. There may be massacres beginning and someone has to protect the Greek population. We must decide it before the Italians return. Let us give the order to our admirals that they allow the Greeks to

⁸ Ibid. 200.

⁹ Ibid. 203.

land there, where is a danger of a massacre. Every moment we received information which pointed to how urgent the operation is". Clemanceau applauded; "We must manage it so that the Italians are confronted with our decision taken. We plan the landing of troops in Smyrna in order to hinder massacres and an Italian landing. During the absence of the Italian delegates Greece informed us that new massacres were imminent, which made a landing at Smyrna necessary. This is not an occupation nor a partition of territories of Asia Minor, but a simple protection of the population. It is not a matter to decide the fate of that town but to execute a temporary operation with a fixed purpose". President Wilson insisted that Greece land troops immediately: "If the Greeks land with our mandate the Italians cannot land without consulting us, otherwise they will provoke a serious incident. I'm not ready to let the Italians do what they like in this part of the world. I distrust their intentions. I must observe that it is not the Greeks who demanded the occupation of Smyrna".

The threat that a possible abstention from the signing of the Peace Treaty would have grave consequences for the Italians, forced them to return to the Conference. Prior to their return the British Prime Minister, having some information about suspicious Italian moves in Asia Minor, proposed, on 22 April, that American troops be immediately sent to Constantinople and Armenia and French troops be sent to Syria, in conjunction with the deployment of British forces from Caucasus to the area of Constantinople. There was thus the possibility of an immediate reaction to any possible Italian moves. However, American forces could not deploy immediately, since an amendment to American legislation was necessary. In any case, none of the Allies was eager to relieve the British forces that would be withdrawn from the Caucasus. These difficulties exacerbated the worries of Lloyd George, who feared that, if the Italians were left unhindered, they would occupy the whole of Asia Minor. President Wilson appeared indifferent and relied on the theory that he had the means to impose his own will. On 23 April, Venizelos ordered that I Division of Army Corps A, which was stationed in the area of Kavala, be prepared for transportation to Smyrna. At the same time the commander in chief of the Allied Forces of the East Franchet d'Espèrey was being informed about the prospect of the necessary strengthening of I Division in Smyrna with the other two divisions of the Hellenic Army Corps A, which participated in the southern Russia expedition.

Venizelos ordered all passenger and cargo ships at Piraeus to sail to the port of Eleftherai (in Macedonia) to embark a Greek division for Smyrna. He further ordered that Aristeidis Sterghiadis, the Governor General of Epirus, a Cretan lawyer experienced in administrating mixed Greco-Turkish populations (and a personal friend), should arrive in Smyrna as political representative of the Greek government, either with the troops or immediately afterwards. All preparations were to be made with utmost secrecy and the requisition of ships explained away as necessary for the transportation of Greek refugees from Southern Russia. At the next morning's meeting of the Three, Venizelos guaranteed the secrecy of the preparations of the landing and asked that the Turks should be warned only at the very last moment, so as not to allow them time to organize resistance. It was important to keep everything as secret as possible... President Wilson has not consulted his experts before the decision

had been taken. The American Delegation gave its announcement a cool reception, as well as the British and French Delegations. British General Henry Wilson expressed similar doubts, however, Lloyd George assured Venizelos that Greece had “great possibilities” in the Near East and advised a sustained Greek military effort.¹⁰

The Three decided that the Italians would be informed in Paris in the evening of 29 April, at a time when the Greek troops would already have sailed from Macedonia. The Turks would be informed on the morning of that day, to give them time to order the surrender to the Allies of the forts controlling the entrance of the gulf of Smyrna. The exact time of the Greek landing would then be announced to them, twenty four hours before the projected landing time. The British Admiral Somerset Calthorpe would direct the operation personally. The embarkation of the Greek troops had begun on 27 April and Venizelos sent instructions to Athens, for Colonel Nickolaos Zafeiriou, the Commander of the I Division of the Army Corps A, which was to carry out the operation.¹¹ By a proclamation to be issued in Greek and Turkish immediately upon landing, it was to be made clear that the Greek military occupation did not intend to anticipate the decision of the Conference on the Aidin vilayet. The local administration should continue functioning as before and Izzet Bey, the new Vali, should stay at his post, but under Greek control. The religious and other customs of the population should be respected and everybody was encouraged to carry on with their normal avocations. Moderation and strict discipline on the part of the Greek troops were essential; their behavior would be a test of the worthiness of the Greek nation as a whole in facing up to the responsibilities entrusted to Greece by the Conference. Excesses, insubordination and other offenses should be punished with exemplary severity. The occupation was to be purely Greek. Zafeiriou would receive further orders from the Greek government through Sterghiadis, who would initially act as his political counselor and subsequently be appointed as High Commissioner. All decisions on matters other than of military discipline and organisation should be taken by Sterghiadis, who would take with him from Athens any civil servants he might wish to and employ the Cretan Moslems in Smyrna in the administrative places left vacant by the Turks.

Early in the morning of 1 May, Clemenceau informed Venizelos that, on his Foreign Minister’s advice, he would ask for twenty four hours’ postponement of the Greek landing, in order to obtain Italian consent; he wished to avoid any further deterioration in Italo-French relations. He made it clear, however, that the operation would go ahead even if the Italians opposed it, in which case the responsibility for the possible break up of the Alliance would rest with them. Venizelos reluctantly accepted the postponement and so did Lloyd George and Wilson, while the last made sure that the French still wished Smyrna to be occupied by the Greeks. Indeed the discussion took place the next morning, after news had just reached Paris of a new Italian landing at Bodrum on 28 April, considerably north of the contemplated Italian zone.

¹⁰ Ibid. 203-204.

¹¹ Hellenic Army General Staff/Army History Directorate, *He Ekstrateia eis tin Mikran Asian (1919-1922)*. Ho *Ellenikos Stratos eis tin Smyrnin [The Expedition in Asia Minor (1919-1922). The Hellenic Army in Smyrna]*, May 1919-May 1920 (Athens 1957) 40-53.

Clemenceau informed Orlando that, as fear of massacres of Christians had increased during his absence, the Three had decided to allow the Greeks to occupy Smyrna in order to protect the population. The operation would begin with the occupation of the Smyrna forts by equal numbers of British, French, Italian and Greek troops.¹²

On 1 May 1919, the eve of the landing of the Hellenic Army in Smyrna, in an ambiguous policy, the Peace Conference gave the order to Greece to occupy the city of Smyrna and a part of its vilayet and to Italy to occupy the southern territorial zone. The temporary and unclear nature of the mandate, together with the Italian hostility to Greek expansion and the old differences between Greeks and Turks, were bound to lead to events which would seriously bring into question the Greek government's wisdom in accepting the allied offer. It was clear that the Greeks could keep Smyrna, only if the Peace Conference agreed, and this was rather dubitable.

The Paris Peace Conference lasted a whole year, during which Venizelos and his colleagues energetically negotiated the Greek claims. Nevertheless, at the end of the Conference they had achieved almost nothing and of this they were painfully aware. Were it not for Lloyd George's comforting words in late October and early November and for the withdrawal of the United States from the Conference in December, little hope would have remained in Venizelos's mind for achieving the recognition of most of his claims. The causes of this failure should, however, not be sought in Greek diplomatic mistakes, nor were the clashes with the Turks in Asia Minor responsible for the uncertainty of the Greek claim to Smyrna. The responsibility for the interminable delays and the frustration of Greek hopes for a speedy and favorable Peace lies primarily with Italy and the United States. Italy obstructed all Greek claims in an effort to prevent her from gaining a preponderant position in the Balkans and in the eastern Mediterranean. Apart from base intrigue and outright cooperation with Turkey and Bulgaria, she used the 1915 London Treaty as a diplomatic weapon in Paris. Indeed, the importance of this Treaty in delaying the proceedings of the Conference and in establishing utterly unjustifiable Italian claims in Albania, the Dodecanese and Asia Minor can hardly be exaggerated.¹³

Apart from Lloyd George's eagerness, it was President Wilson's hostility to the Italians that contributed greatly to the decision to allow Greek troops to land in Smyrna. The consequences of this landing soon became apparent. Local Greeks rose to avenge their age-long sufferings and the Greek presence in Asia Minor provided the nationalist Turks with opportunity to stir up national feeling and to lead the Turkish people into open rebellion against the Constantinople government and the Allies. The seriousness of the situation did not escape the awareness of the Greeks for long. Venizelos, on 18 July 1919, had expressed the fear that those who opposed his Asia Minor policy might have been right and went on to recognize the danger that the Greeks might be "thrown out of Smyrna bag and baggage, degraded and humiliated". At about the same time Sterghiadis foretold that if the Greek occupation were to degenerate into a war between Greece and Turkey, Greece would be obliged to keep a large army in Asia Minor for years, and a state of devastation, fire and blood

¹² Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece at the Paris Peace Conference*, 205-206.

¹³ *Ibid.* 339.

would prevail: “Asia Minor would become the tomb of Greece and in Smyrna Athens would find a second Syracusan expedition”. In spite of his own and Sterghiadis’s misgivings, however, Venizelos remained convinced that the Greek claim to Smyrna took precedence over the traditional Greek wish to recover Constantinople. Although he based this view on a sound tactical argument, it nevertheless led him to underestimate the timid, but clear indications brought to his attention in Paris, that the Allies might soon be prepared to cede Constantinople and the whole of Thrace to Greece, in exchange for her abandoning her claim to Asiatic territory and evacuating Smyrna and the Aidin vilayet.¹⁴

The Campaign in Asia Minor lasted about two and a half years, during which the Hellenic Army undertook numerous large-scale operations and was nearly always dominant in the field of battle, with decisiveness, discipline, courage and heroism. Nevertheless, the desired strategic objective was not achieved. The causes of this failure are easily discerned in a review of the diplomatic and political events, the negative attitude of the allies, in addition to the ways of command, the direction and manner of operations. Lack of reserves, unsolvable problems of resupply and maintenance, created as a result of the inordinate extension of the communication lines, led to the lowering of morale; factors that also contributed were the heavy casualties, the insufficiency of forces, a long drawn out campaign that tested the limits of human endurance, and the general sense that had been created, about the loss of the objective of the struggle. Most of all, however, the outcome was influenced by the internal political schism that had deeply divided the country since 1915, a division that extended into the military forces conducting the campaign. Finally, the change of the Allied attitude, especially after the Treaty of Sevres (10 August 1920) was based on their permanently conflicting interests in the region.

¹⁴ Ibid. 340.

ROMANIA BETWEEN THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST AND PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE: THE UNEASY PATH OF A SMALL POWER IN THE GREAT POWERS' GAME

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The territorial issue was the most prominent feature that shaped the political thinking, diplomatic agenda and military conduct of Romania in the wake and aftermath of the First World War. The treaty signed on August 16, 1916 that sanctioned Romania's entry into the war alongside the Entente powers recognized Romania's claims over the territories of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, namely Transylvania, Banat and Bukovina. Following the withdrawal of Russia from the war and subsequent collapse of the Eastern front, Romania was forced to get into negotiations with the Central Powers with the peace treaty being signed on May 7, 1918. However, when the Allied powers requested Romania to re-enter the war against the background of the ample military offensive against the Central Powers on the Southern front, Romania decided on November 10, 1918 to broke with the 1918 treaty and restart the military operations. The end of the war found Romania as part of the Allied war effort and that was to provide it an open door in fulfilling its pre-war aspirations of territorial unification and renewed nation-building. Moreover, between March and December 1918, the National Assemblies from Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvanian, having used their right for self-determination in line with the "14 Points" program, gained full legitimacy to separate from their former imperial authority and ask for unification with Romania.

Therefore, Bucharest expected that the debates within the Paris Peace Conference on its new territorial settlements to be merely a formality the only task being to gain the international recognition of the Unification acts already confirmed by popular will. In other words, the Peace Conference had to acknowledge a *fait accompli* process.

The course of Paris Peace negotiations, however, proved more challenging against the background of diverging security agendas, great power and regional rivalry and growing systemic uncertainty. The main question was how to accommodate Romania's demands with the dynamics of interests of the main Western powers and overcome the challenges posed by Romania's military conduct during the war.

Romania between strategic calculus and military constraints

The decision of the Romanian Kingdom to join the Allied forces in 1916 was taken following complicated and lengthy negotiations that ended with the conclusion of the Alliance Treaty signed on August 17, 1916. This treaty, with both its political and military conventions, represents the basic document certifying the allied assumed commitment to recognize Romania's territorial demands at the end of the war¹. Behind Romania's decision to join Entente forces lay a calculated aim: the

¹ The Political Convention with the Entente regarding Romania's entry the war against the Central Powers, 7/17 August 1916 in *Romania si Razboiul Mondial (1916-1919)* [Romania and the First World War (1916-1919)], vol. I, Monitorul Oficial si Imprimeriile statului. Bucuresti: Imprimeria Nationala, 1934, pp. 9-11

main target of Romania's political agenda regarded the territories inhabited by the Romanian population from the Dual Monarchy, namely Transylvania, Banat and Bukovina. The only option for Romania to reach this goal was to align with the Entente who, under the pressures of the military dynamics, was willing to accept all the Romanian territorial claims.

Although Romania was part of the Central Powers alliance since 1883 (a secret agreement never ratified by the Parliament²), the events of 1914 and the subsequent decision of Austria-Hungary to declare war against Serbia prompted Romania to adopt a position of absolute neutrality. Between 1914 and 1916, the Romanian Prime Minister, Ion I.C. Bratianu was engaged in complex negotiations with the Entente powers to agree on the terms of the Romanian military intervention and the frame of Romania's territorial demands at the end of the war. Important to mention that through the Diamandy-Sazonov Agreement concluded on October 3, 1914, Russia recognized the rights of Romania to annex the territories of Austria-Hungary inhabited by Romanian population in exchange of Romania keeping a "benevolent" neutrality towards Russia³. The political convention between Romania and the Entente powers, that was to become the key document shaping Romania's post-war territorial realities, was signed on 4/17 August 1916, in Bucharest, under strict secrecy⁴. According to its art. 3, the "Big Four" (France, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy) committed to guarantee the territorial integrity of Romania "along its current frontiers" (this was taken as an assurance card to prevent any later request to cease Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria) and recognize Romania's rights to annex the territories claimed from the Dual Monarchy.

Being aware that, as a small country, Romania lacked the means to influence the agenda of the big powers, Bratianu stubbornly sought to get written guarantees regarding Romania's post-war territorial arrangements in exchange of Romania's military engagement alongside the Entente.

Two important stipulations were, however, to complicate Romania's agenda at the end of the war. The art 5 of the convention made any attempt at separate peace strictly forbidden for all signatory parties⁵. Another important stipulation was the art.

² The agreement was signed between Romania and Austria-Hungary with Germany and Italy joining afterwards. Due to the fact that the Romanians from Transylvania were subject of intense discrimination policy pursued by the Hungarian authorities, the King decided to keep the agreement secret as to avoid negative reactions among the public opinion who was very critical towards the anti-Romanian attitude adopted by the Hungarian government.

³ Télégramme secret du ministre des Affaires Étrangères à l'ambassadeur à Bucharest, no. 3028, 20 septembre/3 octobre 1914, Documents Diplomatique Secrets Russes, 1914-1917, D'après les Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères à Pétrograd, Payot, Paris, 1928, pp. 179-180

⁴ Dumitru Preda, Ioan Chiper, Alexandri Ghisa, *Romania la Conferinta de pace de la Paris (1919-1920). Documente diplomatice* [Romania at the Paris Peace Conference. Diplomatic Documents]. Bucuresti: Editura Semne, 2010, pp. 160-165

⁵ In Mihail E. Ionescu (coord), *Romanii in "Marele Razboi". Anul 1916. Documente, impresii, marturii* [The Romanian in the Great War. The Year 1916. Documents, impressions, testimonies], Bucuresti: Editura Militara, 2017, pp. 116-117. See also *Romania in Primul Razboi Mondial (1916-1919)* [Romania in the First World War (1916-1919)], vol. I, Monitorul Oficial si Imprimeriile Statului. Bucuresti: Imprimeria Nationala, 1934, pp. 9-11

6 regarding the great powers agreement to recognize Romania the same status as the Great Allied Powers during the preliminary and final peace negotiations (art. 6).

The supportive attitude towards Romania's territorial demands can allow us to decipher particular approaches behind the Great Powers' calculus. If England assumed that a united Romania could become a shield against Russian penetration to the Balkans, France saw it as a possible obstacle against the German expansions, while Italy was rather interested to use Romania as an ally against the Slavs who were supposed to be a force to reckon with following the defeat of Austria-Hungary. As far as Russia was concerned, the aim was to keep Romania away from the German economic orbit, able to provide an easy access to the Slavs in the Balkans⁶.

Nevertheless, it was obvious since the beginning that the Allied Powers sought to keep some flexibility in reading the text of the document signed with Romania. It's revealing the letter sent by Aristide Briand notifying J.C. Blondel, the French minister in Bucharest, that "the Great Powers rather prefer to prevent the small powers from participating on an equal footing in the discussions regarding the peace conditions".⁷ Moreover, the French foreign minister proposed a secret agreement between France and Russia stating that: "the annexations promised to Romania will come into force if the general situation would allow it so that the Great Powers keep their right to discuss the big issues among themselves. The issue of Banat is to be discussed later on"⁸.

Having the allied guarantees, Romania entered the war and launched its military campaign against Austria- Hungary on 27 August 1916. It's not the scope of my paper to discuss the dynamic of the military operations on the Romanian front. Suffice to say that the military campaign of 1916 ended in a dramatic defeat of the Romanian armed forces by the Central Powers who occupied more than a half of the Romanian territory including capital Bucharest. As a result, by the end of 1916 the political and military apparatus was forced to withdraw to north-eastern part of the country (in Moldova) in an attempt to stop the German advancement. While the Romanian forces entered an ample process of reorganization and training, under the close coordination and supervision of the French Military Mission, over 1 million Russian troops were deployed on the Romanian front to secure the new defense alignment. The Romanian-Russian military cooperation was to become an important factor in the overall defense effort conducted on the Romanian front in the summer of 1917 when the offensive launched by the Central Powers was stopped forcing them to reconsider their immediate military goals in the East.

The general chaos installed in the Tsarist Empire following the abdication of the Tsar and the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917 had dramatic and rapid

⁶ Sherman David Spector, *Romania la conferinta de pace de la Paris*. Iasi : Institutul European, 1995, p. 35

⁷ Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)- France, Serie: Papiers d'agents, Fond Papiers Paleologue, vol. 3, telegrams no. 992-994, signed Briand to Paleologue in C. Botoran, I. Calafeteanu, E. Campus, V. Moisuc, *Romania si conferinta de pace de la Paris (1918-1920). Triumful principiului nationalitatilor* [Romania and the Paris Peace Conference (1918-1920) The Triumph of the principle of nationalities]. Cluj-Napoca: Editura Dacia, 1983, p. 85

⁸ Sherman David Spector, *op. cit.* p. 30

consequences on Romania's capacity to continue the war. Once the new Soviet government decided to exit from war and signed the armistice with Germany (Brest Litovsk, December 1917), the whole Romanian front collapsed. Romania was left with no other option than to enter armistice negotiations with the Central Powers which were concluded on 26 November/ 9 December, 1917 at Focsani. The decision was taken by the Council of Ministers convoked under the presidency of King Ferdinand (on 21 November/4 December 1917) being stated that the armistice that Romania was compelled to sign will have an exclusive military character⁹. During the Inter-allied conference held in Paris in December 22-23, 1917, the allies agreed, following lengthy and complicated debates, to consider the armistice signed by Romania in Focsani as a temporary cessation of fire, not as a prelude of a separate peace.

Peace of Bucharest

Between the Focsani armistice and the Bucharest Peace Treaty signed on 7 May 1918, Romania main priority was to find a compromise with the Allied powers as to be able to sign a separate treaty with the Central Powers without jeopardizing its territorial gains guaranteed by the allies in 1916. Bratianu understood the complicated game that he was forced to play since according to the Art. 5 of the 1916 Treaty, Romania was denied the legal right to enter peace negotiations with the enemy. This is why the main efforts led by the Romanian government focused on getting the consent of France and Great Britain for its planned withdrawal from the war. In other words, a revision of the 1916 convention as to allow Romania to conclude at least a temporary peace without undermining its legal status of allied country. Being isolated from its western allies, completely surrounded by enemy forces and exposed to Bolshevik destabilizing actions in the east, Romania considered the conclusion of a peace treaty as the only possible solution to secure the state survival.

Nevertheless, the international dynamics made Romania's situation even more complicated. On 5 January 1918, Lloyd George gave his famous speech stating that is not England's intention to disintegrate Austria-Hungary, but rather to accommodate certain rights for the Romanians and other nationalities within the Empire. Three days later, President Wilson issued his "14 Points" program. Two articles were especially important for Romania: the art 1 that denied the secret diplomacy (the 1916 Convention was directly challenged by such a provision), and art 10 that called for the autonomy of the people from Austria-Hungary, without any territorial annexations. When asked to explain the US's position regarding the Alliance of 1916, the US State Secretary, Robert Lansing, stated that the United States is not aware of any agreement/alliance between Romania and the Allies as regards the peace conditions¹⁰. Under these circumstances, the American minister

⁹ C. Botoran et al, *op.cit.*, 1983, p. 162

¹⁰ Telegram- The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Romania, Washington, January 23, 1918, File no. 763.72/7794, US Foreign Relations, 1918, Supplement. 1, The World War I, Vol. I, p. 752, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Supp01v01/pg_752

in Romania, Charles Vopicka, noted that the fear in Bucharest was that the new narrative supported by both the US and Great Britain might leave Romania without the promised lands even if the Allies win and therefore there is no use for Romania to keep on fighting¹¹.

Despite the increased pressures from both Paris and London that urged Romania to stay engaged in the war, they finally admitted that, given the military conditions, a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers was the only available option to avoid a complete collapse of the Romanian state.

The peace treaty negotiations triggered a major crisis in Jassy (the refugee capital of Romania). The main issue in dispute regarded the territory of Dobrudja, the Romanian government being informed that the cessation of this territory is the *sine qua non* condition for starting the peace negotiations. In a discussion with Count O. Czernin, minister of foreign affairs of Austro-Hungary, King Ferdinand of Romania complained that it is utterly impossible to find a Romanian government willing to sign a peace treaty under the condition of losing Dobrudja.

The harsh territorial and economic terms¹² imposed by the treaty were used by Bratianu to argue that the peace was imposed upon Romania who was left with no other choice, given the severe military circumstances, than to accept it. To avoid signing the treaty, Bratianu left the prime minister office being replaced by General Averescu. The new Romanian government was advised to accept all the demands required by the Central Powers without negotiations. In such a way, in the words of Bratianu, "peace is nothing but a diktat" and Romania could present itself as a victim of the war. As the Russian minister in Romania, A. Mossolov later remembered, Bratianu "remained fully confident that the Entente forces will be victorious and if it will cease to exist as a state, Romania will find itself in a wrong position when the peace will be concluded"¹³. The peace treaty was signed on May 7, 1918 in Bucharest by a newly established pro-German government led by Alexandru Marghiloman.

The Allied ministers at Jassy have officially notified the Romanian Government that their governments cannot but consider as null and void the stipulations of a peace forced upon Romania, in so much as they violate the rights and the interests of the

¹¹ Telegram of the American minister in Bucharest (Vopicka) to the State Secretary Lansing, 9 February 1918, Jassy, File no.763.72/8832, US Foreign Relations, 1918, Supplement. 1, The World War I, Vol. I, p.757, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Supp01v01/pg_757

¹² According to the Peace Treaty's stipulations, Romania had to cease southern Dobruja to Bulgaria while the Northern Dobruja entered under the protectorate of the Central Powers and lease its oil fields to Germany for 90 years while Austria-Hungary gained control over the passes of the Carpathians Mountains. Telegram of the American minister in Bucharest (Vopicka) to the State Secretary Lansing, 14 May and 20 May 1918, Jassy, File no.763.72119/1670, 1678, "Text of the Peace Treaty made between Romania and the Central Powers", Papers related to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Supplement. 1, The World War I, Vol. I, p.771-777, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Supp01v01/pg_770

¹³ A.A. Mossolov, *Misiunea mea in Romania. Curtea imperiala a Rusiei si Curtea regala a Romaniei in timpul razboiului. Memorii* [My mission to Romania. The Imperial Court of Russia and the Royal Court of Romania during the War. Memoires], Editura Silex, Bucuresti, 1997, p. 82

Allied Powers and the principles for which they are fighting”¹⁴. The Allies reaffirmed their commitment to obtain at the eventual peace conference a revision of the harsh terms imposed by the enemy upon Romania¹⁵. Moreover, Clemenceau informed Bucharest that all the commitments taken when Romania entered the war will be respected¹⁶.

In September-October, discussions regarding Romania’s potential decision to rejoin the Allied military efforts, got a new speed. In October, the American minister at Jassy informed his government that the French and British governments have again promised Romania the claimed territories of Transylvania, Bukovina, and part of the Banat, if she will re-enter the war¹⁷. The Romanian government understood that the new political agenda assumed by the American president could turn against its interests. Especially important was the issue of the territories claimed from the Austria-Hungary. It was obvious, in light of the exchange of messages/telegrams following the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Germany, that the final position adopted by the American government was to have a major influence on the conduct of the other great powers. This is why the Prime minister Bratianu was especially focused on getting firm assurances from Washington that the terms already agreed on Transylvania will not be subject of change. As the American minister in Jassy noted, “they seem to consider that their future is in the hands of America only”¹⁸.

Starting by early October, Romania restarted the discussions with the allied powers as to find ways to re-enter the war. In October 1918, Marghiloman government denounced the Peace Treaty with the Central Powers, the document being subsequently nullified by the terms of the armistice of 11 November 1918.

The struggle for national self-determination

The year of 1918 was marked by dynamic national movements throughout Central and Eastern Europe with rapid spillover effects among various nationalities in both Tsarist and Habsburg Empires. The principle of self-determination, legitimized by

¹⁴ Statement of the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, lord R. Cecil, delivered in Parliament 19 June 1919, in Ion Ardeleanu et all (coords), *1918 la Români. Desăvârșirea unității național - statale a poporului român. Documente externe 1916-1918* [The Romanians in 1918. The accomplishment of the national-state unity of the Romanian people. Foreign Documents 1916-1918], vol. II, Editura Stiintifica si Enciclopedica, Bucuresti, 1983, pp. 1120-1121

¹⁵ Telegram of the Ambassador of France (Sharp) to the US State Secretary, File no. 763.72119/1679, Paris, May 22, 1918, p. 778, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Supp01v01/pg_778. See also The British Ambassador on Special Mission to the Secretary of State, File no. 763.72119/1697, Washington, May 31, 1918, p. 779, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Supp01v01/pg_779

¹⁶ Conte de Saint-Aulaire, *Insemnarile unui diplomat de altadata in Romania, 1916-1920*, Humanitas, Bucuresti, 2016, p. 238

¹⁷ Telegram of the Minister in Romania (Vopicka) to the State Secretary, File no. 763.72/12059, Jassy, October 26, 1918, p. 784, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Supp01v01/pg_784

¹⁸ Telegram of the Minister in Romania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State, File no. 736.72119/2446, Jassy, October 21, 1918, p. 783, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Supp01v01/pg_783

the “14 Points” Program issued by the American president Woodrow Wilson, became the norm shaping the attitude and pattern of conduct in the territories inhabited by Romanian population, namely Bessarabia, Transylvania, and Bukovina, that voiced their commitment for territorial unification with Romania.

The first episode of unification took place in Bessarabia. Following Lenin’s Decree of November 1917, the Council of the Land (*Sfatul Tarii*)¹⁹ proclaimed on December 2, 1917, the Autonomous Moldovan Popular Republic as part of an ample process of national renaissance and self-determination which spread all over the former Tsarist empire and led to the establishment of new autonomous republics. The territorial claims voiced by the Ukrainians was another reason that motivated the political leaders of Bessarabia to establish their own autonomous republic²⁰. Facing growing pressures from the Bolshevik forces and the risks of instability and chaos, the Council of the Land asked General Dmitry Shcherbachev, the commander of the Russian troops on the Romanian Front, for support. General Shcherbachev, having also the Allied agreement, requested the Romanian Government to intervene to establish internal order in Bessarabia. The main concern of the Allied Command focused on the need to secure the back of the front and prevent the Bolsheviks to threaten the communication and supply lines of the Romanian front²¹. The Romanian military campaign in Bessarabia lasted from 10/23 January to 27 February/12 March 1918. Following the dissolution of the Russian Empire and Ukraine’s decision to declare its independence, the Council of the Land adopted, on 24 January/6 February 1918, the Declaration of Independence of the Moldavian Democratic Republic. Two months later, on 27 March/9 April, the Representative Assembly of Bessarabia adopted the Declaration of Unification with Romania (adopted by a vote of 86 support, 3 opposed, and 36 abstention). Following the declaration of unification, the Moldovan Democratic Republic ceased to exist and Bessarabia regained the status of Romanian province. On March 30, the Declaration of Unification was handed over by a Bessarabia delegation to King Ferdinand of Romania who validated it through the Royal Decree on 9/22 April 1918. Germany adopted a benevolent attitude towards the issue of Bessarabia which was seen as part of a broader plan of negotiations of the terms of the peace treaty with Romania. Count Czernin, the minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary told Alexandru Marghiloman, the prime minister of Romania, that “Romania must get Bessarabia. A likely protest raised by Ukraine is not an obstacle; she has no right to say anything”.²² According to the documentary evidences, Germany’s intention was to allow Bessarabia’s unification as a compromise deal so that Romania agrees in exchange the cessation of Dobruja to Bulgaria and the conclusion of the peace treaty.

Nevertheless, the Peace treaty signed by Romania with the Central Powers on 7 May 1918 did not explicitly recognize the unification of Bessarabia. The art. 5

¹⁹ The Council of the Land was established on November 21, 1917

²⁰ Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, *Sfatul Tarii* [Council of the Land], Chisinau: Civitas, 1998, pp. 58-60

²¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 71-72

²² *Ibidem*, p. 100

left room for interpretation since it mentioned that the situation of Bessarabia will be further assessed, but no clear commitment was taken by the Central Powers. Following the resignation of Marghiloman government on 6 November 1918, all the decrees adopted during his term have been revoked, a measure which indirectly affected the act of Bessarabia unification. As a result, on 27 November /10 December 1918, the Council of the Land voted a new Declaration of unconditional unification with Romania.²³

Simultaneously, on 27 October 1918, it was established the National Council of the Romanians from Bukovina which announced the intention to ask for Bukovina's unification with Romania. On 28 November, the Romanians from Bukovina held their National Assembly in Chernivtsi (Cernauti) that proclaimed unconditional unification of Bukovina with Romania based on the right of self-determination.

As early as 12 October 1918, the Romanians from Transylvania issued a resolution claiming the right for autonomous self-determination that was officially presented in the Hungarian Parliament on October 18, 1918. Two days before the armistice signed by Hungary with the Entente Powers on 13 November 1918, the Romanians voiced their right for national self-determination and stated the separation of Transylvania and other Romanian regions from Hungary. The Great National Assembly gathered at Alba-Iulia on 18 November/ 1 December 1918 being attended by over 100.000 people from Transylvania, Banat, Crisana, and Maramures. The Resolution of unification was adopted by the rightful representatives of the Great National Assembly composed of 1228 delegates unanimously elected by the population and 64 delegates representing officers, NCOs, and soldiers so that the voting process had a clear plebiscitary character.²⁴ The National Assembly proclaimed the unification of all Romanians from Transylvania, Banat, and the Hungarian Country and of all the territories inhabited by them with Romania as well as the inalienable right of the Romanian nation to the whole Banat bordered by the Mures and Tisa rivers and the Danube.

On 20 December 1919, following the first general elections after the national territorial unification, the Constituent Assembly of Romania ratified the unifications acts approved already by the National Councils of the Romanians from Bessarabia, Transylvania and Bukovina.

The Peace Treaty Conference: challenges and opportunities

Once the proceedings of the Peace Conference started on January 12, 1919, Romania's stance was driven by two main concerns: the attitude of the Allied Powers regarding the Alliance Treaty of 1916 and their attitude concerning the Peace of

²³ AMFA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Part I, vol. 25, f. 15-21, La Roumanie devant le Congres de la Paix ses revendications territoriales, 1 February 1919, Paris, in Dumitru Preda et al (coord), *op.cit.*, 2010, pp.147-160

²⁴ AMAE, Fond 71/1914. E2, part I, "Resolution of the Great National Assembly from Alba Iulia regarding the unification of Transylvania with Romania, 1 December 1918", vol. 25, ff. 25-26; Idem, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Part I, vol. 1, f. 44-46. See also *Istoria militara a poporului roman* [The Military History of the Romanian people], vol. VI, Editura Militara, Bucuresti, 1989, pp. 2-4

Bucharest that Romania concluded with the Central Powers in May 1918. It was well understood in Bucharest that the general approach of the main allies on those specific documents were intended to guide the discussions in Paris, particularly those with regard to the provisions agreed through the 1916 Alliance Treaty.

However, it should be mentioned that Romania's overall position at the Peace Conference was developed around two main approaches. The first one advocated by Take Ionescu, an important political leader and one of the most prestigious Romanian personalities at international level, supported a more moderate agenda. He acknowledged that the Allies had no intention to observe the provisions of the 1916 Treaty with Romania. Since Romania's main interest was to preserve the good relations with the Allied Powers, Ionescu pledged for a territorial solution of compromise to prevent a potential diplomatic isolation of the country. Moreover, he sought an agreement with the leaders of the national movements from the Dual Monarchy in order to advance a joint platform of actions within the Peace Conference. In October 1918, he reached an agreement with Nikola Pašić, Eleutherios Venizelos, and Thomas Masaryk to provide mutual support during the peace negotiations. Part of this agreement, Ionescu agreed with Pašić to split the Banat territory between Serbia and Romania, and planned together with Venizelos on a future Balkan Confederation²⁵. Basically, Ionescu's idea was to find a compromise as to preserve good relations with the neighbors especially important in the newly emerged circumstances given the already complicated dossiers on the western (Hungary)-eastern (Russia)- southern (Bulgaria) directions.

The second approach was supported by the prime minister, Ion I.C. Bratianu who urged for a maximalist agenda whose legitimacy rested on the unification acts already adopted by the Romanians in 1918, the provisions of the 1916 Treaty and the "Fourteen Points" program of President Wilson. In other words, it was expected that the new territorial arrangements concerning Romania's borders to fully observe the commitments assumed by the Allied Powers in 1916 as well as the decisions adopted by the Romanians from Habsburg and Tsarist Empires to join the motherland based on the principle of national self-determination. Bratianu was not attuned to the idealist ideology advocated by Wilson; his thinking was the product of realist principles shaped in terms of national interests and practical strategic benefits. He refused any concession that could prevent Romania to expand its territory as agreed with the Allies in 1916 seen as the only way to strengthen the country's security and enhance its international position. The arguments to support the new territorial paradigm were shaped by both ethnical-historical considerations and economic-strategic imperatives.

Bratianu's agenda prevailed and this was to define Romania's overall conduct during the Peace Conference that can be deciphered based on several specific priorities: (1) the recognition of all territorial demands as agreed through the Alliance Treaty of 1916; (2) the recognition of the unification of Bessarabia; (3) the new frontiers to be established as to secure maximum economic and strategic advantages;

²⁵ Spector, *op.cit.*, 1995., pp. 54-55

(4) to have Romania granted an equal status with the other great powers during the Conference proceedings²⁶. In advocating its position, Romania run into a challenge with the Supreme Council and its agenda of interests.

The first challenge that Romania had to face with was the lack of consensus regarding the validity of the Alliance concluded in 1916. There were some opinions shared among the Entente Powers that the 1916 Alliance was no longer valid since Romania violated it by signing the separate peace treaty with the Central Powers. Added to this narrative, the United States refused to recognize any agreement signed before America entered the war. Of course, this was to affect also the Alliance signed by Romania in 1916 with the Entente powers. The British Foreign Office informed as early as December 1918 that: Romania, “having concluded a separate peace in violation of art V of the Treaty, we cannot possibly regard that Treaty is still binding... Whatever representation may be accorded to Romania at the Peace Congress must therefore be based not on the 1916 Treaty, but on the second declaration of war made by the Coanda Government [on 10 November 1918]. On this principle, Romania will attend as a Government Associated but not Allied, and her former allies will be render no contractual obligations towards her”²⁷. Bratianu argued that the Treaty of Bucharest imposed by Germany was never ratified by the King and therefore its validity cannot be recognized²⁸. Moreover, through the armistice of 11 November 1918, Germany was forced to renounce all the benefits provided by the peace treaties signed during the war²⁹. In other words, both the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest lost their validity.

The issue has been finally settled in January 1919 once the Allied Powers reached a consensus on accepting the allied status for Romania³⁰. In early January 1919, France informed Bucharest that Romania was recognized the status of allied power but, however, the clauses of the 1916 treaty were to be admitted in accordance with the general and special interests of the Allied Powers. France was to play an important role in settling the issue in Romania’s advantage. Part of the explanation of the French political calculus may be find in the note drafted by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 22 December 1918: “[...] Romania is our main point of support in Eastern Europe, we have great economic action prospects that will require agreements with the Romanian government ... To treat Romania as an allied country does not forbid us at all to make clear that some clauses of the 1916 treaty cannot be fully applied for reasons of fairness and the general interest of Europe”³¹. By the same logic, it is also revealing the telegram sent by Berthelot, the former chief of the French Military Mission to Romania, to Clemenceau in January 1919: “If we give the Romanians the

²⁶ Spector, *op.cit.*, p. 85

²⁷ Ion Ardeleanu et all, *op.cit.*, p. 1310

²⁸ AMFA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Part I, vol. 180, Doc no. 86, Memoire of the Romanian delegation regarding Romania’s contribution to the Entente during the First World War presented by Ion I.C. Bratianu, President of the Council of Ministers, 1 February 1919, Paris

²⁹ AMFA, France, Serie “Europe 1918-1929, Roumanie”, vol. 131, f. 129 in C. Botoran et all, *Romania and the Peace Conference...*, p.297

³⁰ AMFA, Fond 71/1914. E2, Part I, vol. 181, f. 5, Telegram no. 47 sent by Victor Antonescu to Ion I.C. Bratianu, President of the Council of Ministers, 16/19 January 1919, Paris

³¹ AMFA - France, vol. 32, f. 32-33, in C. Botoran, *op. cit.*, pp. 305-306

satisfaction to which they are entitled and if we honor our commitments, we will have in Romania a real French colony of over 15 million inhabitants, where we will be able to develop the trade and industry and where we will find ourselves at home”.³² In other words, Berthelot recognized that the special relationship between the two countries and the strategic value of Romania are a significant assets that France cannot afford to lose if she wants to remain the leading geopolitical player in the region.

The debates regarding Romania's status at the Peace Conference reveals the already emerging post-war competing geopolitical ambitions in Eastern Europe each of the big victorious powers seeking to get the most advantageous alignments to secure a dominant position. It's worth mentioning that the French supportive stand towards Romania was influenced by a sudden change in the overall British position concerning the Romanian allied status, an evolution which increased Paris's anxieties related to British goals in Romania already acknowledged by the French MFA note.

Although it was recognized as an allied country, Romania was denied, contrary to the provisions of the 1916 Alliance Treaty, to share the same status with the main allied powers, so that it was integrated into the second category of small powers with limited interests. It was well understood that the interests of the great victorious powers will prevail and Romania was left outside the decision making process that remained the exclusive attribute of the “Big Four”. As a result, the strategy adopted by Bratianu was to reject any possible compromise that could question the legitimacy of the decisions of unification adopted by the Romanian provinces and of the commitments assumed by the allies through the 1916 treaty.

A major concern in Bucharest was to secure strong and easily defended borders to allow her to build stable defense alignments. It was well understood in Romania that the emerging vulnerabilities generated by the revisionist agenda of the defeated powers in her close vicinity coupled with the rapid expansion of Bolshevik revolutionary influence require strategically advantageous frontiers. This is why the Romanian delegation insisted to have common borders with both Poland and Czechoslovakia. Such a territorial arrangements was to prevent a direct connection between Russia and Hungary motivated especially by the fear of Bolshevik revolution. During the plenary reunion of the Peace Conference of 31 May 1919, Bratianu explicitly underlined that the frontier in Bukovina needs to be settle as to facilitate a common Romanian-Polish border.

The issue of the Romanian-Hungarian border was especially complicated. Although the war ended in Western Europe in November 1918, the hostilities continued on the Eastern front. Romania was not part of the armistice signed by the Allies with Hungary on 31 October/13 November 1919 which agreed on a provisory separation line between Romania and Hungary on the Mures river in Transylvania³³.

³² Telegram sent by General Berthelot to Clemenceau, 9 January 1919, in Ion Ardeleanu et al (cords), p. 1307

³³ AMFA, Fond 71/1914. E2, Part I, vol. 178, f. 67-68, Report of General Constantin Prezan, Head of General Staff, to Ion I.C. Bratianu, President of the Council of Ministers regarding the implications of the military conventions signed at Villa Giusti and Belgrade, no. 1667, 6/19 January 1919, Bucharest

Therefore, Romania refused to accept the armistice decisions being argued that the new frontier does not correspond with the ethnical realities, the principle of nationalities, the declaration of the self-determination of the Romanian National Council from Transylvania as well as the provisions of the 1916 political Convention.

The situation became even more complicated due to the rapid developments in Hungary where the Bolsheviks under the lead of Bela Kun took over the power and proclaimed the Republic of Councils. This was to raise a double challenge for Romania: on one hand, the spread of Bolshevik revolution and, on the other hand, the territorial revisionist agenda assumed by the Hungarian Bolshevik government. The Allied Great Powers acknowledged the Hungarian problem but found difficult to agree on how to manage it notwithstanding the growing concerns regarding internal political-ideological shift in Hungary. Facing the Bolshevik destabilizing actions on both eastern and western directions and having the support of the French General Staff (Bratianu also acknowledged the confidential advice sent by Clemenceau in support of launching the military intervention³⁴), the Romanian Government approved the military intervention leading to the occupation of Budapest by the Romanian army on August 4, 1919 and the removal of the Bolshevik government from power. Bucharest warned the Allied Powers that it's vitally important for Romania to secure a stable and easily defended border with Hungary to take into consideration the ethnical, economic and strategic dimensions³⁵.

By June 1919, the Allied Powers reached a consensus regarding the final design of Romania's new frontiers being recognized *de jure* the decisions of unification of the Romanians from former Austria-Hungary and Bessarabia.

However, Romania's position regarding the Treaty of Minorities generated a sort of mini-crisis during the Peace Conference. The reason was Bucharest's reluctance to accept being compelled to sign the Treaty for the protection of minorities, which was annexed to the Treaty with Austria, as a precondition for the recognition of its new territorial enlargement. As a result, the prime minister Bratianu left the Conference and refused to sign the Peace Treaties. Facing growing pressures from the Supreme Council, Bratianu preferred to resign (September 12, 1919) and a new government was established. On November 15, 1919, the Inter-Allied Supreme Council sent an ultimatum asking the new government to accept within 8 days "without discussion, without reservations, and without conditions" to sign the two treaties (with Austria and the Treaty on minorities), otherwise the member countries of the Council will break the diplomatic relations with Romania.

Facing growing international pressures, Bucharest decided, with delay, to sign

³⁴ AMFA, Fond 71/1914. E2, Part I, vol. 181, f. 29, Telegram sent by Ion I. C. Bratianu to Mihail I. Pherekyde, President ad-interim of the Council of Ministers, 4 February 1919, Paris

³⁵ Important to mention that in October 1919, the Memorandum issued by Miklos Horthy stated that: "The No. 1 enemy is Romania because our biggest territorial claims are against her and she is the strongest neighbor country. This is why the main goal of [Hungary]'s foreign policy is to solve the issue with Romania even by using weapons", In *Istoria Militara a poporului roman* (Military History of the Romanian People), vol. VI, Bucuresti: Militara, 1989, p. 10; see also Florin Constantiniu, *O istorie sincera a poporului roman* [An honest history of the Romanian People], Univers Enciclopedic, Bucuresti, 2010, pp. 300-301

the peace treaties. The Treaty with Austria signed by Romania on December 10, 1919 recognized the rights of Romania over the former Duchy of Bukovina. On the same day, it was signed the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria which re-confirmed the pre-war Romanian-Bulgarian border (as settled in 1913). The Treaty of Sevres signed on 10 August 1920 settled the terms of the Romania-Poland common border.

The issue of Bessarabia was settled through the Treaty of Paris signed on October 28, 1920 between Romania and Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan being recognized the unification of Bessarabia. The status of Bessarabia was a special case since this territory was not included in the 1916 Treaty. However, the democratic process that led to the declaration of independence and then unification with Romania was recognized as legitimate and therefore the Allied Powers admitted its integration as part of the Romanian Kingdom.

Great Britain, France and Italy ratified the treaty between 1920 and 1927, but Japan never did. The United States refused to accept it on the grounds that no territorial change concerning the former Tsarist Empire should be made without the consent of a representative government in Russia. The issue of Bessarabia was partially solved when the USA agreed in 1933 to include Bessarabia as part of the immigration quota for Romania. In such a way, even indirectly, the USA recognized the Romanian sovereignty over the territory between Prut and Dniester.

A few conclusions

For Romania, it was obvious that the national territorial project that shaped the entire country's conduct during the war, was to highly depend on the support of the allied powers and the way in which the "Big Four" were to design their own agenda of interests and geopolitical concerns. Nevertheless, the prime minister Ion I. C. Bratianu ruled out any compromise on the borders being argued that the free will expressed by the Romanian population in line with the self-determination principles and the commitments assumed by the Allied powers in 1916 are not subject of negotiations.

However, the reluctance of the Allied Powers to fulfill their commitments, the separate peace signed by Romania with the Central Powers (May 1918) and Wilson's opposition towards all secret treaties concluded during the war weakened Romania's position during the Peace Conference. As the decision-making format evolved into the "Council of Four" by late March 1919, it was obvious that the interests of France, Great Britain, the USA, and, in a lesser extent, Italy were to prevail. Particularly important, France's security agenda and the emerging competitive interests shaped the strategic and geopolitical imperatives of the emerging post-war order. For France, the main priority was to solve the "German problem"- which also included the idea of creating strong allied states on Germany's Eastern border³⁶; the UK was rather concerned about the prospects of growing French hegemony in Europe while the US was seeking to overthrow the old European diplomacy and replace it with

³⁶ Robert Gerwarth, *The Vanquished. Why the First World war Failed to End, 1917-1923*, Penguin Books, 2017, p. 172

higher moral values and principles as the foundation of the Continental map (self-determination, collective security and international peace as the main vectors of the new American thinking).

For all the Great Allied Powers, it was obvious that the principles of nationalities and self-determination assumed a prominent position in shaping the new world order. However, it was widely acknowledged that the complicated territorial realities could not be resolved simply by redrawing borders to accommodate a broad variety of national demands. At the same time, the political and military realities in 1918-1919 highly limited the freedom of action of the Allied forces given the war fatigue and the contradictions emerged between them.

In Bucharest it was acknowledged the rising geopolitical competition between the victorious powers for influence in Central and Eastern Europe and the fact that the decision of the Peace Conference were to be a direct result of the realpolitik principles. Given its large natural resources, especially oil and gas, each of the main leading international actors sought to secure a better negotiation place with the Bucharest government as to get privileged access to its market and resources. Romania became an important target having in view its geopolitical position and the role she was expected to play in the regional balance of power. France was to play an important role as she sought to align Romania to its planned hegemonic design in Eastern Europe and counter the possible drive of Italy or Great Britain towards the region. The withdrawal of the US from the Peace Conference gave a renewed impetus to France's plans.

The growing great power contradictions proved beneficial for Romania. The absence of Russia was definitely a factor which influenced the final results of the Peace Conference in Romania's advantage especially with regard to the final setting of the frontiers in Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. Furthermore, Bucharest could manipulate the threat of Bolshevism which became a major concern for the Western powers to mobilize support for Romania's territorial project.

At the end of the Conference, Romania gained a territory larger than what it was promised through the Treaty of 1916. If in 1912, Romania's territory was 130177 square km with a population of 7160682, in 1920, the territory was extended to 295049 km with 15.541.424 inhabitants, more than doubled than before the war. Given the new territorial realities, strategic posture and the wealth of its resources, Romania was well placed to reach all its political goals.

There is also true that reaching an agreement on the final design of the frontiers generated a series of mini-crisis as happened in case of the Romanian-Hungarian frontier, the issue of Banat with Serbia or the status of Bessarabia. If the Romanian-Serbian issue over the Banat was finally settled so that the two countries could develop close security and military relations after the war, its main frontiers on the east-west-south axis with the Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria was to create a complex strategic and military situation for Romania. The borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia secured the frontiers in north/north-west but the Soviet Union never recognized the unification of Bessarabia. In fact, the Soviet Union did not recognize the entire Versailles settlement. The issue of how to defend its new acquired borders

was to soon become the key question that shaped the entire military and political thinking of the Romanian leadership.

Romania emerged at the end of the Paris Peace conference with not political-territorial issue in dispute-, but, however, the military-strategic problems were just about to start. The rationales are complex but the primary factor that weakened its foundation was the vulnerability shaping the position of a small power in the great power game. Since the beginning, the United Romania was to depend on both the allied Western support (France's support was especially important) and the ability/willingness of the war victorious powers to secure the Versailles world order and counter the revisionist European forces. Facing growing geopolitical unrest coupled with the failure of the Western allies to deliver on their commitments, Romania collapsed in less than 25 years against the background of a rapid shift in the systemic military balance and a change of power paradigm throughout Europe.

THE TREATY OF NEUILLY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE NATIONAL POWER OF BULGARIA

MG Grudi Angelov, PhD (Bulgaria)

On 27 November 1919 Bulgaria signed the Treaty of Neuilly that endorsed officially the end of its participation in the First World War. Between 1912 and 1918 the country was involved in three successive military conflicts (the two Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 as well as the First World War 1914 - 1918) to achieve the national ideal of unification. That historic act marked the end of these pursuits. Bulgarian historiography has already devoted much attention and large volumes to the aftermath of the treaty, yet, so far, no one has dared an attempt to determine its impact on the national power of Bulgaria. On the other hand, lately, theoretical works have emerged which emphasize the utility of the application of the historic approach for research on the problems of national power¹.

National power, as a complex phenomenon, stands out as a quantitative expression of the sum of the kinetic capabilities and the potential of the state, the positive and the negative aspects of power leverage and the foundations of the state. National power comprises a dynamic dimension and allows comparison with other nations and states. Multiple factors interact simultaneously to produce the unique conglomerate of national power: economic, political, military, social, territorial, informational, scientific, technological, etc. Indeed, particular time periods and certain epochs have witnessed the more or less perceptible prevalence of a certain factor or a set of factors. Yet, when one observes that specific timeframe, from 1900 to 1945, one cannot help distinguishing the four factors of crucial importance: the territorial, the social (demography and education), the economic and the military. Their presence poses no surprise as military theory is dominated by the idea of total war. Henceforth, the current article will focus exactly on the impact of the Treaty of Neuilly on these factors.

* * *

Treaty of Neuilly obliged Bulgaria to cede a territory of 11,278 square kilometers and afterward it covered 103,146.2 square kilometers, while at the onset of World War One the territory amounted to 114 424, 5 square kilometers². The annexation of almost 10 percent of the national territory also had a very pronounced qualitative aspect: Bulgaria relinquished lands and settlements with undoubted economic and strategic importance, inhabited by diligent and enterprising Bulgarian population: the districts of Dobrich, Balchik, Tutrakan, Bosilegrad with their district centers and part of the district of Struma and the towns of Silistra, Kavarna and Tsaribrod.

¹ See, for example: Ангелов, Гр. Б. Медникаров. Приложение на историческия подход при изследване на националната мощ. // Военен журнал, 2018, № 2, с. 9–21. [Angelov, Gr., B. Mednikarov. The Historical Approach in the Examination of the Nature of National Power. // Voenen zhurnal, 2018, № 2, pp. 9-21].

² Данаилов, Г. *Изследвания върху демографията на България* [Danailov, G. *Studies about the Bulgarian Demographics*], (София, 1930), p. 157.

This had a very negative effect on Bulgarian national power in terms of territory and demography. The negative influence was aggravated significantly in the context of the vastly enlarged territories and manifold increased population of neighboring countries³:

Table 1

	Territory (sq.km)		Population (millions)	
	Before the war	After the war	Before the war	After the war
Serbia (Yugoslavia)	48,303	248,100	2.311	13.5
Greece	63,211	127,000	2.631	6.205
Romania	130,177	295,000	7.234	17.7

After the end of the war, the demographic situation in Bulgaria gradually began to improve. According to the last pre-war census conducted in 1910, the population of the country was 4 337 513 people (2 206 685 men and 2 130 828 women). In the coming years, it changes as follows⁴:

Table 2

Year	Male	%	Female	%	Total
1920	2 420 784	49.9	2 426 187	50.1	4 846 971
1926	2 743 025	50.1	2 735 716	49.9	5 478 741
1934	3 053 893	50.2	3 024 046	49.8	6 077 939

The Bulgarian society was also deprived of around 100,000 men in their prime, who remained as prisoners of war (captives) of the Entente and contributed to the welfare of these countries with their workforce. They returned to the homeland in stages from the countries of their captivity: Great Britain and its dominions, Italy, France, Greece and the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. Their organized repatriation continued until 1921. In certain cases captives reached homeland as late as the 1930s, for the fate of thousands in Serbian and Greek internment the Bulgarian state received no advice whatsoever, others perished while in custody⁵.

By the end of 1939, the Bulgarian population was estimated at exactly 6 450 000. The increase in the population was due not so much to the birth rate as in that respect

³ Ibid, p. 159.

⁴ Мишайков, Д. *Изследвания върху населението на България в сравнение с някои други страни. Демографическа студия* [Mishaikov, D. *Studies about the Bulgarian Population in Comparison with some other countries*], (София, 1940), p. 8.

⁵ See, for example *Николов, Ст. Забравените герои. Пленническият въпрос от войните на България 1885–1918 г.* [Nikolov, St. The Forgotten Heroes. The Bulgarian Prisoners of War Issue, 1885–1918], (София, 2018), p. 221–236; *Николов, Ст. За съдбата на българските военнопленници и военноположници след Първата световна война от края на септември 1918 г. до края на 1920 г.* [On the Faith of the Bulgarian Prisoners of War and Hostages of War from the end of September 1918 to the end of 1919], *Минало*, 2007, № 1, p. 77–96.

Bulgaria lagged behind its neighbors, but due to the lower mortality of the population (deaths per 1000 inhabitants), and it outstripped them noticeably in that indicator⁶.

Table 3

	1935	1936	1937
Bulgaria	14.5	14.1	13.5
Greece	14.9	15.2	15.2
Yugoslavia	16.8	16.0	15.8
Romania	21.1	19.8	19.3

The gender ratio in the total population was changing, thus compensating for the loss of male population during World War I: according to the Ministry of Defense, they amount to 101 224 killed, dead and missing in action⁷. Although relatively low, the prevalence of men over women among the Bulgarian population persisted during the interwar period, with 990 women per 1,000 men in 1934. In this respect, Bulgaria differs sharply from its neighbors, where, at the same time, 1000 men matched 1017 women in Greece, 1022 in Yugoslavia, 1035 in Romania and 1036 in Turkey⁸. According to the public opinion at the time, the physiological difference between the two genders predetermined unambiguously their social roles, with the man being the guardian of the home and, hence, of the entire national territory, which made him an essential prerequisite of the national power of the state.

By the end of 1938 51.3% of Bulgarian men were in the age range from 20 to 65 years, which is the quota of the eligible for military service. In the Balkan countries, out of every 1000 men between the ages of twenty and sixty, 246 are Bulgarians, 232 Greeks and Yugoslavian subjects, 226 Romanians and 202 Turks. These proportions outlined clearly the size of the mobilization resource of each nation. The advanced age does not allow for any participation in military actions⁹.

As it has already been pointed out, education emerges as one of the key factors impacting the national power of any state. That fact has been well-known to the Bulgarian governments. Not long after the end of the war, a compulsory elementary 7-year education was introduced in Bulgaria with amendments and annexes to the National Education Act effective from 1924. For a little more than a decade (1919-1930) the number of primary schools increased, from 3472 to 4586. They provided education to 493 188 and 519 252 children respectively. The number of middle schools increased from 374 to 1412, and the number of students enrolled in them from 44 821 to 121 886¹⁰.

⁶ Mishaikov, D. *Studies about the Bulgarian Population*, pp. 6, 107.

⁷ State Military History Archive (DVIA), Fond 22, Opis 3, File 239, p. 429a.

⁸ Mishaikov, D. *Studies about the Bulgarian Population*, p. 35.

⁹ Ibid, pp. 35, 45.

¹⁰ Белдедов, Е. *Развой на образователното дело през последните двадесет години* [Beldedov, E. *Development of the Education in the Last Twenty Years*], Училищен преглед, 1938, № 8, p. 940-947.

This had a beneficial effect on the literacy rate of the Bulgarian population. Before the wars of 1912-1918, the literacy rate was 33.5%¹¹, but by December 31, 1934, it had reached 68.4%¹². The quota of literate men was higher than that of the women: it exceeds 80% for men of active age, which is a prerequisite for easier acquisition of the requirements of military science.

After the end of the First World War in Bulgaria, the institutions and the interactions in the field of research and development began to be more clearly structured and the infrastructure and personnel improved, and the scope of specific research projects expanded and deepened. Science was developed in close connection with higher education, with scientific achievements being used in the specialties and disciplines studied, and higher education institutions are the main centers of research and development through their material resources, financial resources, and teaching staff. Of particular importance are the research achievements in the newly opened (respectively in 1921 and in 1923) faculties of Sofia University, the one specializing in Agriculture and the one in Veterinary science. The research activity was carried out in the Balkan Middle East Institute (Free University), established in 1920 in Sofia, with majors in the field of economic and political sciences. The following year, a specialized Higher School of Economic Sciences was opened in Varna. In 1936, a Higher School of Commerce was established in Svishtov, meant to provide “theoretical and applied knowledge in the various branches of economic sciences”. In general, between 1920 and 1944 Bulgaria witnessed the inauguration of seven schools of higher education¹³. The Bulgarian Academy of Sciences focused mainly on the humanitarian and social sciences as it carried out scientific research in three fields of knowledge: historical-philological, philosophical-social and natural-mathematical¹⁴.

Research entities also existed within individual establishments. Within the Ministry of Agriculture and State Property, these were the Central Veterinary-Bacteriological Institute and the Central Agricultural Approbatory Institute. The Military History Commission and the State Geographic Institute operated within the structure of the Ministry of War¹⁵.

Various public associations on a professional basis were engaged in scientific activity: the Bulgarian Engineering-Architectural Society, the Bulgarian Chemical Society, the Bulgarian Microbiological Society, etc. They attracted the leading

¹¹ Danailov, G. *Studies about the Bulgarian Demographics*, p. 80.

¹² *История на България. Т. 9 [The History of Bulgaria. Volume 9]*, (София, 2012), p. 650.

¹³ *България 20 век. Алманах [Bulgaria in the Twentieth Century. An Almanac]*, (София, 1999), p. 639.

¹⁴ About the Bulgarian Academy of Science see details in: *История на Българската академия на науките. Първа част [The History of the Bulgarian Academy of Science. Part One]*, (София, 2016).

¹⁵ The most important unit among them, undoubtedly, is the Board of Military History to the HQ of the Armed Forces created in 1914. For its creation and development until today, see, for example Николов, Р., Ив. Христозов, Г. Ганев, Ст. Николов, Б. Жеков (съставители). *20 години Институт за перспективни изследвания за отбраната [Nikolov, R., I. Hristozov, G. Ganev, St. Nikolov, B. Zhekov (compilers). 20 Years Devence Advanced Research Institute]*, (София, 2019), p. 9–29.

names in the relevant scientific fields and representatives of the higher state administration.

The scientific output developed in these organizations facilitated the economic development of the state, which is the foundation of its national power.

* * *

The Bulgarian economy was in a critical state after the end of World War I. De facto, the Bulgarian economy entered a critical state after the end of the conflict. Bulgarian professor Georgi Danailov¹⁶ provided very clear calculations. According to him, the state expenditure amounted to more than 8 billion leva during the period of the Bulgarian participation in the war (1915 - 1918).

The signing of the peace treaty of Neuilly further aggravated the dire state of the Bulgarian economy. The country was forced to pay reparations amounting to 2 250 000,000 gold francs at a rate of interest of 5% for 37 years. According to the calculations, the annual installment of the country amounts to 134 million gold francs. These obligations caused a sharp increase in the external debt of the country¹⁷. Additional financial encumbrance was incurred with the support of the Allied military control, created in 1920 to monitor the compliance with the clauses of the peace treaty¹⁸.

On the other hand, territorial losses triggered a sharp decline in cereals production, followed by a severe downturn in foreign trade and a decrease in revenues. Due to its diplomatic isolation, Bulgaria could not rely on substantial external financial support¹⁹. This unfavorable situation was gradually overcome as a result of the economic policies of the Bulgarian governments, which was characterized by strict financial discipline and regulatory intervention by the state in the economy.

During the interwar period, Bulgaria continued to be a predominantly agricultural country. The annexation of arable land, where cereals were traditionally grown, led to a transformation in agriculture. Growing other industrial crops (cotton, sunflower, sugar beet, etc.) became more widespread. The country established itself as one of the leading producers of high-quality Oriental tobacco. Livestock production gradually recovered as well, at the beginning of 1921 the number of goats, sheep and cattle reached and even slightly exceeded the pre-war level. Provided raw materials from agriculture, the manufacturing industry doubled its production by 1929²⁰.

¹⁶ Danailov, G. *Les effets de la Guerre en Bulgarie*, (Paris, 1932), pp. 699–700.

¹⁷ More in *История на външния държавен дълг на България, 1878–1990. Втора част [The History of the Bulgarian Foreign Debt, 1878–1990. Part Two]*, (София, 2008), p. 9–59.

¹⁸ Станев, Вл. *Междусъюзническият военен контрол в България (1920–1927)* [Stanev, Vl. *The Inter-Allied Military Control in Bulgaria (1920–1927)*], (София, 2019), p. 84–99.

¹⁹ *The History of Bulgaria. Volume 9*, p. 52–55.

²⁰ Димитров, М. *Държавата и икономиката в България между двете световни войни 1919–1939 г. Факти, анализи и оценки за икономическата политика* [Dimitrov, M. *The State and the Economy in Bulgaria between the two World Wars, 1919–1939. Facts, Analyzes, and Estimates about the Economic Policy*], (София, 2014), p. 139–153.

Table 4

Year	General index of the volume of the industrial output
1921	100
1929	209

The financial stability impacted positively the public finance. From 1921 to 1930 the state budget doubled.

Table 5

Fiscal Year	State Expenditure in BGN
1920/1921	3 059 080 383
1929/1930	7 430 021 899

The global economic crisis (1929–1933) slowed the pace of development of the Bulgarian post-war economy, but after the end of the Great Depression, the Bulgarian economy continued its positive growth. It was of great importance to establish ever-closer economic relations with Germany, which began to regain its role as a Great Power after 1933. The “auspicious complementarity” between the agricultural potential of Bulgaria and the industrial capabilities of the Third Reich made a significant contribution to the development of the Bulgarian economy over the last peaceful years in Europe²¹.

The positive growth of the Bulgarian economy during the interwar period amounted to a continuous reinforcement of the national power of the country. The permanent increase of the state budget created favorable conditions for the increase of the defense expenditure of Bulgaria. As far back as the first post-war decade, the budget of the Ministry of War began to catch up with the levels of expenditure on the eve of World War I. Between 1921 and 1929, an average of 18% of the state budget was allocated to the Armed Forces (in 1914 Bulgaria’s military budget was about 21% of the total budget). During the global economic crisis, the share of defense spending declined, but as early as 1935 the military budget exceeded 1/5 of the total, and in 1938 it was now nearly 1/3 of it.

²¹ Анкета на едрата и покровителствената индустрия в Царство България през 1921 г. [A Poll for the Heavy and Patronized Industry in Bulgaria], (София, 1925, книжка 4), р. 626; *The History of Bulgaria. Volume 9*, р. 77–95; *Статистически годишник на Царство България за 1921 г.* [The Statistical Yearbook of the Kingdom of Bulgaria for 1921], (София, 1921); *Статистически годишник на Царство България за 1930 г.* [The Statistical Yearbook of the Kingdom of Bulgaria for 1930], (София, 1930); Тодоров, Д. *Насърчаваната индустрия и индустриална политика в България* [Todorov, D. *The Patronized Industry and the Industrial Policy in Bulgaria*], Стопанска мисъл, 1933, № 4, р. 48, 56.

Table 6

Fiscal Year	Budget of the Ministry of War in BGN	Proportion of the military budget of the total budget in percent
1920/1921	587 375 069	19.3
1924/1925	6 604 250 000	19.0
1928/1929	1 182 419 660	16.5
1935	1 255 457 739	21.0
1938	2 367 295 940	32.4

The distribution of the spending part of the military budget was also gradually changing. By the end of the 1920s, on average, more than 80% of the budget of the Ministry of War was spent on manpower, which could be explained with the replacement of the mandatory military service with a professional army. Only about 3% was spent on weapons and ammunition. This trend changed over the next decade, and on the eve of World War II, 31% of the military budget was allotted for military equipment, weapons, and ammunition. The peak was reached in 1939 when 40% of the military budget was apportioned for arms and ammunition²².

* * *

Perhaps military power is the essential component of the national power of any nation. Undoubtedly the Neuilly Peace Treaty had a devastating impact on the Bulgarian Armed Forces. The Neuilly Peace Treaty made the Bulgarian army an institution primarily for solving domestic political problems. It was of limited size (33,000 strong along with guards at the borders, in the field and in the forests) and was staffed through voluntary recruitment, did not have a system for military education (only the Military School was allowed). A ban on the training of officers abroad was imposed. The Allied Military Control Committee, created by the victors in the war, strictly monitored the actions of dismantlement or export outside Bulgaria of all types of military weapons and equipment that exceeded the quantities and qualities fixed in the Treaty of Neuilly²³. De facto, according to clauses of the peace treaty, the Armed Forces could hardly fulfill in this form their role as a potent protector of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Bulgarian state and they were turned into an institution for solving problems of a domestic character.

The abolition of compulsory military service and its replacement by voluntary service had an extremely adverse effect on the country's military might. Taking into account the fact that after the First World War nearly 70% of the Bulgarian population lived in the villages and its main occupation is agriculture, filling the army with volunteers became

²² Петров, Л. *Военната икономика на България 1919–1945* [Petrov, L. *Issues about the Bulgarian Military Policy, 1934–1939*], (София, 1999), p. 30–35; Стателова, Ел., Ст. Грънчаров. *История на нова България 1878–1944. Том III* [Statelova, E., S. Grancharov. *The History of New Bulgaria, 1878–1944. Volume III*], (София, 1999), p. 578–580.

²³ Central State Archive (TsDA), Fond 284K, Opis 2, File 218, p. 1–63.

a difficult problem. The abolition of the conscript system effectively put Bulgaria in a position of inability to prepare a mobilization reserve of trained soldiers.

The training of officers and non-commissioned officers was no better. According to the Peace Treaty, by decree No. 96 of December 19, 1920, the Military Academy, all schools and Navy schools were disbanded. Thus, the preparation of command staff for the army became very difficult. The situation was further complicated by the ban on training of officers abroad. Of all military educational institutions, only the military school remained in operation²⁴. In this form, the armed forces could hardly fulfill its role as a full-fledged guarantor of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Bulgarian state.

The government of the Bulgarian Agricultural Peoples Union (BNAU) carried out the re-adjustment of the armed forces in compliance with the treaty through the acts²⁵ of 1921 and 1922. The newly formed eight infantry regiments did not differ in principle from the earlier divisions and the infantry “troops” from the former regiments. The divisions of the Fourth Regiments were reorganized and incorporated as complementary parts of the newly created regiments, the armed forces districts were renamed first-class garrisons, seemingly performing only the Commandant’s Service.

The Border Guard Force, created in compliance with the Neuilly Peace treaty, had a very limited strength (only 3000 men) which posed severe difficulty when providing real protection of the state borders²⁶. Indicative in this respect is the incident between Bulgarian and Greek border guards of 19 October 1925 when a Greek border guard was killed on Bulgarian territory. With the causes of the incident still unclear because of a pending investigation by representatives of the Greek and Bulgarian border services, Prime Minister Pangalos ordered an unexpected attack on Bulgaria. On 22 October 1925, without any declaration of war by Greece, its troops invaded the district of Petrich. During the incursion, the Greek troops infiltrated some 20 km into Bulgarian territory, causing severe material damage. A total of 14 people were killed: 4 soldiers, 4 police volunteers, and 6 locals, two of whom were children. The line of combat extended 40 km along the border. The Greeks occupied seven villages on both banks of the Struma River. The attack involved ground and aerial bombardment in Petrich and nearby villages. The small border-guard force had to withstand the pressure of the entire Fourth Thessaloniki Corps with 20,000 well-armed Greek soldiers. The Bulgarians mustered fierce resistance to the Greek troops. By order of the Minister of War, six infantry companies and three machine-gun companies, eight mountain guns and one pioneer company were re-directed. Despite their apparent superiority, the Greeks were stopped, with many casualties. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) and the local population also contributed to the

²⁴ Станчев, Ст., Р. Николов. *История на Сухопътните войски на България. Том втори* [Stanchev, St., R. Nikolov. *The History of the Bulgarian Land Forces. Volume Two*], (София, 2017), p. 18–24.

²⁵ *Държавен вестник* [State Gazette], Issue 27, 27 May 1921; *ibid*, Issue 292, 29 March 1923.

²⁶ Прокопиев, А. *Пограничната стража на България в условията на Ньойския договор* [Prokoriev, A. *The Bulgarian Border Guard under the Neuilly Treaty*], in: 100 години независима България: стълбовете на държавността (София, 2009), p. 177.

defense. However, Bulgaria could not sustain its defense for long. That was why the government of Alexander Tsankov appealed for support in front of the League of Nations in Geneva. A special meeting of its standing committee came up with a resolution that strongly condemned the Greek invasion. The victorious countries of the First World War this time did justice by defending Bulgaria²⁷.

Although the military restrictions severely hurt the Bulgarian armed forces, from the very beginning, the rulers in Sofia made efforts to circumvent them. For example, part of the weapons were concealed from the Allied Control Commission. Measures were also being taken to introduce “off-site” military training through labor service²⁸. From the summer of 1923, the gradual reduction of the period of voluntary military service began, so that as many people as possible could pass through the ranks of the armed forces. Efforts were also being made to militarize the gendarmerie authorized by the peace treaty. The relationship between the gendarmerie and the armed forces were codified in the Gendarmerie Act and the Regulations for its implementation, which gave the Minister of War all rights and obligation concerning the training, the scope of operation and control on the gendarmerie units in the country²⁹. This created prerequisites for the gendarmerie to become part of the Bulgarian armed forces.

Armed Forces also saw significant organizational changes as 16 Gendarmerie troops and 8 cavalry troops were formed.

In addition, the Bulgarian governments were also working to circumvent the negative effects of the peace treaty related to the preparation of officers for the armed forces. In 1922, a clandestine operation of the Military Academy began on its territory under the name “Tutorial Course”. Initially, it included ten officers of the first graduates of the Academy from 1915, still in active service in the ranks of the heavily reduced post-1919 Bulgarian armed forces. In 1923 the training of the first regular three-year course also commenced, and new 21 officers were enrolled. After this year, students doing a three-year training course began to enroll every other year, with the next enrollment being in 1925 when another 14 people were admitted. On 16 July 1927, an order was issued by the Minister of War, General Ivan Valkov, and then for the first time, the name of the course became officially known. The name continued to be used until 31 March 1938, when the school restored its name of Military Academy. All this occurred in close connection with the signing of the Salonika Agreement (also called the Thessaloniki Accord) in the same year and the expiration of the restriction of the Treaty of Neuilly. Since 1930, the staffing and the organizational structure of the Academy underwent significant changes aiming at its development. The period of study still remained three years, but the students were already arranged in classes. A new specialty was introduced in 1931 and was aimed

²⁷ Прокопиев, А. *Охраната на държавните граници на България от Освобождението до 1946 г.* [Prokopiev, A. *The Protection of the State Borders of Bulgaria from the Liberation to 1946*], in: *Охрана на българските държавни граници 681–2006*, (София, 2011), p. 93–94

²⁸ Стоилов, П., М. Йонов, Л. Петров. *Българската армия като институция (1878–1944 г.)* [Stoilov, P. M. Ionov, L. Petrov. *The Bulgarian Army as an Institution (1878–1944)*], in: *България 1300. Институция и държавна традиция*. Т. I. (София, 1981), p. 380.

²⁹ Stanchev, St., R. Nikolov. *The History of the Bulgarian Land Forces. Volume Two*, p. 27.

at the preparation of officers as quartermasters. In this way, two separate departments were formed in the Academy: General (Common) and Quartermaster. In total, during the period 1922-1944, 16 officers graduated from the Academy (16 general staff and 11 quartermasters), and 521 officers received diplomas, of whom 10 were foreigners³⁰.

In breach of the military restrictions of the peace treaty, the end of the 1920s also the restoration of the practice to send Bulgarian officers to further their qualifications abroad. Over the next decade, the number of officers sent overseas increased steadily. According to a report dated 2 September 1939, prepared for the needs of the Army Headquarters, it is clear that in 1939 over 110 Bulgarian officers had been or were on specialization, more than half of them in Germany³¹. Since the end of the 1920s the position of Bulgarian Military Attaché was gradually reinstated. This extended the capabilities of the Bulgarian armed forces leadership to monitor foreign experience in military construction. For example, in November 1937, the study department of the Ministry of War sought assistance to gather information about the military in some countries (Italy, Greece, France, Hungary, Yugoslavia, USSR, and Germany) and the first information from the military attaches was obtained in early 1938³².

The cessation of the operation of the Allied Committee in 1928 opened the opportunity to take measures for the organizational strengthening of the Armed Forces. The former eight regiments were organized into divisions and the military inspection districts became four and began to play the role of army headquarters. Two divisions, a cavalry group, an artillery regiment, and an engineering regiment, were detached to each district. Significant changes also occurred in the organization and the structure of the artillery, the engineering troops, the cavalry, etc³³. Particular attention was also paid to the systematic preparation of troops. In 1928, bilateral maneuvers were conducted in the area of Shipka, which tested the designed wartime mobilization plan.

At the same time, a significant step was made to bring the Armed Forces in line with the increased requirements of the time: the first plan for the deployment of the Bulgarian Armed Forces was drawn out after the signing of the Treaty of Neuilly. According to it, the eight divisions of peacetime would double in wartime. Four separate armies were formed, each with four infantry divisions, a cavalry division, an air regiment, rear troops, and services. Auxiliary troops were also envisaged: first and second draft with eight stage regiments and the same number of regiments of the volunteer force. The plan as a theoretical development is an indisputable achievement of the Bulgarian military-theoretical thought, although it does not fully correspond to

³⁰ Petrov, T., St. Stanchev. 105 Years "Georgi Stoykov Rakovski" National Defense College. Sofia: Rakovski National Defense College, pp. 14–15.

³¹ DVIA, Fond 22, Opis 3, File 302, p. 391–393, 396.

³² DVIA, Fond 22, Opis 3, File 295, p. 459–460; Жеков, Б. *Българската армия и усвояването на бойния опит от Най-голямата война 1939–1945 г.* [Zhekov, B. *The Bulgarian Army and the Adoption of the Battle Experience from the Second World War, 1939–1945*], in: *Великите сили, Балканите и България през Втората световна война*. София, 2016, с. 259.

³³ *Кратък обзор на бойния състав, организацията, попълването и мобилизацията на българската армия от 1878 до 1944 г.* [A Brief Overview on the Combat staff, the Organization, the Replenishment and the Mobilization of the Bulgarian Army from 1878 to 1944], (София, 1961), p. 127–128.

the real resources of the state at the moment³⁴.

In 1934, the peacetime Armed Forces included 25 infantry, 9 artillery, 8 cavalry and 4 engineer regiments, a railway and signals regiment, and other units and formations. The personnel amounted to 57 262, including 2 615 officers and 3 421 non-commissioned officers. 98.1% of the personnel were in the Army, 0.8% in the Air Force and 1.1% in the Navy. The ratio between the services and the branches shows a complete failure to comply with the requirements for structural proportions adopted in the Armed Forces of the leading powers³⁵.

The necessary equipment (armament, combat vehicles, communications, chemical, optical and another materiel), as stated by the Army Headquarters, “does not meet the contemporary requirements”³⁶. There was a large shortage of ammunition and the motorization of the military units was insignificant. The Army did not have anti-tank guns, tanks, and other modern assets for armed combat, the Air Force did not have even one modern aircraft, and the Navy had only four old torpedo destroyers and two patrol ships that were “unsuitable for modern combat operations.” On this basis, the Army Headquarters acknowledged that “the materiel stockpiles of the Armed Forces are very slim, to say the least.” That was one of the reasons why Bulgaria followed the line of “peaceful revisionism”, of neutrality and independence in its international relations.

However, all governments worked to turn the armed forces into a massive modern armed force to increase its importance as a “foreign policy tool”, to actively promote the state policy of revision of the Treaty of Neuilly. As early as the mid-1930s, with the assistance of Germany, a process of secretly rearming the army began. But the process of restoration of the Armed Forces became official after the abolishment of the military clauses of the Treaty of Neuilly with the Thessaloniki Accord in 1938. The opportunity for accelerated modernization was given to the Bulgarian Armed Forces, which would, in turn, make it the foundation of the national power. The Armed Forces exceeded 72,000 servicemen, possessed relatively modern armament and were able to guarantee the national sovereignty of Bulgaria on the eve of World War II³⁷.

* * *

The Treaty of Neuilly signed on November 27, 1919, dealt a heavy blow to Bulgaria’s national power in all its manifestations. Despite that, in the next 20 years, the entirety of the material and spiritual resources of Bulgaria, which formed its national power, developed and gradually overcame the negative consequences of the defeat of the country in World War I. This allowed Bulgaria to rebuild and expand its influence in the Balkan region and, on the eve of World War II, to become a desirable partner of the conflicting geopolitical antagonists in the European arena.

³⁴ Йонов, М. *Българската армия като държавна институция след Първата световна война 1919–1929 г.* [Ionov, M. *The Bulgarian Army as a State’s Institution after the First World War, 1919–1929*], (София, 1995), p. 235; Stanchev, St., R. Nikolov. *The History of the Bulgarian Land Forces. Volume Two*, p. 54–55.

³⁵ Petrov, L. *Issues about the Bulgarian Military Policy, 1934–1939*, p. 141–156.

³⁶ Stoilov, P. M. Ionov, L. Petrov. *The Bulgarian Army as an Institution (1878–1944)*, p. 383.

³⁷ Petrov, L. *Issues about the Bulgarian Military Policy, 1934–1939*, p. 156–192.

Tuesday, 20 August

A GHOST WONDERS AROUND VERSAILLES. THE ALLIES AND THE RED RUSSIA IN 1919

Dr. Paolo Formiconi (Italy)

Introduction

In recent times the Western world has been quite in trouble with Russia. This is basically/mainly caused by the coming back to the scene of the Russian power, started ten years ago after the eclipse following the end of the Soviet system.

The European powers and the US has known the main situation a century ago, after the fall of the tsar and the rise of the Soviet power.

When the tsar lost the power in the February/March 1917, the country fell in a dangerous and confused state. The power was taken by the Russian parliament - the Duma - inside which was established a Provisional Government. Immediately, Great Britain, France, Italy and the US asked the respect of the treaty signed by the tsar, and the Provisional Government assured it. In this decision was important the menace to stop all financial and material help to Russia. Such decision destroyed the greatest part of the trust between the Russian new government and the population, especially the soldiers.

The Russian participation in the Great War was a fundamental pivot/pillar in the Entente strategy in the WWI. It was exactly for this reason that the German intelligence took part in the conspiracy oriented to cause the fall of the Russian Provisional Government.

The most powerful factor which could cause a riot in Russia, and consequently to put her out of the war, was the small Bolshevik Party, headed by an almost -unknown leader, Vladimir Uljanov Lenin living in exile in Zurich.

An old revolution-companion of Lenin, Alexander Helfand, has become a rich international trade merchant and lived in Berlin. Helfand took the first contact with Lenin by offering him the free pass through Germany, to Russia. The agreement included also the transfer of a big amount of money.

Lenin accepted, and in the first days of April he arrived in St. Petersburg. The life of provisional government became immediately in danger. The Lenin's demands, peace, bread, land, called quickly the most part of the Army and the factory-workers on his side. And after two failed riots - in April and in July - in November 1917 the Bolshevik Party took the power with a typical military golpe.

After the Bolshevik coup d'état, and the following fall of the Provisional Government, the first act of the new power was the immediate request of a ceasefire to the German Army. General Dukhonin, the Chief of the Army Staff of the Russian Army, who had refused to undersign the act, was killed and replaced by the navy-private Krylenko.

The Entente Powers were terribly scared about these events/what happened. A peace between the Austro-Germans and the Bolsheviks meant the consequent sending on the western front of two or more millions of soldiers. This would happen in a critical/serious/grievous moment of the war: the 23th of October the austro - german

Army has broken the Isonzo front and was still pushing back the Italian Army toward Venice.

Luckily for the Western Countries, in the first weeks of the 1918 the application of the agreement between Berlin and Moscow, the new Russian capital, was not easy like it could be. The austro-germans demands were higher than the Bolshevik previsions, and the negotiations, started in Brest-Litovsk, a city located on the borders, become immediately difficult and long-lasting .

This fact gave a chance to the Entente diplomacy. During the Provisional Government period many delegations and intelligence missions from Italy, Great Britain and France has been sent to Russia in order to maintain the country enter the Entente and the war too. Some negotiations were also with some Bolshevik leaders like Kamenev and Bucharin, but then stopped after the Lenin return.

Now, the new Commissar for the foreign affairs, Leon Trockij, understood that a simultaneous talk with the Western Powers could bring some advantages to the Russian position, that was in this period very weak. The Russian Army was indeed in almost total disintegration.

During this period some little expeditionary forces took land without contrast in the northern of Russia to patrol the weapons and material storage sent in Russia in the previous months.

At this point the German General Staff broke the negotiations and ordered an advance into the Russian territory. Ordering to not answering to the fire the Bolsheviks wished to produce a mutiny in the German troops, but this did not come. When the Germans were at the gates of St. Petersburg, Minsk and Kiev, Lenin accepted the heavy conditions of the armistice, bringing all the resources of the Eastern Europe to Germany.

Some in the Russian Government, especially in the left-current of the Social democratic party, tried to persuade Lenin to restart the war joint with the Western Powers, but in vain. The treaty were signed the 3th march 1918 in Brest-Litovsk.

This was the beginning of the fracture between the two souls of the Russian revolutionary power, fated to produce many severe consequences in the following months.

Allied reactions were rough, but substantially weak: the 5th of april a British contingent occupied the docks of Vladivostok, at the same time all the allies diplomatic delegates refused to follow the Bolshevik Government to Moscow and asked of leave Russia immediately. Only the chief of the Italian military mission, general Romei Longhena went to Moskow, trying to keep a channel with the Russian power. He comments: “if we’ll shake all the diplomatic delegates in a cauldron, not even a drop of logic will come out”.

Plots, invasions and espionage

German was fast to keep the fruits of the victory. The 13 of march a contingent took land in Finland, and at the same time an expeditionary force occupied Ukraine, white Russia and all the Baltic coast untill 40 km from Petrograd. In may Berlin announced to Russians that all the Georgian territory was under the German protection.

Lenin was shocked by this rough style, and authorized Trockij to restart the connections with the Entente, asking the sending of a military mission to rebuild the Russian Army.

It's hard to imagine where these agreements could have arrived if the 14th of May the Czech Legion, and the Bolshevik forces hadn't start fighting.

In the Supreme War Council of the 3th of June, the Allied Powers decided to help the Czech Legion and with this, the possibility of a cooperation between Red Russia and Allied Powers were suspended for twenty years.

Despite the opinion of many Entente's leaders, the alliance didn't declare war to Bolshevik Russia. The European powers hadn't the necessary energies, and the US President Wilson explained very clearly that the Congress and the people of the US were absolutely in disagreement with any hypothesis of intervention in Russia.

The strategy was to joint a secret help to the Czech Legion and to the new-borned *white russian* parties with the sending of some expeditionary forces in the Russian main ports. After the destruction of the "red power", a new Russian government would restart the war against Germany.

In the end part of spring almost all Siberia was under the powers of the Czech Legion and the ports of Archangelsk and Murmansk were occupied by British and Canadian forces. The 30 of June Czechs and allies mariners occupied the city of Vladivostok.

Still now we are not capable to know the steps of the allied intelligence operation, strongly sustained by Winston Churchill, but we can be quite sure that through the British Legations many agents took contact with the social-revolutionary party to organise the fall of Bolshevik power.

On the 6th of July the German ambassador in Russia von Mirbach was executed by two SR agents in Moscow. At the same time a battalion of the Ceka, controlled by the SR Party, tried a *coup d'état*, failed at the last moment, while the Congress of the Marxist parties in Moscow.

The bad news were still not enough. The 17th of July the president Wilson authorized a little expeditionary force to occupy Vladivostok joint with Japanese and Anglo-Italian-French contingents, but his rules were limited to protect the evacuation of the Czech Legion.

The 30th of July the same fate of the ambassador shot the German military governor of Ukraine by social-revolutionary agents.

Assured the power, Lenin came on that a new agreement with Germany was obligatory. The 27th of August a new treaty between Russia and Germany fixed new terms of their cooperation: instead food and raw materials, Germany would have returned to Russia White Russia and the eastern-half of Ukraine. Probably, the pact included also the exportation of revolutionary riots in all Entente's territories, in Europe and in Asia.

The reaction was immediate. At the end, the 30 August, Moseij Urickij, chief of the Soviet police and maker of the Winter's Palace capture, were killed in Petrograd. The same day also Lenin was shot with three bullets by a SR female leader.

The same evening, a crowd of red guards and factory workers attacked the British

embassy and killed the naval liaison officer, the commander Francis Cromie, and arrested under accuse of espionage many others officers. In all Russia the repression were indiscriminate, and went to increase in the following months.

The Entente Powers were in these moment too much dramatically busy in Europe to realize a retaliation. Only the US and the Japanese Government were capable to do it, but both them were not interested to encourage the anglo-french policy in Russia.

The only thing that Paris, London and Rome could do, was to help, as far was possible, the anti-Bolshevik forces that in Siberia, following the riot of the Czech Legion, were organizing a democratic government. At the same time, arose others white government, that took the control of some border regions of the former Russian Empire, in Archangelsk, in Vladivostock, in Estonia and in southern Ukraine-Kuban.

In the following months, 8.000 US soldiers and 50.000 Japanese troops, joint with a few of miles of Italian, French, Canadian and British soldiers, arrive in Russia, but with the caveat to don't take part in any fighting.

Nevertheless, President Wilson ordered to his commander in Russia, general Graves, to not look for contacts with any Russian politician. The only agreement that had been realized, was, on the 4th of July, with the Japanese Government, to fix the limits of the mutual collaboration.

The American strategy would have been repaid. The German summer offensive failed at the beginning of September, and in November the war in Europe suddenly ended, with the defeat of Central Powers. Russia were now in power of his enemies: the western capitalist powers.

When Germany and Austria surrendered, Bolsheviks were taking advantage in the civil war, after a difficult summer. The Entente's victory changed immediately the frame. The 17th of November with a military *coup d'état* the admiral Alexander Kolchack took power in Siberia, deleting the rest of the democratic Russia, and building a *white dictatorship* to fight a total war against bolshevism.

The Entente's Supreme Commander general Foch, thought that this war the correct moment to start a real campaign against the Red Russia and, agree with the British Minister of military supplies Churchill, proposed his plan to the Presidents Wilson and Clemenceau and the Prime Ministers Lloyd George and Orlando. All them refused. European peoples were tired and shocked by the bloody war and all their countries were financially exhausted. The main question was organize a good peace, not start another war.

In the same days Lenin was terrified by the possibility of an allied invasion. Frantically, he looked a method to restart the old contacts with the western governments. Luckily, two important members of the US presidential staff, the colonel Mendel House and the colonel Robins of the American Red Cross were strongly interested to an agreement with Russia. On the 24th of October, through his Foreign Affairs Minister Cicerin, the Russian leader offered many facilities to the western powers: safety for the American banks in Russia, exclusive contracts for the exploitation of mines and forests. "Tell us clearly: how much" said Lenin.

At the first seemed that the Entente's will was the war: the 24th of December Odessa were occupied by the anglo-french fleet, and the 12th of January 1919 the

marshal Foch showed his new plan for an invasion of Russia using Polish, Finnish and Baltic troops. Winston Churchill was strongly arguing this solution, but Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando were still not convinced. They wouldn't accept the Bolshevik Republic, but they wouldn't at the same time start a new conflict.

The only decision, was the handing of a lot of quantity of war-issues to the White Armies through the ports of Vladivostok.

Lenin, believing to being at the day before the invasion and still in difficulty in fighting with the *White Armies*, resigned himself to ask a peace conference with anti-Bolshevik delegates under the Entente protection.

After ten days, the Allies Powers accepted, and fixed the meeting in the island of Prikipo, behind Istanbul. The 4th of February the Russian foreign Commissar announced the Bolsheviks adhesion, and assured the total loan repayment to the Allies of Russian war debt (17.000.000.000 of gold pounds).

When the announcement become in the public domain, the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, thought that this was the end of the Revolution.

Incredibly, the white Russians refused to take part in the conference. Probably they thought to be only a feet far from the victory, or they were convinced by Churchill that only a uncompromising behaviour will bring them the final success. At the same time, on the 18th of February polish and Russian troops started to fight on the polish-Lithuanian borders.

Annoyed, President Wilson the 18th of February sent in Russia a personal delegate, William Bullit, attached to the US embassy in Paris. Lenin confirmed to him his own decision to recognize the white governments like interlocutors, but when Bullit was coming back to Paris with a written guarantee, the 7th of march the Admiral Kolchak's Army, started his last offensive to Moskow.

Wilson made him report that he wasn't capable to speak with him at the moment and the peace conference faded away. The US President and the Italian and british premiers were still not totally convinced by the military way, but Foch, Clemenceau and Churchill persuaded them to stop any negotiations until the end of the battle. However, they didn't obtain the formal recognition of the Admiral like *only Russian legal power*. Japanese and US army didn't help the white army to fight Bolsheviks, and also the Czech legion start his coming back from the fighting front right at the offensive's beginning.

Churchill commented "The Allied Powers didn't choice about war or peace [...]. They are immobile between the two options, equally booth disgusting to them".

Without Allie's help, the *White Army* were defeated after four months of heavy fighting. To win this crucial battle, Lenin and his War Commissar Trockij accepted many compromise, also the cooptation of former monarchist officers in the Red Russia and the independence of many border-territories of the old Empire, like Finland and Baltic countries.

After the Kolchak's defeat, one by one the other *White Armies* were eliminated before the end of the spring. Many times Allie's forces had been involved in fighting, but, differently from Churchill previsions, it didn't bring the war with Russia. Lenin

was now in advantage position. He has understood the Entente's policy, or the Entente's not-policy toward Russia.

He made before the end of 1919 an agreement with the other two defeated countries, Turkey and Germany, assuring them about the Russian neutrality to their Marxist revolutionary parties. At the same time, he improve the organization and the enforcement of the propaganda in the other countries, mostly in the western world. Suddenly in Italy, French and Great Britain, like in Japan and US, strikes and demonstrations rise up and shocked the public opinion. In Italy strange mutinies of some regiments happened in Fiume and in Ancona, and few weeks later in the French fleet in the Black Sea. A great quantity of Russian weapons arrived also in Afghanistan, where the king Amanullah was beginning one of the various conflicts with Great Britain, and afghan officers were sent to do their studies in the soviet military schools. This was a road coming from far and directed to so more far too.

In the US, where the red scare was just at the beginning, an isolationist senator claimed to Wilson: "Mr President, the American Congress didn't declare the war to Russia".

At this moment, the Russian Government sent to Allies his proposal. The channel was the Bolshevik leader Karl Radek, "golden convicted" in a German prison. In some interviews he declared that the Soviet's Government could be in the future use all his advice power to stop the riots in Europe and in Asia, in exchange of the end of the Allies interference.

The German Republic was a clear example of this policy: German *freikorps* ended their help to the white army in the Baltic area and Berlin refused to agree with the blockhead against Russia. A german agent, the young-turkish leader Enver Pascià were arrested few weeks later, with a letter from the German to the Russia government, with some economic e foreign politics proposal. The 17th of July regular relations were restored between Moscow and Petrograd, and Lenin, that in this moment were deciding to invade Poland, assured Germans that his troops would be stopped on the old German Empire's border.

Conclusion

Nobody in Europe answered publicly to Radek's interviews, but the following facts show that his demands has been not in vain.

The 8th November Lloyd George announced to the House of Common the decision to end the military aids to *White Russians*, and the 9th of December started secret negotiations in Copenaghen with the Soviet Government. The 16th January the Entente's Government revoked the blockhead, and Italian and French delegations arrived in Copenaghen. The 13th December 1919, under the Socialist party demand, the Italian Parliament recognized the Russian Government.

In the firsts days of January 1920 the Red Army occupied all the Siberian territory, and the rest of the White Army dissolved itself. The Admiral Kolchak, captured after a mutiny of his troops, were executed the 7th of February, and few weeks later the red

troops were at the gate of the Pacific, while all the western expeditionary forces were coming back in Europe.

Only the Japanese Army was remained between Lenin and the final victory in the east. The Soviet republic was not strong enough to brave the Tokyo's Army. But it was not necessary. The US Government, convinced to end the US mission in Siberia was at the same time convinced to prevent the Japanese presence in the same theatre. Under the American menace of ending the sale of steel and oil the Japanese Government was forced to begin a negotiation with Russia, concluded in the 1923 with the complete exit from the Siberia. The relation between Tokyo and Washington went down, and in the following years, will continue to get worse until the final crisis.

On this time, the last war of the Soviet Republic were ended from two years. On the March 1921, after a suffered victory at the gates of Warsaw, Poland and Soviet Republic signed their "poisoned peace". Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy were at the window. It was only an interval.

THE BUILDING OF THE RED ARMY AS A RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGES OF THE VERSAILLES WORLD ORDER

Dr. Oleg Alpeev (Russia)

The World War I failed to become “the war to end all wars”. The Paris peace conference of 1919 didn’t resolve the numerous contradictions between the winners and the losers and rose a number of hotbeds of tension in Europe, in the Near and in the Far East.

Soviet diplomatic representatives weren’t invited to the conference. The USSR claims for participation in the post-war reconstruction of the world were ignored. The Red army (RKKA) developed as a response to numerous challenges of the Versailles-Washington system of international relations after the end of the Russian Civil War of 1917–1922. The building of the Soviet Armed Forces was based on the demand to confront threats in Europe from the old capitalist States – Great Britain and France, and the new States, created in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles. The main potential enemies of the USSR in Europe were the so-called “Limitrophe states” – Poland, Romania, Finland and the Baltic States. They formed a kind of “sanitary cordon”, created by the will of the Entente to oppose Soviet Russia.

The backbone element of the hostile environment on the Western border of the USSR became Poland – the “favorite child of the Entente” and “main support” of the Versailles system in Europe. Created within the framework of the Versailles world order, Poland tried to achieve the status of a great power and made attempts to dominate in Eastern Europe by subjecting the foreign policy of Romania and the Baltic States to her will. In 1920 Soviet Russia clashed with Poland in a bloody war and was defeated. Taking in to account such a dangerous enemy, the military leadership of the USSR considered the European theater of war as the main one. Mostly to counter Poland’s attempts to create a durable Alliance with Romania and the Baltic States, in 1922 Soviet Russia began rapprochement with another “rogue state” of the Versailles world order – German Weimar Republic, and signed an agreement in Rappallo on the restoration of diplomatic relations. The main enemy in the Far East was Japan, which became the strongest regional power after the World War I.

The building of the Soviet Armed Forces in the 1920s – the first half of the 1930s was based on the need to outnumber the main possible foes in the West and East – Poland, Romania, the Baltic States, Finland and Japan in troops, equipment and military supplies in case of a war. For example, according to Soviet intelligence reports of the spring of 1933 the coalition of Poland, Romania and the Baltic States was able to deploy against the Soviet Union 109 infantry divisions, 1153 tanks and 2566 warplanes. That’s why the Soviet military leadership had to get ready in case of war to raise more than 100 infantry divisions to outnumber the potential enemies¹.

Another imperative that influenced on the development of the Soviet Armed Forces, was the need to match the tasks of military construction to the capabilities of the country’s economy exhausted by the Civil war. By 1 January 1921, the soviet infantry consisted of

¹ Rossijskij gosudarstvennyj voennyj arhiv (RGVA). F. 40442. Op. 1 a. D. 747. L. 1.

85 rifle divisions and 39 separate rifle brigades. The cavalry had 27 cavalry divisions and 7 separate cavalry brigades. The artillery consisted of 464 artillery battalions. According to the census of the Red army on 28 August 1920, the ground forces consisted of 2 066 892 men². The defeat of the White Armies and poor conditions of the national economy forced to reduce the numerous war-time Army and Navy. The military leadership tried to find a system of military construction, which wouldn't be burdensome to the state and would provide military training for the entire male population and would allow to deploy an army comparable with the Western enemies.

The solution was found in the introduction in 1923 in the Armed Forces of the mixed territorial and cadre system of recruitment. According to this system, the conscripts, called to the colours, served either in regular units or in territorial ones (so-called "peremenniki"), where they gained the short-term camp training. This system allowed to keep a small army (478 000 men, 58 infantry divisions in 1924) and to create numerous mobilization reserve with low expenditure on maintenance of the territorial units.

By the end of the 1920s, 60 % of the infantry units belonged to the territorial army. This system of military construction supplied the Red army with a huge number of reservists. According to mobilization plan called "Variant 5-ze" (1924) proposed for deployment against potential enemies in Europe, the wartime Army consisted of 3200 000 men and 107 infantry divisions³. This was comparable to the combined forces of Poland, Romania and the Baltic States.

The weakness of the Soviet Armed Forces in the first years after the end of the Civil War brought to the predominance of the so-called "strategy of attrition", according to which the victory in the future war could be reached by the gradual accumulation of military-political and economic achievements, and the strategic defense was proclaimed the main type of military operations. This concept was developed by famous military theorist Alexander Svechin. The first mobilization and deployment plans of the Armed Forces since 1921–1923 foresaw the defense against Poland and her allies. Since the mid-1920s the "strategy of attrition", declared reactionary, had been replaced by the "strategy of annihilation", and the offense was declared the main type of military operations. This statement was fixed in the "Provisional field regulation of the Red army" of 1925. At the same time the new branch of military art, called "the operational art", was defined. The dominant theory of the early Soviet operational art became the theory of the "successive offensive operations".

At the beginning of 1927 there was a conflict between the USSR and Great Britain, induced by the Soviet support of the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek. This conflict led to a rupture of diplomatic relations between two powers and brought to the "War Scare". The military and political leadership of the country had to accelerate the process of military construction. In 1927–1928 the Staff of the Red army developed a 5-year plan (1928–1932) for the development of the Armed Forces.

² Alexei B. Astashov, "Social'nyj sostav Krasnoj armii i Flota po perepisi 1920 g.", in: *Vestnik RGGU. Series "Istoricheskie nauki": Istoriofografiya, istochnikovedenie, metody istoricheskogo issledovaniya*. 2010. Issue 7(50)/10, 111.

³ RGVA. F. 54. Op. 3. D. 34. L. 38.

It proposed the growth of the Army to 625 thousand men in 1932 and 1933⁴. The adopted plan closely connected with the first 5-year plan for the development of the national economy. Prominent successes of the Soviet economy led to the revision of the 5-year plan for the construction of the Armed Forces before it was accomplished. In August 1930 a new “reconstruction” of the Red army was initiated. It foresaw the troops to be issued with new models of weapons and military equipment – first of all, artillery, tanks and aircraft, and proposed wide mechanization of units while preserving fixed strength of peacetime army.

Since 1932 the Staff of the Red army had been working on the second five-year plan of the development of the Armed Forces (1933–1937). The developers of this plan intended to continue the progressive development of the Red army. They wanted the Red army to achieve “the first place in the World in all decisive types of means of destruction (aircraft, tanks, artillery)”⁵. The total strength of the peace-time Red army was suggested to increase to 1050 thousand men in 1938⁶. The mass issue of armored vehicles brought to the formation of the first mechanized units. In 1932–1934 four mechanized corps consisted of two mechanized and a machine-gun brigade were formed⁷.

Due to the implementation of two 5-year plans, the Soviet Armed Forces increased significantly in strength and were equipped with modern weapons and military equipment. In 1924, at the beginning of the military reform, the Red army consisted of 58 infantry and 10 cavalry divisions with 537.5 thousand men and possessed 3046 guns, 485 aircraft and 18 tanks. In 1935 the Soviet Armed Forces had 86 infantry and 22 cavalry divisions, 14 mechanized brigades, 959 thousand men and 136 thousand civilian specialists, 13 387 guns of 76 mm caliber and above, 4750 aircraft and 10 257 tanks⁸. However, the developing Soviet industry has not yet been able to fulfill the requests of the growing army: the “Mobilization plan № 15” (1933) was supplied with infantry tanks T-26 and T-18 only for 53 %, with cruiser tanks BT for 73 %, with fighters for 67 %, with reconnaissance aircraft, light bombers and ground support warplanes for 77 %, with heavy bombers for 60 %, with anti-tank and field guns for 31 %, with rifles for 89 % and with rifle cartridges only for 40 %⁹.

By the mid-1930s, the Soviet military and political leadership faced new challenges, which began to influence on the building of the Red army. The most scaring was the rapid reconstruction of the Armed Forces of Nazi Germany – the Wehrmacht, which started in the fall of 1934. After denouncing unilaterally the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, the leadership of the Third Reich increased the strength of the peacetime army from 100 thousand men to 240 thousand. On 16 March 1935 the Law on the creation of the German Armed Forces was adopted, introducing universal conscription. The military intelligence reported about the probable Alliance

⁴ RGVA. F. 7. Op. 10. D. 573. L. 60.

⁵ RGVA. F. 40442. Op. 1 a. D. 332. L. 102.

⁶ Ibid. L. 106.

⁷ *Sovetskie Vooruzhennye Sily. Istoriya stroitel'stva* (Moscow 1978) 200–201.

⁸ RGVA. F. 40442. Op. 1 a. D. 1465. L. 148; Op. 2 a. D. 14. L. 3, 5, 7; D. 62. L. 36; Ilya B. Berkhin, *Voennaya reforma v SSSR (1924–1925 gg.)* (Moscow 1958) 178–179, 201, 211, 220; *Istoriya Vtoroj mirovoj vojny 1939–1945 gg.* Vol. 1 (Moscow 1973) 270.

⁹ RGVA. F. 40442. Op. 1 a. D. 1045. L. 42–55.

between Poland, Romania, the Baltic States and a new dangerous enemy – Germany. According to intelligence estimates of 1938, the allies could deploy against the USSR 150 infantry divisions, 5 cavalry divisions and 20 brigades, 14 tank and motorized brigades, 6835 tankettes and tanks, 5068 warplanes¹⁰.

On 14 April 1935 Chief of Staff of the Red army Alexei Egorov presented to the people's Commissar of defense Kliment Voroshilov report "Development of the Red army in 1936–1938", laid to the basis of further military construction in the USSR¹¹. Its authors proposed to increase the peacetime Red army to 100 infantry divisions and to 175 divisions in wartime¹². By the beginning of 1935 the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces increased from 959 thousand men to 1423 thousand. The new coil of growth of number of the PKKA became a compulsory measure in reply to deterioration of the international situation connected with sabotage of attempts of creation of system of "collective security" in Europe, undertaken by the Soviet management in purpose to stop aggression of fascist Germany. The Soviet government was once again convinced of absence of allies after the refusal of France to keep the treaty of mutual assistance of 1935 in reply to aggression of Germany against Czechoslovakia. "The Munich Agreement" of 1938 has proved a course of the Soviet management on development of armed forces in the conditions of isolation of the country and growth of expansion of fascist Germany.

The experience of the mixed territorial-cadre military construction showed that it didn't not provide the necessary readiness for combat of the troops and slowed down the growth of strength of the Red army. Rank and file of the territorial units were unable to embrace the new military equipment in a short time. Therefore, in 1935 the cadre system of the Army building up was adopted instead of territorial one. At the same time the growth of the Army strength continued. By 1938 all the troops finally moved to the cadre organization. The Red army consisted of 87 infantry and 27 cavalry divisions with 1 688 187 men. The transition to the cadre principle of the Soviet Armed Forces building up was fixed by the "Law on universal compulsory military service" of 1939.

The World War II, started in 1939, brought to the speedy growth of the Red army and caused a new wave of formations. By the beginning of 1939 the Red army consisted of 25 rifle corps, 98 rifle divisions, 4 tank corps (renamed from mechanized), 31 tank brigades with 1 910 477 men¹³. In 1939–1941 the Soviet Armed Forces increased more than threefold. During this period 42 infantry, 29 mechanized corps, 5 airborne corps, 125 infantry divisions, 61 tank and 31 motorized divisions were formed¹⁴. The total strength of the Army and the Navy had risen to 5 080 977 men¹⁵.

Such a rapid growth of the peacetime Red army became possible because of

¹⁰ RGVA. F. 40442. Op. 2 a. D. 142. L. 65–69.

¹¹ See: Oleg N. Ken, *Mobilizatsionnoe planirovanie i politicheskie resheniya (konets 1920-h – sereдина 1930-h gg.)*. 2nd ed. (Moscow 2008) 377–381.

¹² Ibid. P. 378.

¹³ Mikhail I. Mel'tyuhov, *Upushchennyj shans Stalina. Skhvatka za Evropu: 1939–1941 gg. (Dokumenty, fakty, suzhdeniya)*. 3rd ed. (Moscow 2008) 249, 273.

¹⁴ Ibid. P. 264.

¹⁵ Ibid. P. 276, 281.

flexible system of mobilization, which allowed hidden mobilization, disguised as so-called “Large boot camps”, of single units and entire military districts. This option was included for the first time into the “Mobilization plan № 15” (1933)¹⁶. The Soviet military and political leadership received the first experience of the hidden mobilization in 1938, when the partial mobilization was started in the response to the German threat to Czechoslovakia. About 400 thousand reservists were called to the colours. In total 16 infantry and 16 cavalry divisions, 3 tank corps, 22 separate tank and 17 aviation brigades were brought to readiness for combat¹⁷.

The growth of strength of the Red army and its rearmament with modern weapons and military equipment, the development of aviation, armored and mechanized troops led to the serious changes in the Soviet military art. The theory of the “succeeded operations” was superseded by the theory of “deep combat and deep offensive operation”, aimed to the simultaneous suppression of the enemy’s defense to the full depth and to the breakthrough of his tactical zone of defense, followed by the turning of tactical success into the operational one. The theory was developed by Vladimir Triandafillov, Georgii Isserson, Evgenii Shilovsky and others. The Soviet war plans became offensive as well. They foresaw the defense held by covering armies in the short so-called “initial period of war” to repel enemy’s invasion. After the deployment of the main forces the Red army supposed to begin offense itself. The last before the Great Patriotic War deployment plans of the Red army from 11 March and 15 May 1941 were offensive as well.

Thus, in the period between the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War the USSR created the numerous modern Armed Forces, able to face all the challenges of the Versailles world order. The success of the Soviet economy allowed to increase the strength of the Armed Forces and to issue them with new weapons and military equipment. The results of the Soviet military construction were tested during local wars and military conflicts of 1938–1940 – in the Battle of Lake Khasan in 1938, during the Nomonhan incident (the Battle of the Khalkhin Gol) of 1939, during the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939–1940. However, due to political and military-strategic mistakes of the Soviet leadership, the plans of the development of the Armed Forces weren’t fulfilled before the Great Patriotic War. The German invasion caught the Red army in a state of structural adjustment, rearmament, retraining of regular and reserve contingents. Nevertheless, in the interwar period the potential for development was laid down, which allowed the Red army to overcome the difficulties of the first months of the War and to win a victory over the fascism.

The Development of the Soviet Armed forces was a response to the international isolation of the USSR after Civil war and to the hostile politics of the European powers, and to the failure of “the policy of collective security”. Due to this fact the Soviet state, which had no allies in Europe, had to prepare to reflect numerous threats of the national security.

¹⁶ Ken, *Mobilizatsionnoe planirovanie*, 292.

¹⁷ Matvei V. Zakharov, *General’nyj shtab v predvoennye gody* (Moscow, 2005) 102.

THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE UNSETTLED PROBLEMS AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

Sr. Col. Zhang Mingcang (China)

The First World War and the subsequent Paris Peace Conference, which completely changed the world strategic pattern and highlighted “three major centennial difficult problems”: the dilemma of people’s survival, the dilemma of national self-determination, and the dilemma of global governance. To China, the Paris Peace Conference and its unsettled problems were not only a crisis facing a heavy disaster, but also an opportunity for a turning point of fate, which promotes the foundation of the Communist Party of China. Just as Chinese President Xi Jinping pointed out, the original aspiration and the mission of Chinese Communists is to “seek happiness for the people, rejuvenation for the nation and Great Harmony for the world.” Under the leadership of the CPC, the Chinese people achieved great victories of China’s revolution, construction and reform, and realized the great leap from standing up to getting rich and becoming strong. In view of the changes in the past hundred years since the Paris Peace Conference, we must learn lessons from history, jointly promote the peaceful development of the world and build a community with a shared future for mankind.

First, the Paris Peace Conference highlighted the dilemma of people’s survival: the Communist Party of China insists on seeking happiness for the people, leading the Chinese people to turn over and liberate, and move towards richness.

The First World War was a great catastrophe for mankind and a great disaster for the people. The war spread over three continents of Europe, Asia and Africa, covering 33 countries, 1.5 billion people. The troops on both sides of the war suffered more than 32 million casualties, of which nearly 10 million were killed in action. The spread of disease caused by the war resulted in the death of 50 million people. Chinese Beiyang Government adopted the strategy of “substitute workers for soldiers”, sent 140,000 workers to European battlefield, of whom 100,000 formed the British “Chinese Labor Brigade”, 40, 000 were employed in French factories and farms, and nearly 10,000 were dead in European battlefield. The two major military and political blocs, the Allies and the Central Powers, completely lost their reason and ignored the lives and deaths of the people, and staged the first collective slaughter in human history. Its greatest disaster was to cause unprecedented great death and injury to the people.

The Paris Peace Conference did not resolve and lurk a greater crisis of people’s survival. The Paris Peace Conference was actually reduced to a conference of the great powers to divide up the spoils of the world again, planting the fire of a bigger world war, and blackmailing the defeated Germany planted the seeds of revenge as well. China is one of the victorious countries in World War I, but under the manipulation of America, Britain, France and Japan, the rights and interests of Chinese Shandong occupied by Germany, were transferred to Japan, which encouraged Japan’s ambition to invade China in an all-round way and caused the Chinese nation to encounter a serious survival crisis. The shame China suffered at the Paris Peace Conference aroused the struggle of the whole nation, and the Chinese delegation refused to sign

the Treaty of Versailles. It was proved that the Paris Peace Conference not only failed to create the peace of the world, but also bred the Second World War, caused more than 100 million military and civilian casualties, and the war of aggression against China waged by Japanese militarists alone caused more than 35 million casualties among the Chinese army and people. The Paris Peace Conference eventually went to the opposite side of peace, which was the tragedy of history!

The First World War and the Paris Peace Conference promoted the birth of the Chinese Communist Party, and made the Chinese people have a strong core of leadership for the liberation. Since Britain launched the Opium War in 1840, the western powers had invaded China in hundreds of times, and forced the old China to sign more than 1,100 unequal treaties. The Chinese people, ravaged by war, saw their homeland torn apart and lived in poverty and despair, and made unremitting efforts to explore the way to save the nation from subjugation and ensure its survival. If the 1911 Revolution was a denial that the Chinese gave to their traditional feudal autocracy, the May 4th Movement, which was caused by the humiliation that China suffered at the Paris Peace Conference, showed that Chinese progressives had lost their trust in the western countries. At the same time, on July 4, 1918 and On July 15, 1919, the Soviet Russian Government announced twice that it was willing to give up the privileges and interests that Tsarist Russia plundered in China. Which was in sharp contrast to the aggression and hegemony of the western powers, and many Chinese progressives turned to socialism and Marxism-Leninism, and the CPC came into being in 1921. At a time when the country was suffering from internal and external disasters and the social crisis was more serious than ever, the CPC made vigorous efforts to turn the situation. The CPC united the Chinese people and led them through 28 years of arduous struggles, especially 14 years of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, overthrowing the three mountains of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism that were oppressing the Chinese people, and extricated the Chinese people from the abyss of humiliating survival.

On October 1, 1949, the people's Republic of China was founded, and the Chinese people stood up from then on. The CPC insists on taking the right to survival and development as the greatest human right, fundamentally reverse the tragic fate of the Chinese people being poor and weak, lagging behind and being vulnerable to attacks since the Opium War of 1840. In particular, since the reform and opening up in 1978, the people's happiness index has jumped sharply, the per capita disposable income of residents has increased from 171 yuan to 28,000 yuan, the number of poor people has decreased by 740 million, and the average life expectancy of residents has increased from 67.8 years in 1981 to 77.0 years in 2018. On the whole, the problems of hunger, lack of food and clothing and hardship in life bothering the Chinese people for thousands of years are gone forever! Of course, China's development is still uneven, the vast central and western regions are still relatively backward, and there are still 16.6 million poor people in rural areas in 2018. The report of the 19th National Congress of the CPC put forward "people-centered" and listed "accurate poverty eradication" as one of the three major battles, striving to ensure and improve

people's livelihood, and constantly enhancing the people's sense of achievement, happiness, and security.

Second, the Paris Peace Conference highlighted the dilemma of national self-determination: the Communist Party of China insists on seeking rejuvenation for the nation, leading the Chinese nation to achieve independence, and ushering in prosperity and strength.

“National self-determination” was an important principle of the Paris Peace Conference, but only to make a promise and not keep it. After World War I, the national consciousness of the vast number of underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America had been enhanced, and the national independence movement had risen. In this context, US President Wilson incorporated “national self-determination” into his “14-point peace principle”. The Paris Peace Conference established Mandate System for the colonies of the defeated countries, but it was only the transformation of the colonial system, and it was difficult to solve the problem of national self-determination. The same as British Prime Minister Lloyd George, French Prime Minister Kerry Munso, Wilson finally compromised with Japan on the Shandong issue of China. It seemed to be proof again that “Might is Right”, which made the Chinese people completely awake from the dream of “axiom defeats power”. The students of Beijing University sarcastically said that Wilson invented a mathematical formula for his new world order: “ $14 = 0$ ”. Historian Russell H. Fifield pointed out that the Shandong clause was an important reason why the US Senate finally vetoed the Treaty of Versailles.

The May 4th Movement, triggered by the injustice of the Paris Peace Conference, became the beginning of China's new democratic revolution. The May 4th Movement was a great patriotic and revolutionary campaign pioneered by advanced young intellectuals and participated extensively by the people to thoroughly oppose imperialism and feudalism. It marked a milestone in the historical process of the Chinese nation's pursuit of national independence and development and progress since modern times, and made ideological preparation and cadres' preparation for the establishment of the Communist Party of China. Once the CPC was established, it shouldered the historic mission of realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

The Communist Party of China led the Chinese nation to carry out three major revolutions and made a great leap from standing up to getting rich and strong. The first was the completion of the new democratic revolution, and the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The second was the completion of the socialist revolution, establishment of the socialist fundamental system, and great achievements in socialist construction. The third is to push forward the great revolution in reform and opening up, which has opened up the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics, formed a theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, established a socialist system with Chinese characteristics, and ushered in a bright prospect for the Chinese nation to realize great rejuvenation. In the past 41 years of reform and opening up, China's gross domestic product(GDP) increased from 367.9 billion yuan to 90.03 trillion yuan, the proportion of the gross world product(GWP)

rose from 1.8 percent to 16.7 percent, contributing more than 30 percent to world economic growth over the years. At present, China is the second largest economy in the world, the largest manufacturing country, the largest country in goods trade, the second largest country in commodity consumption, the second largest country in foreign capital inflow, and the first in the world in foreign exchange reserves for many consecutive years. Reflecting the past centennial practice, independence is an inevitable conclusion drawn by the CPC from China's reality, after going through the stages of revolution, development and reform by relying on the strength of the Party and the people. To put ahead reform and development in China, there is no textbook of golden rules to follow, and no one is in a position to dictate to the Chinese people what should or what should not be done.

Of course, China is still a developing country with a population of nearly 1.4 billion. In 2018, the per capita gross domestic product of China was only \$9,462, ranking more than 70th in the world, the second lowest among the top 10 countries in GDP, and less than 1/6 of the per capita gross domestic product of America (\$62,914). Reform and opening up plays the decisive role in determining the destiny of contemporary China, the practice of reform and opening up has shown that openness bring progress, while seclusion leads to backwardness. China will adhere to the basic national policy of reform and opening up, and promote the reform and opening up of the new era to become more stable and further.

Third, the Paris Peace Conference highlighted the dilemma of global governance: the Communist Party of China insists on seeking Great Harmony for the world, promoting the world peaceful development and win-win cooperation.

Versailles-Washington System was formed after the Paris Peace Conference, but it was unable to build a peaceful and stable post-war international order. Versailles-Washington System, between Vienna System and Yalta System, introduced the powers outside Europe into the stage of international hegemony, indicating that the era when European powers determined the fate of the world was gone forever, but failed to effectively alleviate the contradictions between the great powers and prevent the outbreak of a new world war. The tenet of the League of Nations established in January 1920 was "to promote international cooperation and ensure international peace and security." Ironically, however, President Wilson of the United States regarded the League of Nations as the pillar of the post-war international order and personally served as chairman of the drafting Committee to prepare the League of Nations Covenant, but the Covenant aroused heated debate in the United States. US Senate voted twice to reject the Versailles Peace Treaty, including the League of Nations Covenant, and to prohibit the United States from participating in the League of Nations. Germany, Italy and Japan, which launched World War II, were once permanent members of the Executive Yuan of the League of Nations. In the face of the aggression of Germany, Italy and Japan in the 1930s, the League of Nations did little and ceased to exist except in name. In 1931, Japan launched the September 18th Incident and invaded the provinces of Northeast China. In 1932, "Lytton

Report" of the League of Nations tried to exonerate Japan from its guilt. In 1933, the special meeting of the League of Nations passed the "Report on the Dispute

Between China and Japan”, which still did not identify Japan as an invading country, but only demanded that Japan withdraw its troops to the “railway area.” Even so, Japan was so dissatisfied that it announced its withdrawal from the League of Nations, and the decision of the League of Nations was abandoned and could not be implemented at all. With the outbreak of World War II, the Versailles-Washington System collapsed and became the shortest international system in human history.

The historical lessons of the ineffectiveness of the international system formed after the Paris Peace Conference provided valuable reference for the construction of the international order after World War II. After completely defeating Germany, Italy, Japan Fascist Axis, the World Anti-Fascist Allies established the post-World War II international order. The main goal of this international order is to prevent a new world war, to maintain universal and lasting international peace and security, to take the “Charter of the United Nations” and other international law as an important cornerstone, and to take the cooperation of major powers with different social systems within the collective security mechanism of the United Nations as the basic guarantee. China was one of the main allies of anti-fascism, which made great contributions to defeat Japanese militarism and achieve the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War. In 1943, “the Cairo Declaration” clearly stated that “ the territory Japan stole from China, such as the four provinces of Northeast China, Taiwan, Penghu Islands, and so on” must be returned to China. In the newly established United Nations, China has become one of the permanent members of the Security Council. In the more than 70 years since the end of World War II, although the world is not at peace, the world war has been avoided. Compared with the two world wars in the first half of the 20th century, this is a great progress in human history and the greatest well-being of the people of the world.

China is an active participant, builder and contributor of the current international system, and vigorously promotes the construction of a community with a shared future for mankind. “Great Harmony in the World” is an important spirit of Chinese culture. The Communist Party of China strives for both the happiness of the Chinese people and the cause of human progress. It has strong feelings of the people and the world. President Xi Jinping creatively put forward the concept of “building a community with a shared future for mankind”, which is the correct choice for the people of the world to live side by side in harmony and effectively solve global problems. China adheres to the Global Governance View of joint consultation, construction and sharing, and promotes the establishment of a new form of international relations featuring mutual respect, fairness, justice, and win-win cooperation. China advocates the democratization of international relations, resolutely abandon the Cold War mentality and power politics, and take a new approach to developing state-to-state relations with communication, not confrontation, and with partnership, not alliance. China supports the United Nations in playing an active role in international affairs, and supports the efforts of other developing countries to increase their representation and strengthen their voice in international affairs. China will continue to play its part as a responsible great country, take an active part in reforming and developing the global governance system. Since the “Belt and Road Initiative” put forward by

China in 2013, there are more than 150 countries and international organizations have actively participated in it. China does not follow the old road of “strong nation is bound to seek hegemony”, but closely combine the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and the construction of a community with a shared future for mankind, and constantly contributes Chinese wisdom and strength to global governance.

The Chinese army has always been a firm force in safeguarding world peace and stability, and demonstrates the mission of the armed forces of a responsible great country. China suffered a lot from war and love peace very much. China pursues a defensive national defense policy, and China’s military development does not pose a threat to any country. No matter how much stronger it may become, China will never seek hegemony or expansion. In the 70 years since the founding of the people’s Republic of China, the Chinese army has not initiated any war or conflict, nor has it invaded any country. For a long time, China’s defense expenditure accounts for about 1.3% of its gross domestic product, far below the world average of 2.3% and 2.5%, and the proportion of the military powers such as America and Russia of more than 3%. On the basis of a reduction of 1.7 million military posts since the 1980s, another 300,000 has been reduced in recent years. China is the country with the largest number of peacekeepers among the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and the peacekeeping funds are the second in the world. Since 1990, the Chinese army has successively participated in 24 United Nations peacekeeping operations, sending more than 40,000 peacekeeping personnel, of which 13 Chinese soldiers sacrificed on the international peacekeeping line. The Chinese army advocates strengthening strategic mutual trust, strengthening crisis control, and trying to provide more public safety products for maintaining world peace.

Looking back on a hundred years, World War I and the Paris Peace Conference have deeply influenced the development process of China and the world, China and the world have never been so closely linked before. The Chinese people have profoundly changed their “views of China and the world”, and the international community also needs to have new “views of China and the world”. Today’s world is facing great changes that have not occurred in a hundred years, and human society is at a new crossroads. Between peaceful development and conflict confrontation, between open inclusion and closed exclusion, between win-win cooperation and zero-sum game, between mutual learning among civilizations and arrogant prejudice, how to choose will determine the future and destiny of mankind. The Chinese army is willing to work hand in hand with the armed forces of all countries in the world to meet the challenges, jointly safeguard world peace and development, and contribute actively to the building of a community with a shared future for mankind.

ROMANIA AND THE BOLSHEVIK OFFENSIVE IN EUROPE. The International Dimension of the Romanian Campaign in 1918-1920

Amb. Dr. Dumitru Preda (Romania)

On November 11, 1918, by the signing of the armistice at Compiègne, after 52 months of unprecedented clashes, the Great War was officially over. However, in a complex context, amplified by strong social, political and national convulsions, especially in the territories of the former multinational empires – Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and in German; in Central and Eastern Europe there will be a dangerous prolongation of the state of conflict, with numerous consequences for political stability and the general effort of economic recovery.

Major disagreements between the Great Allied and Associated Powers, which appeared just before the official opening of the Paris Peace Conference, in January 1919, will multiply the international crisis beyond the borders of the Old Continent.

After this terrible total confrontation, with more than 10 million casualties, more than six million disabled, a large part of them mutilated, after various and heavy human pain and material damage, the world, the European generations in particular, experienced a severe physical and mental weakness. Everywhere there were signs that the old essential bonds of society were broken by this long fatigue, and not only in the defeated countries. The diary word was **Revolution**.

At the end of 1918 and during the year 1919 the revolutionary wave in Europe is thus in full rise. The model of Russian councils (Soviets) is about to set Europe on fire. In this sense, the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, wished to emphasise to his French counterpart, Georges Clemenceau: *“All Europe is filled with the spirit of revolution. There is a deep feeling amongst the workers not only of discontent, but of anger and revolt against post-war conditions. The whole existing order, in its political, social and economic aspects, is questioned by the masses of the population from one end of Europe to the other”*¹.

It remarks an evident workers' radicalisation, expressed by the waves of strikes, going far beyond the traditional economic and trade union issues that had hitherto been expressed. We can also add as participants to these movements the old soldiers and a significant number of peasants. The major examples are in Germany, particularly in Bavaria, in Hungary, where in March 1919 a “republic of councils” is proclaimed or in Ukraine (a second Soviet government is installed between November 1918-August 1919); all events must be seen in the context of the Soviet-Polish war that followed between 1919-1921, proving that it was **the question of power that is at stake**.

At that time, faced with so many political, geopolitical and economic issues, often contradictory, that will weigh on the new architecture of international relations negotiated in Paris, involving the future of relations between Russia and the rest of Europe (see also the vision and character of Western intervention in the former

¹ Apud R. Page Arnot, *The Impact of the Russian Revolution in Britain*, London, 1967, p. 150. See also F.L. Carsten, *Revolution in Central Europe 1918-1919*, Berkeley, 1972.

empire affairs), what could it be **the role of countries, such as Romania, designated as States with “limited interests”?**

Preliminaries

The ending of hostilities on November 11, 1918, had once again found Romania in the Entente camp, collaborating with its allies, politically and militarily, against Germany. In the memorandum issued by the General Constantin M. Coandă to the representatives of the Allied Powers of Iași (Jassy), it was stated: “*The question of the Romanians of Hungary was imposed, by its very nature, on the day when the principles of justice, independence, and freedom of peoples have been proclaimed. It was also imposed by the circumstances of the war when, by the treaty of 4 [17] August 1916, the Allies were obliged to assure the Romanians their national unity*”².

In the forthcoming, apart from the support given to the national liberation movements of Bucovina and Transylvania, the Romanian Government was going to deploy an intense diplomatic action aimed to know the position of the victorious Great Powers in relation to the commitments made previously regarding Romania; to inform and thus clarify relations with them in key issues, such as the place and role reserved for the Romanian State at the next peace conference, and consequently the confirmation of the national unity achieved during 1918.

An objective analysis of all contemporary evidence leads us to one conclusion: at the end of that year, **Romania could not be neglected by anyone – it was an important political and military factor in Southern Europe. Perhaps even the most important.**

Nevertheless, many uncertainties arose in front of Romania, that will announce the “Peace Calvary” during 1919-1920; in these circumstances, the Romanian Government, led now by Ion I. C. Brătianu (after 12 December 1918), assumed a pragmatic and resolute attitude, in accordance with his objective (international recognizing of the 1st December 1918 political union)³.

It should be mentioned that in a war-torn country, surrounded by several neighbouring hostile forces, all ready to take advantage of it, there was a severe shortage of basic provisions that could give rise to a severe social crisis, with unanticipated political consequences⁴. Faced with these inner worries, the Brătianu

² 1918. *Desăvârșirea unității național-statale a poporului român. Recunoașterea ei internațională* [1918. Completion of the national-state unity of the Romanian people. Its International Recognition], vol. III *Documente interne și externe, august 1918-iunie 1919* [Internal and External Documents, August 1918-June 1919], București, 1986, doc. 465.

³ See Ioan Scurtu, Ionuț Cojocaru, *Ion I.C. Brătianu*, București, 2017, passim.

⁴ On March 25, 1919, in the Council of Four, David Lloyd George declared: “*I recently heard Mr. Brătianu consider that what is most important to do in Romania: 1° to feed the population; 2° to equip the army; 3° to give the land to the peasants. These are intelligent and effective ways of preserving Romania from Bolshevism. But must we insist on keeping Odessa, whose population will rise as soon as the Bolsheviks appear? It is better to concentrate all our defenses in Romania and establish there our barrier against Bolshevism*”. *Les Délibérations du Conseil des Quatre (24 mars-28 juin 1919). Notes de l'officier interprète Paul Mantoux*, vol. I *Jusqu'à la remise à la délégation allemande des conditions de paix*, Paris, 1955, doc. III.

Government had to deal with changes in attitudes and even political blackmail that went beyond even the darkest estimates. In the backstage game of the Great Powers, its allies, when the decision passed to a smaller number of their representatives, the Romanian Government will oppose a persistent action to defend and strengthen the unified national state, even at risk of “irritating” the “Big Four”⁵.

At its borders, the situation was also complicated, even dangerous, which led to an undeclared state of war: on Nistru (Dniester) river, the small-scale attacks not only of the Bolsheviks but also of the Ukrainian nationalist groups were duplicated by a subversive network, especially in Bessarabia, with the aim of opening a new destabilising centre. In the last decade of January 1919, there will be a first more powerful attack on the Dniester line: supported by the Russian-speaking population of small Ataki region, the Bolshevik armed forces will occupy for several days the city Hotin (Khotin) and a number of surrounding villages. After heavy fighting, the Romanian troops took over the area. However, the alert status in Bessarabia and Bucovina will be maintained in the coming months.

The Bolshevik offensive on the Russian and Ukrainian fronts threatening the south Russian territory towards Odessa, where the Allied Expeditionary Force had its staff, as well as the extended Hungarian political anarchy and the rise of communists in other Central European countries were to be the main arguments for a more realistic approach to the role of Romania as a factor of political and military stability in the region. A diplomatic note from the Romanian Minister in Paris conveyed on March 14, 1919 to Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau and to General Henri M. Berthelot, chief of the Allied Danube Army, highpoint: “*From Russia, said Victor Antonescu, the Romanian Government receives the most disturbing information. The Bolshevik groups, well organized and commanded by officers, some of them German, are planning an attack on Romania. According to our reliable information, it turns out that Hungarians and Bolsheviks agree to organise an offensive against Romania. [...] We are the last resistance against Bolshevism*”⁶.

Confronted with the increased aggressiveness shown at its still undefined state borders, the Romanian army was ready to fulfill its mission of defending the decisions taken. The GHQ will only carry out a major reorganisation of its big units and completed the troops deployed in the vulnerable regions, both in the east, north-east and west (where the state of anarchy and terrorist attacks had increased, especially since the German and former Austro-Hungarian troops of Ukraine had begun the retreat and the vacuum of real state power became more and more threatening). The actions of the Romanian troops, determined by the operational needs resulting from the evacuation of the enemy forces and by the immediate and prospective objectives, were settled in permanent coordination with those of the Army of the Danube and other allied forces.

⁵ Gheorghe I. Brătianu, *Acțiunea politică și militară a României în 1919 în lumina corespondenței diplomatice a lui Ion I.C. Brătianu* [Romania's Political and Military Action in the Light of the Diplomatic Correspondence of Ion I.C. Brătianu], București, 1939, passim.

⁶ Romanian Diplomatic Archives [AMAE], fond *Paris*, folder 54.

From the state of war to war

However, the greatest attention was given to the situation in Transylvania and to the relations with the new Hungarian state. Romania was obliged to witness the reorganisation and concentration of the Hungarian forces behind a contradictory demarcation line (on the course of the Mureş River), a provisional and only with a military character (The Belgrade Armistice, November 13, 1918).

Once the proclamation of Hungary as a People's Republic, Mihály Károlyi's government, instead of demobilising its armed forces on the level established by the said Convention, had taken measures to reorganise and concentrate the units at the same time, behind the Mureş line, calling new contingents of recruits to the flag.

The inability or unwillingness of the Budapest leaders to accept the Alba Iulia's decision of December 1, 1918, rejecting any attempt to dialogue for a peaceful solution to bilateral problems – firstly those concerning the delimitation of the border – keeping the hope to get influence at the Paris Peace Conference, will generate an increasingly and open conflict between Romania and Hungary. Engraved by a complex historical legacy, due to the contradictions and tensions accumulated centuries after the aggression and the Hungarian domination over vast Romanian territories, exacerbated the last decades by the policy of forced denationalisation of Romanians in Transylvania, as well as by the divergent positions during the years of the First World War, these relations eventually led to a painful, but inevitable war in 1919⁷.

The Peace Conference in Paris decided, in these aggravated circumstances, on 26 February 1919, to create a neutral zone between the Hungarian and Romanian armies under the control of the French troops. The Hungarian government inflexibly rejected this solution; thus produced the failure of the missions led by Lieutenant-Colonel Fernand Vix (March 1919) and General Smuts (first decade of April), to obtain a cessation of the permanent and increased clashes, kept alive by the Hungarians.

The communists seized power in Budapest, in alliance with the Social-Democrats,

⁷ Dumitru Preda (coord.), Vasile Alexandrescu, Costică Prodan, *La Roumanie et sa guerre pour l'unité nationale. Campagne de 1918-1919*, Bucarest, 1995; Dumitru PREDA, *Sub semnul Marii Uniri. Campaniile armatei române pentru întregirea țării 1916-1920* [Under the Great Union Sign. Romanian Army Campaigns for completion country 1916-1920], Editura Academiei Române, Editura Militară, București, 2019; see also Constantin Kirițescu, *Istoria războiului pentru întregirea României* [History of Romania's War for Reunification], 3rd edition, vol. 2, București, 1989; *Jurnal de operațiuni al Comandamentului Trupelor din Transilvania* [Operations Journal of the Transylvanian Troops Command] (1918-1921); eds. Viorel Ciubotă, Gheorghe Nicolescu and Cornel Țucă, vol. I-II, Satu Mare, 1998; General Gheorghe Mărdărescu, *Campania Ardealului și ocuparea Budapestei, 1919-1920* [The Campaign of Transylvania and the Occupation of Budapest, 1919-1920], București, 1922. For Hungarian historiography, see, for example: Fogarassy László, *A Magyarországi Tanácsköztársaság Katonai Özseomlása* [Military Collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic], Budapest, 1988; József Galántai, *Hungary in the First World War*, Budapest, 1989; Hajdú Tibor, *The Hungarian Soviet Republic*, Budapest, 1979; Liptai Ervin, *Vöröskatonak előre! A Magyar Vörös Hadsereg harcai 1919* [Red soldiers ahead! Battles of the Hungarian Red Army in 1919], Budapest, 1979; Ormos Mária, *Padovától Trianonig* [From Padua to Trianon] 1918-1920, Budapest, 1983; Peter Pastor (ed.), *Revolutions and Interventions in Hungary and its neighbor States 1918-1919*, Boulder, 1988.

on 21 March 1919, and the danger of an open armed conflict between the Romanians and the Hungarians seriously increased. The attacks against the Romanian positions escalated and were supported by artillery and armoured trains. In parallel, the Hungarian command built up fortifications on the Western Carpathians and at the Mureş river gates, to block a possible offensive of the Romanian army; a solid Hungarian Red Army was quickly organised. The idea of a convergent, simultaneous offensive action of the Hungarian and the Bolshevik armies against Romania became obvious.

Meanwhile, the situation of Allied forces in southern Russia became critical. Due to the insufficient number of troops, the evacuation of Odessa was ordered on April 4, as well as the withdrawal of French troops on the territory of Bessarabia. Romanian units operating alongside French troops in the Razdelnaia-Tiraspol region also withdrew without fighting on the right bank of the Dniester.

At the end of March 1919, the military situation of Romania was presented as follows: on the defense front from Banat to the line Zam-Zălau-Sighetul Marmăției (Maramureşului)-Cernăuţi-Nistru to the Black Sea (1,000 km in a straight line), the Romanian operational units accounted for about 81,000 people. They were thus grouped: in Bessarabia and Bukovina, before the Bolshevik army, covering an area of about 550 km, there were 46,000 soldiers; another 35,000 were in Transylvania against the forces of the Hungarian Republic of the Council. Despite the foreign correspondents have seen the Romanian army, as "The Times" (March 11, 1919): *"The Romanian army is currently one of the best-disciplined armies in Europe (even the Hungarians of Transylvania have been obliged to admit it), and the peasantry, which is now a landowner and has a stake in the country, has no use for Bolshevism"*⁸, the General Headquarters esteemed that **"the military situation is critical"**⁹.

The danger which Romania was confronted was correctly remarked in the officious "Le Temps" (30 March 1919): *"Romania is today simultaneously threatened on three sides: 1. To the East on the Nistru and to the North in Bucovina by the Bolsheviks who have amassed 10 infantry divisions in the Lemberg (Lvov) region and considerable forces whose strength was still instated, in Odessa. A double attack was probable by the end of April; 2. To the West, in Transylvania, by the Hungarians, these had now 6-8 divisions and could easily increase these forces under the trick of having a Red Army. The Hungarian attack would coincide without a doubt with that of the Bolsheviks; 3. In the South, along the Danube and in Dobrogea by the Bulgarians"*¹⁰.

In such serious circumstances, which were worsening day by day and the imminence of the great offensive of the Hungarian Red Army was imminent, the

⁸ 1918. *Desăvârşirea unităţii naţional-statale...* [1918. Completion of the national-state unity...], vol. III, doc. 563.

⁹ Romanian Military Archives [RMA], fond *Microfilms*, roll P.II.5. 219, c. 755-763.

¹⁰ Apud *Exposé des opérations de l'armée roumaine en Hongrie après le 3 novembre 1918 (Guerre de 1919) et des Événements qui ont été la cause*, Paris [1922], p. 24. On April 13, the four Allied Ministers in Bucharest communicated to their capitals: *"Nous attirons une fois de plus l'attention de nos Gouvernements sur la situation très critique où se trouve la Roumanie par suite de faction évidemment concertée des Bolcheviks Russes et Hongrois"*. Apud *British Policy on Hungary 1918-1919. A Documentary Sourcebook*, Ed. by Miklós Lojkó, London, 1995, p. 160.

Romanian state was acting firmly to defend the national interests and save the Romanian population still under foreign occupation proved not only fully justified, but also of utmost urgency. The Council of Ministers in Bucharest met on 10 April in the presence of King Ferdinand I and decided to advance the Romanian army into Western Transylvania.

At the same time, the Romanian General Headquarters took measures to regroup and reinforce the operational forces on the line of the Western Carpathian and ordered the execution of the offensive operations to reach the Satu Mare, Carei, Oradea, Arad line.

Therefore, in mid-April, both sides were prepared for an offensive. The first to attack were the Hungarians, on the morning of 15 April, but immediately their units were blocked by the Romanian army that turned the table and went on the offensive. On 1 May 1919, the Romanian troops in Transylvania arrived at Tisa River, spread along the entire length of the front. On the next day, the Hungarian Supreme Command requested an armistice. This request was only a maneuver of the Hungarian Bolshevik government to give time to the Russian Bolsheviks, who had launched an ultimatum two days ago to Rumania.

If on the Tisa front the situation apparently stabilised, serious concerns arose in the neighboring regions, north and south. Since the end of April, Bolshevik forces have reached the Dniester line throughout its territory, from the Zbrucz River (the former Austrian-Russian border) to the Black Sea. Daily incursions and clashes with 5th Army Corps troops (9th and 10th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division) between Hotin and Tighina, without being of high intensity, were accompanied by attacks in the south against the Franco-Greek allied group under the command of General d'Anselme, as well as a persistent offensive in Galicia against the Ukrainian nationalist units of Petlioura, in order to establish a direct link with the Hungarian Republic of the Councils. At the request of V.I. Lenin, on April 26, the staff of the Ukrainian Red Army ordered his troops to advance rapidly through Bucovina, while other forces would execute blows Romanian defensive break on the Dniester.

All the actions indicated the existence of a concerted politico-military plan of the Bolshevik governments against Romania. In this regard, I have to mention the note of Commissioner Georgy V. Chicherin, of May 1, by which Soviet Russia summoned the Bucharest Government to evacuate Bessarabia (until May 3), but also Bucovina; on May 5, was the fourth note of the Ukrainian Independent Soviet Republic (after those of February 15, March 16, and April 12, 1918), which did not recognise the union from March 27 to April 9, 1918, and the immediate withdrawal of the Romanian army from Bucovina was required¹¹.

Failure of hetman N.A. Grigoriev, who, after the occupation of Odessa, rebelled against Soviet power in Kiev (Kyiv), as well as against the successes of the Admiral's White Guard forces Alexander V. Kolchak, however, would prevent the launch of offensive actions on a large scale on the Dniester line in the Dniester territory. All other tentative will be quickly annihilated by the Romanian command.

¹¹ Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu, *Bătălia diplomatică pentru Basarabia 1918-1940* [The Diplomatic Battle for Basarabia 1918-1940], Iași, 1991, pp. 79-81.

Taking advantage of the halting of the Romanian offensive, the Hungarian Red Army Command succeeded in restoring and reinforcing the combat capabilities of its units. Informed and encouraged by the indecision of the Allied Powers, after a week – during which there were brief clashes and harassment – on **May 16, he launched an attack against the Czechoslovak forces, generalized four days later all over the front.** Thanks to this initiative, it was planned that, at the junction of the two allied groups, a corridor would be opened directly to the region where the Bolshevik Ukrainian and Russian troops were working, that is to say, the forces for which important logistic support was expected functionally. Under the command of the former Minister of War, Böhm Vilmos (Chief of Staff was Stromfeld Aurél), the 1st and 5th Hungarian Divisions (about 40 battalions and many pieces of artillery) would break through the Czechoslovak defensive system and take control, even in the evening of May 20, from Miskolc.

By this vigorous intervention, the Rumanian Command managed to prevent the following attempts to force the Tisa River by Hungarian troops. Meanwhile, the advance of the Hungarian Red Army in the general direction of Užhorod (Ungvár), approaching the line Mukačevo-Čop, tended to endanger the Romanian defense system, in case of occupation of the territory between Maramures and Tisa, which would compromise the connection the Romanian divisions of northern Transylvania with the 8th Infantry Division, transferred in Pokucie (Pokuttia) at the request of the Polish General Staff.

As a result, the link between the Hungarians and the Ukrainian Red Armies was prohibited.

Intervention in Pokucie¹². The ongoing conflict between Poland and the Republic of Ukraine, generated by the territorial conflicts in Galicia, while the Warsaw government was seeking to restore its sovereignty over the old frontiers before the first division of the Kingdom of Poland (1772), constituted – alongside the threat of Bolshevik Ukrainian forces lead by Hristo Rakovski, President of the Council of People's Commissars – a very worrying factor for the Romanian High Command; (multiple defense needs on an open Danube front in the Eastern Carpathians and the Black Sea). Two months later, on August 17, 1919, at 0:00 am, according to a protocol agreed between the Romanian High Command and the Polish Army Staff, the province was evacuated, an operation that ended on August 24.

“The impact of Romanians’ advancement seems to be considerable on the Budapest government [...]. The Transylvanian army is, therefore, able to continue the offensive action. His moral condition would be excellent” (Rapport of general Paul de Lobit, May 8, 1919)¹³.

The military successes went along with Romania's diplomatic efforts for an international recognition of its new borders in post-war Europe drawn at the Peace

¹² *Memoriul istoric rezumând acțiunea trupelor Diviziei 8 din Pocuția* [Historical Memoir summarising the actions of the 8th Division troops in Pokucie], RMA, fond *Great General Staff. Historical Service*, folder 477, f. 25-209.

¹³ Général Jean Bernachot, *Les armées françaises en Orient après l'armistice de 1918*, vol. II *L'Armée française d'Orient (28 octobre 1918-25 janvier 1920)*, Paris, 1970, annex 26.

Conference in Paris. Brătianu – notes the American historian Sherman David Spector, in his documented analysis of the Romanian diplomacy of this period – succeeds “to show that Romania could no longer be expected to remain under constant subjection to the machinations of the Great Powers, who were still trying to use her as a pawn, Brătianu overturned the established concept that smaller European states had only marginal control over their destinies”¹⁴.

The military deployments of the second part of May and early June and the victorious offensive of the Hungarian Red Army in Slovakia (June 6, the fall of Košice, and June 8 and Prešov) aroused strong fears among the Allied leaders who, in Paris, were preparing to finalize the documents that would lay the foundations of the new politico-military order on the old continent. The divergent opinions on the means and means of resolving the State in conflict, due first of all to the divergent interests of the region, but also to the divergent points of view as to the appreciation of the elements which had generated them, would have led to the perpetuation of hesitations and the lack of stronger measures to end “all unnecessary hostilities”, as stated in their decision of 7 June, made public the following day¹⁵.

Brătianu underlines to the “Big 4” that “Romania is not only in a state of war but also in a declared war with the Bolsheviks of Russia and with those of Hungary”, adding: “It is very good to disarm the gendarmes but on the condition of having previously disarmed the brigands”¹⁶.

The aggressive attitude of the Hungarian Red Army throughout the month of June-July – infantry raids and the short-term bombing of Romanian positions at the air raids behind them – will intensify early next month, marking the entry into the final phase of the Romanian-Hungarian conflict.

The success of the Hungarian Red Army on the Czechoslovak front considerably increased its morale and gave the Budapest government confidence in organizing a much larger new military action, this time against Romania. **The goal was to push the Romanian army back to the Tisa River and reoccupy Transylvania.**

The War

The Romanian-Hungarian armed clashes of the last decade of July and beginning of August 1919 took place in two stages. **The first phase included two distinct moments:** the Hungarian offensive from 20 to 23 July and the Romanian counteroffensive from 24 to 27 July. **The second phase began with a preparatory phase** (27-30 July), so that on 30 July, the Romanian army forced the Tisa River, continued the follow-up operation between 31 July and 4 August and the Budapest occupation. Frank Rattigan, an influent British diplomat in Bucharest, reported to

¹⁴ Sherman David Spector, *Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference. A Study of the Diplomacy of Ioan I.C. Brătianu*, New York, 1962, p. 235.

¹⁵ Ion Rusu Abrudeanu, *România și războiul mondial. Contribuții la studiul istoriei războiului nostru* [Romania and the World War. Contributions to the Study of our War], București, 1921, p. 283.

¹⁶ *Les Délibérations du Conseil des Quatre ...*, vol. II *De la remise à la délégation allemande des conditions de paix jusqu'à la signature du Traité de Versailles*, Paris, 1955, doc. CX.

the Foreign Office on August 6, 1919: *“I am informed that the Romanian troops on their arrival in Budapest have been received, if not enthusiastically, with apparent satisfaction by the Hungarian population”*¹⁷. Satisfaction, of course, with the fall of the communist regime.

The military catastrophe suffered by the Hungarian Red Army has had immediate political consequences. On the morning of August 1, 1919, on the cabinet reunion in Budapest, the Social-Democrats right-wing forced the Garbai-Kun government to resign. A new transitory cabinet with a social-democratic mark, led by Peidl Gyula, replaced him.

Budapest was occupied on the night of 3 August 1919 and next evening the Romanian troops marched in the centre of the Hungarian capital, inaugurating a short period of occupation. The Romanian military occupation of Hungary lasted only as long as was necessary to quench the flames of war in this region and to obtain the necessary guarantees for the security and integrity of Romania.

The success of the Romanian army in operations from July 30 to August 3 is remarkable, the Hungarian Red Army being practically destroyed and the 80th International Brigade dissolved. The entry of the Romanian army into Budapest and the cessation of all resistance by the Hungarian troops marked the end of the true military operations of the 1918-1919 campaign. It was a struggle with profound internal and international implications in the life of the two States and the two peoples, but also for inter-European relations.

This complex effort has had a significant European dimension – it blocked the wave of bolshevism towards the centre of the continent – and, despite certain initial reluctance, was largely commented and rightly appreciated by the European democratic governments and by allied public opinion.

¹⁷ *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, eds. E.L. Woodward and R. Butler, First series, vol. VI, London, 1930, p. 129.

FIGHTING IN SUBARCTIC FORESTS: MILITARY EXPEDITIONS BY FINNISH IRREDENTIST VOLUNTEERS INTO RUSSIAN EASTERN KARELIA, 1918–1922

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Dense forests pose serious challenges to military operations. This was concretely experienced between 1918 and 1922 by those thousands of Finnish volunteers that went east across the Russian border to help those Finnic peoples who wished to join Finland. Many Finns, who had gained their own independence from Russia in late 1917, felt that the kindred people living in North-West Russia or Estonia had the right to self-determination. Some Finns were motivated by a Greater Finland ideology. In order to accomplish their aims, the volunteers conducted several military expeditions into Eastern Karelia. They were materially supported by the Finnish government but they were still private initiatives of irredentist warriors. In Finnish historiography these ill-fated incursions are known as the Kinship Wars.¹

The expeditions took place while diplomatic negotiations were going on. Two municipalities of North-West Russia temporarily belonged to Finland, but the Tartu Peace of 1920 settled the border issues between Finland and Soviet Russia. In 1923 the autonomy of Karelia was also contemplated by the League of Nations, which ruled in favor of the Soviet state. The larger contexts to these events were the Russian Revolutions and the ensuing Russian Civil War between the Whites and Reds. Some expeditions in the southern areas were partially executed to support White Russian plans to capture the city of Petrograd. The Allied intervention to Murmansk and Archangel from 1918 to 1919 further complicated the overall military situation in the region.²

The Finnish military expeditions started in March 1918 in the north because the German-supported Finnish White Guards, waging their own Civil War, feared that the Reds, who had fled from northern Finland to Russia, would threaten the main areas of operation in the south of Finland. Thus the first incursions were not only meant to guard the border but also to open a new front of the Finnish Civil War that now partially spread to the Russian territory. Curiously, at first, in order to deny German access to the huge resources of the area, the British recruited some Finnish Reds to fight the Finnish White volunteers in Eastern Karelia.³

This paper examines the military geographical challenges facing the Finnish volunteer infantry troops operating in heavily (85–100%) forested, sparsely populated and almost trackless wilderness in White and Olonets Karelia (Viena and

¹ Aapo Roselius, "Holy War: Finnish Irredentist Campaigns in the Aftermath of the Civil War", in: Tuomas Tepora and Aapo Roselius (eds.), *The Finnish Civil War 1918: History, Memory, Legacy* (Leiden 2014), 119–155; Atso Haapanen, *Suomalaisten heimosotaretket 1918–1922* (EU 2014), passim.

² Roselius, "Holy War", 126–130, 142–143, 147–148; C. Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture* (London 1928), passim; Pekka Vaara, *Viena 1918: Kun maailmansota tuli Karjalaan* (EU 2018), passim.

³ Jussi Niinistö, *Heimosotien historia 1918–1922* (Hämeenlinna 2005), 22–53.

Aunus Karelia, respectively). The Eastern Karelian case studies are the expeditions to White Karelia in 1918, to Olonets Karelia in 1919 and the Finnish participation in the Karelians' East Karelian uprising of 1921–1922. The Finns conducted armed raids to the Arctic Coast too, but those small-scale operations are not discussed because the terrain above the Polar Circle is treeless tundra.⁴ The role of Finnish volunteers who also fought in the simultaneous Estonian War of Independence and in the Ingrian operations in the vicinity of Petrograd is also excluded from the discussion, as this mainly occurred in flat and thinly forested areas. The paper draws upon archival documents, diaries, participant memoirs and secondary literature.

The paper specifically focuses on the tactical considerations of fighting in subarctic northern boreal (taiga) forests. The forest battlefield terrain is analyzed, discussing the role played by limited observation and fields of fire, good cover and concealment, plentiful natural obstacles, unclear key terrain and poor avenues of approach that restricted maneuverability and impeded troop movements. In addition, the difficult environment and weather conditions placed demands on organization, command, training, equipment, logistics, supply and the morale of the expeditioners. The paper draws upon archival documents, diaries, participant memoirs and secondary literature.

The taiga forests were peculiar areas of operation that differed greatly from other European battlegrounds, especially in terms of restricted visibility and trafficability. Eastern Karelia mainly comprised of dense and almost untouched old-growth forests with big trees and few clearings. The ground was partly hilly, and in many places the soil was swampy yet wooded. The areas were large and distances long. The road network was underdeveloped: often it only consisted of tracks or beaten paths. In the north, habitation was concentrated in backwoods villages on lakes, and in Olonets, villages were located along river banks. The forested terrain, which was basically similar on both sides of the border, was a challenging operational environment. It was suitable for low-intensity warfare of small units, normally companies or battalions at the most. The Karelian-Finnish irredentist troops were inferior in numbers to their Red adversaries.⁵

The German-trained Finnish Jaeger officers led the expeditions. They knew how to fight in open terrain but lacked experience of fighting in forests. Moreover, command was affected by communications that rested on orderlies on foot, skis or horseback. Due to slowness in conveying messages the operations were hard to coordinate. The lack of proper maps constituted another problem. It made orienteering a challenge, and sometimes the volunteers lost their sense of direction in the vast forests.⁶

⁴ See, for example, Eero Kuussaari, *Heimosodat 1918–1922, I: Taistelu Petsamosta* (Helsinki 1939), passim and Niinistö, *Heimosotien historia 1918–1922*, passim.

⁵ Ilmari Karhu, *Neuvostoliiton sotilasmaantieto* (Helsinki 1934), 130–135, 161, 204–218; Theodor Homén, *Itä-Karjala ja Kuollan Lappi* (Helsinki 1918), 85–98; *Aunuksen retken muistojulkaisu* (Helsinki 1930), 29–31; Väinö Salminen, *Viena-Aunus: Itä-Karjala sanoin ja kuvin* (Helsinki 1941), 9–22.

⁶ Matti Lauerma, *Kuninkaallinen Preussin Jääkäripataljoona 27: Vaiheet ja vaikutus* (Helsinki 1966), 919–934; Jarkko Kemppi and Jukka I. Mattila, *Jääkärit 1918: Valkoisen armeijan sotilasjohtajat* (Riiika 2018), 60–74; J. Takkinen, *Metsäsissipäällikön muistelmät 2: Taistelut Karjalan vapauttamiseksi* (Helsinki 1931), 224–225.

The Finnish volunteers fought on the side of local civil guardsmen and other Karelians who possessed a major advantage, local knowledge, and good qualifications for forest fighting. The Finnish volunteers were often inadequately trained, badly equipped and fed. The expeditions started at a time of serious food shortages, and thus it was difficult to gather foodstuffs from the area. Small rations led to malnutrition among the volunteers, and the horses did not have enough fodder either. Not all Karelians welcomed the Finns as liberators. All this had an impact on the volunteers' performance and motivation resulting in disciplinary problems and desertions.⁷

There was dead ground in many places in Eastern Karelia. Therefore, both sides aimed at getting points of observation by occupying higher ground. They preferred hill tops or ridges to have elevated positions for their machine guns. However, the hills were often rocky and therefore difficult to dig into. Vantage points and sentry posts were sometimes placed up in the trees or on roofs overlooking the terrain in the enemy's direction. Observation was easier in early summer when the undergrowth was still low, with nothing in the line of sight.⁸

In forests, fighting often took the form of close quarters combat. The density of vegetation made the effective ranges short and affected the accuracy of fire. The field or mountain guns, when available, were typically deployed for direct fire or for coastal artillery duties. *Minenwerfer* mortars proved useful.⁹

Because it was difficult to observe enemy movements, the threat of being cut off or encircled was ever-present. This emphasized the need for proper reconnaissance. Positions were designed for all-around defense. To set up, flank and rear security outposts were established and constant patrolling initiated to monitor the gaps. The Finnish-Karelian troops also conducted long-range patrolling to the Murmansk Railway (which opened in 1916) but, lacking explosives, they could only burn some bridges, thus temporarily interrupting train traffic.¹⁰

⁷ Takkinen, *Metsäsissipäällikön muistelmät* 2, 65, 133; *Aunuksen retken muistojulkaisu*, 47, 147–148; Martti Santavuori, *Suomen sotahistoria II* (Helsinki 1943), 252; Vahtola, Jouko, "Suomi suureksi – Viena vapaaksi": Valkoisen Suomen pyrkimykset Itä-Karjalan valtaamiseksi vuonna 1918 (Jyväskylä 1988), 141, 440; Roselius, "Holy War", 133; Mirko Harjula, *Venäjän Karjala ja Muurmanni 1914–1922* (Helsinki 2007), 75; Sami Kallio, *Karjalan vapauden puolesta: Vienan rykmentti Itä-Karjalan kansannousussa talvella 1921–1922* (Helsinki 2016), 109; Jouko Vahtola, *Nuorukaisten sota: Suomen sotaretki Aunukseen 1919* (Helsinki 1997), 190.

⁸ After-action report of Paavo Talvela's battalion (of the North Olonets volunteer troops), April 29, 1919, PA 21, KWA, FNA; Einar Palmunen, *Hämeen miehet Aunuksen retkellä 1919* (Hämeenlinna 1967), 75; Mauno Jokipii, "Heimosodat Vienassa ja Aunuksessa 1918–1922", in: Mauno Jokipii (ed.): *Itämerensuomalaiset: Heimokansojen historiaa ja kohtaloita* (Jyväskylä 1995), 285; Kallio, *Karjalan vapauden puolesta*, 38; Vahtola, *Nuorukaisten sota*, 235–236.

⁹ Vahtola, "Suomi suureksi – Viena vapaaksi", 361, 368; Lauri Kivinen, *Karjalan puolesta: Muistelmia Vienan Karjalan toisen retkikunnan vaiheista* (Helsinki 1919), 138–140; Pasi Tuunainen, "Suojärvellä käydyt sotatoimet sotilasmaantieteellisestä näkökulmasta tarkasteltuina", in: Tapio Hämynen (ed.), *Omal maal, vierahal maal: Suojärven historia IV* (Nurmes 2011), 39.

¹⁰ Gunnar von Hertzen, *Karjalan retkikunta* (Jyväskylä 1921), 64; Anthony Clayton, *Warfare in Woods and Forests* (Bloomington and Indianapolis 2012), 1; Palmunen, *Hämeen miehet Aunuksen retkellä 1919*, 49, 65–66, 74–75; Niinistö, *Heimosotien historia*, 82; Paavo Talvela, *Sotilaan elämä: muistelmät I* (Jyväskylä 1976), 49; Vahtola, "Suomi suureksi – Viena vapaaksi", 336; Vahtola, *Nuorukaisten sota*, 253–255.

Forests offered good cover and concealment: troops could hide among the trees without being detected from the air. Aerial reconnaissance was not always possible because overcast, a typical feature of the north, grounded the planes. The forests also offered shady paths to cut the opponent's lines of communication and supply, and gave the troops chances for outflanking movements and ambushes. Stealth was enhanced by clothing, in winter by white camouflage for some. All this made securing flank and rear areas difficult, but made using the element of surprise easy.¹¹

The forests were hiding places, but, most importantly of all, provided cover for safe approaching marches (and retreats) and bivouacking. It would have been useful to bypass enemy strongpoints in villages around which the trees had been cut. Instead, attacks in lines were stalled in open fields and bogs surrounding villages. Both sides learned that the edge of forest attracted fire, and thus it was better to build defenses slightly inside the tree line. This practice favored the defender.¹²

Night fighting was a rare phenomenon during the expeditions since, in the "land of midnight sun", the sun practically did not set at all in midsummer, but from late summer until the spring, the darkness started to play a role.¹³

Most of the forests were obstacles as such because they split up forces and canalized their movement. In mobile warfare in Eastern Karelia it took time to regroup and redeploy the troops. In more static trench-warfare situations, defensive positions were constructed behind choke points (like bridges) and natural obstacles, like lakes, rivers, marshes and easily defended passes. Yet the volunteers did not have enough troops to be dispersed over a large area or for wide defense in depth. The positions could be built of logs that could be found everywhere. The same is true for timber that was used to construct abatti obstacles and barriers to block the roads. Furthermore, the forest floor was criss-crossed with dead trees slowing down troop movements.¹⁴

In summer, soft swamps, marshes and bogs hindered movement. However, they were not impassable no-go areas because they could be crossed along duckboards, causeways or corduroy roads built over these wetlands. In winter the snow was an obstacle but only to those without skis.¹⁵

The leaders of the volunteer troops often designated villages as key terrain: they believed that holding them was essential to accomplishing their missions. The buildings provided the troops with shelter. This was important because the troops

¹¹ Recollections of Ilmari Töyry, CTFWIKW, Pk-869, FNA; Vahtola, "Suomi suureksi – Viena vapaaksi", 361–362; Haapanen, *Suomalaisten heimosotaretket 1918–1922*, 227–228; Vahtola, *Nuorukaisten sota*, 214, 217.

¹² The Diary of Samuli Paulaharju from the northeastern front, April 6–8, 1918, AFLS; Recollections of K. M. Wallenius, CTFWIKW, Pk-869, FNA; von Hertzen, *Karjalan retkikunta*, 90; Palmunen, *Hämeen miehet Aunuksen retkellä 1919*, 56, 80–85; Vahtola, "Suomi suureksi – Viena vapaaksi", 141–143; Harjula, *Venäjän Karjala ja Muurmanni 1914–1922*, 73–74.

¹³ Kivinen, *Karjalan puolesta*, 123; Vahtola, *Nuorukaisten sota*, 211.

¹⁴ Jussi T. Lappalainen, *Punakaartin sota, osa 1* (Helsinki 1981), 98; Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*, 31; Vahtola, "Suomi suureksi – Viena vapaaksi", 175; Armas Eskola, *Pojat Vienan saloilla* (Hämeenlinna 1971), 34, 52; Jokipii, "Heimosodat Vienassa ja Aunuksessa 1918–1922", 291.

¹⁵ War diary of the South Olonets volunteer troop's Headquarters, April 21, 1919, EA 1, KWA, FNA; Takkinen, *Metsäsissipäällikön muistelmät 2*, 133.

were bivouacking out in the open around campfires in different weather conditions (and in summer they were badly bothered by mosquitoes).¹⁶

The villages changed hands over and over again during the expeditions. The Finns managed to temporarily take the major population center in Olonets, and they also reached the gates of the main center in the area, Petrozavodsk, but were lacking resources to capture it.¹⁷

Due to the lack of a proper road network and because transport was confined to the roads, the most important road junctions were usually designated as key terrain. This was typically the case in the southern fronts.¹⁸

Mobile warfare as exercised in Eastern Karelia depended on the marching ability of individual soldiers in the seemingly endless forests. On the roads it came down to horse-drawn carriages. Yet poor avenues of approach resulted in grave logistics and supply problems. The existing roads could not, for example, facilitate movement of heavy weapons. Therefore, the volunteers did not have adequate heavy fire support at their disposal. Some attempts were made at building, widening and improving tracks and at maintaining the existing roads. Poor roads caused delays and prevented columns of rearguard detachments from linking up with the main forces which, in some instances, prevented the reaching of objectives.¹⁹

To overcome traffic problems the volunteers extensively used the waterways to transport men and material. In addition, the lakes could serve as avenues of approach and for landing operations. Near Olonets, for instance, the Reds landed troops ashore behind the volunteer's main front forcing them to retreat.²⁰

The mobility issues largely vanished in the winter when the ground was frozen. In winter, sled columns were used for cross-country transport in snow-clad forests and on the open ice covers on lakes. In the decisive winter combat engagement of the 1921–1922 uprising, the fast-moving ski company of the Finnish Red Guards took the volunteers' headquarters and supply center by surprise. However, the coldness of winter brought about different problems. Machine guns occasionally did not function in the cold weather.²¹

¹⁶ Vahtola, *Nuorukaisten sota*, 563–564.

¹⁷ Palmunen, *Hämeen miehet Aunuksen retkellä 1919*, 22; Vahtola, *Nuorukaisten sota*, 398–415, 420–426; Niinistö, *Heimosotien historia 1918–1922*, 168–170, 176; Harjula, *Venäjän Karjala ja Muurmanni 1914–1922*, 160–162.

¹⁸ Kivinen, *Karjalan puolesta*, 27; *Aunuksen retken muistojulkaisu*, 128; Vahtola, *Nuorukaisten sota*, 224.

¹⁹ Transport records of the Kuisma expedition, August–September 1918, KWA, K1, FNA; Takkinen, *Metsäsissipäällikön muistelmat 2*, 222–226; Kivinen, *Karjalan puolesta*, 10; *Aunuksen retken muistojulkaisu*, 26, 103, 133, 147; J. O. Hannula, *Suomen vapaussodan historia*. 5th edition (Porvoo 1956), 301; Vahtola, "Suomi suureksi – Viena vapaaksi", 354–356; Haapanen, *Suomalaisten heimosotaretket 1918–1922*, 218; Kallio, *Karjalan vapauden puolesta*, 111–112.

²⁰ Homén, *Itä-Karjala ja Kuollan Lappi*, 90–98; von Hertzen, *Karjalan retkikunta*, 80; Kivinen, *Karjalan puolesta*, 8–15, 27; Jokipii, "Heimosodat Vienassa ja Aunuksessa 1918–1922", 285.

²¹ Recollections of Oiva Willamo, CTFWIKW, Pk-869, FNA; Matti Lackman, "Punasissit suksilla: Punaisten sissitaktiikka Neuvosto-Karjalan kapinan kukistamisessa 1921–1922", in: *Sotahistoriallinen aikakauskirja* 17/1998, 83–113; von Hertzen, *Karjalan retkikunta*, 24; Vahtola, "Suomi suureksi – Viena vapaaksi", 154; Markku Salomaa, *Punaupseerien nousu ja tuho* (Helsinki

The worst season from a transportation point of view was the break-up period. According to the original plan, the Second White Karelia expedition and the Olonets expedition were to commence in winter, which enabled the use of ski troops. The campaign was delayed, and ran into difficulties during the spring thaw when the roads became really muddy. In early summer when the snow was still melting, the forests flooded. This gave the Reds extra time for counter-measures, contributing to the failure of the White incursion.²²

To conclude, one can say that the expedition failures can be attributed to various factors, many associated with military geography. The volunteers lacked suitable equipment and were not trained to fight in the forests. Moreover, serious logistics and supply problems were caused by difficult terrain and weather conditions.

The Finnish Army learned from the expeditions. During the interwar period forest terrain held a special place in Finnish tactical thinking. In the 1930s the Finnish officer corps generally agreed that forests offered protection and were the best terrain for offensive operations by small units. Specialized equipment, organizations, tactics and techniques for forest warfare were developed. Forest fighting was incorporated into their tactical doctrine and training. Every Finnish soldier learned to move, orienteer, camp and fight in forests in all seasons.²³

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2018), 161–170. See also Vikström, Uljas, *Toiska: Kertomus Toivo Antikaisen elämästä* (Petroskoi 1975), 94–100.

²² After-action report of the battle of Nannila, May 4, 1919, EA 39, KWA, FNA; von Hertzen, *Karjalan retkikunta*, 27; Aarne Sihvo, *Muistelmani II* (Keuruu 1956), 30; Palmunen, *Hämeen miehet Aunuksen retkellä 1919*, 18; Vahtola, *Nuorukaisten sota*, 168, 195, 236, 563.

²³ Antti Juutilainen, *Mottien maa: IV Armeijakunnan sotatoimet talvisodassa* (Helsinki 1985), 29–30; Pasi Tuunainen, *Finnish Military Effectiveness in the Winter War 1939–1940* (Basingstoke 2016), 143–144; Pasi Tuunainen, *Talven soturit: Talvisotataito Suomessa 1918–1940* (Tallinna 2019), 56–57, 136, 155, 233, 288–290. See also T. V. Viljanen, *Metsätaistelukokemuksia: Taistelut Argonnen metsässä liikuntasodan aikana v. 1914* (Helsinki 1938), 6–7 and Tynkkynen, Vesa, *Hyökkäyksestä puolustukseen: Taktiikan kehittymisen ensimmäiset vuosikymmenet Suomessa* (Helsinki 1996), 44–45.

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LE RÔLE DE LA FRANCE À CONSTANTINOPLE - 1919-1920 - D'APRÈS LES MÉMOIRES DU GÉNÉRAL NAYRAL DE BOURGON ET LES ARCHIVES DE L'ARMÉE FRANÇAISE

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Au cours de l'hiver 2018-2019, a été organisée à Paris une exposition intitulée „1919-1923 Une guerre sans fin“. Cette dernière a eu pour but de montrer que les traités de paix censés interrompre le premier conflit mondial, ne s'étaient pas forcément montrés adaptés au règlement de la guerre, en particulier en Orient, puisqu'ils ont généré des fractures au sein d'états existants. La désagrégation de l'état russe a constitué une préoccupation supplémentaire.

Je me propose de montrer les difficultés auxquelles ont été confrontés les autorités françaises, impliquées dans le Corps d'Occupation de Constantinople, dans la gestion des questions dites d'Orient. L'éternelle Question d'Orient, la maîtrise des Détroits trouve là sa continuité. Deux sources principales ont été utilisées pour cette présentation : D'une part les mémoires détaillées du général Nayral de Bourgon, d'autre part les archives de l'armée.

Le général Nayral de Bourgon est le collaborateur puis le successeur du général Franchet d'Espérey. Son départ en Orient est considéré comme un limogeage. Limoges a été la ville française loin du front où les généraux disgraciés par Foch avaient été envoyés suite au traumatisme de la bataille de la Marne qui avait failli voir arriver les Allemands à Paris. Cela rappelle la nomination de nombreux généraux de l'armée d'Orient que l'on souhaitait éloigner, privilégiant la victoire sur le front de France, dont le plus célèbre est le général Sarrail en juillet 1915.

Auteur de mémoires très détaillées, le général Nayral de Bourgon commande pendant huit mois à Constantinople, en 1920. Sa résidence est le yali d'Enver Pacha, gendre du Sultan, situé sur le Bosphore.

Parti de France le 11 avril 1919, il a d'abord assuré la fonction de représentant à Salonique, étant chargé de liquider les stocks de l'Armée d'Orient, de gérer la situation du général Mackensen prisonnier, de régler la question de Koritza d'Albanie et d'harmoniser les relations avec les Grecs.

Cette étude se limite à la période de grands bouleversements de 1919-1920. Après avoir évoqué le contexte Allié par rapport à Constantinople, quatre états qui ont été au centre des préoccupations pendant la période, la Turquie, la Grèce, L'Italie et la Russie seront évoqués.

Des Alliés divisés *Les hostilités avaient cessé mais non l'état de guerre*^{avril 1919}

Les alliances scellées au cours de la guerre, laissent place à des divergences de vue qui vont compromettre le règlement des problèmes en Orient et l'instauration de la paix. Les positions et implications françaises vont paraître plus radicales que celles des Britanniques qui vont les tempérer. L'affichage des dissensions est préjudiciable aux solutions. La popularité de Franchet d'Espérey est concurrencée par celle de l'Amiral de Robeck, commandant en chef des flottes alliées en Orient et Haut commissaire

britannique. Les Anglais ont réussi à distendre le rapport de subordination du général Milne, en lui faisant confier directement la mission d'occuper Constantinople par le Conseil suprême et en constituant sous son commandement une armée nouvelle, dite de la mer Noire, soustraite à l'autorité de Franchet d'Espérey. malgré les accords antérieurs. Le départ de Franchet pour la conférence de San Remo est un prétexte. Les Alliés occupent Constantinople, les Dardanelles, les bords de la mer Noire, Odessa et la Crimée. Le général apprend qu'un grave conflit vient d'éclater entre le général en chef Franchet d'Espérey et les hautes autorités anglaises sous le commandement du général Milne. Ces dernières venaient de perpétuer ce que les Français appellent un *coup d'état* en occupant les divers ministères et en plaçant dans chacun d'eux un officier anglais chargé d'en contrôler le fonctionnement. C'était selon Nayral de Bourgon, *la mainmise sur le gouvernement ottoman où déjà la Grande Bretagne avait placé dans la personne du grand vizir Damad Férid, un homme à sa dévotion.* L'épineuse question d'Orient s'en trouvait tranchée à son bénéfice. Ces événements rappelaient la mésentente entre les généraux Sarrail et Milne.

Les actions militaires sont inenvisageables en raison de la faiblesse des effectifs restés sur place. Quand le général Nayral de Bourgon arrive à Constantinople après une mission en Macédoine pour liquider les stocks de l'Armée d'Orient, il a laissé à Salonique l'équivalent d'un Corps d'Armée. La plus grande partie des troupes se trouvait aux côtés de l'armée roumaine en Bessarabie et Podolie au contact des Russes bolcheviks. Le général Nayral de Bourgon envisage une action offensive mais la démobilisation selon lui ruine l'armée d'Orient. *La plus grande irrésolution régnait d'ailleurs dans notre gouvernement au sujet des affaires d'Orient de plus en plus inextricable faute d'action militaire – toujours le nœud gordien* . On compte moins d'arrivées que de départs. La plupart des arrivants sont des réservistes, ce qui n'est pas un atout. Après le traité de Sèvres, On assiste à une réduction importante des effectifs français : le 1er juillet 1920 soit six mois plus tard. A cette dernière date, 18 000 h sont en Turquie, près de 2000 à Salonique et près de 600 à Sofia afin de contrôler la ligne Sofia-Belgrade.

1. Le cas turc

A la sortie de guerre, paradoxalement, la Turquie était l'état qui posait le moins de problème dans la région acceptant le principe d'un traité de paix avec la perte des provinces arabes. Le sultan avait renvoyé tous les responsables Jeunes Turcs et se montrait fort accommodant, acceptant le contexte d'occupation étrangère avec le contrôle du gouvernement par des Hauts Commissaires. Il jouait la carte de l'attentisme, conscient des graves tensions entre Alliés, stérilisant toute action militaire.

Au lendemain du traité de Sèvres, le 10 août 1920, la France se veut jouer un rôle *d'associée avec la nation turque, justifié par une tradition plusieurs fois séculaire.* Ce traité génère l'organisation du Corps d'Occupation de Constantinople octobre 1920 – octobre 1923 est à effectifs réduits, Il est chargé d'une mission nouvelle en collaboration avec les Britanniques et les Italiens. La France a la nostalgie de

ses anciennes relations avec la Porte et de son statut privilégié depuis l'alliance de François 1er avec Soliman en 1536 conue sou le terme de Capitulations. Ces rapports privilégiés avaient eu des conséquences sur le prestige de la France et le commerce. Marseille en a largement bénéficié. La langue française avait un statut officiel. De nombreuses établissements d'enseignement en Français existaient dans les grandes villes. Le français figurait sur les timbres poste, certains billets de banque, des affiches publiques. Cette prééminence tendait à s'effacer dans les provinces ayant acquis leur indépendance : Grèce, Roumanie, Serbie, Bulgarie. Le général de Bourgon ne souhaitait pas le démantèlement de la Turquie. Il proposait l'abandon de la Cilicie, même de la Syrie.

Des considérations économiques importantes motivaient la bienveillance de la France. C'est le cas des concessions des mines de charbon d'Héraclée à Zoungouldak situées sur la côte de la mer Noire à 80 km de Constantinople, qui ont été découvertes et exploitées par les Français lors de la campagne de Crimée. J'en viens au pouvement kémaliste : Ce site a vite été remarqué par les kémalistes qui en ont assuré le blocus en imposant un tribut sur les passages sous menace d'embargo. Fin août 1920, le président Millerand demande une action militaire pour dégager la région minière jusqu'aux principaux villages fournissant les mineurs. Les Anglais et les Italiens veulent en partager le contrôle. En avril, le maréchal Foch consulté avait élaboré un projet sommaire d'opérations exigeant 300 000 h pour réduire l'Anatolie jusqu'au cœur par des actions concentriques : ni la France, ni l'Angleterre, ni l'Italie ne peuvent fournir une armée. Le président Millerand trouve le Traité de Sèvres trop favorable aux Grecs, car il favorise l'indignation nationaliste ottomane dont Mustafa Kemal profite. De plus, l'expédition militaire en Cilicie naît de l'idée de faire barrage au kémalisme.

En juillet 1920, l'avance grecque en Anatolie et en Thrace orientale se développe en un mois. Grecs deviennent maîtres d'Andrinople. Ils ont progressé jusqu'au Bagdad Bahn après le célèbre combat d'Ourfa.

M. Kemal a installé son quartier général à Angora en attendant d'en faire sa capitale. Il a des armes : ce sont les dépôts de matériels laissés par les Britanniques et les Français qui se rejettent la responsabilité. M. Kemal se défend de toute pensée de rébellion contre son souverain. Il se défend de toute connivence avec les jeunes turcs dont il passait auparavant comme l'ennemi. Il se réclame de l'intégrité du territoire des Osmanlis, qu'il dit livré aux Grecs.

M. Kemal n'engage que des avant-gardes formées d'irréguliers ou de paysans, combinant les travaux agricoles avec les expéditions militaires, à la manière des Chouans ou des Vendéens pendant la période révolutionnaire. Ses troupes sont de petits groupes de réguliers, artilleurs, mitrailleurs, provenant en grande partie de la gendarmerie. La gendarmerie constituait une élite de l'armée ottomane grâce au général Foulon qui en avait réorganisée les services avant la déclaration de guerre. Des unités kémalistes arrivent jusqu'aux portes d'Istanbul en juin

Mustapha Kemal, refoulé, se met à s'appuyer sur les bolcheviks, en cours d'implantation en Géorgie et en Azerbaïdjan qui le ravitaillent. Des pourparlers se déroulent entre les Alliés et M. Kemal. Les Français sont chassés de Cilicie le 21

janvier 1921, après d'intenses combats qui ont gardé le nom d'enfer de Marache

L'occasion semblait alors favorable de lancer une offensive générale interalliée avec l'armée du sultan. Le problème de cohésion anglo-français la neutralise: les Anglais ne veulent pas d'un commandement français *que nous nous disposions soit disant à „tunisifier“* écrit le général. En fait aucun des gouvernements occidentaux ne se souciait de se lancer dans une aventure anatolienne. Aucun ne souhaitait non plus que les Grecs ne poursuivent leur progression.

La France souhaitait reprendre les meilleures relations possibles avec les Turcs mais les engagements pris avec les Grecs ne le permettaient pas. Elle fut vite accusée de duplicité. *Ces contradictions handicapent notre politique jusqu'à la fin de l'automne Le nœud gordien ne pouvait se trancher que par l'épée, nous venions de la remettre au fourreau.*

À l'issue du traité de Sèvres, Le général de Bourgon préconise de reconstituer la Turquie de 1914 diminuée de la Syrie, la Mésopotamie, la Palestine qui seraient sous mandats occidentaux. Il préconise un empire ottoman à cheval sur Asie et Europe maintenant sa capitale à Constantinople, assez puissant pour décourager les ambitions balkaniques. IL faut *laisser Andrinople/Edirne aux Turcs, ville fort peu hellénique*, selon lui.

2. Le cas grec

Le souci des Alliés de rétablir de bonnes relations avec la Turquie, indispose la Grèce qui se trouvait dans le camp des vainqueurs de 1918. Des quatre alliés constituant le Conseil des Hauts Commissaires, la Grèce seule conservait une armée sur le pied de guerre, animée du désir de soutenir ses intérêts. En 1919 à Salonique, le général pointe que malgré la cordialité des autorités, les relations avec l'ensemble des Grecs demeuraient délicates. Pourtant la France avait contribué pour 50 % au prêt accordé aux Grecs lors de la révolution vénizéliste, Le gouvernement vénizéliste ne cache pas ses désirs d'expansion, la Grande Idée, ce qui a été vu en parlant de la Turquie. À son retour à Paris à la fin de l'année 1920, le général de Bourgon rencontre Foch qui s'inquiète que ces positions ruinent quatre siècles de prestige et d'influence française en Turquie.

Le rétablissement sur le trône de Grèce du roi Constantin germanophile, déplait fortement à la France qui tente de s'accommoder de ce qu'on peut appeler une humiliation, en expliquant qu'elle délire en parallèle la France des engagements pris avec Venizelos. De leur côté, les Grecs se disent indisposés par plusieurs décisions prises par la France. Un exemple est le recrutement sur place de légionnaires grecs. De plus les Alliés doivent faire face à des grèves importantes dans les chemins de fer à Salonique.

En cette période, les relations avec la Grèce sont donc complexes. Et les événements qui suivent comme l'affaire de Smyrne vécue comme une non-assistance altéreront les relations entre les deux états.

D'autant que les Alliés se doivent aussi de gérer les relations avec les Italiens qui sont tendues.

3. Le cas italien

L'Italie qui fait partie également du camp des états vainqueurs, *se dit aigrie des libéralités au profit de la Grèce*. Elle se considère comme désavantagée dans le partage qui s'organise. Les Italiens ont des revendications semblables aux Grecs. L'Italie revendique le vilayet de Smyrne qui possède de riches terres agricoles, ainsi que des concessions sur le bassin minier d'Héraclée déjà évoqué. Cet état est dans une logique d'expansion. Une grande partie du territoire national est formé de terres ingrates qui ont du mal à nourrir une population qui s'accroît rapidement. L'envoi de slaves sur les côtes de l'Adriatique qui s'ajoute aux résidents habituels, soulève des protestations de la part de l'Italie. *C'est comme si on les mettait le long du canal de Suez* écrit le général de Bourgon. L'installation à Cattaro rappelle la menace autrichienne. De plus l'Italie est instable politiquement avec un risque de guerre civile.

Je terminerai par le cas russe, le plus marquant pour la période concernée.

4. Le cas russe

En Russie, le général Denikine chef des Russes blancs, soutenu par les Cosaques du Don, défait les bolcheviks sur le Don et entre au centre du pays. En septembre, le Donbass est repris, ainsi que la Crimée et des villes comme Kharkov, Kiev, Odessa. L'avance maximum a lieu en septembre et début octobre 1919. Mais l'armée Denikine est en déroute en octobre 1919 suite à une contre-attaque bolchevique. La contre-révolution semble donc avortée. Les bolcheviks sont en train de passer de l'anarchie à un gouvernement régulier. A son arrivée, le 8 avril 1920 le général de Bourgon sent que les choses vont être difficiles. Il demande du matériel aux Alliés. Les Français et les Anglais débarquent à Odessa et Sébastopol fin 1919, mais se heurtent à l'hostilité des populations. Les Français réembarquent en avril 1920.

Le général Denikine démissionne le 4 avril 1920 au profit du général Wrangel. On apprend que le Baron Wrangel, jeune officier de cavalerie, installé en rade de Sébastopol, veut réorganiser la base de Crimée à la tête des troupes décimées de l'armée Denikine. Il veut reprendre la région du Donetz pour remettre les charbonnages en exploitation. Nous connaissons la suite.

L'Angleterre de Lloyd George qui avait soutenu le général Denikine, n'entend pas soutenir le général Wrangel qui demande une médiation pour faire la paix avec les bolcheviks. Le Foreign Office renvoie la responsabilité sur la France qui seule, a reconnu le gouvernement de Wrangel. Nayral dit de la réaction britannique : *c'était net, c'était ... comme une gifle*.

L'échec de la contre-offensive du général Wrangel se termine avec l'arrivée, sous protection française, en une semaine de 130 navires de guerre et de commerce à Constantinople. Ils sont bondés transportant 135 000 réfugiés dont 70 000 militaires, la plupart debout sur les ponts, dont l'état sanitaire est déplorable. Il y a des cas d'asphyxie.

Le général de Bourgon a pour mission de recevoir le général Wrangel qu'il rencontre le 19 novembre 1920 et de négocier avec lui les conditions de l'accueil de ces réfugiés. Le général Wrangel arrive sur l'Amiral Korniloff qui mouille à

proximité du yali de Nayral de Bourgon et lui rend visite. Les Français vont devoir gérer quasiment seuls l'accueil de ces Russes Blancs. la France se charge d'héberger les réfugiés civils et militaires. Parmi les militaires se trouvent des Cosaques du Don et des troupes régulières. Au cours de cet entretien, le général Nayral de Bourgon impose le désarmement sous le régime de l'internement en territoire neutre et une discipline irréprochable. A la tête de chacun des groupements, sera nommé un officier supérieur français délégué par le général en chef français, ayant toute autorité sur les officiers généraux russes, même d'une ancienneté et d'un grade supérieur. Le général Wrangel obtient que l'on laisse aux Cosaques leur poignards *accessoire emblématique dont un cosaque ne se sépare pas sans se croire déshonoré*.

En a-parté, Nayral note que *certaines propos de Wrangel trahissaient l'arrière-pensée de conserver cette armée toute prête pour continuer la lutte contre le bolchévisme, au besoin en s'attaquant aux kémalistes en voie de bolchevisation*.

Afin de ménager les Turcs, le général de Bourgon, veut éviter que cette armée ne débarque à Constantinople. Seuls les évacués y ayant de la famille et des civils sont alors admis.

En parallèle, deux lieux de cantonnement sont choisis pour les militaires. Le Haut-commissaire français DeFrance décide d'installer des camps sur la presqu'île de Gallipoli. L'armée régulière russe y est installée à Gallipoli. Les camps édifier par les occupants pour les troupes régulières. La surveillance est assurée par la présence d'un bataillon sénégalais

Quant aux Cosaques déjà évoqués, ils sont envoyés sur l'île de Lemnos qui est bien équipée en baraquements car elle était la base arrière de l'expédition des Dardanelles. Des camps tout installés sont cédés par les Britanniques. On y installe environ 5 000 cosaques du Don. Le camp est occupé jusqu'en octobre 1921

Les civils sont répartis autour de Constantinople et près de Tchataldja, avec la copération des Britanniques et aussi des Américains.

La France a pris totalement en charge les frais de gestion de ces camps Il y a un problème avec l'Etat Major russe qui veut garder son armée intacte et reprendre la lutte contre le bolchévisme. Au début de décembre, Le général de Bourgon doit assurer une difficile mission. Ils rencontre les officiers russes qui se disent impatients de reprendre les opérations. Nayral leur recommande la patience, tout en sachant que la cause est très compromise. Le 2 décembre, l'escadre de guerre russe doit se rendre à Bizerte. Le gouvernement français dont l'armée est exangue, ne veut plus soutenir les Russes comme force militaire. Le général Wrangel ne ne résout qu'avec désespoir au licenciement de son armée. Il apprend la dispersion de ses troupes. *Il m'adressa une véhémence protestation à laquelle je ne pouvais répondre que par des condoléances*. Il est très humilié car il comptait s'installer au palais de Beyerbey. Une grande partie des cosaques retournent dans leur pays malgré l'opposition de Wrangel. Les autres sont acceptés en Bulgarie et Yougoslavie. *L'exode de Wrangel intéresse peu le département des Affaires Etrangères. Le coût préoccupe, la tendance est à faire comprendre à Wrangel qu'il doit désarmer, lui faire perdre ses illusions*. La France n'a plus les moyens de subvenir au coût de l'hébergement , d'autant qu'elle doit verser des pensions aux Russes partis s'installer dans tous les Etats voisins.

En cette mi-décembre, le général de Bourgon a terminé sa mission. La veille de son départ, le 13 décembre un dîner d'adieu avec cérémonies est donné sur un bateau de guerre. A son bord. Le général Wrangel est présent, il offre son sabre de parade richement orné d'ivoire et d'argent au général de Bourgon.

La défection de la Russie délivrait l'Angleterre du cauchemar de la promesse de lui concéder les détroits après la victoire. IL en était de même pour les Grecs

CONCLUSION

En 1921, *Rien n'a changé du trouble dont souffrait l'Europe*

Ces années sont donc marquées par des tensions entre alliés qui ont nuit à la recherche de solutions consensuelles. La France s'est montrée plus interventionniste, l'Angleterre plus passive. Personne n'a perçu à temps les effets du désastreux traité de Sèvres générant les ambitions de Mustapha Kemal. Le général de Bourgon a perçu que la diplomatie ne suffisait pas, et que des forces militaires dissuasives alliées auraient peut-être modéré la situation. Mais le cadre d'une sortie d'une guerre épuisante pour tous ne le permettait pas.

Nous avons là un exemple de sortie de guerre que l'on souhaitait pacifique, et qui se résoudra finalement par la force en 1923, dans le contexte du traité de Lausanne.

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L'IMPACT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DE PAIX DE 1919 SUR LES NATIONALISMES AFRICAINS PAR L'ABSENCE DE LA QUESTION COLONIALE: LE CAS DU MAROC

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Notre thématique suggère l'existence d'un lien entre la *conférence de la paix* et les *nationalismes africains* de l'après-guerre, dans le sens d'une réactivation patriotique dépassant le continent, pour d'autres contrées du monde contre le colonialisme. Notre ambition est de le démontrer succinctement, en mettant en lumière le cas du Maroc, pour son rôle directeur¹. Mais pour y parvenir, l'exercice sera multidimensionnel.

En effet, la Conférence de la paix², tenue à Paris du 18 janvier 1919 au 7 février 1920³, donnant lieu au *Traité de Versailles*⁴, ne révélerait mieux ses secrets qu'à travers deux réalités historiques : le *Colonialisme* et la *Grande Guerre*, sans lesquels nous n'en parlerions pas ici. Mais faudrait-il encore dévoiler leurs causes et leurs finalités pour l'Occident impérialiste, leurs implications et leurs conséquences⁵ pour le monde afro-asiatique. C'est dans ce cadre corrélationnel où le *nationalisme* marocain aura affronté les premières années du *colonialisme*, avant de se positionner vis-à-vis d'une *guerre* qui le surprendra en 1914 et d'une *paix* qui le décevra en 1920.

¹ À cet effet, tenterons-nous une analyse générale (dans la limite du temps qui nous est imparti) car un événement n'est mieux expliqué que par un décryptage, découvrant ses causes autant que ses conséquences.

² Les conférences internationales coloniales du vingtième siècle n'étaient pas des réunions banales. Pour la guerre ou pour la paix, ouvrant ou clôturant des négociations, elles s'expliquent par des événements historiques majeurs et leurs résultats engendrent des situations décisives nouvelles, à des objectifs déterminés. Dans une telle dynamique, aussi valable pour d'autres réalités post-coloniales, post-guerre froide, touchant la géopolitique du troisième millénaire, l'interaction de cause à effet se déroule entre des variables de même nature, et souvent à degrés d'impact comparables. S'agissant de *Conférence de paix de Paris* elle représentait une réunion internationale, organisée par les vainqueurs de la Première Guerre mondiale, „afin de négocier les traités de paix entre les Alliés et les vaincus“

³ Certaines sources avancent la date du „21 janvier 1920“ comme date de clôture de la conférence. C'est inexact, car la dernière réunion officielle s'est tenue le 7 février 1920, avec la livraison des coupables (Cf. Volume XXII, F. delta rés. 801 (2)(22).

⁴ Le *Traité de Versailles* est un traité de paix signé le 28 juin 1919 entre l'Allemagne et les Alliés à l'issue de la Première Guerre mondiale. Il annonce la création de la Société des Nations (SDN) et détermine les sanctions prises à l'encontre de l'Allemagne et de ses alliés. Certains en percevront „la paix des vainqueurs“, d'autres „la paix des colonisateurs“. Qui avait raison? Qui avait tort? La meilleure réponse reviendrait à l'Histoire. Mais tout le monde découvrira la même réalité: une „*paix mondiale provisoire*“, de vingt ans seulement, presque jour pour jour, à laquelle la Deuxième Guerre mondiale mettra fin. Mais, revenons à la Grande Guerre qui, faut-il le souligner, avait éclaté dans un climat international, fondamentalement colonial : par la force des choses communes en l'observant d'une terrasse collective, ou par l'attrait des causes individuelles, en la regardant derrière l'étroit vitrail de chaque protagoniste. Et si la guerre était une erreur géostratégique qu'on aurait pu éviter en domptant la convoitise colonialiste au 19^e siècle, le fait de renforcer l'impérialisme au 20^e siècle à partir de la Conférence de paix, dans l'ignorance des intérêts des colonisés, serait alors une erreur géopolitique essentiellement européenne, plus grave encore que celle de l'avant-guerre.

⁵ Un événement n'est pas important en tant que tel, c'est en explorant son fond et son contexte, au-delà de son apparence, que l'on pourrait mieux le saisir.

Toute autre démarche analytique restreinte, tomberait en dessous du seuil minima, s'éloignant du substratum, vers le superficiel, l'artificiel ou le partiel.

C'est donc une action de plongeur que nous tenterons dans l'océan de l'exploration, où notre cloche à plonger sera la quête de vérité. Mais prenons garde dans notre plongée, car l'histoire est „souvent dénaturée pour justifier des politiques monstrueuses, pour servir des revendications territoriales extravagantes ou pour expliquer de mauvaises décisions“⁶ selon l'historienne canadienne Margaret MacMillan. Toutefois, la recherche cartésienne que nous prenons comme méthode, nous guidera mieux peut-être vers la réalité des annales, dénuée de grimage; parce que „l'Histoire est une grande dame qui n'a pas besoin de soubrettes pour la maquiller afin de la rendre plus jolie. Elle reste toujours l'Histoire et sait apparaître comme il faut, quand il faut, où il faut“⁷, déclarera un jour feu SM Hassan II. C'est cette „Grande dame“ qui incarnera notre bref séjour dans les profondeurs de la *relation-réflexion*. Allons-y!

Nous voilà d'abord à trois décennies et demie de recul par rapport à la conférence de la paix à Paris (1919-1920), puisque la racine coloniale de la *Conférence de Berlin*⁸ (novembre 1884 et février 1885) - qui a consacré le partage de l'Afrique entre les puissances européennes comme on le sait⁹ - remonte à la *Conférence géographique*

⁶ <https://www.international.gc.ca/odskelton/macmillan.aspx?lang=fra>

⁷ Hassan II, *La Mémoire d'un Roi*, Librairie Plon, Paris, 1993, p. 140

⁸ Étaient finalement réunis à Berlin : les représentants de 14 pays à savoir : Allemagne, Autriche-Hongrie, Belgique, Danemark, Empire ottoman, Espagne, États-Unis, France, Grande-Bretagne, Italie, Pays-Bas, Portugal, Russie, Suède. Ils étaient là, sur invitation du chancelier Otto von Bismarck, pour s'accaparer l'Afrique.

⁹ En procédant au partage de l'Afrique (en 1885) dans sa quasi-totalité (dont les contrées peuplées primitivement découvertes et soumises) avant la conférence de Berlin, celle-ci confirmait en même temps des territoires progressivement occupés, à partir du 15^e siècle, par les colonisateurs du Jeune continent. Il s'agit, *Premièrement*, de la ville de Melilla, occupée en 1497, comme étant, d'une façon absolue, la première colonie européenne en Afrique, placée sous la domination de l'Espagne (amputée du territoire marocain), suivie de la deuxième ville septentrionale marocaine de Ceuta reliée à Melilla en 1580, puis de la Guinée équatoriale en 1778...etc.). *Deuxièmement*, l'Angola, première colonie portugaise en Afrique à partir de 1482. *Troisièmement*, le Sénégal, première colonie française en Afrique, occupé primitivement et partiellement par la France en 1626 sous le nom de „colonie du Sénégal“ avant d'être entièrement conquis et soumis en 1895 et intégré dans l'*Afrique Occidentale Française* (AOF). *Quatrièmement*, la Gambie première colonie britannique en Afrique constituée en 1783. Par ailleurs, la conférence de Berlin fut „une initiative allemande pour calmer les tensions entre les pays européens créées par la ruée sur le continent africain“. Elle a établi, en conséquence, des „règles de conduite pour la division et l'occupation du territoire, devant dorénavant s'opérer à partir des côtes du continent et ensuite remonter [prudemment] à l'intérieur des terres soit une stratégie d'occupation. D'autres dispositions réglementaires sont établies celles „d'avoir une administration effective, de lutter contre l'esclavage, d'améliorer les conditions de vie des populations locales et être engagé dans l'évangélisation de ces derniers, soit une politique de conversion religieuse comme l'un des objectifs de la colonisation, faisant partie de la mission de civiliser les africains, telle que conçue primitivement par Léopold II (...)“.

de Bruxelles¹⁰ (septembre 1876), convoquée par Léopold II, roi des Belges¹¹, âgé alors de 24 ans.

Cette conférence avait justifié l'envoi des expéditions au Congo aux motifs d'y "abolir la traite des noirs" et, selon les propres termes du Souverain belge, de „civiliser le continent africain“. Retenons bien le verbe „civiliser“.

Et c'est un homme d'État français, Jules Ferry¹² (alors Président du Conseil des Ministres) qui adoptera l'idée colonialiste „civilisatrice“ de Léopold II, neuf ans plus tard, comme leitmotiv de l'occupation pour la France.

“Les races supérieures ont le droit de civiliser les races inférieures”¹³ avait-il déclaré à la Chambre des députés, à Paris, en juillet 1885.

Mais comme heureusement tout le monde n'a pas toujours la même opinion, Jules Ferry, se verra diamétralement contredit, deux jours plus tard, par un député pas comme les autres, nommé Georges Clemenceau¹⁴, surnommé *Le Tigre*, dont on parlera d'ailleurs.

“Non - lui dit-il - il n'y a pas de droits de nations dites supérieures contre les nations dites inférieures (...)”¹⁵. Son raisonnement sera aussi rationnel que passionnel¹⁶.

¹⁰ Cette conférence aboutira à la création de l'*Association internationale africaine*. Et dès 1878, le roi Léopold II saisit l'occasion de la traversée du continent par H.M Stanley pour l'inviter à se joindre aux travaux de ladite Association.

¹¹ Léopold II, deuxième roi des Belges, prince de Belgique, duc de Saxe, prince de Saxe-Cobourg-Gotha, duc de Brabant, fondateur de l'État indépendant du Congo, succède à son père, Léopold I^{er}, sur le trône belge en 1865. Par sa mère Louise d'Orléans, il est le petit-fils de Louis-Philippe I^{er}, roi des Français. (Wikipédia)

¹² Jules Ferry, né le 5 avril 1832 à Saint-Dié et mort le 17 mars 1893 à Paris, est un homme d'État français. Opposant à l'Empire, il est après la chute de celui-ci, en 1870, membre du gouvernement provisoire et, pour quelques mois, maire de Paris. (Wikipédia)

¹³ Jules Ferry, discours à la Chambre des députés du 28 juillet 1885.

¹⁴ „Georges Clemenceau, né le 28 septembre 1841 à Mouilleron-en-Pareds et mort le 24 novembre 1929 à Paris, est un homme d'État français, président du Conseil de 1906 à 1909 puis de 1917 à 1920“ (Wikipédia) Du reste, Georges Clemenceau fut „l'homme aux quatre visages : le Tigre qui fait tomber les ministères, le dreyfusard qui mène pendant neuf ans le combat du droit et de la justice, le premier flic de France qui, trois ans durant, dirige d'une main de fer le ministère de l'Intérieur, enfin „le Père la Victoire“ qui conduit le pays à l'armistice avec l'Allemagne. Ce radical, d'abord haï par la droite pour son anticléricalisme, puis par la gauche pour son sens de l'ordre et sa lutte contre le pacifisme, est un homme apparemment contradictoire, qui se définissait lui-même comme un “mélange d'anarchiste et de conservateur“. Du premier, il avait la passion de la liberté, la philosophie individualiste, le dégoût de la “caserne collectiviste“. Du second, l'amour de la patrie, le respect de la propriété, une certaine forme de pessimisme - celui de l'homme d'action – sur la nature humaine“ (*Michel Winock*)

¹⁵ Georges Clemenceau, réponse à Jules Ferry, discours à la Chambre des députés du 30 juillet 1885).

¹⁶ Voici un autre extrait de la réponse de Georges Clemenceau: „N'essayons pas de revêtir la violence du nom hypocrite de civilisation; ne parlons pas de droit, de devoir! La conquête que vous préconisez, c'est l'abus pur et simple de la force que donne la civilisation scientifique sur les civilisations rudimentaires, pour s'appropriier l'homme, le torturer, en extraire toute la force qui est en lui au profit du prétendu civilisateur. Ce n'est pas le droit: c'en est la négation. Parler à ce propos de civilisation, c'est joindre à la violence l'hypocrisie. [...] Quant à moi, mon patriotisme est en France. Je déclare que je garde mon patriotisme pour la défense du sol national“ (Réponse de Georges Clemenceau, réponse à Jules Ferry, discours à la Chambre des députés du 30 juillet 1885)

Cependant, dans aucune des conférences de Bruxelles et de Berlin précitées, les populations africaines n'ont été ni représentées, ni consultées sur la manière dont on voulait les „civiliser“. Et entre ces deux conférences s'était tenue une réunion internationale, spécialement consacrée au Maroc, pour la première fois, sous l'appellation: *Conférence de Madrid*¹⁷ de 1880¹⁸. L'Empire chérifien était déjà ciblé entre ces deux rassemblements coloniaux de premier ordre. Une deuxième conférence internationale, plus importante que les précédentes, sera encore dédiée au Maroc, deux décennies plus tard, en janvier 1906: la *Conférence d'Algésiras*¹⁹. Elle aboutit à l'*Acte d'Algésiras*²⁰ qui, tout en „internationalisant la

¹⁷ „La Conférence de Madrid donna lieu à des accords signés par le Maroc, sous le règne du Sultan Hassan Ier (1873-1894) et les pays européens, pour renforcer les avantages liés à l'évolution de ces derniers sur le sol marocain et donner un caractère juridique et réglementaire à cette progression. Seize séances se sont déroulées entre le 19 mai et le 3 juillet 1880 en présence de plénipotentiaires représentant l'Allemagne, l'Autriche-Hongrie, la Belgique, l'Espagne, les États-Unis, la France, la Grande-Bretagne (et le Danemark), l'Italie, le Maroc, les Pays-Bas, le Portugal, la Suède (et la Norvège). Une convention a été adoptée le dernier jour, 3 juillet 1880. En vertu de ces accords, les pays européens gagnèrent la liberté de posséder des terres et des biens dans l'ensemble du territoire du Maroc“.

¹⁸ Elle marqua l'origine de l'internationalisation de l'affaire marocaine, dans la course de convoitise européenne sur ce pays afro-maghrébin. Signalons que Les résultats de la Conférence de Berlin (1884-1885) seront adoubeés par certains accords bilatéraux et multilatéraux entre les puissances coloniales, officialisant leurs ententes et leurs trocs et délimitant leurs colonies.

¹⁹ La conférence rassemble 13 pays y compris le Maroc. Soit 12 États européens, à savoir : l'Allemagne, l'Autriche-Hongrie, la Belgique, l'Espagne, les États-Unis, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, l'Italie, les Pays-Bas (Hollande), le Portugal, la Russie et la Suède. La délégation marocaine est la plus grande en comprenant 5 membres dont les noms suivent : Mohammed El-Mokri (président de la délégation, représentant du Sultan futur Grand-Vizir) Mohammed El Torrès, Mohammed Esseffar, Abderrahmane Bennis et Abdelhadi Zniber. Mais c'est le président américain qui est choisi comme médiateur. Il s'agit en fait de la première intervention des États-Unis en politique étrangère au niveau mondial, en totale rupture avec la doctrine Monroe. La conférence s'ouvre à Algésiras le 16 janvier 1906. Un droit de regard est reconnu à l'Allemagne sur les affaires marocaines. Toutefois la France et l'Espagne obtiennent des droits particuliers sur les affaires marocaines, en raison des intérêts liant ces pays (Acte final de la conférence d'Algésiras, 7 avril 1906). Concrètement, ces deux pays se voient confier la police des ports et le droit de créer une banque d'État internationale.

²⁰ L'*Acte général de la Conférence d'Algésiras*, (appelé communément l'*Acte d'Algésiras*) est un texte dûment signé le 7 avril 1906 : composé de sept chapitres, 123 articles et un protocole additionnel. Outre le principe de la souveraineté du Sultan, de son indépendance et de l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire, l'Acte déclare garantir la liberté économique sans aucune inégalité (...). L'*Acte* en question établit également un règlement sur les douanes, confirmant le tarif douanier maximum de 10% *ad valorem* (seulement). Il instituait par ailleurs le régime de la <porte ouverte>. Il décrétait en même temps la répression de la fraude et de la contrebande (...); même si l'Empire chérifien est „placé sous la protection des douze pays signataires. En somme, l'Acte d'Algésiras cristallisait une „lourde servitude diplomatique qui ne permettait pas au Maroc de défendre ses industries naissantes contre les produits étrangers“. (Voir Lasserre-Bigorry J.-H. Le mythe d'Algésiras. In: *Politique étrangère*, n°3 – 1950 – 15^e année. p. 317-341). Par ailleurs, l'Allemagne semblait avoir obtenu satisfaction en obtenant la reconnaissance du „principe de la porte ouverte “ mais en fait le règlement va dans le sens des intérêts de la France qui conserve sa position privilégiée. La sécurité des ports est ainsi de son ressort (conjointement avec l'Espagne) tandis qu'elle devient majoritaire dans la banque d'État créée pour accompagner la modernisation du pays“. Aussi, l'Acte

question marocaine“²¹ proclamait cependant „le principe de la souveraineté et de l'indépendance du sultan ainsi que l'intégrité de ses États“. Retenons bien cette proclamation, parce qu'on y reviendra pour son importance fondamentale dans la question marocaine.

Le Maroc (appelé à l'époque *Empire chérifien*) est la dernière pièce du puzzle colonial qui manquait sur l'échiquier géopolitique mondial²². Comme si l'on n'attendait que l'instauration du „protectorat“ dans ce pays, pour y clôturer la première aventure de l'expansionnisme occidental le 30 mars 1912, afin de passer à la seconde aventure: celle de la Grande Guerre. Un conflit horrible, déclenché le 28 juillet 1914, soit 28 mois plus tard. À peine 28 mois! Joseph Caillaux n'avait-il pas présenté le protectorat sur le Maroc comme „l'achèvement de l'œuvre séculaire de la France en Afrique du Nord“²³

Qui croirait donc que l'attentat de Sarajevo valait vraiment une guerre planétaire dans laquelle devaient s'entretuer les européens eux-mêmes, en entraînant dans leur sillage infernal d'autres peuples, d'outre-mer²⁴.

Dès son annonce, la Conférence de la paix, intervenant deux mois et une semaine après l'armistice²⁵, suscite tant d'espoir de liberté chez les peuples colonisés, non seulement en Afrique et au Maghreb, mais aussi au Moyen-Orient et même en Asie. Tels des otages se précipitant auprès de leurs ravisseurs pour négocier leur délivrance, en sous-estimant l'obstination de ces derniers à les maintenir encore. La métaphore n'est pas exagérée si l'on sait qu'au déclenchement de la Grande Guerre,

d'Algésiras „se donne-t-il pour objectif de trouver les moyens de moderniser et d'internationaliser l'économie du royaume chérifien“. Et dans ce sens, les USA s'engagent à „faciliter (au Maroc) l'introduction de réformes dont „le résultat serait un bien-être général (...)“ (Voir Hélène Harter, *La Conférence d'Algésiras de 1906, un nouveau rôle des États-Unis dans le concert des nations?* in Bult de l'Institut Pierre Renouvin, 2015/2(N°42), p 75 à 88.) Lire également: „The Secretary of State to Delegate White, April 5, 1906“, FRUS, 1906, p. 1492. Voir la traduction en français telle qu'elle apparaît dans l'acte final.

²¹ Hassan II, *Le Défi*, Ed. Albin Michel, Paris, 1976, p. 15.

²² Une aventure plus dramatique que la première (celle de l'impérialisme) pour défendre les possessions coloniales et les intérêts économiques antagoniques, sans s'imaginer le prix excessivement douloureux qui allait en découler pour l'humanité.

²³ Joseph Caillaux, *Journal officiel de la République Française Débats parlementaires Chambre des députés*, édition du 19 décembre 1911, p. 4063-4068.

²⁴ En vérité, sans contester „le droit pour la liberté des nations, le salut des peuples et le maintien de la paix et de l'ordre“ pour lesquels combattaient les Alliés; force est de reconnaître, au demeurant, que le colonialisme autant que la Grande Guerre – deux phénomènes aussi humainement désagréables que complémentaires – ont émergé par la prédominance de la force, pour des motivations matérielles, industrielles, démographiques, religieuses et politiques, accentuées par des projets stratégiques. Voilà comment la géopolitique, optimisée par une géostratégie expansionniste à déterminant économique, avait d'abord favorisé la formation d'empires coloniaux; pour conduire finalement au Premier Conflit planétaire qui surprit quasiment tout le monde, sauf ceux qui le préparaient secrètement pour agresser ou ceux qui s'y préparaient pour se défendre, en voyant venir son spectre.

²⁵ L'armistice de 1918, signé le 11 novembre 1918 à 5 h 15, marque la fin des combats de la Première Guerre mondiale (1914-1918), la victoire des Alliés et la défaite totale de l'Allemagne, mais il ne s'agit pas d'une capitulation au sens propre. (Wikipédia)

„ le monde entier est colonisé par l'Europe²⁶, soit directement, soit indirectement : seuls le Japon et les États-Unis, eux-mêmes ancienne colonie européenne, échappent non seulement à cette main mise, mais l'imitent : alors que le Japon se taille un empire colonial en Chine et en Corée, les États-Unis, de manière indirecte, contrôlent l'Amérique du sud, une grande partie du Pacifique et s'implantent en Chine²⁷.

L'Égypte²⁸ est, chronologiquement, le pays qui ouvre la danse, à travers Saad Zaghloul, leader du parti El-wafd. Il „rencontre le Haut-commissaire britannique Sir Reginald Wingate, le 13 novembre 1918 – [soit 48 heures après l'armistice] – et demande [carrément] *l'autonomie pour le pays*²⁹ (...) [en souhaitant] qu'une délégation (*wafd*) de nationalistes puisse se rendre à Londres afin d'y exposer le cas de l'Égypte. Mais le Cabinet britannique refuse de recevoir le Wafd³⁰. Donc pas question d'en parler à Paris.

La Corée est le deuxième territoire colonisé à se tourner vers Paris³¹, à

²⁶ C'est d'ailleurs, en cette année où éclate la Grande Guerre que la Grande-Bretagne instaure officiellement le protectorat en Égypte (deux ans donc après le protectorat français sur le Maroc) bien que sa présence fût bien antérieure, dès 1882. Le protectorat anglais durera jusqu'en 1922 officiellement, mais réellement, la présence britannique effective s'étalera sur près d'un siècle, les possessions égyptiennes permettent aux Britanniques d'accroître leur Empire en Afrique et d'être maîtres des routes maritimes en direction de l'Asie, via le canal de Suez.

²⁷ Décidément, les Américains, bien très éloignés du vieux continent, n'étaient donc pas pour rien, dans toutes les conférences coloniales précitées à *Berlin*, à *Madrid* et à *Algésiras* ! (Voir pour plus de détails, Georges Brun, *in* http://www.crdp-strasbourg.fr/data/histoire/1GM_combats/europe_monde.php?parent=61

²⁸ L'Égypte est un ancien royaume sous domination turque (1501) qui avait été occupé par la France (1798) avant de devenir protectorat britannique à partir de 1814. Le pays des Pharaons obtiendra son indépendance en 1922.

²⁹ Il propose en échange un traité d'alliance avec la Grande-Bretagne.

³⁰ Nada Tomiche, *Les origines politiques de l'Égypte moderne*, in *L'Égypte d'aujourd'hui, permanence et changements 1805-1976*, chapitre IV, Publ. Institut de Recherches et d'Études sur les mondes arabes et musulmans (IREMAM), Marseille Université, 1977, pp. 85-105.

³¹ C'est précisément de l'Asie de l'Est, si retirée de l'Afrique, que jaillit, à l'automne 1918, la première étincelle d'émancipation, à travers la Corée. Car s'appuyant sur un *Traité d'amitié et de solidarité* conclu entre les États-Unis et la Corée en 1882, les Coréens d'Amérique adressèrent une pétition au Gouvernement américain pour les soutenir à participer à la Conférence de la Paix. Dans cette perspective, „l'Association Coréenne Nationale d'Amérique élut trois délégués. Drs. SyngmanRhee, Henry Chung et le Révérend C. H. Min pour joindre les délégués de l'Extrême-Orient à Paris. Cependant, „les trois personnalités précitées ne parvinrent pas à obtenir des autorités américaines ni passeports ni visas“. Il est clair que le Japon, puissance coloniale occupante de la Corée, était intervenu auprès de Washington pour empêcher les nationalistes coréens de rejoindre Paris, en les privant de titres de voyage. C'est alors que les Coréens se tournèrent vers le Président américain Woodrow Wilson pour qu'il défendit leur cause auprès de la Conférence, après avoir proclamé unilatéralement leur indépendance. Une initiative à laquelle le Japon puissance occupante et participante à la conférence de Paris, s'y opposa farouchement. Selon des archives coréennes, le gouvernement japonais était politiquement soutenu par ses pairs coloniaux. Il „opprimait la nation coréenne qui, admirablement unie comme un seul homme, du Nord au Sud, aspirait à prendre en main sa propre destinée. En effet, ayant pris connaissance de ce premier mouvement nationaliste indépendantiste coréen, les autorités japonaises en Corée procédèrent à „l'arrestation d'environ 200 Coréens le mois suivant (décembre 1818)“. Néanmoins, cela n'empêcha pas les initiateurs de poursuivre leur démarche politique, en

la fin de novembre 1918, suivie „des Noirs des Amériques“ à la rescousse de leurs frères africains³², en mars 1919; puis de la Tunisie en avril 1919, à travers le mouvement des *Jeunes Tunisiens*³³, sous l'impulsion d'Abdelaziz

communiquant avec plusieurs associations à l'étranger, à la faveur des délégués qui furent choisis pour le peuple coréen tout entier à la Conférence. Un choix qui fut même dûment ratifié par le Gouvernement provisoire de la République Coréenne“. Une formation nationale spéciale fut créée pour l'exécution du projet appelée: „Union Nationale d'Indépendance Coréenne“, comprenant „toutes les classes et les organisations du pays“ unies pour leur liberté. Elle incorporait, initialement, 2.000.000 de *Chundo-kyoins* (une secte politico-religieuse du pays), 1.000.000 de Bouddhistes, 500.000 membres de l'Église chrétienne et 1.500.000 Confucianistes. Tous s'unirent dans le même but, sans distinction de classe, de croyance, de secte ou de religion. Du reste, suite à l'attitude japonaise opposée à leur initiative, „les représentants du mouvement national indépendantiste se contentèrent d'envoyer des lettres et des pétitions au Président américain Wilson en vue de défendre, auprès de la Conférence de la Paix, la volonté de la Corée à l'indépendance. Parallèlement, „un congrès fut organisé à Philadelphie du 14 au 16 avril 1919, regroupant plus de 150 représentants (des 8.500 Coréens résidents aux États-Unis, à Hawaï et Mexico, et d'un million et demi de Coréens établis en Sibérie et en Mandchourie). Y assistèrent également des centaines d'Américains et amis étrangers“

³² Ayant remarqué, à six mille km de Paris, l'indifférence de la conférence à l'égard du Jeune continent, „des Noirs des Amériques“ décidèrent de prêter main-forte à leurs frères africains (dans l'intervalle des deux initiatives coréenne et tunisienne précitées); en tentant de „participer à la signature du futur traité de Versailles et d'obtenir la libération des colonies africaines de l'Allemagne, et par extension du reste de l'Afrique“. Leur démarche fut infructueuse. À la tête de leur mouvement se trouvaient notamment Marcus Garvey et W.E.B. Du Bois. Mais aucune de ces deux grandes figures du panafricanisme ne reçut d'autorisation pour se rendre à Paris. (Voir: <https://www.nofi.media/2015/02/premier-congres-panafricain/9755>). C'est à peine qu'ils parvinrent à organiser le Premier Congrès Panafricain durant les 19, 20 et 21 mars 1919, soit deux mois après le commencement des travaux de la Conférence de Paris, presque jour pour jour. Faute de pouvoir participer directement au traité de Versailles W.E.B. Du Bois parvint finalement à organiser ce premier Congrès panafricain après moult difficultés d'ordres politique, diplomatique, consulaire, administratif et même matériel. Parce qu'il était étroitement et constamment surveillé par les Services secrets français. Pour ceci, il était entré en contact direct avec le Sénégalais Blaise Diagne, Sous-secrétaire des colonies et Commissaire général des troupes noires françaises. Celui-ci convainquit Georges Clémenceau, le Président du Conseil français, de lui donner son autorisation pour l'organisation du Congrès. Les Français ne voyaient pas cette conférence aussi dangereuse comme la voyaient les Américains. Les Britanniques s'opposent aussi à la manifestation et refusent de délivrer des passeports aux ressortissants de leurs colonies. Finalement, 57 personnalités de 15 pays du monde noir de l'époque participent au Premier congrès panafricain. En réalité, les afro-américains essayaient de transmettre „les objectifs d'une Afrique libérée et gouvernée d'elle-même“. Dans cette perspective, 9 pays africains présents avaient demandé aux puissances coloniales un engagement juridique et législatif afin de „faire respecter les droits des populations africaines en matière d'accès et de contrôle de la terre, d'abolition du travail forcé et de droit à l'éducation“. Mais seront-ils entendus par leurs colonisateurs?

³³ Au niveau du Maghreb, le nationalisme tunisien contemporain, originellement incarné par le mouvement des *Jeunes Tunisiens*, fut le premier à réagir à la conférence de la paix. Ce mouvement avait effectivement adressé „en avril 1919, adressa au Président américain un rapport pour dénoncer la situation du pays et les abus du colonisateur français“ (Voir Pascal Le Pautremat et Charles-Robert Ageron, *La politique musulmane de la France au XX^e siècle. De l'Hexagone aux terres d'Islam: espoirs, réussites, échecs*, éd. Maisonneuve et Larose, Paris, 2003, p. 97). Le leader dudit mouvement, Abdelaziz Thaalbi, réclamait „la restauration d'un État indépendant et doté de structures modernes par une constitution“ (Voir Élisabeth Mouilleau, *Fonctionnaires de la République et artisans de l'empire. Le cas des contrôleurs civils en Tunisie (1881-1956)*, Éditions L'Harmattan, Paris, 2000, p. 169)

Thaâlbî³⁴. Aucune suite favorable ne leur sera notifiée.

En désespoir de cause, certaines organisations nationalistes, recourent au président des États-Unis Woodrow Wilson, afin de convaincre les Européens à leur ouvrir la porte de Versailles. Mais vainement³⁵. Même en dehors de la conférence, les puissances européennes bloqueront les voies diplomatiques à la question coloniale.

En effet, la France, la Belgique, les États-Unis et le Portugal prennent part au Premier Congrès Panafricain au début du printemps 1919; ce qui explique le fait que „les indépendances africaines n’y furent à aucun moment évoquées“³⁶.

Toutefois, cette vague d’espoir à la liberté qui déferle incontinent sur le continent comme une ruée vers l’or de l’indépendance, ne provient pas du néant. Les nationalistes africains se rappellent bien du discours historique de Woodrow Wilson, prononcé le 8 janvier 1918, contenant „*le principe d’autodétermination, qui doit prévaloir à la reconstruction du monde*“³⁷. C’était juste une année avant le début de la conférence.

Un phénomène singulier vient cependant embrouiller la cohérence apparente des choses dans notre plongée historique, particulièrement entre novembre 1918 et fin mars 1919. Car en fermant sa porte aux Égyptiens, Coréens, Tunisiens et aux Noirs afro-américains qui voulaient y entrer, la conférence de la paix ouvre cette même porte aux délégations de l’émir Fayçal³⁸ du Hedjaz (fils du Chérif de la Mecque) et des délégations syriennes et libanaises, dès janvier 1919, pour entendre leurs revendications³⁹.

Ce qui nous importe dans tout cela c’est de signaler l’incohérence de la conférence dans l’admission des entités politiques concernées ou intéressées, inspirant avoir deux poids, deux mesures. La contradiction apparaîtra encore plus prononcée lorsqu’on apprend qu’en établissant, dès le mois de novembre 1918, la liste officielle des participants, le ministère des Affaires étrangères français Georges

³⁴ Abdelaziz Thaâlbî est le fondateur du Destour en 1920, parti politique duquel émerge le Néo-Destour du futur président de la République tunisienne Habib Bourguiba. Il est l’auteur du manifeste *La Tunisie martyre. Ses revendications*, (ouvrage plus connu sous son titre court *La Tunisie martyre*), édité à Paris en janvier 1920.

³⁵ Comme si, cyniquement, dans cette Conférence parisienne, „*le malheur des uns* (en Afrique) *fait le bonheur des autres* (en Europe)“; en supposant que les héros de Versailles pouvaient vraiment se réjouir de l’exclusion des Africains, hypothèse que nous écartons totalement, malgré la réalité.

³⁶ <https://www.nofi.media/2018/02/congres-panafricain/35495>

³⁷ Ce principe est peut-être plus connu sous sa formulation, tirée de la philosophie des Lumières, de „droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes“. Si ce principe a été utilisé en Europe centrale, certains peuples se le sont vus refuser malheureusement.

³⁸ Son nom complet est Fayçal ben Hussein al-Hachimi né le 20 mai 1885 à La Mecque et mort le 8 septembre 1933 à Berne, fils de Hussein ben Ali, Chérif de La Mecque et roi du Hedjaz.

³⁹ „La correspondance Hussein-MacMahon, l’intervention de Hussein de La Mecque et de ses fils à la révolte arabe déclenchée le 10 juin 1916, l’entrée triomphale du fils aîné de Hussein, Fayçal, à Damas aux côtés des Britanniques le 3 octobre 1918, légitiment la venue de Fayçal à la conférence de la paix à Paris. Celui-ci s’y rendit avec l’appui de Lloyd George et défendit à plusieurs reprises le projet hachémite de réalisation de l’unité arabe sous un gouvernement chérifien, par deux mémorandums des 1^{er} et 29 janvier 1919, par une intervention à la conférence le 6 février (1919) et par une rencontre avec Clemenceau le 16 avril de la même année. Son projet rencontre l’hostilité de la France, déjà présente militairement en Syrie, et dont les intérêts ont été reconnus par les accords Sykes-Picot de 1916. Fayçal quitta alors Paris et rentra à Beyrouth.

Clemenceau y précisait que seuls „*les délégations représentant des États doivent prendre part aux négociations*“⁴⁰. Or si l'on s'en tient fidèlement à la définition politico-juridique de l'État, en tant que „Personne morale de droit public territoriale et souveraine“⁴¹, conformément à ses trois éléments constitutifs dont l'existence d' „un gouvernement titulaire du monopole de la contrainte légitime et investi d'un pouvoir institutionnalisé“⁴², l'on pourra alors se demander comment une „colonie“ dépourvue d'un gouvernement national, sans monopole de la contrainte pourrait-elle être assimilable à une entité politique „souveraine“⁴³? Comment pourrait-elle siéger dans une conférence internationale, ayant décidé de n'accepter que des États? Et qui dit „souveraineté“ dit forcément „indépendance“⁴⁴, puisque la souveraineté „en droit international, est une marque de l'indépendance“⁴⁵ de l'État et de la plénitude de ses compétences internationales“⁴⁶. Or, parmi les pays ayant effectivement participé en nombres de représentants quasiment comparables, l'on remarque - aux côtés des 27 États souverains et indépendants officiellement admis à siéger - des „colonies“ ou des „protectorats“ ne figurant pas initialement sur la liste officielle établie par M. Clemenceau comme l'Inde et l'Égypte, par exemple.

L'Inde, en effet, conviée avec deux représentants, au même titre que plusieurs États indépendants, était „une colonie britannique“⁴⁷ depuis pratiquement 1849 et „rattachée à la Couronne britannique en 1858“⁴⁸. Et dans les deux situations, elle ne jouissait en conséquence d'aucune forme de souveraineté internationale.

L'Égypte dont nous connaissons le statut de protectorat britannique jusqu'en février 1922 a également réussi à plaider sa cause devant la conférence, avec deux représentants.

Quant à la Syrie et le Liban que nous évoquions, leurs cas sont quasiment assimilables à l'Inde et l'Égypte, pour le motif qu'ils n'étaient politico-juridiquement ni effectivement soumis à la tutelle française, ni totalement libérés de l'influence d'un Empire ottoman en cours de démantèlement, entre le 30 octobre 1918 et le 1^{er} novembre 1922. Nous n'avons pas d'objection pour le Prince Fayçal du Hedjaz, car ce territoire n'était ni une colonie ni un protectorat.

N'omettons pas le cas du Canada, également invité avec deux représentants, qui semblait encore juridiquement plus critiquable, dans la mesure où, considérée

⁴⁰ *France-diplomatie*: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/archives-diplomatiques/action-scientifique-il-y-a-cent-ans-l-inauguration-de-la-conference-de-la-paix-a-travers-nos>

⁴¹ Lexique de politique, 7e édition, Éditions Dalloz, 2001, p. 160

⁴² Lexique de politique, 7e édition, Éditions Dalloz, 2001, p. 160

⁴³ Entendu que la notion de souveraineté „a été intégrée dans la théorie juridique par les légistes et implique l'indépendance totale de l'État vis-à-vis des puissances étrangères (souveraineté externe) et l'exclusivité de sa compétence sur le territoire national (souveraineté interne)

⁴⁴ Lexique de politique, 7e édition, Éditions Dalloz, 2001, p. 402

⁴⁵ Par conséquent, une „colonie“ étant „une dépendance territoriale d'un État située outre-mer, administrée directement par des agents de la métropole et n'ayant pas de personnalité juridique internationale“ ne constitue pas un État, en droit international. (Lexique de politique, 7e édition, Éditions Dalloz, 2001, p. 75)

⁴⁶ Lexique de politique, 7e édition, Éditions Dalloz, 2001, p. 402

⁴⁷ Lexique de politique, 7e édition, Éditions Dalloz, Paris, 2001, p. 210.

⁴⁸ Le Petit Larousse, grand format, Ed. Larousse, Paris, 1994, p. 1408.

à l'époque comme „colonie britannique“ (depuis 1763), figurait néanmoins dans la liste officielle de Clemenceau.

Mais dissipons vite l'énigme, car l'on saura plus tard que les quatre grandes puissances s'étaient mutuellement reconnus le pouvoir discrétionnaire d'inviter à la conférence des représentants qu'ils jugeraient utiles, parmi des territoires déjà conquis ou à conquérir ultérieurement (sous mandat ou sous tutelle) en commun accord⁴⁹. La conférence de la paix ne fut-elle pas alors en 1919 une *Conférence Berlin Bis* de l'après-Guerre où la France et l'Angleterre se partagèrent le Moyen-Orient, après avoir partagé l'Afrique notamment avec l'Allemagne, l'Espagne, le Portugal et la Belgique? Par le rapport de force, la tyrannie des intérêts des puissants l'emportait ainsi sur la vertu de la liberté que l'on claironnait pour les faibles, quitte à violer ses propres lois. C'est donc dans cette logique de pragmatisme moralement discutable que les délégations syro-libanaises précitées étaient même reçues – parallèlement à leur présence au sein de la conférence - par le président français Poincaré, le 28 août 1919, et par le président du Conseil Clemenceau, le 5 octobre. Ce dernier déclare, clairement, „approuver le programme de la délégation libanaise: indépendance du Liban et restauration dans ses limites historiques“⁵⁰. Ce sera chose faite en moins d'une année: le 1^{er} septembre 1920, la création du „Grand Liban“ est proclamée. Par contre, l'Émir Fayçal venu chercher l'indépendance totale de la Syrie rentrera bredouille de la conférence, après avoir „signé, le 9 janvier 1920, un accord avec la France (l'accord Fayçal-Clemenceau)“⁵¹ par lequel il reconnaît le mandat sur le Liban et sur la Syrie⁵². Lequel mandat sera „confirmé par les accords Sykes-Picot modifiés (accords sur les pétroles), avant même le feu vert officiel de la Société des Nations, qui interviendra en tout cas le 27 avril 1920“⁵³. Paris et Londres étaient pragmatiquement condamnés à l'entente, dans le cadre de cette occasion historique inespérée que représente la conférence de la paix. Ainsi, „la France se voyait octroyer les mandats sur le Liban et la Syrie, et l'Angleterre les mandats sur la Palestine, la Syrie du sud (Transjordanie) et l'Irak“. En vérité, „l'attribution des mandats ne fut rien d'autre qu'un partage de gains impérialistes, rejetant les prétentions du nationalisme arabe et les bonnes intentions des États-Unis et des 14 points du programme de son

⁴⁹ Une dérogation qui avait donc la même valeur que la décision prise à la veille de la conférence, „interdisant l'admission des pays vaincus et la Russie communiste à la table des négociations“. Le sort des empires allemand, austro-hongrois et ottoman allait donc se régler en leur absence, tandis que l'on offrait l'occasion aux quatre pays non européens précités de se faire représenter, même pour leur miroiter un sort plus fictif que réel.

⁵⁰ Anne-Lucie Chaigne-Oudin, *Conférence de la paix, délégations syriennes et libanaises*, art. 09/03/2010, in : <https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/Conference-de-la-paix-delegations.html>

⁵¹ Samir Anhoury, *La Syrie et le mandat français (1920-1946)* : http://maaber.50megs.com/issue_august03/look

⁵² Le gouvernement français s'engageait en retour à prêter son concours à la Syrie et à garantir son indépendance dans les frontières qui seront reconnues par la conférence de la paix“. Entre-temps le prince Fayçal se fit proclamer roi à Damas, le 8 mars. On connaît la suite avec la bataille de Khan Meisseloun, en juillet 1920, et l'exil de l'éphémère monarque du Levant.

⁵³ Guy Mandron, *La décolonisation armée contemporaine et ses conséquences*, Ed. L'Harmattan, Paris, 1995, pp. 72-73.

président *Woodrow Wilson*, fondé sur le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes⁵⁴ écrira Samir Anhoury. Pauvre *Grande Syrie* ou „Bilad al-Cham“ qui se réduira de 300.000 km² à 185.000 km², avec des frontières tracées à l'est et au sud-est en plein désert en ligne droite “. Nous connaissons tous l'histoire des mandats par la balkanisation de Bilad Achcham “. Mais ce que tout le monde ne connaît pas, c'est que cette balkanisation a été secrètement décrétée dans le forum ou la foire de la paix dont Paris était le foirail. C'était ça aussi la conférence de la paix. Acceptons donc le visage de cette *grande dame sans maquillage qui apparaît ici comme il faut* “ pour reprendre la métaphore de feu Hassan II.

Continuons notre plongée

Mais nous n'avons pas encore parlé du Maroc! Qu'en est-il pour lui? Avait-il reçu une invitation du Président Clemenceau à participer à la conférence? Pas du tout; comme d'ailleurs la majorité écrasante des pays africains. Car le Libéria⁵⁵ (indépendant depuis 1847) et l'Afrique du Sud (indépendante en 1910) étaient invités, par exemple. Mais le Maroc n'en a pas fait une maladie. L'on dirait même qu'il s'y attendait, sereinement, sans nulle surprise.

Il s'est abstenu, en effet, de toute démarche revendicative d'indépendance. Ni directement en s'adressant à Paris, ni indirectement en recourant au pays de l'Oncle Sam pour atteindre la ville natale de Molières.

Incroyable peut-être, mais vrai. C'est ce que nous confirment les archives de la conférence que nous avons compulsées. Et nul ouvrage sur l'événement ne prétend non plus le contraire.

Ainsi, ni lettre, ni mémoire, ni mémorandum, ni télégramme, ni note, ni communication, ni proposition, ni protestation, ni pétition, rapport, ni requête. Rien de toutes ces formes de documents soumis ou adressés à Paul Dutasta⁵⁶, secrétaire général de la Conférence, n'a été émis de l'Empire chérifien à l'attention de Clemenceau⁵⁷

Tâchons d'en découvrir les raisons:

Premièrement, le Sultan ne voulait pas s'exposer à un refus humiliant du Président Clemenceau sur une proposition de participation marocaine au Congrès de Paris, après que d'éminents dirigeants nationalistes afro-asiatiques en eussent essuyé, comme ceux que nous avons déjà évoqués.

Deuxièmement, il avait d'autres références logiques, à savoir *trois protectorats* ayant déjà passé des durées beaucoup plus longues sous l'influence française que les sept années non encore révolues qu'on comptait pour le Maroc et qui n'étaient pas invités à la conférence à savoir : le Cambodge, Madagascar et la Tunisie⁵⁸.

⁵⁴ Samir Anhoury, *La Syrie et le mandat français (1920-1946)*: http://maaber.50megs.com/issue_august03/look

⁵⁵ Le Libéria est la première République d'Afrique.

⁵⁶ Le Secrétariat général de la Conférence de paix est confié à Paul Dutasta, ambassadeur de France à Berne et appui politique de Georges Clemenceau.

⁵⁷ Clemenceau est, quant à lui, élu président de l'organe central, le Conseil suprême ou „Conseil des Quatre“ dans lequel siègent Wilson, Lloyd George, Orlando et Clemenceau qui avaient commencé à se réunir au cours du mois de décembre 1918 pour préparer les négociations.

⁵⁸ Il y avait effectivement le Cambodge et Madagascar d'abord, respectivement sous la

Troisièmement, il voyait que les quatre puissances de la conférence⁵⁹ avaient d'autres chats à fouetter que de faire de la question coloniale dans les colonies africaines⁶⁰.

Quatrièmement, il s'est vite rendu à l'évidence que la conférence n'avait quasiment exclu la question coloniale que pour l'Afrique et les Africains hormis le protectorat britannique en Egypte, pour les mobiles que nous avons vus. C'était ça aussi la conférence de la paix.

Cinquièmement, il „pensait que sa présence à la conférence aurait provoqué une friction“ qu'il valait mieux éviter entre le Souverain qu'il demeurerait et le colonisateur-administrateur direct qu'aurait devenir la France, surtout après la victoire. D'autant que n'ayant pas les oreilles fermées par du fil à coudre, il lui aurait été impossible d'assister bouche cousue en simple observateur, devant des représentants syro-libanais qui revendiquaient, à grand cri, l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de leurs pays. Deux fortes probabilités de tension que renforçait d'avantage la position géopolitique particulière du Maroc, notamment pour la France et l'Espagne⁶¹. Sa présence à la conférence, même par hypothèse, aurait équivalu à „tirer le premier fil du bas nylon“ du colonialisme, selon une métaphore du futur Premier ministre britannique Winston Churchill⁶².

En réalité, la rivalité infernale sur le Maroc s'explique pour être comparé au *premier fil du bas nylon*. N'oublions pas que ce pays séculaire a été exclusivement sur la table des négociations entre les puissances coloniales durant de nombreuses années, à travers sept accords. Les deux derniers traités mettent un terme à la rivalité coloniale

protection française depuis 56 ans (1863) et 34 ans (1885), n'ayant pas été conviés pour autant, et n'ayant pas sollicité à assister à Paris. Ensuite, la Tunisie, toute proche; occupée depuis quatre décennies environ (1881), et qui, on l'a vu, s'est même vu *opposer une fin de non-recevoir*.

⁵⁹ Le programme de cette conférence est le plus vaste jamais connu. „À la différence du congrès de Vienne en 1815, tout est à reconstruire: avec la chute des grands empires, les frontières européennes sont à redessiner, les circuits économiques et commerciaux à recréer. La situation alimentaire et l'instabilité politique découlant de la révolution bolchevique sont également des préoccupations constantes des „artisans de la paix“ (M. Macmillan) de même que leur souci de pérenniser leurs constructions grâce à une organisation de sécurité collective“.

⁶⁰ Pour le cas spécial du Maroc, l'on remarque que moins que beaucoup de pays ayant participé à la guerre, le nom du Maroc n'a été cité dans les documents officiels de la conférence que deux fois. Il est vrai qu'une „*Commission spéciale*“ pour le Maroc a été constituée, d'ailleurs sans l'avis du Maroc. Mais pour les Marocains cette „Commission“ traduisait la métaphore de „*la montagne qui a accouché d'une souris*“, parce qu'ils en attendaient le rétablissement légitime de leur souveraineté à l'instar des autres peuples qui récupéreront assez rapidement leur indépendance, tels que l'Égypte et le Grand Liban par exemple; alors qu'elle se penchait plutôt sur les intérêts des occupants dans l'Empire chérifien.

⁶¹ La participation marocaine, ne pouvant pas être purement protocolaire, aurait revêtu une signification politico-diplomatique délicate pour l'avenir du colonialisme européen lui-même. Une signification particulière incomparable à celle que pouvait insinuer la présence du prince Fayçal ou celle que devait traduire l'invitation des délégations syrienne et libanaise dont on a vu les résultats.

⁶² Une métaphore que le Premier ministre britannique exprimera sur la question coloniale marocaine lors de la Conférence d'Anfa (au Maroc) de crainte que l'Empire chérifien ne pût recouvrer son indépendance précocement pour en contaminer les autres colonies anglaises en Afrique.

sur ce pays, en la clôturant, en 1912, par la présence franco-espagnole⁶³, en raison „d'abord de sa position géographique comme <Pays de l'extrême Occident>“⁶⁴, le plus proche de l'Europe par rapport aux autres pays africains, „situé à un carrefour de mers, de continents, de peuples et de civilisations“⁶⁵. Et cela, les participants de la Conférence de la paix le savaient très bien sur le Maroc puisque c'étaient leurs pays qui furent les plus grands rivaux de sa convoitise.

D'ailleurs l'appétence de l'État français sur l'Empire chérifienn'a-t-elle pas été interprétée allégoriquement par le fait que la France, „venant d'instaurer son protectorat en Tunisie, il était naturel <qu'elle eût la coquetterie d'attacher à l'Algérie cette deuxième boucle d'oreille>“⁶⁶. Mais par respect à la grammaire française, cette métaphore serait impropre à l'égard du Maroc dont le nom est masculin⁶⁷. Est-ce peut-être pour cela que l'on inventa une autre allégorie, sous la plume de l'historien Gabriel Galland⁶⁸, regroupant encore les trois pays maghrébins, selon laquelle : „Le Maghreb tout entier ressemble à une côtelette dont la Tunisie et l'Algérie constitue

⁶³ Premièrement, à Fès, le 30 mars 1912, l'autorité coloniale française s'exercera dans le cadre du traité de Protectorat, et celle de l'Espagne dans le cadre de l'Accord franco-espagnol du 27 novembre de la même année. L'Espagne en obtint de la France „une sorte de sous location dans le nord et au Sahara“ pour ainsi dire. En effet, „c'est l'accord du 27 novembre 1912 qui donne des précisions sur la nature et le statut administratif des possessions espagnoles au Maroc. Ses grandes lignes sont les suivantes: les régions comprises dans cette zone resteront placées sous l'autorité civile et religieuse du sultan. Dans la même perspective, il précise que les possessions espagnoles jouiront d'une autonomie administrative à laquelle veillera un haut-commissaire espagnol. Elles seront administrées par un *Khalifa* du sultan ayant eu l'approbation préalable de l'Espagne. Sur la question de la délimitation géographique, l'accord conclu prévoit la création d'une commission mixte franco-espagnole à laquelle sera confiée la tâche de délimiter le tracé sur le terrain“. (Voir Wanaïm, Mbark, *La France et Abdelkrim: de l'apaisement politique à l'action militaire (1920-1926), Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, N° 85, 2012, pp. 285-301). Du reste, pour mieux saisir le contexte historico-géopolitique sans lequel l'accord franco-espagnol du 27 novembre 1912 n'aurait vu le jour, rappelons les cinq premiers traités qui lui furent antérieurs, et conclus dans les conditions suivantes: à Londres, par la signature de l'Entente cordiale franco-britannique en 1904. À Algésiras, dans une conférence tenue en 1906. Mais avant cette réunion internationale, la France et l'Espagne avait commencé par le Sud, en se partageant le Sahara en vertu de la convention du 27 juin 1900, ainsi que les <Accords secrets> de 1902 et 1904. Nous devons préciser que cette frontière septentrionale du Sahara espagnol, fut établie avec les régions du Souss et de l'Anti-Atlas, au niveau de l'oued Draa. Dès lors, le Sahara sous contrôle espagnol est divisé entre trois régions, qui furent pourvues de noms différents selon les périodes: au sud, le *Rio de Oro*; au centre, un espace baptisé *Saguia el-hamra* (avec Laayoune et Smara); au nord, la *région de Tarfaya* (incluant Tan Tan). Ainsi les dés furent jetés, à l'automne 1912, où tombaient les feuilles jaunes des arbres, celles de l'arbre du Maroc tombaient également pour une saison d'occupation dont on ignorait la période, mais pousseront certainement au printemps de la liberté, à laquelle les Marocains débiteront concrètement le combat de résistance depuis le drame de la région de Chaouïa, en 1908.

⁶⁴ Hassan II, *Le Défi*, Éditions Albin Michel, Paris, 1976, p. 11

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Lasserre-Bigorry J.-H. Le mythe d'Algésiras. In: *Politique étrangère*, n°3 – 1950 – 15^e année. p. 318

⁶⁷ Un nom masculin devant ceux de ses deux voisines, dont les appellations relèvent du genre féminin.

⁶⁸ Professeur au Lycée Condorcet, à Paris, en 1912 (Agrégé de l'Université).

*le manche, et les riches plaines du Maroc le noyau succulent. Beaucoup d'appétits convoitaient cette riche aubaine: félicitons-nous qu'elle soit échue à notre belle France, et tâchons d'en tirer le meilleur parti possible*⁶⁹.

Pour toutes ces raisons rationnelles réunies et pour tant d'autres que nous ignorions encore, le Sultan avait décidément décidé de laisser décider les décideurs de la conférence de paix sur le destin de deux qu'ils croyaient pouvoir toujours dominer sans trop savoir comment et jusqu'à quand. Il prit alors une initiative des plus formidables pour le Maroc et les Marocains, pour ne pas perdre son temps.

Ainsi, persuadé que la véritable indépendance réside non seulement dans la libération d'un territoire mais dans la possession de ce qu'il renferme en sous-sol comme richesses minières, et comprenant que les principaux mobiles de convoitise du Maroc par les puissances coloniales (allemande, française et britanniques) étaient d'ordres économiques, motivés par les richesses du sous-sol marocain, notamment pour l'exploitation du „phosphate dont les gîtes ont été découverts en 1893, outre les gisements de fer dans l'Atlas et dans le Rif⁷⁰, le Sultan estima le moment venu de décider, par dahir, „*que la recherche et l'exploitation des phosphates sont exclusivement réservés au Maghzen*“, c'est-à-dire à l'État marocain.

Une telle décision est l'aboutissement d'une longue tâche à laquelle il s'est attelé discrètement, durant toute une année sans discontinuité, aussitôt après la proclamation de l'armistice. Pour le souverain, c'était le moment psychologique opportun, où le gouvernement français était totalement plongé dans les épineux dossiers de la conférence de la paix. Et pour les Président de la République et Président du Conseil Poincaré et Clemenceau jamais le moment n'était aussi propice à la France, pour détourner le sultan et son Maghzen de l'idée de venir à la conférence revendiquer l'indépendance du Maroc. Chaque partie estimait avoir politiquement raison de l'autre sur deux questions croisées. Le Sultan, fidèlement soutenu dans son initiative par la complicité de Lyautey, sera non seulement le pionnier afro-arabo-asiatique en matière d'étatisation de ressources naturelles d'un pays au 20^{ème} siècle, mais il aura été le seul à nationaliser de telles richesses sous le joug du colonialisme. Puisque toutes les nationalisations de richesses minières tiers-mondistes sont réalisées en périodes post coloniales. Pour n'en citer que certains pays-modèles : l'Algérie⁷¹ pour ses hydrocarbures, en février 1971, soit 9 ans après l'indépendance ; la Mauritanie⁷², pour l'exploitation des mines de fer, en novembre 1974, soit 14 ans

⁶⁹ Gabriel Galland, *Le Maroc, un empire qui se réveille*, nouvelle édition, Dar Al Aman, Rabat, 2016, p. 299. Idem Première édition, *Le Maroc, un Empire* (Paris, juillet 1912)

⁷⁰ Jaurès cité par Georges Oved in *La gauche française et le nationalisme marocain*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1984, tome 1, p.20.

⁷¹ Annoncée par Houari Boumediene le 24 février 1971, „la nationalisation du secteur algérien des hydrocarbures a consacré la souveraineté du pays sur ses ressources et mis en marche le processus de son développement économique et social“.

⁷² L'annonce, faite le 28 novembre 1974 par le gouvernement mauritanien, de la nationalisation de la MIFERMA, venant moins de deux ans après la sortie de la Mauritanie de la zone franc et la création d'une monnaie nationale, confirme de manière spectaculaire un recul important de l'impérialisme dans cette zone – particulièrement de l'impérialisme français.

après l'indépendance, l'Iran⁷³ pour son industrie pétrolière en mars 1951, soit après un demi-siècle d'exploitation étrangère...etc.

Pour le Sultan, les dés sont jetés et advienne que pourra.

Nous savons tous que le Maroc est le premier exportateur mondial des Phosphates, mais tout le monde ne sait pas qui a nationalisé les phosphates, quand, et dans quelles circonstances délicates.

Voilà comment Moulay Youssef avait exploité, génialement et judicieusement, les 12 mois et 7 jours de la Conférence de la paix, pour nationaliser ou maghzeniser les phosphates du Maroc sous l'ère même du colonialisme, en y faisant le meilleur contrepoids économique du colonialisme lui-même. Car en faisant de son colonisateur et futur partenaire (la France) un débouché des phosphates nationalisés du Maroc parmi tant d'autres importateurs occidentaux, le Sultan n'en réplique-t-il pas à la thèse colonialiste de Jules Ferry pour qui les „possessions coloniales françaises“ sont d'abord des „débouchés“ pour son pays.

Mais comment parler de Jules Ferry sans évoquer le plus grand de ses rivaux idéologiques anti-impérialiste? Il existe, en effet, un personnage français incomparable dont on ne parle que rarement dans l'histoire du protectorat du Maroc, notamment à partir de 1906. Il s'agit pourtant d'un homme hors-pair, le tribun Jean Jaurès⁷⁴, anticolonialiste jusqu'à la moelle, dont le nom n'est pourtant pas moins retentissant que celui de Lyautey, bien qu'on eût attribué à ce dernier le qualificatif „Marocain“.

C'est justement Jaurès qui, député et maître de conférence d'Université à Paris, avertissait les futurs maîtres de la Conférence de paix à Paris, sur la gravité de la situation coloniale au Maroc, en pilotant inlassablement les plaidoiries des plaideurs plaidant pour une cause compréhensive pour le *vulgum pecus*, donc bien comprise par les puissances impérialistes occidentales, ayant participé à la Conférence d'Algésiras.

Car en définitive, le hic politico-juridique du problème colonial franco-marocain résidait originellement dans la violation de l'Acte d'Algésiras, signé le 7 avril 1906, qui proclame „le principe de la souveraineté du Sultan, de son indépendance et de l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire“.

N'avait-il pas interpellé le gouvernement français avant „cet extraordinaire Acte de spoliation“⁷⁵ que fut le traité de Fès – comme le qualifiera le futur Roi Hassan II – et juste après celui d'Algésiras, dans un double questionnement aussi philosophique que politique :

– „De quel droit nous portons la guerre, le fer et le feu au coeur même du Maroc?“⁷⁶ s'écria-t-il ? C'était en mars 1908, suite aux dramatiques émeutes dans la région marocaine de la Chaouia.

Et de revenir à la charge, aussi philosophiquement que juridiquement :

⁷³ „La Nationalisation de l'Industrie Pétrolière iranienne est un événement important dans l'histoire iranienne. Elle fut effectuée le 15 mars 1951, sous le premier Ministre Hossein Ala par le Parlement iranien qui adopta une Loi-Paragraphe“.

⁷⁴ Jean Jaurès est un „homme politique français né à Castres le 3 septembre 1859 et mort assassiné à Paris le 31 juillet 1914. Orateur et parlementaire socialiste, il s'est notamment illustré par son pacifisme et son opposition au déclenchement de la Première Guerre mondiale“ (Wikipédia)

⁷⁵ Hassan II, *Le Défi*, op.cit. p. 15.

⁷⁶ Jean Jaurès, extrait de son intervention à la Chambre des députés, le 27 mars 1908.

– „*De quel droit prenons-nous le Maroc? Où sont nos titres?*“⁷⁷ martela-t-il dans l'Assemblée nationale.

C'était en juin 1912, presque trois mois après l'occupation française.

Deux phrases interrogatives rejetant systématiquement l'“*argument civilisateur*“ de Jules Ferry et, bien avant lui, du Roi des Belges Léopold II, autant que l'idée de „supériorité des races“,

Jaurès y répondra lui-même en reconnaissant l'existence d'une „*civilisation marocaine capable des transformations nécessaires, capable d'évolution et de progrès, civilisation à la fois antique et moderne*“⁷⁸.

En définitive, c'est le droit à l'indépendance d'un pays „qui n'a jamais été un peuple soumis“⁷⁹ que défend Jaurès.

Jusqu'à ses derniers jours, c'étaient, à la fois, l'*occupation de l'Empire chérifien* et la *guerre*⁸⁰ qui lui donnaient des cheveux blancs. Et comme une ultime sonnette d'alarme à la France et ses alliés, il en établit le lien à trois jours de sa disparition, à trois jours du déclenchement du conflit planétaire.

Écoutons-le :

*“C'est l'Europe en feu, c'est le monde en feu. Dans une heure aussi grave, aussi pleine de périls pour nous tous, pour toutes les patries, je ne veux pas m'attarder à chercher les responsabilités. Nous avons les nôtres (...) Et j'atteste devant l'Histoire que nous les avons prévues, que nous les avons annoncées lorsque nous avons pénétré par la force, par les armes au Maroc. C'était ouvrir l'ère des ambitions, des convoitises et des conflits. On nous a dénoncés comme des mauvais Français. Et c'est nous qui avons le souci de la France. Voilà hélas, notre part de responsabilité (...)”*⁸¹.

En fait, le nom du Maroc et sa cause ont été les premiers termes qu'il évoqua dans ses nombreuses plaidoiries anticoloniales à l'Assemblée nationale française à l'automne 1906. Et le nom du Maroc et sa cause ont été également les derniers termes qu'il invoqua dans son dernier discours à l'assemblée nationale, 72 heures seulement avant son assassinat. Mais combien parmi les historiens y sont-ils attentifs?

Évoquer ici Jaurès avec tant d'émotion et de raison c'est toucher le cœur même de notre thématique, parce qu'il ne parlait pas à des morts ni à des hommes sourds-muets non-voyants. En 1906 comme en 1914, la plupart des dirigeants ou gouvernements qui participeraient à la conférence de paix, étaient bien pétillants en activités, en l'écoutant ou en le lisant dans les journaux sur la question marocaine. Ils étaient

⁷⁷ Jean Jaurès discours à la Chambre sur le traité de protectorat sur le Maroc, 28 juin 1912, *Pour la paix V*, p. 89.

⁷⁸ Jean Jaurès, discours à la Chambre sur le traité de protectorat sur le Maroc, 28 juin 1912, *Pour la paix V*, p. 90.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*

⁸⁰ C'est-à-dire l'indépendance du Maroc et la paix internationale.

⁸¹ Jean Jaurès, discours de 25 juillet 1914.

tous-là : Raymond Poincaré⁸² et Clemenceau⁸³ de France, David Lloyd George⁸⁴ du Royaume-Uni, Woodrow Wilson⁸⁵ des États-Unis.

Et comme nous l'avons signalé, le nom de Jean Jaurès au Maroc renvoie au „Père du Protectorat“; un Lyautey aussi conscient de l'héritage civilisationnel exceptionnel du Maroc et de son devenir, souffrant pour son souverain et son peuple, particulièrement durant la tenue de la conférence de la paix, alors que le Traité de Versailles faisait encore parler de lui. En témoigne une dernière dépêche qu'il délivra, en guise d'avertissement, au Ministre français des Affaires Étrangères. C'était le 31 décembre 1920.

Lyautey y „rappelait le poids historique spécifique de l'Empire chérifien par rapport aux autres pays maghrébins à commencer par son voisin de l'Est, son effort particulier dans la Grande Guerre, sa solidarité incomparable à la France, soulignant enfin (à deux reprises) le caractère d'*Allié* du Maroc, parmi les *Alliés*“⁸⁶.

Le Maréchal n'en aurait-il pas alerté les signataires du Traité de Versailles par le biais de son ministre, à quelques mois du déclenchement de la bataille d'Anoual?

Alexandre de Tocqueville résumait la politique coloniale en écrivant: „*ce qu'on peut espérer (...) ce n'est pas de faire que notre joug soit aimé, mais qu'il paraisse de plus en plus supportable*“⁸⁷. Mais l'“œuvre civilisatrice“ coloniale en Afrique était-elle vraiment supportable, avec toutes les iniquités qu'elle portait en elle-même, en prétendant le contraire?

En tout cas, „*force est de reconnaître que depuis 1920, le Protectorat s'est tourné vers une administration de plus en plus directe, jusqu'à une tentative d'annexion juridique du pays*“⁸⁸ comme l'affirmera l'historien français Guy Delanoë. Ce déraillement colonial au mépris du traité de Fès rappelait aux Marocains le même phénomène au „Cambodge qui, après avoir accepté le protectorat français en 1863 sous le règne de Norodom I^{er} s'est vu imposer un *régime d'administration directe* (conventions de 1884 et 1897)“. Les Marocains refusaient de se voir asservis en colonisés par un protectorat qui déposséderait leur sultan de sa légitime souveraineté, après avoir longtemps patienté dans le calme, en donnant du temps au temps. Pour „*un peuple qui est de beaucoup le plus intelligent de toute l'Afrique du Nord, et le plus apte à réagir*“⁸⁹, la Guerre du Rif était donc l'unique réaction intelligente à opérer, pour ne pas démentir le témoignage de Lyautey.

⁸² Raymond Poincaré, Président de la République française aussi bien en 1914 qu'en 1919 (avec un mandat présidentiel de sept années consécutives allant du 18 février 1913 au 18 février 1920)

⁸³ Georges Clemenceau sénateur français en 1914 (face à Jules Ferry) représentant de la France à la conférence de la paix en tant que Président du Conseil des Ministres, en 1919.

⁸⁴ David Lloyd George, chancelier de l'Échiquier du Royaume-Uni en 1914, Premier Ministre lors de la conférence, en 1919.

⁸⁵ Woodrow Wilson, Président des États-Unis, en 1914 comme en 1919, représentant son pays à la conférence (son mandat couvrait la période 4 mars 1913, 4 mars 1921)

⁸⁶ Guy Delanoë, *Lyautey, Juin, Mohammed V, fin d'un protectorat*, Éditions Eddif, Casablanca, 1996, p. 18

⁸⁷ A. de Tocqueville, *Premier rapport des travaux parlementaires sur l'Algérie*, 1847.

⁸⁸ Guy Delanoë, *Lyautey, Juin, Mohammed V*, op.cit, p. 28

⁸⁹ Guy Delanoë, *Lyautey, Juin, Mohammed V, fin d'un protectorat*, Éditions Eddif, Casablanca, 1996, p. 22

Le nationalisme marocain⁹⁰ semblait avoir suffisamment donné du temps au temps: le temps de la patience au temps du protectorat. Il espérait voir l'autorité coloniale franco-espagnole améliorer la vie socio-économique des Marocains, en la modernisant dans l'égalité entre ces derniers et les colons, sans bafouer les principes de l'Islam. Ces attentes n'ayant pas été atteintes au minimal qu'en espérait le peuple durant un quart de siècle, depuis le début de l'internationalisation de la question marocaine ; la seule réplique qui semblait inévitable résidait dans la *résistance armée* dont la bataille d'Anoual fut la démonstration magistrale, de l'avis unanime des historiens⁹¹. Une victoire incroyable de 3000 guerriers „indigènes“ contre 600.000 soldats européens, armés jusqu'aux dents. Rappelons que le héros du Rif Abdelkrim était pourtant un jeune fonctionnaire exemplaire⁹² et discipliné dans l'administration coloniale espagnole⁹³ depuis 1906“.

Outre ses conséquences intérieures immenses en matière de résistance armée contre les forces franco-espagnoles, la guerre du Rif aura des effets techniques instructifs et stimulateurs considérables en termes de stratégie militaire de la guérilla en zone montagneuse, sur les futurs mouvements de libération dans le monde. D'une manière immédiate, elle commence, au niveau maghrébin, par éperonner le nationalisme combattant libyen, en incitant Omar Al-Mokhtar à se porter à la tête de la résistance armée contre l'occupation coloniale italienne⁹⁴. D'une manière indirecte, „l'organisation rifaine va préfigurer les luttes ultérieures et un général

⁹⁰ Un nationalisme réaliste et vigilant, qui se traduisait par les attitudes et l'action patriotiques naturelles du Sultan et du peuple marocain en général, donc Abdelkrim et les Rifains inclus.

⁹¹ Est-il peut-être utile de souligner que ce quart de siècle d'expérience entre pacification d'occupation et résistance d'indépendance, fut successivement marqué par le premier défi colonial collectif d'Algésiras (1906-1912), les premières épreuves du protectorat (1912-1914), la Première Guerre mondiale (1914-1918) et le premier test post-guerre de coexistence entre colonialisme et résistance (1918-1921). Soit tous les épisodes décisifs d'une tentative de cohabitation qu'on aurait espéré possible dans les deux camps, mais s'avérant quasi-impossible par tant d'affronts coloniaux.

⁹² Il y avait travaillé durant 13 ans consécutifs, sans jamais posé de vrais problèmes aux Espagnols avant 1921. C'est donc vers la fin de 1919, soit vers la fin de la conférence de la paix, qu'il a quitté définitivement son poste de Cadi à Melilla, après avoir constaté que le Maroc n'a pas été invité à Paris, comme l'ont été les représentants des trois pays arabes précités: „géographiquement plus loin de l'Europe que le Maroc, historiquement moins liés, économiquement moins associés, socio-culturellement peu connectés, et politiquement moins

⁹³ En effet, au moment où se tenait la conférence d'Algésiras au printemps 1906, le futur chef de la résistance âgé de 24 ans, était un paisible fonctionnaire de l'administration espagnole, installé à Melilla, travaillant comme rédacteur du journal *Telegrama del Rif*, nommé l'année suivante, à l'automne 1907 au poste de *Secrétaire du Bureau des affaires indigènes*, et promu ensuite aux honorables fonctions de *Cadi-chef*, au début de la Grande Guerre, en 1914. Il ne quitta l'administration espagnole qu'à l'automne 1919 après y avoir travaillé plus de 13 ans, pour se fixer à Ajdir, sa ville natale. Et ce n'est qu'à partir du printemps 1920 qu'il commença à soulever les Beni Ouriaghel à la révolte

⁹⁴ Encouragé, en effet, par Abdelkrim Al-Khattabi au Maroc, Omar Al-Mokhtar se porta à la tête de la résistance à la colonisation italienne en adoptant une stratégie de lutte contre les Italiens, fondée sur la formation d'un commandement militaire unifié. C'est ainsi qu'il engagea „une lutte de guérilla dans les forêts et vallées du Djebel al Akhdar (la montagne verte) surplombant la côte de Cyrénaïquedans l'est libyen“. Cette stratégie lui permit de „tendre de multiples embuscades à l'ennemi et de prendre de surprise l'armée italienne, mieux organisée, nombreuse et bien armée“.

espagnol enseignera aux Cubains les techniques rifaines de guérilla“. Elle inspirera le Che Guevara au Cuba, Mao Zedong en Chine et Hô Chi Minh au Vietnam, la „guerre de résistance anti-française“⁹⁵ d’Indochine qui débutera également au lendemain de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale (1946). À ce propos, Diên Biên Phu était l’Anoual d’Indochine⁹⁶.

Le Sultan Moulay Youssef incarnait à la fois le symbole de souveraineté, le représentant suprême du peuple et l’interlocuteur principal d’un État sous tutelle d’une part; le rempart du nationalisme sous lequel devait compter la résistance pour la soutenir intelligemment d’autre part.

Par obligation politique, concurremment juridico-pragmatique, autant que par devoir patriotique, parallèlement islamo-nationaliste, il devait s’acquitter de cette masse de responsabilités quasi-paradoxaes, dans l’empire de la réalité qu’il était censé mieux saisir dans l’action et la réflexion, telle *la vérité que connaît seulement celui qui combat le taureau dans l’arène, et non ceux qui critiquent la corrida en remplissant les gradins*. Une métaphore que nous empruntons de John Kennedy sur l’art de gouverner.

Il faut donc se mettre non pas seulement dans la peau du sultan Moulay Youssef mais aussi dans sa conscience pour imaginer la difficulté de s’astreindre aux implications du *marteau dominateur* du traité de *protectorat* qu’il héritait directement ; sans pour autant se dérober des impératifs de l’*enclume défensive* de la *résistance* qu’il devait orienter indirectement. Abdelkrim El Khattabi semblait avoir compris cette double mission quasi-inconciliable du Sultan, pour n’avoir jamais voulu le supplanter ou être à sa place comme *torero*. Contrairement aux contrevérités des détracteurs de la légitimité.

Il est étrange que certains „historiens“ se soient focalisés presque uniquement sur la prétendue république d’Abdelkrim qui n’en fut pas une en réalité, négligeant ou ignorant la loyauté du chef rifain envers le souverain et la monarchie. Non seulement son image contrastait avec l’idée que se faisait une partie de l’Occident sur la nature et la finalité du combat réel qu’il menait, mais elle s’accordait avec le regard des Marocains à son endroit, inspiré par sa foi et son patriotisme incorruptibles. Tous les documents et ouvrages crédibles que nous avons pu consulter confirment ces réalités. N’est-ce pas là encore, et enfin, le beau visage naturel de cette *grande dame qui n’a pas besoin de soubrettes pour la maquiller afin de la rendre plus jolie (...)* paraissant ainsi, maintenant, ici, puisqu’il le faut, comme il le faut, conclure avec la sage métaphore du successeur du libérateur du Maroc, en 1956, feu SM. Mohammed V, que tous les successeurs des signataires du traité de Versailles étaient censés connaître, autant que leurs arrières-prédécesseurs, signataires de l’Acte d’Algésiras connaissaient bien le signataire du traité de protectorat.

⁹⁵ Appelée aussi „La guerre d’Indochine“ ou „la guerre d’indépendance d’Indochine“.

⁹⁶ La lourde défaite des forces françaises à Diên Biên Phu infligée aux troupes françaises par les combattants indépendantistes indochinois, malgré le soutien américain consistant en armes et en logistique, ressemblait à la cuisante défaite des forces franco-espagnoles imposée à Anoual par les combattants d’Abdelkrim.

LA CRISE DES REGIONS DU NORD-OUEST ET DU SUD-OUEST AU CAMEROUN DE 2016 A NOS JOURS: RESURGENCE DU PARTAGE DU CAMEROUN ENTERINE PAR LE TRAITE DE VERSAILLES

Prof. Daniel Abwa (Cameroon)

Introduction

De 2016 à nos jours, la République du Cameroun connaît une crise sociopolitique dans deux des 10 régions de son territoire. Il s'agit de la région du Nord-Ouest, chef-lieu Bamenda et celle du Sud-Ouest, chef-lieu Buea, prosaïquement appelées "régions anglophones" en opposition aux huit autres régions (Adamaoua, Centre, Est, Extrême-Nord, Littoral, Nord, Ouest, et Sud) dites "francophones". A l'origine, c'était des revendications corporatistes des Avocats et des Enseignants "anglophones" réclamant une meilleure prise en compte de la culture anglo-saxonne face à une prétendue prépondérance de plus en plus envahissante de la culture française dans un Cameroun réputé bilingue où la pratique de l'anglais et du français, constitutionnellement langues officielles, devrait se faire également dans l'ensemble du territoire national. Ces revendications corporatistes vont très vite se transformer en crise politique dont le point culminant est l'appel à la sécession des deux régions dites „anglophones“ qui demandent à se transformer en une nouvelle République appelée „Ambazonie“. Pour ce faire, des armes sont utilisées pour semer la mort entre les forces de maintien de l'ordre chargées de la préservation de l'intégrité du territoire camerounais, les sécessionnistes de la République fantôme d' "Ambazonie" et les civils innocents camerounais; le nombre des populations déplacées intérieures (PDI) connaît chaque jour une croissance exponentiellement importante. La source de cette crise est à rechercher dans la Grande Guerre et le traité de Versailles (I), *malgré* la volonté farouche des Camerounais de rester unis (II) face aux velléités séparatistes encouragées ou même orchestrées par les puissances extérieures (III).

I) LA GRANDE GUERRE, LE TRAITE DE VERSAILLES ET LE PARTAGE DU KAMERUN¹

Le 12 juillet 1884 est signé entre les commerçants allemands et les chefs douala un traité de protectorat, généralement reconnu comme le „traité

¹ La plupart des informations que nous apportons dans cette communication sont tirées de nos travaux antérieurs dont le plus significatifs sur ce sujet sont les suivants: „Le problème anglophone au Cameroun : facteur d'intégration ou de désintégration nationale?“ in C. Dubois, M. Michel, P. Soumille (Ed), *Frontières plurielles, frontières conflictuelles en Afrique subsaharienne*, Paris, IHCC, l'Harmattan, 2000; *Cameroun, histoire d'un nationalisme 1884-1961*, Yaoundé, Clé; 2010; *Ni Anglophones, ni Francophones au Cameroun : tous des Camerounais!! Essai d'analyse historique en hommage au regretté Pr. M. Z. Njeuma*, Yaoundé, Les Editions Kilimandjaro, 2015; „Le problème anglophone et le renouveau de Paul Biya“ *Annales de la FALSH*, Université de Yaoundé I, 2011, pp.191-219 ; „Leçon inaugurale du colloque sur le Cameroun et la Grande Guerre (1914-1916), in Anonyme, *Le Cameroun et la Grande Guerre (1914-1916)*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2017, pp. 19-30; „Leçon inaugurale, les guerres mondiales et les colonies dans l'histoire“ in *XLIIIème congrès international d'histoire militaire, Douala, du 2 au 8 septembre 2017, Actes*, Yaoundé, SOPECAM, 2018, pp. 39-52.

germano-douala² Cette signature permet aux Allemands d'engager la conquête et l'unification administrative de l'ensemble du territoire qui porte désormais l'appellation de Kamerun avec des frontières internationalement reconnues par ses voisins que sont les Anglais et les Français. Lorsque la Grande Guerre commence en Europe, elle s'étend immédiatement au Kamerun alors protectorat allemand. Anglais, Français et Belges forment une armée commune pour bouter les Allemands hors du Kamerun. Et cette armée coalisée réussit l'exploit de vaincre les Allemands et de les obliger à quitter le Kamerun en février 1916 après la capitulation du capitaine Von Raben qui menait la dernière résistance retranchée dans la forteresse de Mora. Les Allemands partis, Anglais et Français n'ont pas hésité à faire main basse sur ce territoire anciennement allemand, à se partager ce „butin de guerre“ sans, bien entendu, demander l'avis d'aucun Camerounais. Les Allemands chassés, Anglais et Français s'empressent de se partager le Kamerun anciennement allemand, comme ils l'ont fait au Moyen Orient avec les territoires arrachés à l'empire ottoman. Ce partage a lieu à Douala le 4 mars 1916, dans le palais jadis dédié aux Gouverneurs allemands, longtemps avant la fin de la Grande Guerre qui surviendra deux ans plus tard, en 1918. A propos de ce partage, nous écrivions :

– La France obtient, non seulement l'entièreté de la portion du territoire de l'AEF que les Allemands lui avaient soutirée et intégrée au Kamerun en 1911³, mais aussi les 4/5^e du territoire à partager alors que les Anglais se contentent du 1/5^e de ce territoire. Ainsi commence la séparation des Camerounais que les Allemands avaient réussi à unir, car, désormais,

² Le prince Kum'a Ndumbe III s'insurge contre la formulation „traité germano-douala“ en faveur du „traité germano-camerounais“ qu'il juge plus conforme à la vérité historique. Dans son argumentaire, il rapporte que dans les textes allemands on trouve plutôt la formule Kamerun Vertrag et nulle part on n'utilise le terme douala qui n'existait pas encore au moment de la signature du traité. Sur le plan formel et chronologique, le prince a parfaitement raison. Seulement, ceux qui utilisent la formulation „traité germano-douala“ ont également raison car il est formellement et historiquement établi que tous les signataires de ce traité du côté camerounais étaient des douala. Le reconnaître n'est nullement faire du tribalisme. Pourquoi doit-on historiquement méconnaître aux douala la contribution qu'ils ont apportée à l'évolution du nationalisme camerounais? Doit-on également leur refuser la paternité des pétitions qu'ils ont adressées à la SDN pour revendiquer le retour à l'unité du Kamerun allemand et un mieux-être pour les Camerounais sous administration française? Que l'on utilise la formulation „germano-camerounais“ ou „germano-douala“, c'est la même vérité historique qui ne mérite pas une polémique stérile car elle n'apporte rien de fondamentalement différent dans cet épisode de l'histoire du Cameroun. D'ailleurs, dans la pétition que les chefs douala adressent le 18 août 1919 à la conférence de paix de Versailles, ils y affirment que c'est eux qui ont légué le Cameroun aux Allemands en 1884. Il en est de même de celle du 19 décembre 1929 adressée à la SDN où ils se présentent comme les „chefs supérieurs qui ont conclu comme souverains indépendants avec le gouvernement allemand le traité politique de 1884“.

³ En 1911, en vue d'avoir les mains libres et prendre possession du Maroc face aux menaces des Allemands qui exigeaient des compensations territoriales pour accorder cette autorisation, les Allemands reçoivent de la France une partie du territoire de l'AEF qu'ils intègrent au Kamerun en lui donnant l'appellation de Neu Kamerun.

une frontière internationale les sépare, faisant d'eux des Camerounais sous administration française et des Camerounais sous administration britannique⁴.

Malgré les protestations des Allemands qui estiment que leur défaite ne devrait pas justifier la perte de leurs colonies qu'ils ont acquises de façon légitime et pour lesquelles ils ont fait d'énormes sacrifices en vue de leur mise en valeur et, de même, malgré le refus des Camerounais qui ne veulent plus qu'une autre puissance étrangère annexe à nouveau leur territoire⁵, le traité de Versailles entérine le partage du 4 mars 1916. La seule modification apportée à ce partage est consécutive à l'obligation faite aux Alliés par le président américain Woodrow Wilson d'incorporer le pacte consécutif de la SDN en tête du traité de Versailles et des autres traités de paix. C'est ainsi que le traité de Versailles „établit à l'article 22 de son pacte un système de mandat appliqué aux anciennes colonies allemandes et aux anciens territoires non turcs de l'empire ottoman, conformément au point cinq des “quatorze points” de Wilson “⁶. Ce faisant, le partage du Kamerun allemand, décidé le 4 mars 1916 par les Anglais et les Français, est maintenu mais, en vertu de cet article du traité de Versailles, le Cameroun devient un territoire sous mandat B de la SDN confié simultanément à la France et à la Grande Bretagne. La responsabilité du traité de Versailles dans la crise qui sévit aujourd'hui au Cameroun est fondée sur cet article 22 qui a confirmé la division du Cameroun contre la volonté unificatrice manifeste des Camerounais.

II) LA VOLONTE UNIFICATRICE DES CAMEROUNAIS CONTRE LE PARTAGE DU CAMEROUN ENTERINE PAR LE TRAITE DE VERSAILLES

Les Camerounais n'ont pas été consultés lorsque Français et Anglais se sont partagé leur territoire le 4 mars 1916 ; leur volonté unificatrice, d'autonomie ou de neutralité n'a pas non plus été prise en considération par la conférence de paix de Versailles qui a plutôt entériné ce partage tout en transformant le Cameroun divisé en territoires sous mandat. Les Camerounais vont subir ce partage sans l'accepter et ils ne manqueront aucune occasion de le contester et de manifester par là leur volonté unificatrice. Celle-ci va s'étendre dans le temps et ne prendra fin qu'avec la réunification des deux Cameroun (français et anglais) le 1^{er} octobre 1961.

Les premiers Camerounais à avoir manifesté leur refus de la séparation que Français et Anglais leur ont imposée sont ceux qui rejettent les frontières internationales arbitraires qui les divisent alors qu'ils ont un fond culturel commun

⁴ D.Abwa, „Leçon inaugurale du colloque....“, p. 29.

⁵ Ce refus se manifeste à travers une pétition que les chefs douala adressent à la conférence de paix de Versailles dans laquelle ils demandent que les Français quittent le Cameroun car „ils sont à même de les remplacer pour sauvegarder l'indépendance du Cameroun qu'ils ont jadis léguée aux Allemands“. Le cas échéant, ils demandaient qu'il leur fût accordé le droit de choisir la puissance étrangère sous laquelle placer le Cameroun. Cf. pétition du 18 août 1919 adressée à la Haute Conférence.

⁶ D. Abwa, *Cameroun, histoire...* p.142.

de part et d'autre du fleuve Mounjo. Ils continuent en effet d'entretenir les relations qui existaient entre eux en franchissant sans hésitation les barrières frontalières fixées par les colonisateurs anglais et français⁷. C'est le cas par exemple des Bakossi qui, du fait de ce partage, se trouvent à la fois au Cameroun français et au Cameroun anglais. Pour assister aux festivités de leur société secrète dénommée *Ahon*, ils n'hésitent pas à faire fi des frontières créées par ces nations européennes. A ce propos, nous écrivions ce qui suit:

– En effet, le festival unificateur des Bakossi dénommé *Ahon* est organisé chaque fois qu'il est question d'accueillir de nouveaux membres initiés dans cette société secrète par des danses rituelles particulières, les *juju dances*. A cette occasion, tout Bakossi qui se respecte, membre initié ou non de cette société secrète, est tenu d'assister à ce festival quel que soit le lieu où il est organisé, tant au Cameroun devenu français ou au Cameroun devenu anglais. Ainsi, pour le Bakossi, il est Camerounais partout où s'organise le festival *Ahon* au Cameroun car les frontières artificielles des Européens n'ont aucune prise sur lui lorsqu'il s'agit du respect de ses traditions séculaires⁸.

Dans le même sillage, il faut signaler les flux migratoires transfrontaliers „pour s'installer durablement et faire souche dans d'autres territoires du Cameroun par affinité avec leurs nouveaux voisins“⁹. C'est le cas des Bamoun qui, dès 1918, encouragés par leur souverain, le sultan Njoya, traversent „la frontière pour s'installer au Cameroun britannique au voisinage des populations qui leur sont culturellement et traditionnellement proches, notamment les Kwanso, chez les Nso, et à Baba chez les Ndop“¹⁰. Ce mouvement migratoire va aller grandissant: en 1926, 150 sujets du chef Njichara du village Bangourain quittent leur territoire pour s'installer au Cameroun britannique dans les chefferies tikar de Bagam, Bangalang, Bamessi, Bafanji, et Babalang. De même, au moment où le sultan Njoya exilé à Yaoundé meurt en 1933, „son successeur pressenti, le prince Njoya Moussa, se trouve au Cameroun britannique avec plus de 2000 Bamoun encadrés par une quinzaine de notables“¹¹. En plus des Bamoun, il y a nombre d'autres Camerounais qui quittent la zone française pour s'installer en zone britannique ; les raisons qui militent pour ces départs sont les suivantes: fuir les pratiques infamantes de l'indigénat, des corvées, des prestations ; la lourdeur de l'impôt de capitation, la répression policière, l'exigence du port d'un laissez-passer pour tout déplacement hors de son territoire d'origine et le chômage ambiant dans cette partie du territoire camerounais. Ces populations qui quittent la zone française ne se sentent pas étrangères dans la zone britannique où elles s'installent car, généralement, elles s'intègrent dans les villages qui leur

⁷ Bien que le Cameroun n'ait pas été formellement une colonie puisque protectorat allemand (1884-1916), condominium anglais-français (1916-1919) territoires sous mandat de la SDN (1920-1945) et territoires sous tutelle de l'ONU (1945-1960/61), Allemands, Anglais et Français y ont adopté les postures des pires colonisateurs.

⁸ D. Abwa, *Ni Anglophones, ni...* pp.36-37.

⁹ Ibid, p. 37

¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹ Ibid

sont apparentés avec des normes culturelles qui leurs sont communes notamment aux niveaux des langues maternelles utilisées, des habitudes culinaires, des noms identiques etc. Elles conservent néanmoins des liens avec leurs parents restés en zone française en créant dans leurs différentes zones de résidence au Cameroun britannique des regroupements associatifs antennes de ceux qui existent en zone française tels que la Solibabi (Solidarité Babimbi) des Bassa ou l'Union Bamiléké des Bamiléké.

Cette volonté unificatrice des Camerounais contre le partage de 1916 entériné par le traité de Versailles va se manifester avec plus de force à travers des revendications politiques clairement et fermement exprimées. Au Cameroun sous mandat français, ce sont les chefs douala qui revendiquent le retour à l'unité du Kamerun allemand dans certaines des pétitions qu'ils adressent à la SDN entre 1919 et 1929. Au Cameroun sous mandat britannique, c'est le rejet ferme et permanent des différentes tentatives des Anglais de transformer les Camerounais en Nigériens par une revendication systématique de la spécificité camerounaise dans la colonie nigériane¹². Toutefois, cette volonté unificatrice de Camerounais, politiquement timide pendant la période de mandat, devient très agressive lorsque le Cameroun devient un territoire sous tutelle des Nations Unies après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale.

La charte des Nations Unies indique en son article 76 (b) que les fins essentielles du régime de tutelle sont de :

- Favoriser le progrès politique, économique et social des territoires sous tutelle ainsi que le développement de leur instruction; favoriser également leur évolution progressive vers la capacité à s'administrer eux-mêmes ou l'indépendance, compte tenu des conditions particulières à chaque territoire et à ses populations, des aspirations librement exprimées des populations intéressées et des dispositions qui pourront être prévues dans chaque accord de tutelle.

Se fondant sur ces dispositions positives de la communauté internationale, les Camerounais des deux rives du Mounjo créent des partis politiques qui revendiquent clairement le retour à l'unité du Kamerun allemand. Au Cameroun sous tutelle française, c'est l'UPC (Union des Populations du Cameroun), parti politique créé le 10 avril 1948 qui a pour slogan „indépendance et réunification des deux Cameroun“. Ce parti utilise également la terminologie allemande de Kamerun dans certains de ses démembrements: Union Nationale des Etudiants Kamerunais (UNEK), Sinistre de la Défense Nationale du Kamerun (SDNK), Armée de Libération Nationale du Kamerun (ALNK). Au Cameroun sous tutelle britannique, la plupart des partis politiques qui se créent se rappellent le souvenir du Kamerun allemand en l'utilisant dans leurs désignations: Kamerun National Congress (KNC), Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP), Kamerun People's Party (KPP), Kamerun United Party (KUP), Kamerun United National Congress (KUNC), Kamerun Union of Settlers (KUS), National Union of Kamerun Students (NUKS), One Kamerun (OK). Cette volonté

¹² A la différence des Français qui n'ont pas pu intégrer leur portion du Cameroun dans leurs colonies de l'AEF, les Anglais quant à eux ont purement et simplement intégré leur partie du Cameroun dans leur colonie et protectorat du Nigeria en les divisant en Northern Cameroons rattaché à trois provinces du Nord du Nigeria et en Southern Cameroons rattaché à une des provinces du Southern Nigeria, notamment celle de la province de l'Est.

unificatrice des Camerounais ne s'arrête pas aux seuls slogans ; elle se manifeste également dans nombre de rencontres entre leaders politiques des deux Cameroun pour harmoniser leurs actions dans la quête de leur unité d'antan.

La première rencontre entre les leaders de l'UPC et ceux du parti dénommé Cameroon National Federation (CNF) créé et dirigé par Dr Emmanuel Endeley a lieu en 1949 à Kumba ; au cours de celle-ci, les participants décident de s'allier pour obtenir la réunification des deux Cameroun¹³. La seconde rencontre a lieu, toujours à Kumba, du 14 au 17 décembre 1951 entre les leaders de l'UPC, de l'Evolution Sociale Camerounaise (ESOCAM), du Kumze et du Ngondo venus du Cameroun français et ceux du KUNC du Cameroun britannique. Ici, l'UPC annonce son intention de recourir à la violence pour atteindre leur objectif commun, ce que lui déconseille le KNUC et l'invite plutôt à exiger des frontières plus fluides entre les deux territoires. En 1952, à Tiko, a lieu une autre rencontre entre UPC et KUNC au cours de laquelle un grand meeting permet à l'UPC de convaincre les Camerounais de la zone britannique d'adhérer aux idéaux de la réunification. Après l'interdiction de l'UPC en zone française en juillet 1955, ses leaders sont chaleureusement accueillis en zone britannique ouvrant ainsi une période de rencontres permanentes entre leaders politiques des deux zones dont le point culminant est la création du parti One Kamerun (OK), la version anglaise de l'UPC, lorsqu'en 1957, les Anglais décident d'interdire toute action de l'UPC dans leur partie du Cameroun. A partir de 1958, lorsque Ahmadou Ahidjo, leader du groupe parlementaire Union Camerounaise (UC) devient le Premier Ministre du Cameroun sous tutelle française et en 1959 lorsque le KNDP de John Ngu Foncha gagne les législatives qui font de lui le Premier Ministre du Southern Cameroons, ces rencontres débordent le caractère purement partisan pour adopter une posture institutionnelle quasi étatique car les deux Premiers Ministres se présentent désormais comme les représentants de l'ensemble des populations de chacun des deux Cameroun. Le 10 avril 1959, John Ngu Foncha entreprend une tournée qui le conduit tour à tour dans les villes du Cameroun français de Loum, Nkongsamba, Dschang et Mbouda. Il y est reçu dignement par des plénipotentiaires désignés par les autorités camerounaises de Yaoundé. A partir de cette dernière ville du Cameroun français, il entre en zone anglaise où il visite Santa et Bamenda, accompagné cette fois-ci du sultan Njimoluh Séidou, 17^e roi des Bamoun, du chef supérieur de Dschang et des maires de Nkongsamba et de Douala. Le 8 mai 1959 il est reçu à Yaoundé avec tous les honneurs dus à son rang par son homologue Ahmadou Ahidjo. Ce dernier se rend à son tour dans les villes du Southern Cameroons où il tient des discours pour dissiper les craintes de certains sceptiques parmi les Camerounais britanniques au sujet de la réunification souhaitée. Le discours le plus percutant est celui qu'il prononce à Victoria le 27 janvier 1960:

- Des gens de mauvaise foi vous disent d'abord que nous avons décidé ou que nous déciderons d'entrer dans la communauté française. Je voudrai apporter ici un démenti solennel et formel pour cette affirmation mensongère... ; il n'est

¹³ D. Abwa, *Ni Anglophones...* p. 52. Les informations qui suivent sont tirées d du chapitre 2 de cet ouvrage dans la rubrique consacrée à l'analyse de la "Contribution des Camerounais de l'intérieur dans la quête de l'unité du Cameroun" pp. 51 -58.

pas question pour nous de renoncer à notre indépendance totale et de nous intégrer dans une quelconque communauté.

- On dit d'autre part que nous n'avons plus les mêmes habitudes, que nous n'avons plus la même langue et moi je dis : si vous, de votre côté, vous avez réussi à avoir les mêmes habitudes que les Anglais en quelques décades et nous, si nous avons réussi à avoir la même langue que la France en quelques décades, comment ne pourrions-nous pas, nous qui sommes frères, nous qui sommes appelés à vivre jusqu'à la fin du monde, ne pourrions-nous pas nous entendre et avoir les mêmes habitudes et la même langue ?

- On dit encore que les uns et les autres, nous sommes pauvres, que nous ne pourrions pas nous suffire à nous-mêmes. Nous le sommes peut-être, mais il n'y a aucune honte à être pauvre et rien ne dit que ceux qui sont pauvres aujourd'hui le resteront toujours.

- D'autre part, on n'a jamais vu un chef d'une famille pauvre aller vendre une partie de sa famille à un voisin riche pour vivre heureux...¹⁴

Par ailleurs, de 1959 à 1961, les rencontres entre Ahidjo et Foncha, parfois seuls tous les deux ou quelquefois avec des équipes qui les accompagnent, se font à un rythme soutenu tantôt à Yaoundé, tantôt à Buea.

Autant les Camerounais divisés par le traité de Versailles se retrouvent de part et d'autre de leurs territoires respectifs, de même ceux qui vivent au loin, dans la diaspora, le font également¹⁵. Les Camerounais de la diaspora dont il est question ici sont pour la plupart des élèves et étudiants poursuivant leurs études secondaires et supérieures en Europe (France, Angleterre et Irlande du Nord) et au Nigeria en Afrique. Ces élèves et étudiants se sont regroupés en associations pour mieux harmoniser leurs actions de revendication de l'indépendance et de la réunification des deux Cameroun. En France, c'est l'Association des étudiants camerounais de France (AECF) créée en 1950 et en Angleterre, c'est l'Association des étudiants camerounais de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord dont la première session s'est tenue à Manchester du 7 au 8 mars 1951. Ces deux associations réussirent à se retrouver et à faire fusion en adoptant un sigle rappelant leur camerounité en y élaguant la spécificité de leurs lieux de résidence. Ainsi, en France cette association devient désormais et tour à tour association des étudiants camerounais (AEC), puis union des étudiants camerounais (UNEC) et enfin union des étudiants kamerunais (UNEK). En Angleterre et Irlande du Nord, cette association prend tour à tour les dénominations de national union of Cameroon students (NUCS) puis national union of Kamerun students (NUKS). Ensemble, ces étudiants camerounais de la diaspora saisissent par des pétitions, l'ONU, pour réclamer l'indépendance et la réunification des deux Cameroun. Ils vont même aller plus loin en participant ensemble à la conférence pan-camerounaise convoquée par le gouvernement Ahmadou Ahidjo au lycée Leclerc à Yaoundé du 27 au 30 août 1959. 10 d'entre eux sont venus de France, 8 du Cameroun

¹⁴ Anonyme, *Recueil des discours présidentiels 1957-1968*, p.114.

¹⁵ Les informations qui vont suivre sont tirées de la rubrique „Contribution des Camerounais de la diaspora dans la quête de l'unité du Cameroun“, D. Abwa, *Ni Anglophones...* pp. 58-63

sous administration britannique, 1 de Londres et 1 du Nigeria. Au cours de cette conférence, ces étudiants réclament le rétablissement de leur unité brisée par le traité de Versailles et recommandent pour ce faire, et entre autres : la création d'un comité pour la réunification composé à égalité des membres des deux zones, des contacts fréquents entre les deux gouvernements, la création d'une université camerounaise où l'on utiliserait comme langues de base l'anglais et le français...

L'action combinée des élèves et étudiants camerounais de l'intérieur et de la diaspora dans la quête de leurs indépendances et de la réunification des deux Cameroun amène l'ONU, qui a déjà levé la tutelle du Cameroun français et programmé son indépendance pour le 1^{er} janvier 1960, à s'intéresser au sort à réserver au Cameroun sous administration britannique. La solution trouvée par cette organisation internationale c'est d'inviter les Camerounais britanniques à se prononcer par référendum sur leur avenir à l'issue de leur indépendance. Deux questions leur sont ainsi posées : veulent-ils se joindre au moment de leur indépendance à la République du Cameroun déjà indépendante ou au Nigeria dont l'indépendance est déjà programmée pour le 1^{er} octobre 1961. Le plébiscite a lieu les 11 et 12 février 1961 et les résultats mettent un terme à la division des deux Cameroun décidée par le partage de 4 mars 1916 entériné par le traité de Versailles : le Southern Cameroons vote majoritairement pour son intégration avec la République du Cameroun tandis que le Northern Cameroons vote pour l'intégration avec la fédération nigériane.

Si les résultats de ce plébiscite mettent officiellement un terme, bien que partiellement, à la division du Cameroun entérinée par le traité de Versailles, il devient alors impératif que les Camerounais usent d'intelligence et de patriotisme pour créer des structures devant positivement consolider cette unité retrouvée. Quatre moments historiques, entre 1961 et 1982, vont permettre la réalisation de cette consolidation.

Il y a d'abord la conférence de Foumban, du 17 au 21 juillet 1961, au cours de laquelle les délégations conduites simultanément par Ahmadou Ahidjo, Président de la République du Cameroun et John Ngu Foncha, Premier Ministre du Southern Cameroons et Président du KNDP arrêtent les conditions de leur vivre ensemble: fédération avec deux Etats fédérés dont la capitale fédérale sera Yaoundé pour l'Etat à mettre en place ; bilinguisme avec deux langues officielles, l'anglais et le français d'égale valeur; une monnaie fédérale: le Franc CFA; une devise: Paix, Travail, Patrie; un hymne: "Au Cameroun; berceau de nos ancêtres, un drapeau : vert, rouge jaune frappé de deux étoiles dorées... Bref, l'essentiel de ce qui avait déjà été arrêté du côté du Cameroun français en 1957 par l'Assemblée Législative du Cameroun (ALCAM).

Il y a ensuite l'indépendance du Southern Cameroons, la proclamation et la célébration de la naissance de la République fédérale du Cameroun, le 1^{er} octobre 1961.

Le 1^{er} septembre 1966 naît un parti unifié mettant un terme au multipartisme existant au Cameroun depuis la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale et consolidant ainsi l'Unité Nationale, principal projet de société du Président de la République fédérale du Cameroun : Ahmadou Ahidjo. Il s'agit de l'UNC (Union Nationale du Cameroun) qui, de fait, devient le parti unique du Cameroun, tous les autres partis existant auparavant ayant volontairement accepté de se dissoudre. Même si ces

dissolutions sont faites à la demande du Président Ahidjo, aucun leader politique y ayant accédé ne peut dégager sa responsabilité de cette évolution politique. Ceux qui s'y sont opposés sont bien connus : André Marie Mbida du Parti Démocratique Camerounais (PDC), Charles René Guy Okala de l'Union Socialiste camerounaise (USC) et Théodore Mayi Matip de l'UPC. Ils ont connu la prison pour avoir osé défier le pouvoir en place et aucun des trois n'est de l'Etat fédéré du Cameroun occidental, c'est-à-dire de l'ancien Southern Cameroons.

Le 20 mai 1972, à l'issue d'un autre référendum, les Camerounais, dans leur immense majorité, se prononcent en faveur du passage de la République fédérale du Cameroun à la République unie du Cameroun. Une nouvelle date de la fête nationale du Cameroun, le 20 mai de chaque année est adoptée. C'est dire qu'au Cameroun, on ne commémore plus désormais ni le 1^{er} janvier qui rappelle l'indépendance du Cameroun français du 1^{er} janvier 1960, ni le 1^{er} octobre qui rappelle l'indépendance du Cameroun britannique et la naissance de la République fédérale du Cameroun du 1^{er} octobre 1961. Ceci témoigne d'une volonté des autorités et du peuple camerounais de rompre avec les effets pervers de la colonisation et de concrétiser le triomphe de l'unité nationale si chère à ce peuple.

Avec une telle évolution du Cameroun, on aurait pu penser que le génie des Camerounais dans leur grand ensemble a réussi à détruire les effets pervers de la division que la colonisation leur avait imposée et retrouver cette unité du Kameron allemand tant recherchée. Pourtant cette victoire que l'on était en droit de croire définitive montre de nos jours ses limites car les démons de la division refont surface pour remettre en question l'unité retrouvée avec le concours volontaire ou forcé des Camerounais¹⁶.

III) VELLEITES DE RETOUR A LA DIVISION ENTERINEE PAR LE TRAITE DE VERSAILLES: VOLONTE DES CAMEROUNAIS OU COMLOT CONTRE LE CAMEROUN ?

Les velléités de division qui se font jour dans les premières décades du XXI^{ème} siècle dans les régions du Nord-Ouest et du Sud-Ouest du Cameroun sont pourtant restées publiquement inaudibles sous le régime présidentiel d'Ahmadou Ahidjo (1960-1982). Lorsque ce dernier démissionne de ses fonctions de Président de la République et désigne son Premier Ministre, Paul Biya pour lui succéder, les initiatives tendant vers la division du Cameroun sur la base du partage effectué par les Français et les Anglais en 1916 et entériné par le traité de Versailles s'invitent de plus en plus sur la scène sociopolitique camerounaise. Ce qui amène à s'interroger sur la raison ou les raisons d'être de cette résurgence.

Ce sont d'abord les vieux compagnons politiques du président Ahidjo, qui, les premiers, entament des mouvements de protestation contre les comportements prétendument de „marginalisation“ en usage au Cameroun depuis l'unité retrouvée.

¹⁶ C'est ce que nous avons analysé dans deux articles publiés dans deux journaux *Mutations et Cameroon Tribune*. Le premier porte le titre „Le paradoxe camerounais“ et le second est intitulé „Intellectuels camerounais, cessons de créer artificiellement des marginalisations au Cameroun“

Profitant en effet de la démission d'Ahidjo et de la crise qui s'en suit entre son „successeur constitutionnel“ et lui, ainsi que de la décision contestée prise par le nouveau Président de la République de transformer par décret la République unie du Cameroun en République du Cameroun, John Ngu Foncha et Solomon Tandeng Muna cherchent à déconstruire tout ce qu'ils ont construit avec Ahidjo depuis la conférence de Foumban¹⁷. Chacun des deux démissionne à tour de rôle du Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais (RDPC), parti politique unique créé à Bamenda en 1985 par le nouveau président pour remplacer l'UNC encore profondément influencée par l'aura de son prédécesseur. Dans ce nouveau parti, les „deux dinosaures“ y occupent pourtant les positions importantes de vice-président pour Foncha et de membre du Comité central et du bureau politique pour Muna. Ils „quittent le navire“ sous le prétexte que Paul Biya, le nouveau Président ne leur accorde pas toute l'attention et les égards qu'ils estiment devoir leur être dus. La lettre de démission de Foncha est suffisamment explicite à ce sujet :

– Lorsque le pouvoir a changé de mains au Cameroun et votre Excellence devenu Président de la République et également leader de l'UNC, j'ai rassuré votre Excellence que **j'étais disposé à vous faire bénéficier de ma large expérience et de vous donner tout conseil dont vous aurez besoin concernant les problèmes nationaux. Malheureusement, tel n'a pas été le cas et il devient de plus en plus clair que je suis devenu une nuisance inopportune qui mérite d'être ignorée et ridiculisée....Si, en ma qualité de Vice-Président national du RDPC, personne ne désire m'écouter en dépit du fait que c'est le RDPC qui dirige le gouvernement, je me sens complètement perdu quand je constate ce qu'est devenu ce parti...**¹⁸

Après leur démission respective du RDPC, la volonté des „deux dinosaures“ de déconstruire tout ce qu'ils ont construit avec Ahidjo prend une nouvelle ampleur et ce, après le décès de l'unique interlocuteur qui pouvait valablement leur apporter la contradiction survenu le 30 novembre 1999 à Dakar, au Sénégal où il vivait en exil avec sa famille. Foncha et Muna entreprennent alors un voyage à Londres et à l'ONU pour demander aux autorités de ce pays et de cette organisation internationale d'intervenir pour que le Cameroun revienne à la fédération qu'ils ont pourtant contribué à détruire. L'activisme des „deux dinosaures“ encourage les „jeunes loups“ à s'engager dans cette voie de la contestation consacrée par ce qu'ils appellent la „marginalisation des anglophones“. C'est alors que commencent les défis ouverts adressés au gouvernement en place à travers des réunions publiques autorisées ou non et la création des regroupements qui revendiquent, dans un repli identitaire grossier, une appartenance à „l'anglophonie“ sous le *regard* bienveillant, tolérant, naïf ou complice du gouvernement camerounais: All Anglophone Conference (AAC), Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM) Buea Peace Conference (BPC)

¹⁷ Nous avons rédigé à cet effet un article publié dans le journal *Mutations* avec le titre suivant: „Le „mea culpa“ des dinosaures: „ce que nous avons contribué à faire, c'est à vous de le défaire sans avoir à nous juger“ veulent-ils faire croire“.

¹⁸ Lettre de démission du RDPC de M. Foncha du 9 juin 1990. La traduction de l'anglais en français est de nous et c'est nous qui soulignons.

All Conference Standing Committee (ACSC) ; Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC).

Ces protestations contre la „marginalisation des anglophones“ commencées timidement et pacifiquement vont prendre une tournure de plus en plus violente avec l'avènement du SCNC „qui recrute ses militants de préférence parmi les jeunes qui se sont eux aussi constitués en *Southern Cameroon Youth League (SCYL)*. Ce mouvement politique devenu radical, après avoir prononcé des discours incendiaires contre la République du Cameroun, distribué des tracts et des pétitions, prône désormais ouvertement la sécession ¹⁹. Cette volonté sécessionniste va être clairement proclamée dans une correspondance adressée au Président Paul Biya, alors qu'il se trouve au congrès de Bamenda par Fon Gorji Dinka :

– We now come to the end of the story, by reviving the old Republic of Cameroon, which the Fomuban Accord had submerged in order to create a federation with Southern Cameroon-on-Ambas, the Republic of Cameroon has irretrievably acced from the union.. So unless a new accord is concluded so as to create a basis for an union between the two States, any claim by the Republic of Cameroon to govern Southern Cameroon-on-Ambas would simply mean annexation pure and simple. That is international law.... So those who may develop this diabolic annexionist plan want Southern Cameroon-on-Ambas to be regarded and treated as a colony of the Republic of Cameroon.... If the expression “Southern Cameroon” has exposed us to any annexionist ambitions then we henceforth call ourselves Ambazonia²⁰

Avec l'intrusion du vocable Ambazonia, cette appellation autant adulée par certains Camerounais qui en font la „République fédérale d'Ambazonie“ que honnie par d'autres qui la transforment en „République fantôme d'Ambazonie“, le train de la sécession pour revenir au Cameroun décidé par le traité de Versailles entre en gare pour le départ vers une nouvelle division du Cameroun déclaré pourtant UN et INDIVISIBLE depuis le 20 mai 1972. Ses premiers arrêts sont les gares où la provocation ouverte dans les régions du Nord-Ouest et du Sud-Ouest occupe la première place conformément à la déclaration selon laquelle le 1^{er} octobre devient désormais jour de fête de l'indépendance de l'Ambazonie, déclaration faite en 1996 par le leader du SCNC, l'Ambassadeur Henry Fossung. Ainsi, chaque année, à l'orée du 1^{er} octobre, les activistes de la sécession annoncent la célébration de „l'indépendance de la République d'Ambazonie“ en cette date anniversaire de l'indépendance du Southern Cameroons. En réaction, les forces de maintien de l'ordre envoyées par le gouvernement camerounais prennent position pour que cette célébration n'ait pas lieu. Cette ambiance de „chat et souris“ continue jusqu'au moment où les sécessionnistes prennent les armes dans les régions du Nord-Ouest et du Sud-Ouest pour obtenir par la force l'indépendance de la „République d'Ambazonie“. Pour ce faire, Ils dotent leur „Etat“ d'un gouvernement en exil, d'un drapeau, d'un hymne; ils réussissent à trouver des armes qu'ils confient à des milices qui

¹⁹ D. Abwa, *Ni Anglophones...* p. 182

²⁰ Fon Gorji Dinka, „*The new social order*“ in A.W. Mukong (ed), *The case for the Southern Cameroon*, USA, CAMEECO, 1990, p.99. C'est nous qui soulignons.

s'installent dans les „brousses“ des deux régions dites „anglophones“. Alors commence une période de terreur à l'endroit des populations des deux régions afin de les obliger à soutenir ce projet sécessionniste. Cette terreur se manifeste, entre autres, par la proclamation des journées de villes mortes obligeant les populations à rester calfeutrées dans leurs domiciles ; l'interdiction faite aux enfants d'aller à l'école, les enlèvements avec demandes de rançons, les incendies des cases et même des villages entiers, les tueries de natures diverses; les sabotages dans les plantations industrielles de la CDC et PAMOL... En bref, les sécessionnistes cherchent à créer le chaos dans ces deux régions pour contraindre le gouvernement camerounais à accepter la division du Cameroun. En réaction, ce gouvernement a fait voter par son assemblée nationale une loi contre le terrorisme et, pour sauvegarder son intégrité territoriale et protéger les populations de ces deux régions, y a déployé de grosses unités de ses forces de défense. La République du Cameroun est donc, depuis 2016, en situation de guerre comme l'a d'ailleurs reconnue le Président de la République, Paul Biya, dans une déclaration publique²¹. Prises entre deux feux, les populations du Nord-Ouest et du Sud-Ouest qui rejettent ce projet sécessionniste et qui ne veulent pas devenir des complices de ces activistes s'organisent en comités de vigilance, en auto-défenses ou en déplacées intérieures dans les autres régions du Cameroun. La division du Cameroun projetée n'est donc pas voulue par la grande majorité des Camerounais de ces deux régions qui, en s'installant dans les autres régions du Cameroun, témoignent de leur citoyenneté camerounaise.

CONCLUSION

Comment expliquer que les Camerounais qui ont rejeté pendant de nombreuses années la division de leur territoire imposée par le traité de Versailles la réclament aujourd'hui en prenant des armes contre d'autres Camerounais qui veulent préserver leur unité conquise de haute lutte ? La question mérite d'être posée car la „marginalisation“ exhibée comme raison d'être de ce retour à la division de 1916 entérinée par le traité de Versailles ne résiste à aucune analyse sérieuse et ne peut convaincre que ceux qui souhaitent la déstabilisation du Cameroun. En d'autres termes, les Camerounais adeptes de la sécession ne sont-ils pas des complices volontaires ou involontaires de ceux qui veulent une recolonisation du Cameroun? Cette question est d'autant plus valable lorsque l'on prend en compte le nombre important des interventions extérieures qui soutiennent les actes posés par les sécessionnistes et qui condamnent systématiquement la réaction des forces de défense du gouvernement camerounais. Surtout que ces interventions extérieures ne s'interrogent ni sur les sources de financement des sécessionnistes ni sur les lieux de provenance des armes utilisées pour tuer des Camerounais car seuls les Camerounais souffrent dans cette crise du Nord-Ouest et du Sud-Ouest. En réalité, il s'agit d'un complot contre le Cameroun longtemps considéré comme un „havre de paix“ dans une Afrique tourmentée par des guerres. La résurgence du partage entériné par le traité de Versailles convoquée pour justifier cette crise n'est qu'un grossier prétexte.

²¹ Analyser les effets de cette crise n'est pas l'objet de cette communication.

**WEIMAR- AN UNSETTLED PROBLEM:
THE NEW ECONOMIC MILITARY FRAMEWORK
DERIVING FROM THE PEACE TREATY”**

BG Marco Ciampini (Italy)

At the end of the First World War and immediately after the signing of the Armistice in Compiegne, in the biennium 1918–1919, the risk that Germany would cease to exist as a national state was loomed far from being hypothetical.

The Kaiser Wilhelm II had also abdicated on the flood of insubordinations of imperial troops, in particular the sailors of the harbor of Kiel and on 9 November 1918 Philip Scheidemann, leader of the Social Democrats, from the balcony of the Reichstag, proclaimed the Republic.

Two hours later, but few hundred meters away, from a balcony of Berlin Castle a “Socialist Republic” was proclaimed by Karl Liebknecht.

In a climate of great national disorder, insurrectional attempts by the extreme left and political murders by the extreme right, including that of Liebknecht, who was killed with another leading member of the Communist Party (The League of Spartacus) Rose Luxemburg, were organized. On the other hand, in Weimar, the elections of the Constituent Assembly took place and a “Government Coalition” was launched, the so-called “Weimar Coalition”, with a social democratic leadership.

Friedrich Ebert, head of the Social Democratic party, feared the replication of the Russian Bolshevik revolution in Germany and worked to channel political energies into disciplined and regulated paths.

This government was in the situation of operating in a society where an “accelerated modernization” of civil society was moving hand in hand with a period of “economic stagnation”, sharpening contrasts and exacerbating social contradictions among the various segments of society.

All the contradictions of the Versailles Peace Treaty of June 1919 and above all the devastating effects of the enormous weight of the unfair war reparations undermined the political-social structure. The “execution integrale du traité de Versailles” (The complete execution of the Versailles treaty). This sentence contains the negative meaning of the 1919 peace treaty and its disastrous consequences for Europe and the whole world, both from a socio-political point of view and above all from the economic one.

In particular, in the elaboration of the clauses of the treaty two rival projects for the future ordering of the world had taken field:

the 14 points of the President of the USA Woodrow Wilson, contained in a famous speech delivered by the President in front of the Congress gathered the 8 January 1918, and the so-called „Carthaginian Peace“ (with reference to the mortal fury of Rome against Carthage at the end of the III Punic War of 146 BC) of Clemenceau, French Prime Minister. ...The interest of the plenipotentiaries of Paris was not addressed to the future life of Europe... the “means of subsistence”

were not the object of their anxieties and the economic analysis of the consequences of the treaty was not crucial. Their apprehensions, good or bad, concerned borders and nationalities, political balance, imperial enlargements, the future weakening of a strong and dangerous enemy, revenge, and the transfer of the unbearable financial burden of the winners on the shoulders of the losers.

On the other hand, the utopian vision of President Wilson aimed to eliminate the possibility of further wars according to the winners' belief that they had fought "the war that would end every war". This would be achieved through the application of 14 points.

They are listed below by omitting those that have no special relevance for Germany and not pertinent to this speech:

Omissis.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic security.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable government whose title is to be determined.

VI, VII, VIII and XI – ...Evacuation and „Re-establishment“ of all the invaded territories especially of Belgium. ...The so called "codicil of Allies" relating to the compensation of all damage caused to civilians and their property on land, by sea and by air had to be respected...

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all..

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. The League of Nations.

These points were specified in some speeches by the US President and in particular in the one which will have decisive influence into the economic questions held before the Congress 11 February 1918 where it was stated: „There will be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive compensation“; and the principle of self-determination of peoples was also sanctioned as the principle of imperative action”.

The spirit of the Wilsonian document was lost in the Peace Conference.

In fact, the treaty, arguing only in terms of „borders and sovereignty“, will aim

to destroy the German economic system consolidated before of war that was based on three main factors:

1. Foreign trade, represented by Merchant Marine, Colonies, foreign investments, exports, international relations of its merchants;
2. Exploitation of coal and iron and related industries;
3. Tariffs and transports system.

In the context of this economic deconstruction of Germany, the chapter concerning war reparations, that is to say the damage that Germany would have had to pay to compensate the Allies and Associates for the costs and losses of the War, took on particular importance.

In the new-born Weimar Republic and in its uncertain economy, which began to re-structure by it-self on the ruins of the previous Wilhelminian system, the problem of reparations came to be added to the growing of a heavy inflation; repairs fee and inflation intertwined in a perverse and ultimately disastrous manner.

The Weimar economy was a “bundle” of conflicts and contradictions. Its history is definitely divided into three phases: the first 1918–1923 was the “*age of inflation*”; the second 1924–1929 of *rationalization*; the third 1929–1933 of the *economic depression*. Inflation had already begun before, during the war, when the government resorted to the loans to finance the massive war expenditures; the Germans bought government bonds with the promise of high return on investment and the obvious presumption of military victory. They were led to believe that any difficulty would be temporary and soon followed by a period of unprecedented prosperity with the imposition on the entire continent of Germany’s political and economic power. This was not the case and at the end of the war they have to deal with a devalued currency, with industries almost entirely dependent on military orders, with a great shortage of basic necessities and raw materials indispensable for production. Millions of veterans from the front had to be reestablished in some way in civil life. The British kept the naval blockade until the summer of 1919 worsening the already difficult situation in Germany.

In the close post-war period, the structure and recovery ensued without obstacles. In the chaos of the revolution, the Army quickly demobilized and German industry quickly converted itself to the production of peace. Inflation actually reduced the value of credit. Increases in goods prices stimulated investment and expansion in manufacturing. Coupled with inflation, the question of war reparations loomed, filling a surprisingly positive picture with shadows. The repairs were comparable to a tax that the German state perceived by its citizens as a „tax collector“ of the Allies. A tax that lacked the „moral legitimacy“ normally enjoyed by taxation. Government and German citizens were equally convinced of the total iniquity of Allies’ claims. On May 5, 1921, with the so-called „London ultimatum“, the Allies presented the quantification of repairs and then even the most moderate Germans reacted. The bill amounted to 132 billion gold marks. Another political crisis broke out in Germany.

The Government, having to face an almost universal opposition to further tax increases, simply went bankrupt and had to resort to the capital market to raise the obligatory funds without finding buyers.

Inflation did not take long to take a bad turn, when its beneficial effects were canceled by an uncontrolled speculation, by the deterioration of living standards, by the inability of any rational planning. It is clear that in the early 1920s these various elements inevitably complicated the already very thorny issue of war reparations and therefore Germany's international relations. A worried spiral of wage prices was triggered and the Government, unable for political reasons to increase taxes and ignore wage demands, printed paper money and resorted to other methods to increase the money supply. At home and abroad, confidence in the German economy was reduced, favoring speculation instead of rational economic calculation.

In the summer of 1922, runaway inflation turned into hyperinflation accompanied by a slowdown in economic activity, a reduction in exports, and a rapid increase in unemployment: the worst possible framework.

The Allies looked at the situation with great concern. They claimed that Germany manipulated its finances in order to avoid paying for repairs and war obligations, or to pay them in devalued currency. In fact, hyperinflation depended on a set of factors: the wages prices spiral, which no one tried to effectively limit; speculative fever; the fall in confidence in the German currency and the German government, made even more acute by the pressure of the Allies who wanted to be paid at all costs. Therefore, on 11 January 1923 they occupied the Ruhr, the main industrial area of Germany. In response, the German government called for passive resistance, effectively blocking all types of work, both office and manual. In the summer of 1923, production in the Ruhr basin had virtually stopped. As the functioning of most of the German economy depended on it, the consequences of the collapse of production in the region affected the entire country with the ruinous fall in tax revenues. The support of the resistance policy entailed an unsustainable financial commitment for the Government, because it did not have the necessary gold reserves, it was devoid of moral legitimacy, the overall economic production was insufficient. It also printed plenty of paper money. The result was an uncontrolled and uncontrollable increase in prices that had few precedents in universal history. The Reichsbank issued increasingly high-value tickets until it reached the 100,000 billion mark on November 2, 1923. At the end of the month the dollar / mark parity was 1 to 4200 billion. The sacred German strong currency had lost every value. The so-called „inflationary consensus“, that is, the concordance of views of entrepreneurs, workers and the State, on the beneficial effects of inflation, went up in smoke when hyperinflation made any forecast of economic progress and even people's daily behavior impossible. The culmination of the crisis was touched in the summer of 1923 with serious consequences as it was then said of social leveling, „proletarianization“ of the middle class and „general immiseration“. On 26 September 1923 the Stresemann government put an end to the passive resistance in the Ruhr. The way was open to negotiations with the Allies, also because the occupation had become increasingly expensive and useless for the French and the Belgians, who also had to deal with the opposition of US and British.

The work of the Stresemann governments and his successor Marx, succeeded in redressing the economic situation of the country to a certain extent, also if at enormous costs. In short, the republic would not have fully recovered from the cross-blows of hyperinflation and stabilization. Of particular significance, in this context,

was the adoption, on November 15, of a new national currency, the Rentenmark, guaranteed in some way by the agricultural and industrial assets of the country. This move had an immediate effect: it arrested inflation, conferring, therefore, a certain financial stability to the country. Action was taken with emergency measures in every field; the crisis generated by the hyperinflation allowed, in fact, the entrepreneurs to obtain the repeal of almost all the measures of a social nature that they had been forced to accept in 1918–1919. The owners of the coal mines and the steel mills, with the consent of the government, they independently started negotiations that led to the signing of an agreement according to which the German companies undertook to deliver to the French and Belgians part of the Ruhr production as war reparations. The German government also made a huge concession to the interests of the business world, pledging to compensate the industry for the losses due to war reparation payments. In this new climate, new negotiations with the Allies led to the adoption of a substantially US financial aid plan, the Dawes plan, a US banker, at the London Conference in the summer of 1924. At the same time as the Dawes plan, France and Belgium undertook to withdraw the respective troops from the Ruhr during the coming year. Dawes Plan and contextual withdrawal of French troops were, for Germany, the two concluding moves of the stabilization program.

However, the stabilization program carried out in 1923–1924 was not without success. It guaranteed the territorial integrity of Germany and put an end to the revolutionary attempts of the extreme left and right. It gives Germany a reliable currency, first with the Rentenmark and then in the autumn of 1924 with the Reichsmark with a gold standard. The aforementioned interventions created the conditions for a revival of the economy financed by the influx of US capital. The economic recovery was made possible by the existence of a highly qualified workforce that was unrivaled in Europe and by the adoption of modern (American) production methods. „Rationalize“ became the buzzword during the 1920s. Some of the most important industries merged and gigantic companies emerged, such as IG Farben in the chemical sector and Vereinigte Stahlwerke in the heavy industry that could operate with much greater efficiency than the smaller companies of the previous period.

The situation improved so much that, for example, in 1927 the overall industrial production finally returned to the level of 1913 and then exceeded it in the following two years. Improvements of social nature were also introduced. These were the „golden years“ of the Weimar Republic characterized by a certain modern consumerism and by the “rationalization”, whose model was the United States. This term denotes the application of rational methods to production to increase it by reducing the labor force. Rationalization, however, guaranteed a considerable increase in production but not prosperity for workers and made life more difficult. All the positive economic indicators of the so-called „middle period“ of the Weimar Republic - high production, consumption growth, technological innovation - held back strongly in the winter of 1929–1930. The collapse of the US stock market in October 1929 led to a banking crisis, which soon interested Germany with the request by the American banks for the extinction of medium-term loans. The financial crisis quickly turned into a production crisis, which spread like wildfire with mass layoffs, the decline in state revenues and the inevitable collapse in demand. 11

years after the end of the war, 6 years after inflation and stabilization, Germany was the victim of another crisis with terrible consequences. Once again, an economic disaster, thanks to deflationary-type reaction measures, turned into a multifaceted political conflict and a radical crisis of the Weimar system, which culminated in the rise to power of National Socialism and the “*de facto*” end of the Republic.

The outline of the economic and social crisis of Weimar Republic seems to reproduce a recurrent case in history... the involute spiral:

a. excessive military expenditures (including the „war reparations“ of every „end treaty“);

b. the consequent excessive taxation, hyperinflation, depression and serious social disorders, always characterize, as fundamental causes, moments of crisis, even with the necessary adjustments determined by the different historical period.

In fact, this scheme can easily be found, as an example, in two historical moments of serious crisis, even centuries apart from one another:

I. The social economic crisis of the Roman Empire in the third century AD, extraordinarily resolved with profound structural and economic reforms of civil society and of the internal balance of power within society itself (the so-called „tetrarchical reform of the emperor Diocletian“);

II. The crisis of the 600 „, the „iron century“, characterized by continuous wars [in particular the devastating Thirty Years War (1618–1648)] and social revolts, resolved by the Enlightenment, that is by a new way of thinking and to organize the society and the relationships between its various components, as a whole.

Some historians attribute the fall of the Weimar Republic to the deflationary policies of the right-wing governments of the last period of the Republic, with which the Great Depression was faced; policies that would have favored the interest of industry and high finance compared to the middle and working classes, impoverishing the country.

History is always a sort of tale, although based on certain and documentable sources but, from whatever angle it is desired to see, cannot help and grasp the tremendous and devastating influence that the war reparations on the German economy of the time had to have, the unreasonable fruit, also if legitimate and understandable, of the punitive will and the lack of foresight with which the Peace Treaty was conceived, excessively corrective towards Germany. It took place without paying attention to the future economic well-being of the whole of Europe as a basis for the peaceful coexistence of various European states, as also supported at that time by the economist Keynes, unfortunately a disregarded prophet: ...*“even in the last, grievous weeks, I continued to hope that you would find any way to make the treaty a fair and realistic document. But now it is too late evidently... The battle is lost”*.

Thus John Maynard KEYNES stated, in communicating to the British Prime Minister Lloyd George his resignation from the post of treasury representative at the Versailles Conference.

After nine decades, most of the issues dealt with, for example, the legitimacy and economic effectiveness of the sanctions imposed on the losers and more generally the administration of any post-war period are still valid, in the various attempts to resolve the numerous regional crises in all parts of the world.

ITALY'S ASPIRATIONS IN THE ADRIATIC SEA IN THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR I: IMPROMPTU INTELLIGENCE AND NAVAL DIPLOMACY

Prof. Dr. Oreste Foppiani (Switzerland)

Introduction

In the period between the end of 1918 and the end of 1919, which preceded and superimposed on the notorious “red years” of 1919–1920, the political and economic situation of Italy was extremely difficult.

Politically speaking, the end of World War I (WWI) represented for the political class in general and for the government in particular, a sort of *redde rationem* with regard to the free Italian public opinion. The latter, thanks to the new proportional voting system and the end of war censorship, challenged the government, which had to deal with a huge amount of war debts and the loss of over 600'000 human lives in the battlefields. Consequently, the Peninsula was experiencing constant social unrest, high unemployment and inflation. In addition, the “Italian liberal political class, less confident than the country’s former allies were of their capacity to exploit the legitimizing potentialities of the memory of the war¹”, initially reckoned that it had no choice, once a new electoral law embodying the principle of proportional representation had been adopted, and various welfare measures had been introduced, but to “promote a policy entailing the greater involvement of the popular parties in the momentous choices to be made at that particular juncture²”.

Though numerous and closely intertwined, the problems faced by the country in the immediate post-war period were not peculiar to Italy. As in the Italian case, so too the governments of the other victorious nations had in fact to confront the difficulties raised both by the complex economic and social situation and by the manifest consolidation of extremist political forces (i.e., extreme nationalists and would-be communists). What was peculiar to Italy was in fact the “evident incapacity of the political system to properly address the problem of adapting the parliamentary system to fit the new multi-party democracy³.”

Economically speaking, the enormous flow of public expenditure “permitted sectorial industrial concentration and the entry of big companies into new production

¹ Baravelli, A. *La vittoria smarrita. Legittimità e rappresentazioni della Grande Guerra nella crisi del sistema liberale (1919–1924)*, Roma, Carocci, 2006, passim; Id. “Post-war Societies (Italy)”, in *International Encyclopedia of the First World War* (https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/post-war_societies_italy), passim. All websites last consulted on June 2, 2019.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid. On the different aspects of the Italian political crisis in the post-war period, see R. Vivarelli. *Storia delle origini del fascismo*, Bologna, Il mulino, 1991–2012, 3 volumes, pp. 50 37; F. Grassi Orsini and G. Quagliariello (eds.), *Il partito politico dalla grande guerra al fascismo. 9–Crisi della rappresentanza e riforma dello Stato nell’età dei sistemi politici di massa 1918–1925*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1996, passim.

areas, with the aspiration of creating vertically integrated groups⁴.” In some cases, it opened the way for an attempt by the strongest trusts (e.g., FIAT and Ansaldo) to bring under their control the investment banks, which in previous decades had had a role in promoting and guiding the country’s industrial development. Speculative aspects often prevailed over industrial ones, and this contributed to “making the large groups—real giants with clay feet—which dominated the Italian war economy, even more fragile⁵.”

From a war economy to a civilian one, there was a giant leap to be made and Italy was still burdened with international debts, mainly in the hands of the British who in turn owed money to the Americans. The industrialists also asked for substantial orders to accelerate the transition to a peace-time economy and a rapid restoration of domestic transport and international trade, with the aim of entering markets that, before the war, had been controlled by countries now experiencing great difficulties, such as Germany.

In the end, it was a question of maintaining cordial relations with former allies, getting renewed financial support from them, maintaining control over imports, domestic consumption and promoting exports. Yet, Italy’s ambitious program failed to strengthen the Italian financial and industrial system, firstly because the US and the UK, while not ceasing to support Italy altogether, made modest concessions. The famous British economist John Maynard Keynes thought of the Italian situation as a conundrum, advising his government not to grant new loans to Rome⁶.

Finally yet importantly, after years of sacrifices, a viable opposition had matured in Italian society, which would be very dangerous for the country’s political balance. In fact, in July 1919, there were mass protests on rationing throughout the country and although the main protagonists were the popular classes, the middle class, which had been heavily impoverished by the war, was also involved⁷.

The widespread discontent influenced the outcome of the elections of November 1919, which saw the victory of the Socialist Party and the Catholic-based People’s Party, and disastrous results for the liberal groups, which were deeply divided between Giovanni Giolitti’s supporters and the conservatives⁸.

In 1918–1919, the political and economic situation was so chaotic and complicated that most of the military issues, especially in the first year after the war, were often left to the judgment of the Italian generals. The latter’s ideas benefited from the support of the then government and were corroborated by territorial ambitions at the expense of the maritime ones. In a few words, Trento and Trieste, including their

⁴ Degli Esposti, F. “Post-War Economics (Italy)”, in *International Encyclopedia of the First World War* (https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/post-war_economies_italy), passim.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Falco, G. *L’Italia e la politica finanziaria degli alleati, 1914–1920*, Pisa, ETS, 1983, p. 95; D.J. Forsyth, *The Crisis of Liberal Italy. Monetary and Financial Policy, 1914–1922*, Cambridge and New York, CUP, 1993, pp. 227–58.

⁷ Degli Esposti, op. cit., passim.

⁸ Ibid.

regions, were not enough to justify Italy's entry into WWI, especially in front of the new voters, but also in front of greedy and climbing industrialists. The political and economic future of Italy rested on the Adriatic Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea's (partial) control.

The "New" Adriatic Sea between Italians and Slavs

The frictions between the Southern Slavs and Italians in the aftermath of the Great War occurred because of a series of diplomatic intrigues and differing national interests⁹. The latter were not only those between the Italians and the heirs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but also those between France and Italy.

In this fight to have the Boot's geopolitical and economic interests prevail over the Hexagon's, the United Kingdom played the pivotal role of a not so unbiased referee. In addition, president T. Woodrow Wilson's points IX and X, respectively on the frontiers of Italy based on national identities and the right of existence of the former states of the Habsburg Empire, and points I and II, respectively on the denunciation of secret diplomacy (e.g., the "Pact of London") and freedom of navigation, threw a spanner in Italy's works¹⁰.

The young kingdom had to fight a very difficult battle against more skilled and cannier politicians and diplomats to assert its own right and national interest over the Eastern Mediterranean Region and the Adriatic Sea. The latter was by far the most important goal of World War I, but the terrestrial logic of the Italian general officers, backed by the then premier's cabinet members, did not help endorse the blueprint of the Italian flag officers.

Hence, in the last three months of war and in the first phase of the post-war period, the Italian Navy had to find a way to side-step its own government and initiate an unofficial diplomacy and intelligence gathering, to at best achieve the expected result, or, at worst, have an even result with its arch-enemy in the Adriatic, the French Navy¹¹.

⁹ Monzali, L. *Italiani di Dalmazia dal Risorgimento alla Grande Guerra*, Firenze, Le Lettere, 2004; Id., *Il sogno dell'egemonia. L'Italia, la questione jugoslava e l'Europa Centrale (1918–1941)*, Firenze, Le Lettere, 2010, pp. 7–34.

¹⁰ T.W. Wilson, "14 Points", in *The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy*, Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp).

¹¹ O. Foppiani, *The Italian Navy in the Eastern Adriatic Sea*, paper presented at the conference *Beyond the Western Front: The forgotten theatres, contingents and campaigns of the First World War* at the National University of Ireland Maynooth on October 11–12, 2014; O. Foppiani and T. Pizzolato, *The 1919 Eastern Mediterranean Crisis and the Italian Navy*, paper presented at the conference *Gestionarea crizelor internationale din 1919 până azi* or *The Management of International Crises since 1919*, organized by the International Commission of History of International Relations in collaboration with the Nicolae Titulescu University and Nicolae Titulescu Foundation in Bucharest, on September 19–23, 2012; O. Foppiani, "The Italian Navy in the Adriatic, 1918–1919. An Unknown Actor between Diplomatic Rivalry and International Competition," in *Nuova Rivista Storica*, CI, September–December 2017, Vol. 3, 2017, pp. 969–90;

The Watershed Year

The period that spans from the fall of 1918 through the fall of 1919 can be seen as an extremely difficult year for Italy and, definitely, a watershed to either strengthen its international role or downsize it. In fact, by the means of the latter's participation in WWI, Italian diplomats and military tried to make a hazardous bet on a future, hostile international context, which should have been less intransigent toward their expansionist blueprint in the Adriatic Sea and on the Eastern Mediterranean-Balkan coasts. In addition, this blueprint was merely laid out in the Treaty of London of April 26, 1915.

Actually, what rendered the diplomatic actions of the smallest of the Great Powers precarious and ultimately overly ambitious was the sum of the inherent contradictions of Italy's foreign policy. In fact, three years before the Pact of London, the then Prime Minister Antonio Salandra and the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Sidney Sonnino, who were firmly convinced about obtaining a consolidation of Italy's naval rear-guard that would have given them the chance to implement a wider and clearer anti-French action in the Mediterranean Sea, decided to terminate an anachronistic thirty-year-long alliance with the Central Powers. Pushed by the precipitous events of the summer of 1914, Rome quickly replaced the Triple Alliance with diplomatic and military agreements that were even more shaky and uncomfortable.

Adalia, Valona and Rijeka (Fiume) represented complementary and inter-twined issues, which undoubtedly handicapped the Italian diplomatic and military actions overseas. When ready to face the above-mentioned issues, the Peninsula found itself compelled to face different interlocutors who sometimes forced it to sign agreements, which eventually proved to be double-edged swords.

It is important to assert the real role of the Italian Navy (*Regia Marina*) before the 1920 Treaty of Rapallo. In fact, the role of the *Regia Marina* is to this day, at best not sufficiently examined, and at worst unknown. Consequently, it is necessary to bring new insight into the management of the post-WWI Eastern Mediterranean crisis not by diplomats, but by a small group of flag officers who believed in the importance of a long-term diplomatic action, rather than the short-term one envisaged by the brass of the Italian Army (*Regio Esercito*).

The Great War and the Terrestrial Logics vis-à-vis the Maritime Ones

The Great War was fought and judged by Italy's Government through the lens of terrestrial logics, where land operations prevailed over maritime ones. During the very last days of the war, between October and November 1918, a group of admirals headed by the Chief of Staff of the Navy Paolo Thaon de Revel decided to accelerate what was in the opinion of the Allies the excessively static situation of the Italian war conduct and limited to either the defeat at Caporetto or the victory at Vittorio Veneto¹². Yet, these events were isolated and a distant memory in the minds of

¹² L. Riccardi, *Alleati non amici. Le relazioni politiche tra l'Italia e l'Intesa durante la Prima Guerra Mondiale*, Brescia: Morcelliana, 1991, pp. 77–78, 110–11, 113–17, and 126–27; J.J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2001, pp. 186–89.

Allied admirals and generals. In addition, the Allied Naval Committee in charge of the solution of the many problems resulting from the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary into many countries and national entities, which would have formed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (the future Yugoslavia or Kingdom of the Southern Slavic States), did not find a viable blueprint acceptable to all maritime Entente Powers and the United States¹³. Especially, Admiral Paolo Thaon de Revel, and after him Rear Admiral Vittorio Molà, very much wanted to convince the Italian Army's establishment, which was on a different wavelength as far as the Italian-hood of the Adriatic Sea and its importance for the future of the Boot, that they could not give way to the intentions, and plans, of harboring a French naval base in the port of Rijeka, which should have hosted the Eastern French Army¹⁴. The latter, coming triumphantly from a long march, after conquering Bulgaria, occupying Constantinople, and freeing Serbia, wanted to knock on the doors of Vienna and contest Italy's primacy and legitimacy over the Balkans and the Adriatic Sea.

Particularly committed to and active in this geostrategic area was the French Navy (*Marine Nationale*), whose aims were clearly to challenge Italy's domination of those lands. In a few words, through the stratagem of respecting the self-determination of these new countries born from the former Austria-Hungary, and appealing to the US firm determination to enhance the rights of these new nationalities willing to get together in a new state, it asked for the French control of some naval bases all along the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea; if Dubrovnik was already a French coaling station and base, they wanted Rijeka to serve and help the French Eastern Army¹⁵.

The fear of the Italian Navy (*Regia Marina*) was indeed that the Great War could have been fought for nothing, if the Adriatic would not have been secured for the Italian interests and maritime expansionism. The dream of the Adriatic Sea transformed into an Italian lake was certainly the first step for a wider plan, which would have seen Italy expanding in the Eastern Mediterranean and disturbing the French and British interests on those areas. Of course, in 1919–1920, the interests of the Italian Navy, which were different from those of the Italian Army, were focused on those harbors, naval bases and the so-called Istrian-Dalmatian Coast, plus the Principality of Albania.

In the Pact of London, Rijeka was not included, but Italy tried to force its way into that city, because it was intrinsically Italian and the majority of the population,

¹³ Public Record Office and National Archives (PRO-NA), FO 608/248/25, *Allied Naval Committee for the Adriatic (naval mission)*, passim; FO 608/27/9, *Adriatic: Italian obstruction in the Adriatic, Commission of four Allied Admirals*; especially the exchange of messages between the British and the French admirals.

¹⁴ *L'Armée Française d'Orient* (AFO) or Eastern French Army was a unit of the French Army, which fought on the Eastern Front from 1915 through 1918. In 1916, the AFO was part of the *Armées Alliées d'Orient* (AAO) or Allied Eastern Armies, which was formed by troops of the British, Serbian, Italian, Russian and Greek Armies who, under the orders of Gen. Louis Franchet d'Espèrey, caused the defeat of Bulgaria, re-conquered Serbia and Romania, and then invaded Austria-Hungary.

¹⁵ AUSSMM, TB, Box 1161, folder on *Fiume Inter-Allied Base. French intrusive actions in Fiume*, Ministry of the Navy, wire of November 11, 1918.

actually, really wanted to be part of Italy¹⁶. However, according to Gordon Gordon-Smith, the “intrinsic majority” of Fiume was actually the richest, most bourgeois part of it, which advocated a certain superiority with respect to the vast majority of Slavs living in Shushak, the other part of the city:

In 1910, out of a population of 40'000, about 26'000 were Italian-speaking. But the section known as Fiume [...] is made up of two sections, Fiume and Shushak, which are as closely connected as Washington and Georgetown [...]. Of the 20'000 inhabitants of the Shushak section only about 600 are Italian-speaking, so that out of the total population of 60'000 in Fiume-Shushak, 26'000 are Italian-speaking while 34'000 are Yugoslavs¹⁷.

Undoubtedly, between the last quarter of the 1800s and the first decade of the 1900, Fiume benefited from a huge flow of Italian immigrant manpower following the opening of the Whitehead Torpedo factory and the new government tobacco manufacturing facility. This Italian-speaking component of Fiume soon began to serve as the dynamic and vital engine of the Dalmatian city's major business activities.

The Italian Navy between Intelligence and Diplomacy

Long before the Italian Army Chief of Staff Pietro Badoglio¹⁸ and other 4-star generals could imagine it, the Italian admirals thought that the future Yugoslavian Navy, sponsored and exploited by the French as a sort of Trojan horse, would substitute for the Austro-Hungarian Navy and helped bolster the French trade and business in that region. Consequently, as stated by Sonnino one year before entering the war, and corroborated by the then Italian Navy Chief of Staff and future member of the Allied Naval Committee Thaon de Revel¹⁹, what was the point of entering the war if Italy could not have conquered the Eastern Adriatic Coast?²⁰

In addition, as stated in the Rapallo agreements of 1920, the economic influence of

¹⁶ When mentioning the Italian-hood of Fiume, one should always bear in mind that this concept is related to the city and not the countryside or mountains surrounding Fiume, where—likewise in central Istria or the rest of Dalmatia—the majority of the population was Slav.

¹⁷ G. Gordon-Smith, “The Quest of the Adriatic,” in *Advocate of Peace through Justice*, LXXXIV, June 1922, 6, p. 232; A. Emerson, “Experiments in Self-Determination,” in *North American Review*, CCX, November 1919, 768, p. 716.

¹⁸ Badoglio, from February through September 1919, acted as the Extraordinary Commissioner for the Venezia-Giulia Region; on December 2, 1919, was promoted Chief of Staff of the Italian Army after being also Diaz's deputy for about two years.

¹⁹ Paolo Thaon de Revel, Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy from 1913 through 1915, in 1919 was the Italian member of the Allied Naval Committee, from which he withdrew after the behavior of his French counterpart and the weak support of the Italian Government for his plan of action to secure the whole of the Northern-Central Adriatic Sea to Italy.

²⁰ Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS) di Roma, *Nitti Papers*, Box 37, Folder 104, *Delegazione italiana al congresso della pace*, Sub-folder 1, Cable No. 125 of March 3, 1915, cable by Sonnino to the Italian Embassies in London, Paris and Petrograd: “The main motive of our entry into war on the side of the Entente is the desire to get rid of the present, intolerable situation of inferiority in the Adriatic *vis-à-vis* Austria [...]. For the other issues, Italy could probably obtain most of the national *desiderata* only through the present neutrality [...]. Now, it would not be worth it to enter war to get rid of the Austrian predominance in the Adriatic if we had to go back to the same inferiority conditions and constant peril *vis-à-vis* the league of the young Yugoslav States“.

the United States on shipping and the French one on banks and insurance companies would have minimized, if not boycotted, Trieste harbor and consequently the economic and financial structure of Venice²¹. France, clearly wanted to impede the Italian plan enunciated in the London Pact of April 1915, but also the very same plan thought of by the *Regia Marina* in 1918–1919. Hence, the Italian Navy found itself increasingly detached from Rome politics and closer to the military who occupied Fiume; an occupation that according to the *Regia Marina* could have been easily avoided, because the government and the army should have listened to public opinion and the revolutionary aspirations emanating from Rijeka and all Italian-speaking populations of the Dalmatian coast²².

Although the division of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, less that of the Hungarians, was cannily played as a ploy by the Italians (just like the British did vis-à-vis the Arab populations in the Middle East), they then wanted to implement the original armistice plans²³ and state firmly and decisively that nations could not be born during a state of war and that the transfer of the Austro-Hungarian Navy to the future Kingdom of Yugoslavia was illegal. Furthermore, it was considered a last-minute attempt to save the remnants of the fleet, which should have been divided as war loot and reparations among the different Entente Allies and Associate Powers²⁴. Of course, the Italian naval diplomacy was strongly opposed by the Italian Government and Army, which tried to accept the inevitability of an agreement or a compromise, because Italy ran a significant trade deficit, dependent on raw materials and certain commodities supplied by France, Britain, and especially the United States, could not afford to create any enmities in the Adriatic Sea.

The French design to stop Rome in the very northern part of the Adriatic was indeed an attempt to stop Italy going farther south and toward the Eastern Mediterranean to key ports, such as Corfu. Italy indeed fooled itself into believing that it was being treated on equal terms by the other Entente Allies and did not understand that the economic and political designs were much broader than just the Adriatic Sea, which would have indeed sufficed for Italy. As main evidence of the above-mentioned design, not only Germany sponsored Lenin and favored the signature of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, but also the British (and the US) wanted to oust Russia from the Eastern Mediterranean²⁵. At the same time, the French would have played the

²¹ AUSSMM, RB, Box 1443, Folder on *Fiume 1919: Fiume e la sua importanza vitale per l'Italia*, typewritten flyer dated June 17, 1919 and signed by Mr. Lionello Lenaz, delegate to the Paris Peace Congress on behalf of the Italian National Council of Fiume.

²² Ibid.

²³ The Villa Giusti Armistice was signed on November 3, 1918. This armistice contained some naval clauses worthy of interest, which highlighted the prohibition of giving a new flag (i.e., the national flag of the newly formed states) to those military and merchant ships that had to be shared among the Allies and the United States. In addition, see the Naval Clauses No. 2 (submarines) and No. 3 (ships), but especially No. 8 on the occupation of forts and bases by the Allies and the United States.

²⁴ AUSSMM, RB, Box 1108, Folder 1108/3, *Situation of the former Austro-Hungarian battle fleet from 10 November to December*, Ministry of the Navy, cable of November 24, 1918.

²⁵ A. De Goulevitch, *Czarism and Revolution*, Hawthorne, CA, Omni Publications, 1962, pp. 224–30; see also the original edition in French, *Tsarisme et révolution. Du passé à l'avenir de la Russie*, Paris, A. Redier, 1931; L. Trotsky, *My Life*, New York, NY, Pathfinder Press, 1970, passim.

“big-brother policy” with Serbia, which was already under French tutelage after the collapse of Tsarist Russia, and other former Austro-Hungarian countries; probably already thinking of the future France-sponsored Little Entente of 1920–1921²⁶.

After the initially successful adventure by Gabriele D’Annunzio’s legionaries²⁷ and the complacency of many senior officers of the Italian Army and Navy, and after the enquiry commission to establish who was responsible for the crimes committed during the stormy occupation of Rijeka, it is of a certain interest to see that this question had always been magnified under the lens of excessive nationalism; early fascism without a clear vision of a terribly complicated diplomatic situation, which was made worse by the incongruous behavior of a mediocre Italian diplomatic and political class. In a few words, while in those years France could benefit from high-level and skilled diplomats (e.g., Ambassador Paul Cambon in London, his brother Jules as the Head of the Political Section of the French

²⁶ The Little Entente was an alliance formed in 1920 and 1921 by Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia with the purpose of common defense against Hungarian revision and the prevention of a Habsburg restoration. France supported the alliance by signing treaties with each member country.

²⁷ In the clauses of the Secret Pact of London (April 26, 1915), Italy was promised all of the Austrian Littoral, but not the city of Fiume. After the war, at the Paris Peace Conference, this delineation of territory was confirmed, with Fiume remaining outside of Italian borders, instead joined with adjacent Croatian territories into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Gabriele D’Annunzio was angered by what he considered to be the handing over of the city of Fiume. On September 12, 1919, he led around 2’600 troops from the Royal Italian Army (*Granatieri di Sardegna*), Italian nationalists and irredentists, resulting in the seizure of the city, forcing the withdrawal of the inter-Allied (American, British and French) occupying forces. Their march from Ronchi dei Legionari (where today Trieste national airport is located) to Fiume became known as the *Impresa di Fiume*. On the same day, D’Annunzio announced that he had annexed the territory to the Kingdom of Italy. The Italian population of Fiume enthusiastically welcomed him. The Italian Government opposed this move and D’Annunzio tried to resist pressure from Italy. The plotters sought to have Italy annex Fiume but were denied. Instead, Italy initiated a blockade of Fiume while demanding that the plotters surrender. During his time in Fiume, in September 1919, Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, the renowned leader of the Futurist Movement, called the leaders of the *Impresa di Fiume* “advance-guard deserters.” On September 8, 1920, D’Annunzio proclaimed the city to be under the Italian Regency of Carnaro with a constitution foreshadowing much of the later Italian fascist system, with himself as benevolent dictator, with the title of Duce. The name Carnaro was taken from the Kvarner Gulf, where the city is located. D’Annunzio temporarily expanded it in order to include the Island of Veglia. The only other state to recognize the Italian Regency of Carnaro was the USSR. The Charter of Carnaro was a constitution that combined anarchist, proto-fascist and democratic, republican ideas. D’Annunzio is often seen as a precursor of the ideals and techniques of Italian fascism. His own explicit political ideals emerged in Fiume when he co-authored with syndicalist Alceste De Ambris, the leader of a group of Italian seamen who had mutinied and then given their vessel to the service of D’Annunzio. De Ambris provided the legal and political framework, to which D’Annunzio added his skills as a poet. The constitution established a corporatist state, with nine corporations to represent the different sectors of the economy, where membership was mandatory, plus a tenth corporation devised by D’Annunzio, to represent the superior individuals. The legislative power vested in a bicameral legislature consisting of the Council of Optimates and the Council of Corporations. Joint sessions of the Councils would be responsible for treaties with foreign powers, amendments to the constitution, and appointment of a dictator in times of emergency. The charter designated music to be one of the fundamental principles of the Fiume City State.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then Ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Camille Barrères in Rome, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Théophile Delcassé)²⁸, Italy for different reasons could count only on a very limited number of outstanding figures (notably the Anglophone Minister of Foreign Affairs Sidney Sonnino) and often relied too heavily on personalities such as that of Admiral Thaon de Revel, who had indeed a clearer vision of the Adriatic situation than that of cabinet members or the very same premier.

*The Occupation of Fiume as a Direct Consequence
of the Franco-Italian Antagonism*

The harsh competition between France and Italy was ignited right after the dissolution of the Austrian-German military threat. In fact, already when discussing the draft proposal of the armistice's naval clauses, the French Navy requested the "evacuation of Kotor, which will have to remain under the control of the Austrian civilian authorities"²⁹. The Italian Navy's leadership did not reject this hypothesis, notwithstanding the possible repercussions on the future arrangement on the Eastern Adriatic Coast, because in that specific moment it was first important to "secure the surrender of the naval and military garrison of Pula, which is the essential condition to sign the armistice"³⁰. Of course, before the implementation of the armistice the Yugoslavian authorities contacted the French Navy's leadership in Corfu to ask for the deployment of Allied naval units to the former Hapsburg naval base before the arrival of the Italian naval units. In fact, according to the Yugoslavians the Italians would have established an unfriendly regime hostile to the national aspirations of the Southern Slavs. The Anglo-French naval headquarters, abiding by the decisions taken by the political component of the Entente, answered to the Yugoslavian request ordering the whole Austro-Hungarian fleet to go, under the protection of the white flag, to Corfu. However, for a series of reasons, including bad weather conditions, this was not possible. The impossibility to transfer the whole of the Hapsburg fleet to the inter-Allied base in Corfu gave way to a series of diplomatic and military problems³¹. The French Navy, locally represented (in Southern Dalmatia) by Rear Admiral Louis Caubet who went to Kotor to muster out the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian army, would have opposed any interference by the Italians, showing clearly a Yugoslav-

²⁸ Delcassé was for a second term in office in 1914–1915 as French Foreign Affairs Minister. During his first term, from 1898 through 1905, he had to deal with and solve the delicate situation caused by Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand's occupation of the town of Fashoda, Sudan (the 1898 Fashoda Incident). In 1899, he concluded an agreement with Britain by which the problem was finally resolved, and France consolidated her vast colonial empire in North-West Africa. In the same year, he acted as a mediator (with main mediator being Ambassador Jules Cambon in Washington) between the United States and Spain and brought the peace negotiations to a successful conclusion.

²⁹ AUSSMM, RB, Box 1177, Folder 1918, *Armistizio Pratiche varie*, Sub-folder *Copia di documenti relativi all'armistizio*, Office of the Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy: Clarifications and news concerning the clauses of the naval armistice of October 27, 1918.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

friendly attitude³². In the mind of the French Navy and Army's brass in the Adriatic theater, their Italian peers should have only taken care of the evacuation from those territories of the Italian-speaking component of the already dismembered Austro-Hungarian military³³. Other pressing issues such as the reduction of authority of the national Yugoslavian committees to which the Allies should have taken artillery, bases, fleet and, most importantly, the right to hoist a national flag not yet recognized by the international community, should have remained outside the mandate of the Italian military authorities. The French action developed along the dual track of obstructionism (i.e., declare that they could not act for lack of specific directives, which had to be requested and awaited) and of the open opposition to any possible increase of the Italian military presence. In addition, to further complicate the problem, the last administrative and military Habsburg authorities requested the latter³⁴.

Reading the statement contained in a report by the Italian Navy's Captain Carlo Rey di Villarey, who was the commander of the ship *Mirabello*, to bypass the resistance opposed by Rear Admiral Caubet, who firmly denied having any instructions concerning the "participation of the French Navy in collective actions" to guarantee the implementation of the clause No. 3 of the armistice signed by Italy and Austria-Hungary³⁵, an international naval commission was established that was composed of French and Italian naval officers, in order to ascertain the supposed decommissioning and/or disarmament of the ships and forts and to find the most suitable way to speed up the above-mentioned operation of disarmament and/or decommissioning³⁶. This operation, by which the French navy had to abide, upset the Yugoslav faction considerably. In fact, they publicly expressed dismay through their representatives (Mr. Tranic, Gen. Lessick and Radm. Catinelli). The latter upheld the fact that the confiscated batteries and ships belonged to the Yugoslavs and not to the Austro-Hungarians³⁷.

³² AUSSMM, RB, Box 1174, Folder 1174/1, *Zara e isole dalmate, Sebenico, Spalato e interno della Dalmazia*, Sub-folder *Armistizio. Istruzioni a Cattaro*, Copy of the Report No. 435 RR of November 11, 1918.

³³ AUSSMM, RB, Box 1108, Folder 1108/2, *Congresso della pace. Dalmazia et Adriatico*, Ministry of the Navy, Cipher Office, Message No. 140315 of the cable of November 9, 1918, from Vice Admiral Lorenzo Cusani to the Chief of Staff of the Navy Admiral Paolo Thaon de Revel.

³⁴ AUSSMM, RB, Box 1108, Folder 1108/2, *Congresso della pace. Dalmazia et Adriatico*, Ministry of the Navy, Cipher Office, Cable Report No. 141373 from the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army Armand Diaz to the Italian Navy's Chief of Staff Paolo Thaon de Revel.

³⁵ "Surrender to the Allies and to the United States of America, with their complete armament and equipment, of 3 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 9 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, 1 mine layer, 6 Danube monitors, to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America. All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in Austro-Hungarian naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, and are to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America." Armistice's Naval Clause No. 3 (<http://www.forost.ungarisches-institut.de/pdf/19181103-1.pdf>).

³⁶ AUSSMM, RB, Box 1174, Folder 1174/1, *Zara e isole dalmate, Sebenico, Spalato e interno della Dalmazia. Istruzioni a Cattaro*. Copy of the Report No. 435 RR of November 11, 1918, from the commander of the *Mirabello* to the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Navy.

³⁷ AUSSMM, RB, Box 1108, Folder 1108/2, *Congresso della pace. Dalmazia et Adriatico*, ministry of the Navy, Cipher Office, Cable No. 141969 of November 12, 1918, Vice Admiral Lorenzo Cusani to the Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy.

According to the Italian Navy officers, French cooperation was very scarce and made them think of a possible double game. In fact, the Italian Navy's leadership asked Rear Admiral Molà, who was stationed in Kotor, for information about the presence in that naval base of former Hapsburg ships still harboring the Yugoslav flag and staffed with Yugoslav crews. Molà's answer confirmed the suspicions of the Italian Navy's leadership:

Admiral Molà wired that former Austro-Hungarian ships are disarmed. They all have very scarce Yugoslav crews and harbor a Yugoslav flag. I wired back him stating that this does not correspond to the Second Chapter [Naval Clauses], Article 3, of the armistice protocol, which prescribes that all former Austro-Hungarian ships have to be under the control of the Allies and the United States. Hence, it would be necessary to provide with Allied personnel to guard the ships. As far as the flag is concerned, it is necessary that the delegates [to the Inter-Allied Naval Committee and to the peace Conference] have precise instructions from their own governments [...]³⁸.

In the meantime, the Adriatic Naval Committee, which chose to regroup the former Hapsburg ships in three harbors, Pula, Split and Kotor, controlled respectively by the Italian, US and French Navies, before transferring all of them to Pula and handing them over to Italy, froze the above-mentioned discussion over the destiny of those naval units. Hence, it created the problem of finding enough Allied crews to man all units and make them reach the three different harbors. Eventually, due to a lack of Allied crews, the Adriatic Naval Committee decided to prolong the custody of the ships in Kotor under the vigilance and control of the Allies and the United States³⁹.

In the end, in Kotor and elsewhere, the incompatibility between Rome's die-hard positions—convinced that the full application of the armistice clause could have been revised in a more favorable way during the Paris Peace Conference—and the French interpretation, milder and more limited, emerged because Paris decided to avoid the Italian propaganda's blueprint aimed at clearing as a mere stratagem the numerous promises of future political independence made to the many nationalities of the dual monarchy. In the interpretations elaborated by the then involved politicians, the antagonism between France and Italy over the Adriatic did not depend on the above-mentioned divergence in the geo-strategic directives of the two countries. In fact, the frictions developed by the French and Italian military resulted in jingoistic voices and swashbuckling attitudes, especially if one considers the difficult realities of the occupied territories of the former Habsburg Empire, characterized by the scarcity of food and strong social tension. Yet, what created this situation was exclusively the obtusely provocative behavior of some military leaders:

As per your instructions, I would like to inform you that Barrère came to see me

³⁸ AUSSMM, RB, Box 1108, Folder 1108/3, *Situazione naviglio da guerra ex austro-ungarico. Dal 10 novembre a dicembre 1918*, typewritten copy of a cable from Cusani to the Italian Navy Chief of Staff dated November 24, 1918.

³⁹ AUSSMM, RB, Box 1108, Folder 1108/3, Ministry of the Navy, typewritten copy of a cable from Tahon de Revel to Cusani dated November 25, 1918.

concerning the contents of your wire [...]. This meeting represented also an opportunity to talk about the Franco-Italian relations that are concerning nowadays him and I [...]. He remarked that everything is focused on the question of Fiume. Yet, I added that this hot topic could be solved through a sound *modus vivendi* as it should be between Allies. He told me that the difficulties came mostly from the tense relations between the generals and the admirals of our two countries and he complained again about de Revel. Of course [...] I also told him that we were not satisfied with the behavior of Franchet and Gauchet. Although Barrère defended Franchet energetically, he admitted that Gauchet does not have a very conciliatory character [...]. I believe that it is necessary to establish at any costs a good relationship between our army and navy chiefs in the Adriatic. In so doing, we would avoid the constant intervention of our governments to settle their quarrels. I sense that the difficulties concerning Fiume would be stirred up when a certain cordial relationship among people could be inaugurated⁴⁰.

For this reason, Prime Minister Orlando, once he understood that nothing could be obtained by strongly opposing the Yugoslav-friendly conduct of the French, thought that the only viable solution would be a less intransigent approach, aimed at minimizing clashes and frictions. Orlando, consequently, asked Diaz to meet with Franchet in Fiume and build up a cordial relationship with his peer⁴¹.

However, this appeal to a spirit of cooperation did not meet the support of most of the Italian career officers, who thought of this “appeasement” as a mistake, just as it had been an error to exclude Fiume from the Pact of London. Fiume represented a key element in the economic and political design of the new, important role of Italy in the Adriatic and in the Eastern Mediterranean together with Trieste and Venice. The internationalization of Fiume, or its control by the Allies, would have represented a Trojan horse within the new power politics of Italy.

Apart from the quarrel over the undoubtedly secondary importance of the Italian-Austrian Alpine front, the main obstacle to the ambitious plan to dominate the Adriatic was the aversion of Washington, Paris and London to this imperialist design. In addition, they were supported by a strong, progressive public opinion at home, which was supportive of the self-determination of the Yugoslav populations.

Moreover, the considerations of Mr. Lionello Lenaz, the delegate of Fiume National Council, were crystal-clear about the set-up of an international city-state, where the US capital and shipping companies, together with the mighty French banks and insurance companies, would have represented an obstacle to Italian naval hegemony in the Adriatic⁴². Hence, the only possible solution would have been the annexation of Fiume to Italy, because only annexation could have secured the city’s Italian character⁴³.

⁴⁰ ACS, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (PCM), Box 210, Ministry of the Interior, Office of the Minister, Cipher Office, Cable No. 3167 of December 14, 1918.

⁴¹ ACS, PCM, Box 210, Ministry of the Interior, Office of the Minister, Cipher Office, Cable from Orlando to Diaz.

⁴² AUSSMM, RB, Box 1443, Folder on *Fiume 1919. Fiume e la sua importanza vitale per l’Italia*, typewritten flyer dated June 17, 1919.

⁴³ Ibid.

In the end, during the month of December 1918, the Italians accepted to have the French as a co-occupational force in the City of Fiume and let them create a temporary naval base. Yet, they established clear restrictions as far as, for example, the hiring of Serbian workers instead of Italians was concerned, and the number of depots, banks and houses that they could requisition⁴⁴.

The non-binding if not hazardous character of the decision taken by the naval committee to authorize the establishment of the French naval base, gave the French a free hand from the beginning of the construction of the base. In fact, according to the French, the committee called upon by Admiral Ruggiero did not have any powers to deal with political issues; these powers were a prerogative of the delegates to the Paris Peace Conference. Hence, the leadership of the French Eastern Army ignored the document signed by their colleagues of the *Marine Nationale* thus provoking the reaction of Major General Francesco Grazioli, who commanded the Inter-Allied and US Forces in Fiume. Grazioli, in fact, denounced numerous times the constant frictions he had with Major General Auguste Tranié and General Louis Franchet d'Espèrey who protested against almost all of Grazioli's orders concerning the development of the French military base and some of the decisions taken by Franchet. The latter was expanding increasingly against the agreement signed by the French and Italian naval officers⁴⁵. Additionally, when the Italian Army tried to evacuate a contingent of Serbian soldiers, the French refused to obey, and the latter also accused the Italians of having fired at a Yugoslav POW ship while disembarking⁴⁶. Obviously, the very same complaints came from the French side due to similar misunderstanding or reciprocal distrust. Grazioli was definitely against the French occupational force and was pushing for the annexation of Fiume. His behavior was not helping the timid work of the Italian diplomats at the Paris Peace Conference.

Rear Admiral Vittorio Molà, who took the place of Admiral Paolo Thaon de Revel as Italy's representative to the Adriatic Naval Commission, had the same attitude of Grazioli and that of his predecessor within the Inter-Allied Naval Commission. Indeed, Thaon de Revel resigned as a sign of protest against a commission that he deemed biased and anti-Italian. More specifically, he thought that the determination of the British, French and American representatives to maintain a strong inter-allied occupational force in Fiume played against the Italian claim on Fiume⁴⁷.

Likewise Grazioli before him, Molà had major clashes with the French, British

⁴⁴ AUSSMM, RB, B 1177, Folder on 1918 *Armistizio Pratiche varie*, Sub-folder *Ufficio Marina presso il Comando Supremo del R. Esercito. Trasporto truppe*, typewritten copy of the minutes of the meeting of the Committee to implement the establishment of a French naval base in Fiume, attached to Chief of Staff of the Navy – Office of Plans and Operations. Section 1, Protocol No. 1340 RRP of December 24, 1918.

⁴⁵ A. Marzona, "Les incidents franco-italiens de Fiume ou l'expression des frustrations italiennes (novembre 1918–juillet 1919)," in *Revue Historique des Armées*, 2009, No. 254, pp. 29–38 (<https://journals.openedition.org/rha/6383>), pp. 31–32.

⁴⁶ Marzona, op. cit., p. 34.

⁴⁷ AUSSMM, RB, Box 1443, Ministry of the Italian Navy, Out-Message from the Minister Cabinet No. 2664 of January 19, 1919, from Minister Del Bono to Premier Orlando.

and US occupational forces, which took actions against the Italian Armed Forces and consequently challenged the Italian claim on Fiume; i.e., reducing the Italian land troops; welcoming the French request of bigger and newer buildings for their troops; rejecting the clauses thought of by the Italian commandants and local Italian-speaking politicians to oust the Serbs, who came along with the French Eastern Army from Salonika to Fiume. Of course, these were legitimate actions and requests among allies, but against the expansionist ambitions of Italy. Moreover, the room for maneuver of the Roman diplomacy was increasingly circumscribed because of the limits of the Pact of London. Furthermore, the pledge politics reached its limits and did not win over the diplomatic legal service of the other allies. No international community, in fact, would have denied Paris or Belgrade that prerogative of the temporary jurisdiction of their occupational armies. Hence, following the resignation of Molà just after a few months, Rear Admiral Ugo Rombo replaced him and the commission moved to Split, where the better atmosphere should have improved the relations between the members of the commission. Between the spring and the summer of 1919, the tensions escalated, leading to exchanges of shots with casualties among the civilians and the military and numerous riots. Italy's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tommaso Tittoni, who replaced Sonnino, asked for a commission of inquiry composed exclusively of army generals, who could judge what happened without the animosity of the naval officers. However, the commission ended up criticizing the behavior of the Italians and did not recognize them as victims of French prevarications⁴⁸. The commission even replaced the highly destabilizing Italian National Council of Fiume with a collegial body regularly elected and thereby reducing the number of Italian troops.

Notwithstanding the punishment of the Italian troops, the commission also recognized that the French naval base was a perilous element of disorder and destabilization and had to be closed down as soon as possible. In the end, the decisions of the commission diminished the power of both France and Italy and assigned to the British and the Americans the most delicate and controversial tasks; i.e., supervising the imminent elections, establishing a police battalion and chairing the Inter-Allied Military Commission⁴⁹.

After all, what Italy could not obtain through the actions of its determined admirals—the reduction or elimination of the French influence in Fiume and Dalmatia—or dealing directly with the French, was given to her by a commission of army generals, whose concerns were shared with Tittoni. Unfortunately, this partial success did not represent a major turn in the logics of the then international relations. In fact, while the *Regia Marina* abode by the decisions taken by the commission diligently, the *Marine Nationale* did not, and Premier Clemenceau condemned Italy for failing to remove General Grazioli from his post immediately. This situation was one of the major causes of the reaction of D'Annunzio and his

⁴⁸ AUSSMM, RB, Box 1443, *Proposte della commissione interalleata d'inchiesta per Fiume*, typewritten document without date, Annex a, the Prime Minister, No. 10919 of September 9, 1919. Re: *Fiume Inquiry Commission*.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

fellow military officers, who decided to march toward Fiume and occupy the city in the name of the Kingdom of Italy⁵⁰.

Admiral Millo's Role in the Assertion of the Italian-hood of the Adriatic Sea

A naval officer, who played an important role in the 1919 crisis, was Vice Admiral Enrico Millo. Millo, who had been Governor of Dalmatia from 1918 through 1920, through his intelligence network in Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria, tried to change the *fait accompli* of the “diminished victory” of Italy and implement once and for all the Italian Navy’s diplomatic design. It is noteworthy that Millo, whose 1912 action to force the Dardanelles Straits was highly criticized by the British during the Italian-Turkish War⁵¹ and whose WWI record was quite mediocre, became an excellent intelligence officer, and a political agent of Italian assertiveness, not only in Dalmatia but also in the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean.

In November 1919, D’Annunzio led an expedition to Zara with some Italian naval units, now under the flag of rebellious Fiume⁵², to meet Millo and ask for his support as far as the annexation of Fiume to the Kingdom of Italy was concerned. Millo sided with D’Annunzio and held fast to “territory that was rightly Italy’s”⁵³. Millo’s defiance of specific orders from the Rome government exposed Prime Minister Francesco Saverio Nitti’s weakness and his subservience to the *Regio Esercito*’s Chief of Staff and the Allied diplomacy, and perhaps therefore General Badoglio was finally authorized to offer D’Annunzio most of the concessions he had demanded concerning the annexation of Fiume⁵⁴. However, in the end, the Italian Government, against Millo’s advice, decided to force D’Annunzio to leave the Dalmatian city-state.

⁵⁰ G. Giuriati, *Con D’Annunzio e Millo in difesa dell’Adriatico*, Firenze-Roma, Sansoni-Leonardo, 1954; P. Alatri, Nitti, *D’Annunzio e la questione adriatica*, milano, Feltrinelli, 1976; F. Gerra, *L’impresa di Fiume*, Milano, Longanesi, 1974. In general, on the “Adriatic Question” after the end of World War I, see L. Monzali, *Il sogno dell’egemonia. L’Italia, la questione jugoslava e l’Europa centrale*, Firenze, Le Lettere, 2010, pp. 7–34.

⁵¹ Millo’s naval expedition of April–July 1912, which brought about the controversial raid of the Dardanelles, is still a topic of discussion in Italian naval circles. However, that action surely stirred up Italian public opinion and brought prestige and publicity to its protagonist (Millo was awarded the *Medaglia d’Oro al Valor di Marina*, the equivalent of the United States Navy Medal of Honor), the then Captain Millo, but not a tactical advantage with respect to the Ottoman forces. Besides, according to the Entente Powers, this move could have destabilized the already unstable Balkans. See PRO-NA, FO 195/9323, Files 55, *Italian War: Dardanelles and Cdr. Enrico Millo*.

⁵² During the Italian naval blockade of Fiume, some *Regia Marina*’s naval units mutinied and joined D’Annunzio’s legionaries. One destroyer (*Agostino Bertani*), two torpedo boats (66PN, 68PN) and eight MTBs from the Italian Navy went over to Fiume in October–December 1919; the mutiny on one submarine (*F-16*) failed. Three more destroyers (*Francesco Nullo*, *Pilade Bronzetti*, *Espero*) went over to the rebels on 7–8 December 1920. They formed the Navy of the Regency, but the nationalists scarcely used these ships. Instead, they seized civilian boats to assault merchant ships and occupy a number of islands. All the ships were recovered by the Italians when they assaulted the city on 24–28 December 1920. The rebel ships were sent to Pula and renamed on January 16, 1921.

⁵³ J. Woodhouse, *Gabriele D’Annunzio: Defiant Archangel*, Oxford and New York, OUP, 1998, p. 337.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

This episode, and especially the ensuing correspondence between Millo and D'Annunzio⁵⁵, are proof of the Genoese flag officer and future Member of Parliament's blueprint to implement and expand a network of informants and agents on the payroll of the *Regia Marina* all over Dalmatia and the Balkans (up to Greece and Turkey) to keep an eye on the maneuvers of the British, and especially the French, in a geopolitical area that should have become an Italian game reserve without any other interference. Of course, the British dealt with this issue in a quite opportunistic way; i.e., from time to time siding with the Americans and the French, and from time to time siding with the Italians⁵⁶. This seesaw behavior was a ruse to buy time and let the Italians content themselves with a limited portion of Dalmatia down to Split and (maybe) including Fiume.

The French played a large part in diminishing the role of Italy in the Adriatic and limiting its sphere of influence.

However, Admiral Millo, often without the consent of the Italian Government, but with the full approval and support of Thaon de Revel, Molà and the Italian Office for Naval Information (SIS), acted to favor the dominance of the Boot in those lands and beyond his mere duty as Governor of Dalmatia⁵⁷.

It is interesting to see how the Foreign Office was looking at the diplomatic dynamism of the Italian flag officer and the latter's unofficial intelligence service. In a document relative to D'Annunzio's "weapons procurement" between the fall and the winter of 1919, the role of Millo is quite clear: he was the main link between the Italian weapons manufacturers and D'Annunzio who needed those weapons in case of an Allied military action against him and his legionaries⁵⁸. The anti-French incidents within the City of Fiume are also another maneuver, sponsored by Millo and his aides, to oust the French troops from the Dalmatian city. However, Millo was active all over Dalmatia down to Montenegro, where the British would have liked to have the Italians instead of the French. Besides, the latter could count on the support of the Americans who focused on the self-determination of those countries and on the moderation of the Italian requests following the Pact of London. A Foreign Office report, resulting from the intelligence of the British Army and the Royal Navy in Dalmatia, which took place throughout 1919, highlights that Italy was holding a lit match while sitting on a powder keg⁵⁹. Besides, Millo pulled many strings to

⁵⁵ Società di Studi fiumani, Fondo personalità Fiumane, No. 22, Millo-D'Annunzio, 25/09/1919-20/12/192, A9, B29, SB 1, Folder 3, *Millo's memorandum to D'Annunzio on the Importance of the Adriatic Sea and Dalmatia for Italy*, without date, but probably of December 1919–January 1920 (following D'Annunzio's trip to Zara).

⁵⁶ AUSSMM, RB, Box 1161, Folder on *Base interalleata a Fiume. Invadenza dell'azione francese a Fiume*, memo No. 1436 of December 24, 1918. Re: *Miei rapporti con le autorità militari alleate a Fiume*. This is Maj. Gen. Francesco Grazioli's report on his relations with the Allied military Authorities.

⁵⁷ ACS, Box 37, Folder 106, Nitti Papers: *Fiume, D'Annunzio, Dalmazia, luglio–agosto 1919*, Sub-folder 1, *Regno d'Italia, Ministero dell'Interno*, cable Nitti-Tittoni of July 7, 1919.

⁵⁸ PRO-NA, FO 608/41/1, *Export of War Materiel to D'Annunzio at Zara and Italy's Military Activities on the Adriatic Coast*.

⁵⁹ PRO-NA, FO 608/38/14, *Italy: Terrorization in Dalmatia, including Italian Action in Occupied Territory of Montenegro and situation in Fiume and Zara*.

acquire prestige and influence amongst the local politicians and leaders and keeping at bay, if not ostracizing, the French military (especially the French Navy) from those areas. Toward this goal, he used legal and illegal tools, going beyond what was well established not only by the Pact of London but also by the recent WWI surrender terms⁶⁰. Some cables clearly highlight Millo's intelligence activities in Athens, Ankara and Belgrade. The message from Millo to a presumed journalist living in Athens, where he asks for details concerning the presence and the activities of British and French agents, is of a certain interest:

Dear [*omissis*], please inform me on the meeting of the French Chargé d'Affaires with local authorities, especially those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Please inform me also on the recent statements by the British shipping businessmen regarding shipping tariffs and privileged harbors in the Southern Adriatic and Ionian Seas [...]. Develop contacts with your colleagues of the Greek press⁶¹.

The occupation of Fiume, in the fall of 1919, and the constitution of the Republic of Carnaro, together with its progressive charter, became a sort of stereotyped example of general mutiny that the political and military leaders dealt with reluctantly as far as its suppression was concerned. First and foremost, with all its leftist and rightist experimental innovations⁶², Fiume represented a desperate move to carve out some limited room for maneuver. Obviously, the consequences of this military, political and propagandistic elan would have been the definite break with the Allied counterpart; i.e., a hazardous move that Prime Minister Nitti deemed superfluous if not excessive⁶³.

The determination to annex Fiume, in an excess of self-referential, patriotic exaltation, was motivated by an image of WWI based completely on Alpine troops, Sassari brigades and platoon officers, as was most of the Italian historiography on the Great War. In addition, Italy was persuaded to benefit from sufficient international prestige to have recognized, and granted, the right to liquidate the Southern Slavs; a right Italy would have been entitled to after courting and exploiting the Slavs, as the Anglo-French did with the Arab populations once convinced to rebel against the Ottoman yoke. This determination was indeed another sudden, reactionary shift because of the watering down of the Adriatic-Balkan policy pursued by the country.

Conclusion

From the documents analyzed, among other elements, it emerges in particular the ambiguity of the Franco-Italian alliance during WWI and the reciprocal conviction of Rome and Paris to give or receive concessions as and when possible to revise

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid., sub-folder on *Governor Millo's Intelligence Network*.

⁶² See note 27. See also R. De Felice, *D'Annunzio politico. 1918-1938*, Bari, Laterza, 1978; C. Salaris, *Alla festa della rivoluzione. Artisti e libertari con D'Annunzio a Fiume*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2002.

⁶³ Mr. Nitti, already Minister of Finances in the previous government, and for this reason more conscious than the other ministers of the total economic dependence of the Peninsula on foreign imports, believed that only the benevolent support of the other members of the Entente was still able to guarantee the economic survival of Italy.

what was agreed upon before Italy's participation in the war. It also emerges how little room for maneuver Rome had for three main reasons: 1) The small political and diplomatic stature of Italy in the world; 2) The outrageous military defeats (first of all Caporetto's); 3) The French antagonism.

For the above-mentioned reasons, during the 1919 Eastern Mediterranean and Adriatic crisis, the poker table of European diplomacy saw as main players not only standard diplomats, but also a group of hyper-active admirals: Millo, Thaon de Revel and Molà. These flag officers firmly asserted the Italian tricolor on those territories, which should have warranted a different approach by the Italian Navy.

Italy's aspirations, after entering WWI in a controversial way, were understandable. However, it asserted them without a proper diplomatic tool. Probably, a sound diplomacy would have obtained more results than an overzealous and hyperactive navy. Undoubtedly, the latter compensated for the lack of strategy of the former and mitigated the devastating, political and diplomatic effects of the occupation of Fiume by D'Annunzio's legionaries.

IRELAND AND THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

Peter Mulready (Ireland)

Ireland and World War 1

World War 1 had an impact on Ireland which lasted into the War of Independence (1919-1921) and the Civil War (1922-1923). These conflicts can be seen as part of a 'greater war' that lasted for over a decade in Europe. This 'greater war' began in 1912 – when Ulster was armed and a first Balkan War lit the fuse for 1914 – and ended in 1923. Approximately 210,000 Irishmen fought in WWI, (60,000 were already serving in 1914 and 150,000 joined up later). They fought in greater numbers than in any other conflict in the country's history. There was no conscription in Ireland, though an attempt was made to introduce it in 1918. It could be said that this was the decisive moment when Britain lost Ireland. It showed that Britain was unable to conscript its citizens at a time of national emergency. The Napoleonic Wars played a part in making the Act of Union and the First World War played a decisive part in breaking it. In 1914 Home Rule was put on the statute book but its implementation was delayed until the end of the war, which everybody believed would be short and end in victory. The war split the nationalist movement, confirmed partition and transformed political culture in both parts of the country. Ireland's modern political shape to a large degree derives from the war. In 1916 republicans used the old motto, 'England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity', to stage a failed rising. In the aftermath of the rising radicalised Irish nationalism embarked on a campaign for a fully independent state.

Irish delegates attempted to attend the Versailles Peace Conference, but were rebuffed. Ireland then went on to seek international recognition while simultaneously constructing a 'counter-state' at home. The outcome was the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, one of the post-war settlements in Europe.

The December 1918 British General election

The December 1918 general election was the first such election in Britain and Ireland in eight years. It followed the enactment of The Representation of the People Act, 1918 which extended the franchise to virtually all men over twenty-one and women over thirty who were householders. It was the first election under (almost) universal suffrage. The Irish electorate increased from less than 700,000 to almost two million. Women accounted for 36% of the enlarged electorate. Sinn Féin, the republican party, was able to appeal to these new voters who were uninfluenced by voting patterns of the past. In Britain Lloyd George's coalition government was comfortably returned to office, but with the Conservatives now forming the largest party. This development had a significant impact on government policy towards Ireland in the years that followed.

Sinn Féin won seventy-three seats out of one hundred and five. The previously dominant Irish Parliamentary Party was reduced to six seats, while Unionists won twenty-six seats. The Labour Party did not contest the election and thus assisted Sinn

Féin in presenting it as a de facto plebiscite on independence: 'Ireland a nation or Ireland a province' was the choice it presented to the electorate. The Irish electorate, outside of Ulster, had voted by a large margin to repudiate the Act of Union and to establish a separate parliament and government.

Sinn Féin's election manifesto indicated the importance of world affairs. Four means to secure an Irish republic were identified: abstention from the Westminster parliament; agitation in Ireland; an Irish parliament and an appeal "to the Peace Conference for the establishment of Ireland as an Independent Nation." In reality the Allies were unlikely to side against Britain. In propaganda terms, though, the appeal to the Conference which had declared its intention to "settle the future of the Nations of the world....on the principle of government by consent of the governed" was astute. In the weeks prior to the election, republics had been proclaimed in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany and Hungary.

The First Dáil – 21 January 1919

On 21 January 1919 twenty-eight men who had been elected as Sinn Féin MPs in the general election met in public session in the Mansion House in Dublin to proclaim an Irish parliament, Dáil Éireann, as a legislative assembly for Ireland. While all Irish MPs were invited to attend only the Sinn Féin ones did so. The forty-five Sinn Féin absentees were either in prison, including Arthur Griffith and Eamon De Valera, or they feared arrest by the British authorities if they appeared in public.

The meeting received extensive press coverage. Contemporary accounts suggest that seventy to one hundred journalists were present, representing Irish national and local newspapers, as well as British, European, American and imperial newspapers and press agencies. This publicity reflected a determination to publicise the Dáil's existence as a national parliament. Prominent media attention was to be a major part of the battle to force Britain to grant self-government to Ireland. The session lasted only two hours but was carefully choreographed to reflect the objectives of Sinn Féin, both national and international. The deputies approved a short, provisional constitution for Dáil Éireann; appointed delegates to the Paris peace conference; issued a Declaration of Independence, a Message to the free nations of the world, and a Democratic Programme, setting out core principles that should inform socio-economic policy. The Declaration of Independence reflected the Dáil's hybrid origins in revolution and in parliamentary democracy. It stated that in the 1918 general election, the Irish electorate had 'seized the first occasion to declare by an overwhelming majority its firm allegiance to the Irish Republic.' The Dáil now ratified 'the establishment of the Irish Republic.' The Message to the Free Nations was a call for international recognition of Ireland's independent nationhood. It was informed by US president Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and prevailing optimism that a new world order was emerging in the aftermath of the Great War.

While Dáil Éireann assumed many of the trappings of a democratically elected parliament, there was a constant threat that its proceedings would be disrupted by the Crown forces. It met in private and in public at irregular intervals. The Dáil set out

to act as an effective ‘counter-state’. On 11 September 1919 the British authorities banned both Dáil Éireann and Sinn Féin, along with several supporting organisations and weekly newspapers. Now the ‘counter-state’ became an underground entity. The ‘counter-state’ operation had uneven results, but worked well enough to give the appearance of an organised and effective venture. Success in local government elections for urban areas in January 1920, and rural Ireland the following June provided Sinn Féin with a renewed mandate.

The republican campaign at home was underpinned by a sophisticated effort to mobilise global public and political opinion. The Dáil sent diplomats abroad, while its propagandists skilfully cultivated the international press. Advances in communications saw press reports, photographs, and newsreel of British atrocities in Ireland rapidly circulate the globe. Populations of Irish descent were mobilised as never before in Britain, the US, and throughout the dominions to support Irish independence.

The Versailles Peace Conference

From 1914 onwards, immigrant groups in the United States and nationalities in mid-Europe, along with Egyptians, Indians and other nationalist groups outside the US believed that the Allies’ war aims, and specifically those of US president Woodrow Wilson incorporated their demands for independence. His Fourteen Points to Congress on 8 January 1918, included the right of “every peace-loving nation to live its own life, [and] determine its own institutions”.

Irish republican strategists believed they could win Irish independence through an appeal to the Paris Peace Conference. Prior to the conference opening in early 1919, Sinn Féin drafted appeals to the victorious Allied powers, organised independence petition signings and mobilised its supporters in the US. Irish republicans hoped to secure the same kind of independence the Allies would ultimately grant to new European states like Czechoslovakia, Finland, Poland and Yugoslavia.

Sean T O’Kelly and George Gavan Duffy served as the Irish Republic’s uninvited representatives at the peace conference. They requested an opportunity to present their case to the conference for ‘Ireland’s indisputable right to international recognition for independence’ and the propriety of her claim to enter the League of nations as one of its constituent members. For a country like Ireland to demand separation from one of the victors was a difficult proposition. Ireland was seeking independence from one of the victorious powers, and due to the alignment of Irish republicans with Germany in the early years of the war, sympathy for the Irish cause was in short supply among the victorious French and their allies in Paris in 1919. The conference refused to admit the republicans or consider subsequent appeals for recognition of Irish independence. Ireland’s claim was only one of several unsuccessful national appeals rejected by the conference, as questions of global power eclipsed principles of self-determination. Failure at the conference removed the likelihood of a peaceful resolution to Irish independence aspirations, paving the way for an armed republican insurrection that began in early 1920.

When President Wilson sailed for Europe on 4 December Irish republicans still believed that the Irish were included on his list of peoples who would win freedom from the settlement and that he would support the presence of an Irish delegation in the peace negotiations in Paris. But after a visit to London on 28 December where Wilson discussed “the grave menace of the Irish problem”, with Lloyd George, he was even more convinced that it was not America’s responsibility to find a settlement to the Irish problem. The Conference had many issues to consider. Against this background, settling the Irish problem did not appear urgent to Wilson, even if he had wanted to do it. In Paris, the Sinn Féin envoys of the new Dáil failed to meet him. Instead they met individual members of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.

By the end of May 1919, as the proceedings moved to a close in Paris, Wilson’s attitude towards the Irish remained uncompromising. The British actively sought to counter the activities of the Irish delegation, and the Wilson administration accepted the British argument that Irish affairs were a purely internal matter. Wilson approached Lloyd George regarding the Irish issue on 9 June and Lloyd George replied that he “could not consent to hear the Irish in any way” because it would precipitate a parliamentary crisis in London, his government might fall thus jeopardising the peace settlement.

Post the Versailles Conference

With the venture into the Versailles conference turning into a not-unexpected failure, George Gavan Duffy and Sean T O’Kelly turned to nurturing support from the many journalists assembled in Paris, and then over the next two years, promoting similar views in other western-European capitals. In a related activity the Dáil’s Department of Publicity guided British journalists and other visitors, largely American, who were drawn to events in Ireland. The summer of 1919 saw a shift in Sinn Féin’s international strategy, with a new focus on the US in the form of a lengthy American tour by Eamon De Valera, the President of Dáil Éireann. The Dáil and its emerging foreign service began to focus their limited resources on maintaining an international high profile, appointing “consular agents” across Europe, Scandinavia and even South America to ensure that overseas attention remained fixed on the situation in Ireland, in the hope of bringing international pressure to bear on the British.

Though he failed to secure diplomatic recognition and divided Irish-American opinion, de Valera’s presence in the US from June 1919 to December 1920 demonstrated the importance attached to American money and political power. Irish republican publicity constrained the British campaign in Ireland and pressured London to reach a political accommodation. Combining physical force, propaganda and political mobilisation, at home and abroad, Irish republicans fashioned a modern template for revolutionary struggle, one that would influence liberation movements over the following century.

The British Perspective

The election of December 1918 had transformed British politics. Lloyd George's coalition won a huge victory – 478 seats out of 708 - but the Liberal Party had split on the issue of remaining in coalition. This transformed the parliamentary balance of power, with the coalition Conservatives winning 335 seats and the coalition Liberals a mere 133. The Conservative Party remained loyal to Lloyd George. Its effective overall majority in the House of Commons meant that it could do as it wished. It ensured that Lloyd George would never adopt any Irish policy that did not command unionist support. Yet although the phenomenon of coalition government had hardened the inevitability of partition, it had also eroded the pre-war determination of British unionists to oppose Home Rule in any shape or form. Lloyd George had long anticipated the necessity of talking to Sinn Féin. 'We shall have to negotiate some day with the men who do represent Ireland', he had told Liberal ministers as early as mid-October 1918, two months before Sinn Féin had even acquired their democratic mandate in the general election.

The default position of British policy in Ireland had always been an unstable combination of "coercion and conciliation." In 1919 the conciliatory part was slow to emerge. It would be more than a year before a new Home Rule Bill was put before parliament. On 22 December 1919 Lloyd George unveiled the two-parliament policy that became the Government of Ireland Bill. This Bill became the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. Its primary purpose was to placate the Ulster unionists and not to satisfy Sinn Féin's demands for self-determination.

Failure at the peace Conference removed the likelihood of a peaceful resolution to Irish independence aspirations, paving the way for an armed republican insurrection that began in earnest in early 1920. The coercion that occupied the interim was, however, at best half-hearted. The police force, the Royal Irish Constabulary, found no effective response to the public boycott launched early in 1919. The British army, undergoing rapid demobilisation, had little capacity to counter a growing insurgency. Military and police intelligence organisations were ineffective. British forces struggled to retrieve the ground they had lost to the IRA in 1919 and to restore a semblance of stability sufficient to set up the parliaments provided for in the Act. Once the Northern Ireland parliament was established on 22 June 1921, Lloyd George no longer needed to delay. The Truce ending the War of Independence duly took effect at noon on 11 July and paved the way for the negotiations that led to the Anglo-Irish Treaty.

Domestic and imperial political concerns also meant Ireland was not high on the agenda of the British cabinet in 1919. Numerous problems faced the new government. The war had ended but Allied forces were involved in the Russian civil war, and it was going badly. Domestically, there was industrial violence on the Clyde and in Belfast, a police strike in Liverpool, an underground strike in London and the demobilisation of the huge wartime army was underway. Lloyd George was in Paris, at the peace conference, for most of 1919. The Conservative leader and pre-war opponent of home rule, Andrew Bonar Law, was in charge of the government at home.

Britain gained new imperial possessions because of the war, but a number of imperial trouble spots also emerged. For the next three years the quartet of Ireland, Egypt, India and Mesopotamia made regular appearances on the British cabinet agenda.

The Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921

The Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed in London on 6 December 1921. It created the Irish Free State as a self-governing dominion in the British Commonwealth, and ended 120 years of direct British rule over twenty-six out of the thirty-two counties of Ireland. The treaty negotiations had attempted to reconcile Irish desires for an independent ‘Republic of Ireland’ with British requirements for imperial unity and defence and the maintenance of Ireland under the Crown within the British Empire. The form of ‘self-government’ given by dominion status was a considerable step beyond the 1912 Home Rule Bill, but nowhere near to the ‘Republic’ sought by many who had fought for Irish Independence. The terms of the Treaty split the Irish body-politic and caused a bitter Civil War from June 1922 to May 1923. Dáil Éireann passed the Treaty on 7 January 1922 and the Irish Free State came into being on 6 December 1922.

Conclusion

Initially the Irish sought to pursue independence through peaceful, democratic means. This helps to explain how democracy took root very quickly in the Free State. The Irish conflict was a low intensity one, partly because there was a state power to negotiate with. Lord Curzon in 1920 told the British cabinet that the growing restiveness of public opinion in Britain with the repression of the ‘Black and Tans’ and the Auxiliaries made a political settlement inevitable. The Irish revolutionaries pioneered the process of simultaneously deploying parallel political and guerrilla movements, including the use of terror. This was possible because there was a state opposing it whose stake in the war was limited and which was subject to home and international public opinion. Comparisons with other parts of Europe where the period between 1918 and 1923 saw a continuation of violence, provide useful perspective. In contrast to the vacuum in central and eastern Europe, British state power ensured that Ireland’s revolution was a managed process, greatly limiting its violence, but also frustrating aspirations for full independence. During the 1920s and 1930s the Irish Free State was one of the most stable democracies in Europe.

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THE CILICIAN WAR (1919-1921): THE FRANCO-TURKISH WAR AFTER THE GREAT WAR

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The Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923) was a byproduct of the Entente's victory in the Great War and its attempt to partition Anatolia. As Eugene Rogan argues in *Fall of the Ottomans*, Entente efforts to occupy Anatolia doomed the Imperial government and turned the National Movement's struggle into a life-and-death battle for control of Turkey's future. Greece's occupation of areas in Anatolia provoked Mustafa Kemal's decision to join and lead the nascent nationalist revolt, but the Nationalists fought several different foreign powers. Even before the signing of the August 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, French troops were fighting a Turkish revolt in Cilicia, a region in southeastern Anatolia just north of Syria.

Despite the Turkish War of Independence's central role in Middle Eastern politics, historians are still struggling to put it in an international context. Most histories of the war, including M. Şükrü Hanioglu, Uğur Ümit Üngör, Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, and Andrew Mango have understandably focused on Mustafa Kemal and the origins of the Republic of Turkey.¹ Historians looking at the war in an international context usually study the Greco-Turkish struggle or the 1922 Chanak Crisis that almost led to the war between Britain and the Nationalists. Many of the works that focused on the Franco-Turkish conflict are shaped by Turkish and Armenian nationalist narratives that limit their overall value.² Although this literature is useful, the current literature distorts France's the decision-making process by focusing on issues, such as the fate of the Armenians, which were not central to France's political and military leadership. The existing literature also fails to take account of how little reliable information French leaders had about Turkish forces, plans, and intentions.

Battle of Maraş and the Eastern Front

Although British and French leaders had agreed during the First World War that France would control Cilicia after the end of the war, British forces initially occupied the region. Because of manpower shortages caused by the demobilization, General Julien Dufieux and his 156th Division did not reach Cilicia until October 1919. Although the Nationalists strongly protested their arrival, the initial French

¹ M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).; Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement* (London: Sage Publications, 1975); Andrew Mango, *Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey* (New York: Overlook, 2002); Uğur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913-1950* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

² For example: Georges Kévorkian, *La France chassée de l'Empire Ottoman: Une guerre oubliée, 1918-1923* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2013); Vahé Tachjian, *La France en Cilicie et en Haute-Mésopotamie : Aux confins de la Turquie, de la Syrie et de l'Irak (1919-1933)* (Paris: Karthala, 2003); Yücel Güçlü, *Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia, 1914-1923* (Provo: University of Utah Press, 2012).

deployment went well.³⁴ Dufieux commanded French forces in Cilicia, but he was subordinate to General Henri Gouraud's Beirut-based Army of the Levant. Gouraud prioritized securing Syria from King Faisal and his Arab Kingdom of Syria over Cilicia.

The war began in December 1919 with Turkish guerilla attacks against French supply convoys and soon focused on Maraş, a town of 25,000 to 30,000 people with large Turkish and repatriated Armenian populations. French forces in Maraş were especially vulnerable to attacks because they were occupying an isolated position at the norther tip of a salient of French territory. As a result, they could not rely on mutual support from other French garrisons to help defend the city or patrol its supply lines. In addition, mountains north of the city and its proximity to positions of Nationalist strength north of the Maraş gap made it hard to detect approaching Turkish forces or to stop the Nationalists from distributing arms and ammunition to potential insurgents.⁵

In November 1919 Mustafa Kemal sent Kiliç Ali (Süleyman Asaf Emrullah) from Sivas to the area around Maraş to begin organizing militias. By January Colonel Hüseyin Selahtin's 3rd Corps was making planned shipments of weapons and ammunition to selected militias around Maraş.⁶ During December and January Turkish fighters operating under Kiliç Ali's command raided French convoys and attacked Armenian civilians near Maraş.⁷

Initially Turkish forces were mainly composed of locally raised volunteer units which the French called *tchétés*. Although they included many veterans, they were not organized as regular military formations. The Turkish National Movement supplied the volunteer militias with ammunition and weapons and Kiliç Ali provided some overall leadership, but Mustapha Kemal did not initially commit regular troops to the offensive against Maraş.⁸ French forces were a mixture of mainly Senegalese and Algerian troops, some Armenia Legion forces, and a smattering of metropolitan French soldiers. The legion was not part of the Foreign Legion, it was a separate force raised among expatriate and refugee Armenians.⁹

The escalating attacks signaled to General Quérétte, the French commander in Maraş, that a crisis was coming. Quérétte's garrison lacked tactical mobility because of a shortage of trucks and animals and so he relied on fixed defenses to hold the city. When the Turks launched a major attack on 21 January Quérétte tried to ask Dufieux for help, but he did not have a radio transmitter and found that the Turks had already cut the telegraph wires. It thus took until 28 January for Dufieux to learn of the crisis

³ SHD DAT 7 N 1640 No 1447 2 Nov 1919; SHD DAT 7 N 1640 No 1502 13 Nov 1919.

⁴ Kévorkian, *La France chassée de l'Empire Ottoman*, 126.

⁵ Édouard Brémont, *La Cilicie en 1919-1920* (Paris: Gauthner, 1920), 37.

⁶ Hüsameddin Karadağ, *İstiklal Savaşında Maraş* (Mersin: Ata Çelebi Basımevi, 1943), 21-27.

⁷ *Türk İstiklal Harbi, IV: Güney Cephesi (15 Mayıs 1919–30 Ekim 1921)* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1965), 84-5.

⁸ SHD 4 H 229 "Population Report" January 1921.

⁹ Richard Hovannisian "The Postwar Contest for Cilicia and the "Marash Affair" in Richard Hovannisian and Simon Payaslian eds. *Armenian Cilicia*. (Costa Mesa CA: Mazda Publishers, 2008), 499-501.

when a survivor of an ambush reached İslâhiye and reported the roads to Maraş were blocked.¹⁰

The battle of Maraş set the tactical patterns for the early part of the conflict in eastern Cilicia. Turkish forces were too weak to storm most French positions, but the French were too shorthanded to garrison the entire region and keep their lines of communication open in the face of a constant raids. The first phase of the siege involved chaotic fighting inside the city as French forces battled Turkish fighters in the streets. Soon the battle settled down into a series of interlocking sieges. Quérette's troops held a defensive line along the edge of the city but were besieged by Turkish forces outside of it. Inside of Maraş, French troops held some districts while the Turks fortified others, including the citadel, and Armenian militias defended their own neighborhoods.¹¹

Dufieux responded quickly to the Maraş crisis by ordering Lt. Colonel Robert Normand to lead a relief column on 31 January. Normand rushed from Adana to İslâhiye, roughly 45 miles from Maraş, where his force began concentrating. By 2 February the force included two battalions of Algeria troops of the 21st R.T.A. (Algerian Tirailleurs Regiment) and a battalion of the 22nd R.T.A. It also included four platoons of cavalry and 75mm artillery. Two French aircraft assisted Normand's column by acting as spotters. His supply train included trucks, but its backbone was a force of 115 camels which was supposed to have been 250.¹²

While Normand organized his forces, he rushed one battalion forward on 3 February to save two companies of Armenian Legion troops besieged by a larger Turkish force. On 5 February the full column caught up with the rescue force and Normand added the 120 rescued Armenians to his force. The next day French forces struck north toward Maraş. They reached Türkoğlu after an eleven-hour march during which they regularly skirmished with Turkish forces. Unable to stop the French, the Turks resorted to burning villages along the line of march to deny French troops shelter. Turkish forces again attempted to block the French advance the next morning, this time by digging in on high ground commanding the road to Maraş. Normand responded with a sustained artillery barrage that gave cover for his infantry to infiltrate the Turkish positions before launching an attack that carried the position and opened the road. By nightfall on 8 February, French forces were within sight of Maraş and made contact with Quérette.¹³

They discovered that Quérette's position was difficult. The Turks controlled the citadel and Quérette had dispersed into fragmented positions around Maraş to maintain a tenuous grip of the city. Normand and Quérette's discussions are shrouded in controversy, with each man denying responsibility for ordering the retreat. Normand denied that he or Dufieux ordered Quérette to abandon Maraş while Quérette claimed Normand brought orders for him to withdraw. Normand

¹⁰ Robert F. Zeidner "The Tricolor Over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity 1918-1922" Ph.D. Diss, University of Utah, 1991, 348.

¹¹ Stanley Kerr, *Lions of Marash: Personal Experience with American Near East Relief, 1919-1922* (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1973), 95-103.

¹² Robert Normand, *Colonnes dans le Levant* (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1924), 30-1.

¹³ *Ibid.* 31-3.

however acknowledged that he brought instructions from Dufieux warning that he could not assure Quérette that he could keep Maraş's supply line open and that any pacification of the city would have to take place very quickly because his column was needed elsewhere. The implication was that it was unsafe for Quérette to remain in Maraş unless he could use Normand's force to quickly retake and pacify the city so his men could focus on securing their own supply lines.¹⁴ Although it remains unclear who decided a withdrawal was necessary, one or both of the officers decided to evacuate Maraş.

The withdrawal was fought with peril. Quérette lacked the motorized or animal transport to speedily move his force so it would have to leave on foot and pass through Turkish lines. To avoid panicking the Armenian civilians in Maraş, and perhaps to mislead the Turks, Quérette hid his preparations and it was not until the first units started moving that Armenian leaders realized what was happening. Thousands of Armenians fled with the French, but many others were unable to reach the French in time to join the retreat.

Before Querette could execute his escape, Normand's force had to clear a route out of the city. Normand's battalions attacked the main Turkish positions west of Maraş on 9 and 10 February to open the line of retreat while his artillery bombarded Turkish positions inside and outside of the city. As Maraş burned on the night of 10-11 February, the French garrison and as many Armenian civilians as could follow joined Normand's column and headed south. The combined forces included 4,500 soldiers, 150 vehicles, 115 camels, and 3-5,000 Armenian civilians.¹⁵ As French forces withdrew, Marshal Foch unsuccessfully tried to use the Allied Military Committee to pressure the Nationalists to withdraw their support from the revolt. Simultaneously General Franchet-d'Esperey in Constantinople tried, equally unsuccessfully, to use military threats to get Mustafa Kemal to back down.¹⁶

Turkish forces also struck the French at Urfa, on the eastern fringe of France's occupied zone in early February. Major G. Hauger's garrison consisted of a composite battalion of roughly 700 Algerian and Senegalese soldiers reinforced with a company of metropolitan French troops from the 412th Infantry Regiment. Turkish forces led by Captain Ali Sap (Ursavaş) besieged Hauger's men on 9 February. Saip's force was a mixture of Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab men. Unable even to communicate with Dufieux because he, like Quérette, lacked a radio, Hauger held out hoping for relief. French forces tried repeatedly to reach the garrison from Antep. In March and early April Normand and Colonel Andréa led mobile columns toward the city but encountered regular Turkish units of Ahmet Cevder's Thirteenth Corps which blocked their progress through the hills. Normand later blamed a lack of transport and mobile units for his inability to escort supply trains to the threatened city. On April 9, Hauger accepted Saip's offer to withdraw under truce, only to have most of his command massacred while retreating under Turkish escort and the survivors held as prisoners.¹⁷

¹⁴ Ibid., 33-6.; Stanley Kerr, *Lions of Marash*; Brémond *Cilicie*, 39.

¹⁵ Normand, *Collonnes*, 42-44.; Kévorkian, *La France chassée de l'Empire Ottoman*, 126-28.

¹⁶ SHD DM 1 BB3 5. Telegram 16 February 1920.

¹⁷ Zeidner "The Tricolor Over the Taurus," 383-4; Normand, *Collonnes* 49-81.

General Gouraud was under orders to secure French control of Syria and so felt unable to send significant reinforcement to Cilicia before he accomplished his main mission, but he did redeploy units to support Dufieux's command while consolidating control of Syria. On 11 February he began shipping General de Lamothe's division from Lebanon to Alexandretta. Lemothe had to divide his forces to carry out different missions, including suppressing rebels in Alexandretta and northern Syria, but he also assumed control of the eastern part of the Cilician front. This allowed Dufieux to concentrate on the defense of Adana.¹⁸ By late February 1920 French forces throughout Cilicia were retreating before Turkish attacks and on 23 February *Les Temps* reported that the Nationalist offensive against French forces had caused casualties among French troops and the region's Armenian civilian population.¹⁹

The arrival of reinforcements was well timed, because on 1 April Turks in Antep revolted against French occupation setting off months of street fighting. Lemothe moved methodically against the city. In April and May, he focused on securing the supply lines to Antep. His efforts proved successful, especially after French forces inflicted a severe defeat on a concentrated guerilla force on 21 May along the Kilis-Antep road. Fighting in Antep proved harder for the French and Lemothe resorted to besieging Turkish strongholds and launching periodic attacks against them instead of trying to clear the Turks out of Antep in one great assault. The fighting thus dragged on with the French slowly reducing Turkish resistance.²⁰

The Adana Campaign

Most scholars assume that the Turks did not have an overall campaign plan in early 1920. French scholars have emphasized the chaotic guerilla nature of the fighting while Turkish scholars cast the February-June phase of the war as a spontaneous rising, which could not be expected to have an overall operational plan. However, a closer examination of events shows that Turkish forces were engaged in a coordinated offensive aimed at taking Adana. In February 1920 Turkish forces followed three lines of advance in western Cilicia which converged on Adana, the main French base in the region and General Dufieux's headquarters. While one force, which included regular Nationalist troops, advanced toward Adana directly from the north, other forces struck east and west of Adana. The western force tried to close the Adana-Mersin railroad while the eastern force moved south to cut the Adana-Antioch railroad and secure the bridges over the Ceyhan river. If successful, the attacks would have cut Adana off from both its potential supply bases, Syria and the port of Mersin, leaving it vulnerable to the main force. The battles around Maraş and Urfa also supported the Adana campaign by preventing Dufieux from drawing on his eastern garrisons as a source of reserves to support Adana.

The eastern prong of the Adana offensive made good initial progress. A unit

¹⁸ Brémond, *Cilicie*, 42; Normand *Colonnes*, 49-50.

¹⁹ SHD DM 1 BB2 69. Press. "Dans le Levant" *Les Temps* (Paris), 23 February 1920.

²⁰ Zeidner "The Tricolor Over the Taurus," 403.

that included many Cilician Turkish militiamen under Captain Kozanoğlu Tufan attacked and took Kadirli along the Ceyhan River in mid-February. He then tried to push on to the cut the rail link between Adana and Syria by assaulting Misis and Ceyhan. However, instead of being allowed to pursue his promising offensive, Turfan was redirected away from Adana by his superior, Major Kemal Doğan (Kozanoğlu Doğan). On 3 February Doğan had led Turkish irregulars in an attack on Haçin (Saimbeyli), about 80 kilometers north of Maraş. Much of the town's population were repatriated Armenians who, like their commander Sarkis Djebedjian, expected to be massacred if they surrendered and so resisted stoutly. Kemal Doğan had to rely mainly on locally raised militias and he struggled to keep a large enough force around Haçin to sustain full siege. As a result, although the French left them to their own devices, Djebedjian's militia held out until 15 October 1920. Djebedjian's dogged defense of Haçin helped frustrate the Turkish advance of Adana. Faced with Djebedjian's successful defense, Doğan ordered Kozanoğlu Tufan to divide his forces and lead one force in person to Haçin to support the siege. The remaining troops were insufficient to overcome French defenses along Adana's rail line and the respite gave Dufieux time to strengthen Adana's defenses by fortifying a belt of villages along the Ceyhan.²¹

The failure of the Turkish advance to the east of Adana had repercussions for Emin Aslan's (Karakas) advance on Mersin. Located in western Cilicia, Mersin was critical to French forces because it was the best port in Cilicia and was well connected to the Cilician rail network and the interior of Asia Minor. On 11 February Mustafa Kemal ordered Emin Aslan to advance south, cut the transportation links out of Mersin, isolating Adana from its supply base, and attack Mersin. The French garrison proved too large to be directly assailed, so Emin Aslan focused on interdicting the railroad. If Kozanoğlu Tufan has been able to threaten Adana from the east, Dufieux would have had to divide his forces to deal with both threats, instead he was able to concentrate his attention on protecting the Mersin-Adana railroad.²²

The Turkish 11th Infantry Division was the backbone of the central force pushing toward Adana. It kicked off its campaign by attacking Pozanti, an advanced French position roughly 100 kilometers north of Adana that controlled the Gülek Pass (Cilician Gate) in the Taurus Mountains. The French garrison, one battalion of the metropolitan 412th Infantry Regiment under Major Mesnil, held a key strategic position. If the 11th Division pushed through the pass quickly, it could link up with Emin Aslan's forces by descending on the Adana-Mersin rail line from the north. The 11th Division could then have used Emin Aslan's force to guard its flank while it besieged Adana, especially if Turfan's forces had successfully cut the rail line from Adana to Syria. Instead French resistance proved unexpectedly stiff. After failing to push the French out of Pozanti, Colonel Mumtaz, the divisions' commander, began a siege and started expanding his force by raising local militia units.²³

²¹ Ibid., 382-8.

²² Karakas, Emin Aslan [Emin Resa], *İçel Kurtuluş Savaşı Hatıraları* (Mersin: Yeni Mersis Matbaası, 1942), 3-35.

²³ Pierre André [Pierre Radan] *La Cilicie et le Problème ottoman* (Paris: Gauthiers-Villars:

Djebedjian's resistance at Haçin and Mesnil's stand at Pozanti bought Dufieux time to reorganize his forces. He took advantage of it by ordering a series of retreats in February and March 1920 that consolidated his forces along a defensive line guarding Mersin, Adana and the approaches to Syria. Further east, Gourand ordered Lamothe to fan out into the area east of the Amanus mountains. His efforts to relieve Urfa failed, but his force was strong enough to bring a series of garrisons up to sufficient strength to resist Turkish attacks. Most importantly, Lemothe secured the understrength garrison of Antep, which was a critical transport and supply center as well as the dominant urban center in its area.²⁴

Mensil's defense of Pozanti allowed Dufieux to regain some initiative in Cilicia, but if it fell not only could the French garrison be killed, but Turkish troops would be able to mass against Adana. Alert to both dangers, Dufieux organized efforts to relieve Pozanti. The first relief column ran into a detachment of Mumtaz's force at Kavaklihan, in the Taurus mountains near Gülek, 25 kilometers from Pozanti. The Turks outnumbered the French and held strong defensive positions which the French, despite having artillery superiority, failed to carry during a sharp action from 11-12 April. After a second attempt to open the passes failed in May, Dufieux tried and failed to use an armored train to force open the rail line on 25 May. He then had an airplane drop a message to Mensil ordering him to attempt a breakout to save his men.²⁵

Mensil reacted immediately. On the night of 26 May he led his men through the surrounding Turkish forces and instead of heading due south through the Turkish-held valley, he marched into the mountains. Leaving his wounded and some of his equipment, Mensil's command tried to evade Turkish troops by moving 50 kilometers through mountain paths by the night of 27 May. A small Turkish force ambushed Mensil's dispersed column near Karboğazı after dark on 27 May. Unable to pinpoint their attackers who were hidden in around the narrow road, Mensil's exhausted troops lost cohesion and fearing a massacre, he surrendered, only to discover his men significantly outnumbered their captors.²⁶

The Summer Armistice

When no significant reinforcements arrived before summer, Dufieux abandoned Sis and several other positions in May and early June and negotiated a short armistice.²⁷ Some scholars argue that Mustafa Kemal was willing to make peace with the French in May 1920, but the French government was unwilling to break fully with Britain at the time. Regardless, the two states had good reasons to make a deal, whether short or long-term. The Turkish effort to take Adana, although still worrying to French officers, had clearly failed. French resistance

1921), 97-98; Brémond *Cilicie*, 46-51; Kévorkian, *La France chassée de l'Empire Ottoman*, 129-31.

²⁴ Normand, *Colonnes*, 86-94.

²⁵ André *Cilicie*, 97-98; Brémond, *Cilicie*, 46-51; *Türk İstiklal Harbi*, IV, 137-47.

²⁶ Kévorkian, *La France chassée de l'Empire Ottoman*, 130-1.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 126-8.

at Pozanti and the Armenian's stand at Haçin had prevented two of the three columns from deploying their full force against Adana and although sabotage was endemic on the Mersin-Adana railroad, neither city had been isolated. With clear signs the Greeks were massing in the west and growing conflicts with the Republic of Armenia in the east, Mustafa Kemal had no reinforcements to send to Cilicia. The French meanwhile remained over stretched as well. The Millerand cabinet was intent on securing Syria and could ill-afford to deploy significant reinforcements in both Cilicia and Syria. Robert de Caix led a French delegation to Ankara in May and although a lasting peace proved impossible, the two sides agreed to a truce in June 1920.

The truce favored the Turks but facilitated Dufieux's operational goals. De Caix agreed to the French withdrawing to a line running from Mersin to Adana and İslâhiye which kept the critical east-west rail line in French hands. It forced the French to abandon territory they held north of the line, though Dufieux had been slowly doing so before the truce. Painfully for the French, the truce required them to withdraw from Antep.²⁸ However, the truce allowed Dufieux to quickly and safely withdraw threatened garrisons to a more defensible line, allowing Gouraud to focus on the coming campaign against Faisal's Arab state in Syria. Mustafa Kemal was also able to disengage some forces and deploy them to help defend against the Greeks in the west and to strengthen Karabikîr's invasion of Armenia. The truce had limits though, and hopes that a broader peace agreement would follow soon evaporated.

During this period Mustafa Kemal organized Turkish forces into two overall commands. The Second Corps, commanded by Colonel Selahattin Bey, was headquartered in Maraş and was responsible for the eastern part of the front facing northern Syria. The Elcezir front which faced Adana was led by Nihat Pasha. During the armistice Mustafa Kemal handed over full control of the campaign to his subordinates in order to focus on a combination of politics and the Greek summer offensive which pushed Turkish forces back from Smyrna. Mustafa Kemal's turn away from Cilicia was a tacit admission that even if minor territorial gains remained possible, new operations in Cilicia were unlikely to substantially shift the regional balance of power in the Nationalists' favor.²⁹

At the same time Turkish forces had to shift westward to face the Greeks, Dufieux finally began receiving more help. In May, Paris authorized the transfer of General Fernand J.R.G. Goubeau's division from Constantinople to Syria. After arriving in Alexandretta, it became the 4th Division of the French Army of the Levant. Gouraud used the 4th Division to strengthen France's position in northern Syria and by the end of July, its men had occupied Aleppo and began a campaign to suppress northern Syrian rebels. Goubeau's push into Syria's interior formed part of Gouraud's larger offensive against King Faisal's Arab Kingdom of Syria. However, the strengthening of France's position in northern Syria also secured French forces in Cilicia's supply lines.³⁰

²⁸ Zeidner "The Tricolor Over the Taurus," 418-9.

²⁹ Zeidner "The Tricolor Over the Taurus," 361-2.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 394.

The Summer Campaign

When fighting resumed in late June 1920, after the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, Turkish attacks induced Dufieux to continue his retreat. French troops remained strong enough to defeat the Turks in open battle, but constant attacks on their supply lines left French commanders with too few men to garrison the region and keep the roads open. As a result, French garrisons were often cut off and although supply lines to threatened posts could be temporarily restored, it always came at the price of leaving other positions vulnerable. Without the assurance of reinforcements, standing his ground required Dufieux to run the risk of having units picked off, which would create a political crisis in France.

Dufieux's situation was, however, stronger than it appeared. In February and March his forces had faced a real crisis, but now he was trading space for time instead of reeling. His forces slowed the Turkish advance to a crawl, keeping them from providing meaningful aid to Faisal's Syrian forces while Gouraud's main force conquered Syria, France's principal objective in the Eastern Mediterranean. In July Gouraud struck along two axes. In the north, Goubeau's division moved against Aleppo and deployed to dominate northern Syria while providing some support to the eastern portion of the Cilician front. Gouraud led the main body of his forces directly against Damascus. The French victory on 24 July 1920 at Maysalun, along the modern Syria-Lebanon border, opened Damascus, which fell without further resistance on 25 July. Gouraud's success weakened the Turkish Nationalist's long-term strategic position in a war with France by eliminating Syria as a potential ally, but continued guerilla resistance meant that he could not immediately transfer many forces north.

While Gouraud began marshalling some forces to transfer to Cilicia, Dufieux gambled and launched a local counter-offensive against Antep. Turkish forces resisted stoutly and forced the French to begin a siege. In October, modest reinforcements allowed the Dufieux to mount a spoiling attack that broke up the main Turkish offensive and consolidated a strong defensive position in southern Cilicia, but this did not end sabotage attacks against railroads and bridges. The counter-attack's success reassured French generals that their position could be held over the long term and allowed them to contemplate a larger counter-offensive.³¹

In late-November 1920 Turkish forces attempted new attacks, against French forces. While one force struck north of Adana a second Turkish contingent attacked to the west, between Adana and Tarsus. The November attack was a doomed reenactment of the initially Turkish operational concept from February 1920. Neither attack made much progress and Dufieux's swift ripostes inflicted heavy losses of Turkish forces before they withdrew.³² In February 1921 Antep finally fell to French forces, further establishing Dufieux's defensive position. Much of western and northern Cilicia was in Turkish hands, but Adana, Alexandretta, and Antep were securely French and Turkish forces had little hope of dislodging them.³³

³¹ SHD DM 1 BB3 5, Telegram 25 Oct 1920.

³² SHD DM 1 BB3 32 No 388 Bulletin du 1 Jan 1921.

³³ SHD DM 1 BB3 32 Bulletin du 1 Mars 1921.

Peacemaking

French efforts to reach an understanding with Mustafa Kemal had begun early, though they were pursued disjointedly due to the French government's inability to focus on Cilicia. In February 1920, French officers and officials in Constantinople tried unsuccessfully to arrange a meeting with Mustafa Kemal. Later that month, even as the fighting was raging in Cilicia, General Louis Franchet-d'Espèrey ordered his troops along the Mudanya-Bursa railroad to pull back to Constantinople to avoid conflicts, even as he engaged in saber-rattling to try intimidate Mustafa Kemal into pulling back in Cilicia.³⁴

The stalemate in Cilicia left French military and political leaders in a difficult position, but Paris-based French intelligence officers increasingly suggested that Mustafa Kemal's regime was internally divided about how to deal with the overlapping wars it was fighting and its policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union. That encouraged a belief that France could make a deal with the Turks. After negotiations in early 1921 failed to produce an agreement, Aristide Briand's cabinet sent the conservative Radical Henry Franklin-Bouillon to Ankara in the summer of 1921 to reopen negotiations. The negotiations were fraught with danger for both sides, but Franklin-Bouillon prioritized getting Mustafa Kemal to agree to a definitive border with French Syria to permanently end the conflict.³⁵

Throughout 1921, French reports claimed Soviet representatives were pressuring Mustafa Kemal to adopt a closer political and ideological relationship with Bolshevik Russia. A January 1921 report claimed Soviet diplomats had urged the nationalist chief to issue a manifesto calling on Muslims to ally with the Bolsheviks and defending Bolshevism as compatible with Islam.³⁶ In May, French agents warned that Soviet influence was growing in Ankara in the wake of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Moscow.³⁷ In June 1921 reports claimed that Mustafa Kemal was being hard pressed by German and Russian advisers who wanted him to declare a jihad against the Entente.³⁸ In July, while peace talks continued and their result was uncertain, a naval intelligence report concluded the regime was badly split, with Mustafa Kemal and his loyalists favoring peace with France so they could focus on the Greeks, but that other factions hoped to use Russian aid to open new fronts against the Western powers.³⁹

On 12 August 1921, the *Armée du Levant's* Deuxième Bureau advised that the civilian population in Ankara was exhausted by the unending war and recent Greek offensive and would welcome peace with France and a shift against Bolshevism. French analysts also believed that Mustafa Kemal was nervous about the possibility of a conflict

³⁴ Zeidner "The Tricolor Over the Taurus," Note 90. "ATTB: docs. 177, 185"

³⁵ SHD DM 1 BB3 41. 1839-16 Bulletin Periodique No 36 du 20 Octobre au 5 Novembre 1921.

³⁶ SHD DM 1 BB7 238 2413 B-6 14, Le DELEGUE DES SOVIETS RUSSES A ANGORA., Jan 1921.

³⁷ SHD DM 1 BB3 41 Bulletin de Renseignements No 122 26 Mai 1921.

³⁸ SHD DM 1 BB3 41 Bulletin de Renseignements des questions musulmanes, 17 June 1921.

³⁹ SHD DM 1 BB3 41 Bulletin de Renseignements No 230 27 Juillet 1921.

with Russia because the Red Army still had 100,000 men near the Turkish border while he could only spare 10,000 men.⁴⁰ French officials in Ankara were also well aware of rumors circulating in the city that the Soviets were preparing a coup to replace Mustafa Kemal with Enver Pasha. Such rumors were fanciful, but they encouraged the French to make peace with Mustafa Kemal and to strengthen him least they face a return of the pro-German Enver Pasha with Soviet forces at his back.⁴¹

French reports were often inaccurate, but they were not always wrong. Mustafa Kemal and his government had good reasons to negotiate with France. Just as the French were overstretched, so too were the Nationalists. The Greek threat in the west combined with France's successes in Syria meant that if the war continued in Cilicia, it was France, not Turkey, that would likely be getting stronger. 1920 had been the Nationalists' best opportunity to win an operational victory in Cilicia, and despite making impressive gains, they had failed to land a decisive blow. The French held the most important cities in Cilicia, maintained their supply lines, and kept the Nationalists from taking Aleppo or holding Antep, which would have extended the war into northern Syria and allowed the Turkish Nationalists to cooperate with Faisal's forces. As a result, Mustafa Kemal too faced a strategic problem in Cilicia. Like French leaders, he solved it by prioritizing fronts and making limited concessions. Cilicia remained more important to Mustafa Kemal's government than it did to the French cabinet, which made the French more likely to give way in negotiations, but the Turks were in no position to demand everything they claimed.

As Franklin-Bouillon was finalizing negotiations with Mustafa Kemal, a faction of French officers tried to derail the agreement by pushing the government to confront the Nationalists. In October 1921, the African section of the Army General Staff argued that German operatives were working to "coordinate the double Bolshevik Turkish plan" and that German resources and personnel were aiding the anti-French movements in North Africa as well as Turkey. The report's anonymous authors claimed that "the programs of action of the Bolsheviks, Turks, and Germans, have remained in accord in order to try in common to raise the Muslim world against the Entente Powers." Although admitting that their enemies had "not until this day achieved any success" the report claimed that German efforts were making clear progress all over the Middle East, especially in Tripolitania and Spanish Morocco.⁴² The report implicitly warned that making peace with Mustafa Kemal would leave him with more resources to use against the French elsewhere.

Despite such warnings, the Briand government approved the signing of a peace agreement between France and the Ankara government later that same month. Franklin-Bouillon offered Mustafa Kemal major concessions to end the conflict and safeguard French Syria. Conciliating Mustafa Kemal meant accepting the dissolution of the Ottoman Imperial government in favor of his regime and surrendering most

⁴⁰ SHD DM 1 BB3 41 Bulletin de Reinseignements, 12 August 1921.

⁴¹ SHD DM 1 BB3 41 Bulletin de Renseignements des questions musulmanes, 19 August 1921.

⁴² SHD DM 1 BB3 41 No 3607 9/11 18 Oct 1921 "Bulletin des Renseignements des Questions Musulmanes."

of Cilicia in-exchange for Turkey accepting France's Syrian mandate.⁴³ As part of the agreement, Mustafa Kemal accepted that Aleppo and the disputed *sanjak* of Alexandretta would be part of Mandatory Syria, this was the most difficult point of contention in the negotiations.⁴⁴ Those concessions were politically painful to Mustafa Kemal because they involved him sacrificing lands claimed under the National Pact, which was fundamental to his regime's legitimacy and war aims. His willingness to make such concessions demonstrated his recognition that he had not won an operational victory.⁴⁵ Conversely, French willingness to abandon territories they held, including Ateş, showed the cabinet's realization that the French Army was overstretched and the civilian population wanted peace. The combination made it unlikely that they could mass enough military force to win an operational victory. Although the 20 October 1921 Treaty of Ankara represented a compromise peace, it favored the Turks because the French surrendered territory they held in-exchange for Turkey accepting French occupation of another territory the French also already controlled. It also forced France to break Entente solidarity by making a separate peace with Turkey.⁴⁶

Abandoning Cilicia greatly simplified France's strategic situation in the Middle East. It allowed French forces to concentrate on the pacification of Syria and it turned Turkey from a likely enemy on Syria's northern border to, at least, a neutral power. It also represented a victory for the Foreign Ministry over opponents of negotiations and for Paris-based intelligence officers who saw Mustafa Kemal as a secular nationalist and realist over Syrian and North African-based staff officers who consistently saw Mustafa Kemal as a threat to other French colonies. Ending the war with a negotiated settlement served both governments' interests by allowing them to concentrate their forces on high-stakes conflicts.

⁴³ SHD DM 1 BB3 41. 1839-16 Bulletin Periodique No 36 du 20 Octobre au 5 Novembre 1921.

⁴⁴ Now known as Hatay Province, this territory was ruled as part of the Mandate of Syria until 1938 when it became the Republic of Hatay. In 1939 a Franco-Turkish Treaty accepted Turkish annexation of Hatay.

⁴⁵ SHD DM 1 BB3 44. 630-9/11 Bulletin des Renseignements des Questions Musulmans" 20 Feb 1923; 1 BB3 44 8210-9/11 Bulletin des Renseignements des Questions Musulmans" 5 Mars 1923.

⁴⁶ SHD DM 1 BB3 44. 630-9/11 Bulletin des Renseignements des Questions Musulmans" 20 Feb 1923; 1 BB3 44 8210-9/11 Bulletin des Renseignements des Questions Musulmans" 5 Mars 1923.

BRITISH, FRENCH AND ITALIANS, WARY ALLIES

Dr. Giacomo Innocenti (Italy)

The First World War started in 1914 and the conflict saw the coalition of Great Britain, France, Russia and Serbia – the so-called Entente – fighting against Austria-Hungary and Germany, the so-called Central Powers. In the following years more States joined the conflict: the Ottoman Empire chose the Central Powers (1915), so did Bulgaria (1915). On the other side, Japan (1914) and later Romania (1916) joined the Entente (and a number of other minor Powers). Italy was one of the Powers that chose the Entente, in 1915.

The Italian choice was made after a long period of negotiation between the Italian Government and the Entente and the Central Powers. It is well known that Italy was part of the Triple Alliance (1882) and this theoretically implied that at the beginning of the war Italy had to fight alongside Austria-Hungary and Germany.

In reality Italy had added a ministerial declaration to the Triple Alliance's treaty (in 1882). In this declaration Italy said that all the clauses envisaged by the treaty would not have applied against Great Britain. As a matter of fact, Italy did not join the fight from the beginning for three reasons: the strategic dependence from the import by sea, mostly controlled by Great Britain, which controlled Gibraltar, Malta and Suez Canal; the difficulty of protecting the extremely long coasts from an attack led by the Royal Navy and the Royal Italian Army's lack of preparation.

During the first year of war Italian Government was in contact with the Entente and the Central Empires, checking which side could give Italy the best options.

Germany and Austria-Hungary offered to Italy some borders compensations, Trento and a review of the status of the city of Trieste, but these conditions were not enough for Italian ambitions. Italy wanted the control over Trento, Trieste and the leadership on the Adriatic.

After a long period of negotiations, during which the army was mobilized and equipped, Italy chose the Entente, because Great Britain and France guaranteed Italy the possession of the cities of Trento and Trieste with their regions, part of Dalmatia, Valona in Albania, eventually some territories in the Ottoman Empire and some colonial compensation if France and Great Britain gained territories from the German colonial empire. All these concessions were formalized in the London Pact (1915).



After the signature of the London Pact, Italy declared war against its former allies. It was the 24 May 1915. Actually, Italy in the first place declared war only against Austria-Hungary. It was only in August 1916 that Italy declared war to Germany. This fact shows that for Italy the only real enemy was Austria-Hungary, and that partially explains why there were so many frictions and differences between Italy, Great Britain and France during the war. The Italian strategic objectives were very different from those of the British and French and that determined the mutual mistrust inside the Entente, situation that badly affected the negotiations between allies at the end of the war.

It is well known that war in the Alps was extremely difficult for both sides. Italians and Austro-Hungarians fought at one of the hardest fronts and from the 1915 to the 1917 there were twelve major battles: eleven Italian offensives (so called Cadorna's "Spallate") and one led by Austria-Hungary (the Battle of Asiago but is better known as Strafexpedition).

At the end of the 1917 Austria-Hungary had almost completely exhausted its resources. The Austrian-Hungarian General Staff was aware that the Imperial Royal Army would not have been able to support another Italian offensive, so Wien asked Germany for help. Germany sent an entire Army (the 14th Army led by Otto von Below) to support a new Austro-Hungarian offensive and there was the Battle of Caporetto, the "Black Day" for the Italian Army.

24th October 1917 the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians made a joint offensive that hit hard the Italian defensive system, causing the dissolution of the entire 2nd Army and a general withdrawal of the Italian Army, which apparently was no longer in a position to resist Central Empires.

This moment was extremely important for the situation that occurred after the war. Considering the possibility that the Italian Government asked a truce to Germany and Austro-Hungary, France and Great Britain took the decision to send an important number of divisions to help the Italian resistance.

From that moment on, the presence of the Allies in northern Italy partially determined the Italian war and it surely was crucial in the post war contest. During the discussions between the Entente Governments, British and French made clear their intention to take over the control of the strategy over the conflict against Austria-Hungary.

The Italians tried to oppose this politic, but they had to recognize that their financial and material dependence on France and especially on Great Britain, leave them poor choices but let their Allies to obtain several changes on the Italian front.

Even so, Italians managed to maintain their strategic independence, but anyway the presence of the Anglo-French units was a constant reminder of the Italian defeat of Caporetto and was a reminder of the allies' influence over the Italians' ambitions.

As a matter of fact, during the battle that stopped the German Austro-Hungarian offensive, the so called first battle of the Piave, the Allies did not join the fight, and immediately after the conclusion of the defensive battle they began to recall their divisions in France. During the first battle of the Piave there were eleven Anglo French divisions, six of them French, the others British.

Immediately after the battle the major part of these divisions went back to France leaving only five Allies divisions, three of those were British, the remaining two French.

These divisions fought in different battles on the Italian sector. In particular they fought in the second battle of the Piave (the so-called Battle of Solstizio) and in the Battle of Vittorio Veneto.

Their participation in this last battle was extremely important, not just on a military point of view, but more important for the aftermath of the war on the Italian front. In fact, before the battle were established two new armies, one was the Twelfth French Army and the other was the Tenth British Army. Has to be said: these Armies were not British and French, even if they were called British and French, actually they were mixed units. In the French Army there was a French division with three Italian divisions, in the British Army there were two British divisions with two Italian divisions.

Anyway, these Armies were quite important during the battle of Vittorio Veneto. The British in particular had a relevant role in crossing the river Piave, and they were the leading units of part of the general offensive. When the armistice between Italy and Austria-Hungary was signed, the British divisions had overtaken the city of Sacile, and they were the most advanced Entente units in the Venetian-Friulan Plain.

All these facts are quite important in order to comprehend the allies' behaviour immediately after the end of the war.

When the battle was over, immediately the British and French began to speak about an Entente victory over the Habsburg or an Anglo-French victory. Not in all cases, but on many occasions the Anglo-French newspapers tried to underline the Entente effort on the Italian sector, trying to hide the prominent role played by Italians. This attitude worried the Italian Government, which had clear in mind what would have happened if this idea had become established.

Italian embassies in the main European capitals send reports about the diffusion of articles that tried to diminish the Italian military effort. The aim of this policy was clear: to ensure that the Italian military role was perceived as irrelevant. In this way Paris and London would be able to reject or at least reduce Italian requests.

The actual British and French presence in Italy create a particular situation: when the Italian Army began to occupy Austro-Hungarian territories, the Anglo-British divisions cooperated in these operations. With an order: make clear that the occupation was not just an Italian occupation, but an Entente occupation.

That was really clear in Dalmatia. During all the First World War, in the Adriatic Sea there was a constant contrast between the Italians and the Allies, in particular with the French. This friction was caused by the French desire to control all the operations in the sector. This request was presented by France because of the previous pact made with Great Britain: in case of war, the operation in the North Sea and in the Atlantic Ocean would be led by the Royal Navy, in the Mediterranean Sea would be the French Fleet in charge of the operations.

So that was the tool used by the French to try to control the operation in the Adriatic, where on the other side the Italian Fleet pretend to lead all the operation against the Austro-Hungarian Fleet.

This contrast happened because the French did not want that Italy gained the control over the Balkan region, even though they were signatories to the London Pact, which guaranteed to Italy the possession of Dalmatia. This French aim became clear in the last period of existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: while Italian Government supported the national independence movements, hoping that they could make the Empire's collapse by the inside, France supported the Serbs, who were of course enemy of Austria-Hungary, but at the same time they were adversary of the Italian ambition over the Balkan area. In all the period after the war France supported the Serbs instead of the Italians.

One of the most important reasons of contrast between Italians and French was the fate of the Austro-Hungarian fleet. As it was said, when the war was over the French immediately supported the new State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. Before the end of the war the last Habsburg emperor Charles, gave the Austro-Hungarian fleet to the new Balkan state.

The Italians hoped to add the Austrian fleet to their units, but the act of the Emperor created a new and unexpected situation. The Italians protested for that action, but the French and the British did not help Italy in this case, and they let that the Austro-Hungarian fleet became Yugoslav. Before and after this episode, Italian navy officers complained about an overly friendly attitude of the French towards the Yugoslavs, clearly showing that they would support the interest of the new state, not the Italians' war aim.

The French objective was to be sure that the Italian fleet was not the strongest actor in the Adriatic Sea, and therefore the power which could control the Balkan area. Considering all these situations it is not a surprise that the Italian occupation of Dalmatia was not supported by the French. As a matter of fact, there were different cases in which the French directly helped the Yugoslavs.

Meanwhile, what was the attitude of the British towards Italy? During the war the attitude of the British towards the Italians was surely less conflictual than the French. This was clear when the participation of the Allies in Italy after the Battle of Caporetto occurred.

During the period between the First battle of the Piave and the Battle of Vittorio Veneto, the British, although they did not really appreciate Italians, maintained a good relationship with the Italian Army.

In light of this good relationship between the two parties the Italians believed that the British would support their claims over Dalmatia and the other territories claimed by Italy.

The reality was quite different. As has been described, the Allies pretended show that the new occupations were Entente actions, not just Italian. So, the first act that the British did after the armistice with Austria-Hungary was sending troops in the Trentino region, with one clear task, "to emphasise the Allied character of the occupation", as much as happened in Albania, where were deployed British and French units.

Another problem occurred: when the French started to help Yugoslavs, Italy hoped to be supported by Great Britain, why? Because the British did not have a direct interest over the Balkan area. What the Italian Government did not understand

was that the British surely were not interested in the area, but if they had to choose between a good relationship with the Italians or the French, they would have chosen the latter.

And there was another important actor in that dispute: the President of the United States of America, Woodrow Wilson. The United States entered the war only in 1917, but they were decisive for the outcome of the conflict. Using this superiority, Wilson proposed his famous 14 points for the peace. The fourteenth point spoke explicitly of Italy, saying: "A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality". And so did the tenth point: "The people of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development". As a matter of fact, Italy had no ally willing to favour its Adriatic ambitions, and British and French used Wilson's points to contain Italian ambitions.

As a matter of fact, every time there were contrasts British decided to support France's positions, in the way to maintain a good relationship with the stronger ally. So, at the Paris peace conference the territories, that previously were assigned to Italy, were given to the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

The case that better explain this contrast was the case of the city of Fiume. That was a really particular occasion: Fiume was not part of the London Pact. The Italians thought that the city could remain to the Habsburg Empire, because they thought that at the end of the war the Empire would still exist. Having all Dalmatia and controlling Albania was enough to rule over the Adriatic Sea.

But the birth of a new Yugoslav state and the high density of Italian speakers in Fiume made the Italian Government and people want that city. The reaction of both the Allies was negative and in particular the French opposed sending troops. The Italian military governor of the city, general Francesco Saverio Grazioli, was formally the commander of all the Entente troops in the area, but actually the allies, especially the French acted independently, supporting or at least not stopping the Yugoslavs' anti-Italian manifestations, with the consequence of clashes between Italians and Slavs.

Not only but also, they usually helped the Yugoslav component of the city, and at the very end they tried to stop the Italian administration, frustrating Grazioli who did not receive precise orders from Rome, where the Italian Government was afraid of a reaction from the British and the French.

During the Peace conference the city was occupied by D'Annunzio and other Italian nationalists. The consequences were fights between Italians and Yugoslavs. The resolution was the creation of an independent state of the city of Fiume, which was created after the city's liberation made by the Italian Army. The creation of this new state was not the end of the contrasts inside the city. These ended partially after the Rome treaty 1924, that divided the territory of Fiume between Italy and Yugoslavia.

To sum up, Italy believed that joining the Entente enabled them to control of the Adriatic Sea, but the London Pact was not sufficient to guarantee this situation. The truth was that the Allies needed Italy just to fight the Central Powers but at the end of the war they did not want that Italy gained this condition.

To protect their strategic interests they, the French in particular, interfered in the establishment of an Italian administration, fomenting local anti-Italian riots and they opposed to the manoeuvres that Italy made to control the area. Instead they supported the Slavic entity and the new Yugoslav state in order to be sure that the Adriatic Sea was not under the control of only one power and that the Yugoslav state was strong enough to oppose an Italian leadership over the Balkans.

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“ARABS, AEROPLANES, AND ARMoured CARS:” IMPERIAL POLICING AND BRITAIN’S INTERWAR CRISIS OF EMPIRE

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Despite Great Britain’s unsurpassed global power in the aftermath of World War I, the British Empire of the early 1920’s was held together by a shoestring. As the late Keith Jeffery noted, the early interwar years saw Britain possessing a ‘military’ empire for really the first time in its history. Despite the vast conquests that had followed past British victories on battlefields as far flung as Quebec and Plassey, the Empire had never rested on military coercion to the degree it did in the years immediately following the First World War.

Britain’s new League of Nations mandate of Iraq was the most troublesome new possession. In the summer of 1920, a great revolt began, largely among the Shia tribes of the Euphrates River. The Iraq Revolt was suppressed by October, but at the cost of £40 million and about 1,000 British and Indian Army casualties. Britain, facing other revolts, wars, and unrest in Ireland, India, and Palestine, simply could not afford further expenses on this scale. The eventual solution was a triumvirate of instruments: local militias, air control, and small motorized British detachments. With “Arabs, aeroplanes, and armoured cars,” Britain cheaply and effectively maintained security in Iraq until Iraqi independence in 1932, and provided a model for imperial policing in other colonies.

Air Control

The new doctrine of air control was the result of both Winston Churchill’s political ambitions and the determination of Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard to preserve the independence of his fledgling Royal Air Force. First put to use in colonial warfare in 1916, during the suppression of an uprising in Sudan’s Darfur region, the military airplane was a new and strange weapon to the tribesmen and superstitious natives found in many corners of the British Empire, and its effect on morale was often equal to the claims of its most fervent advocates. In the 1920 campaign against Somaliland’s ‘Mad Mullah’, Mohammed Abdille Hassan, two infantry battalions and a squadron of just eight bombers took a mere twenty-nine days to win a campaign which Sir Henry Wilson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had predicted would take two divisions two years to finish. It had cost just £150,000 to end the threat of one of Britain’s most determined colonial irritants.¹

The Mesopotamian garrison in 1919 stood at 25,000 British and 80,000 Indian troops. Even after initial cuts, this force was costing Britain £18 million a year.² Despite the promise of Iraqi oil reserves, and British embarrassment at having to rely upon America and Mexico for the Empire’s oil needs, withdrawal from Iraq

¹ Clayton, *The British Empire as a Superpower*, p. 80; David Killingray, “‘A Swift Agent of Government’: Air Power in British Colonial Africa, 1916-1939”, *Journal of African History*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1984, pp. 434-435

² Group Captain Peter W. Gray, ‘The Myths of Air Control and the Realities of Imperial Policing’, *Aerospace Power Journal*, Fall 2001, p. 4

was looking increasingly attractive before the implementation of air control. Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill gained Cabinet approval for the use of an air control strategy in Mesopotamia on 18 August 1921. After turning over defense of the country to the RAF in October 1922, British expenditure in the region dropped from a figure of £20 million in fiscal year 1921-2 to £3.4 million three years later, and less than half of that figure by 1927-8.³ The last British infantry battalion left the country in 1928.⁴

An *Army Quarterly* contributor would note of Iraq in 1924, 'It is probably safe to say that no country could be better suited to the operations of aircraft.'⁵ Iraq had mountains in its Kurdish north and marshes in the south, but the majority of the country was flat plains and desert, wide open for RAF bombing. Air control functioned through coercion: tribes which continually misbehaved were subject to an escalating level of violence, which could be maintained virtually around the clock. RAF officers stressed that bloodshed was not the primary means of bringing recalcitrants to heel: air control's 'object is not to inflict severe casualties but in the words of the R.A.F. war manual to "interrupt the normal life of the enemy people to such an extent that a continuance of hostilities becomes intolerable.'"⁶

This 'air blockade' often began with two days of heavy bombardment, followed by persistent round the clock raids to make it impossible for tribesmen to visit their homes, fields, and water supply. When air control worked, it was not due to Douhetist theories of breaking the will of the enemy's civilians, but rather through a constant destruction of tactical targets that persuaded rebellious leaders that their resistance was not worth the price.

As useful as air blockading and immediate punitive action from the sky could be, there was still a need for a small ground force to work hand-in-hand with the RAF's planes, to do everything from bomb damage surveys to fighting with tribesmen unreachable by air power.⁷ As the Air Staff's papers repeatedly stressed, 'Air control does not mean the complete elimination of land forces; there are many important functions which can only effectively be discharged by the armed man on the ground.'⁸ While ringleaders and true troublemakers would have be killed or (preferably) arrested, their followers were to be regarded, paternalistically, as wayward children. And arrests obviously could not be made from 5,000 feet. Air control needed a ground force.

Armored Cars

Horse cavalry could immediately be eliminated as a viable solution, despite the argument by some historians that it had proven its usefulness anew during the Revolt.⁹

³ David Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force 1919-1939* (Manchester, 1990), p. 35; Bond, *British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars*, p. 16

⁴ NA AIR 75/27 – Air control staff papers 1929-1938

⁵ Wilkinson, 'Notes on the Military Geography of Iraq', p. 338

⁶ NA AIR 75/27– Air control staff papers 1929-1938

⁷ For an example of the former, see RAFM AC73/19/49 – Report on recently bombed villages by Flight Lieutenant Bowen

⁸ NA AIR 75/27– Air control staff papers 1929-1938

⁹ See for example Jacobsen, "'Only by the Sword": British Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 1920', p. 359

Though cavalry could be employed in Kurdistan and central Iraq, the primary threat to Iraq was across the southern desert. Here horses were not suitable due to the lack of available water. This had been apparent during the Great War, when at the 3rd Battle of Gaza British and imperial cavalry had been almost immobilized by thirst.¹⁰

The camel, able to travel about 250 miles comfortably between drinks during an Arabian summer, was a possibility, and was used in some native units.¹¹ But using camel-borne irregulars was a case of playing the enemy at his own game: British camel corps soldiers would be facing desert raiders on a virtually equal tactical footing, and usually at a numerical disadvantage. The Arabs quickly conceded the superiority of the internal combustion engine; as one armored car officer wrote in 1929, 'It is also interesting to see that the natural inhabitants of these area see the affinity between their type of country and the petrol engine as Ibn Saud has obtained his recent successes by discarding the camel for his soldiers and placing them in motor-cars.'¹²

Operating in the vanguard of General Allenby's Egyptian Expeditionary Force during the First World War, armored cars supported the celebrated cavalry of the campaign and then overtook them, being the first British troops into Damascus. Farther south, in Arabia, a few Rolls-Royce armored cars were a valuable adjunct to T.E. Lawrence's Arab rebellion.¹³ Lawrence himself would write that 'a Rolls in the desert was above rubies'.¹⁴ After the war, in a letter to General Wavell, he asserted that if the Turks had mounted machine-guns on their touring cars and patrolled the desert, they would have crushed the Arab rebellion immediately; 'It wouldn't have cost them twenty men or £20,000...'.¹⁵

Mesopotamia was generally favorable terrain for armored cars. General Aylmer Haldane told Winston Churchill that, 'Mesopotamia is a vast plain devoid of features except the two main rivers and the old banks of disused and other canals, which afford strong positions for the Arabs....apart from the palm gardens and the bigger canals, the country is, or can easily be made, passable for all arms.' For shorter canals, armored cars could use the eight-foot long ditching boards that were fixed underneath their running boards for bridging. By 1930, a portable bridge twice as long had been devised.¹⁶

Motorcycles, of which two were provided to each two-car section, were especially useful. If handled by skillful riders, they could scout ahead and find alternative routes when mud and flash floods closed off some areas.

¹⁰ TM Major General George Lindsay Papers, Box 3, Training: Long Range Desert Exercises + Recce, 1930-32

¹¹ Lawrence, 'The Evolution of a Revolt', p. 65

¹² TM Major General George Lindsay Papers, Box 2, T42 – Policy as regards organization for War. (Likely Theatres of War discussed), Dated 11.7.29

¹³ For the definitive firsthand account of this subject, see the recent reprint by Leona Press of S.C. Rolls, *Steel Chariots In The Desert*.

¹⁴ Quoted in Peter Pugh, *The Magic of a Name: The Rolls-Royce Story: The First 40 Years* (London, 2000), p. 91

¹⁵ Quoted in Lacqueur, *Guerrilla*, p. 170

¹⁶ NA SUPP 17/6 – Rolls-Royce armoured car portable bridge 1930

‘Fi Kull Makan’

The Army’s armored car group in Iraq handed over its machines to the RAF upon the transfer of control of Iraq in October 1922. RAF armored car units sometimes covered 20,000 miles a year on desert patrols. Thus their Arabic motto: ‘Fi Kull Makan’ – ‘in every place’.¹⁷ George Lindsay wrote that off-road but in good terrain, armored cars in Iraq could be expected to manage about 125 miles a day at 16 miles per hour.¹⁸ On roads, these numbers could more than double.

Armored cars in the Middle East were very rarely used in greater numbers than the four-car section. The RAF was more willing to acknowledge these realities than the Army, and in April 1927 broke up its Iraq armored car companies and attached sections of four Rolls-Royce armored cars and their accompanying motor transport to RAF squadrons.¹⁹

In open desert against Arab opponents armored cars could be very effective. The clearest example of this was a battle near Amman in 1924, which merited just a few sentences in *The Times* a few days later.²⁰ Three Rolls-Royce armored cars, assisted by three airplanes, intercepted, decimated and dispersed a large mounted force of Wahhabi raiders, saving the Hashemite regime of Transjordan from extinction in the process. The cars engaged the raiders as the aircraft bombed them, and pursued the fleeing raiders for two hours, only turning back when they ran out of ammunition. Basil Liddell Hart later crowed in the *Daily Telegraph*, ‘Eighteen “mechanicalised” men put to flight 5,000, and inflicted 500 casualties for a cost of two men slightly wounded.’²¹

“Arabs”

Armored cars, for all of their virtues, could not do everything. There were and are some tasks that only infantry can accomplish. For these the British turned to a locally recruited force – who weren’t actually Arabs.

The Iraq Levies were initially a small mounted colonial police force of Arabs and Kurds, formed by the Indian Army’s Major John Inglis Eadie in 1915.²² But the force’s composition was soon to change.

The Assyrian Christians of the Ottoman Empire, courted by both the Turks and

¹⁷ RAFM AC97/140/1 – Typescript of Squadron Leader George Elliott Godsave’s edited manuscript entitled “Fi Kull Makan – In Every Place”, being a personal account of some of the activities of the armoured cars of the RAF in Iraq and adjacent parts of the Middle East between 1925 and 1930, 1969, p. 23

¹⁸ TM Major General George Lindsay Papers, Armoured Cars, Box 1, AC7 – Copy of report on Armoured Cars in Iraq, which shows ideas on a Mechanical Force for that country

¹⁹ Bruce Robertson, *Wheels of the RAF: Vehicles of the Flying Services Through Two World Wars* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 42-3

²⁰ ‘The Amman Raid’, *The Times*, 19 August 1924, p. 9

²¹ Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, ‘Accurate Shooting by Moving Tanks’, *Daily Telegraph*, 17 March 1926

²² Sopanit Angsusingha, “Aliens in Uniforms and Contested Nationalisms: The Role of the Iraq Levies in Shaping Aspects of Iraqi Nationalism Under the British Mandate of Iraq (1921-1933),” (Unpublished thesis, Georgetown University, 2018), p. 70

the Russians in 1914 and 1915, found themselves fighting a brutal war of national survival during World War I. Forced to flee from their ancestral homes of Urmia and Hakkari in modern Turkey, the Assyrians were settled in north-eastern Iraq after the war. The British, impressed with the Assyrians' loyalty and martial abilities and cognizant of the benefits of staffing security services from a tiny minority, turned the Levies into a brigade-sized Assyrian unit after the Iraq Revolt. An Iraqi Army was later stood up, but the Levies were the RAF's force of choice. Assyrian recruits were initially paid twice the salary of an Iraqi private.²³

The Assyrians were especially esteemed for their skill in mountain warfare. This filled a crucial gap in the Mandate's security architecture: both aircraft and armored cars were least effective in the mountains. The Levies were crucial to suppressing a Kurdish revolt in the summer of 1924.

The Assyrian story in Iraq did not have a happy ending. The Assyrians held themselves apart, as mountain men are wont to do: they refused to acquire Iraqi citizenship and learned only minimal Arabic. Perceived as Quislings and British pawns, the Assyrians were regarded with increasing suspicion as Iraqi nationalism gathered force. As one Arab historian put it:

"The swaggering Assyrian levies with their slouch hats and red or white hackles, who stood guard at the Homes of the High Commissioner...became the symbol of British domination."²⁴

Assyrian attempts to gain some measure of independence from the Iraqi government led to the premeditated massacre of nearly 700 Assyrians in 1933. Today, the Assyrians are rebuilding again. Driven from their lands around the Nineveh Plains near Mosul by ISIS in 2014, they are now returning and reclaiming their lands.

I will close by noting that one can see echoes of Britain's imperial policing approach in the Greater Middle East today. Local proxies and allies, from Kurdish peshmerga to the CIA's Afghan militias, have taken on the bulk of the load in the United States' war on Islamic terrorism. Drones and strike aircraft provide a measure of air control, albeit not through deliberate collective punishment. Armor, though, finds itself in a far less permissive environment. The improvised explosive device has spawned a whole new generation of heavily armored wheeled vehicles, the MRAP, and has both restricted and inflated the role of armor in low intensity conflict. The effectiveness of "Arabs, aeroplanes, and armoured cars" for American imperial policing remains an open question.

²³ Angsusingha, p. 101

²⁴ Khaldun Husry, "The Assyrian Affair of 1933, part I," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5 (1974), p. 100

TURKEY IN THE YEARS FOLLOWING THE FIRST WORLD WAR: FROM OCCUPATIONS TO INDEPENDENCE, FROM MOUDHROS TO LAUSANNE

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Introduction

Paris Peace Conference convened in January 1919 with the aim of establishing new world order and determining the provisions of the peace in the aftermath of the First World War. The victorious states had the say. The world, especially the defeated, was at all ears to Paris. The Ententes' perception of Turkey had already been set much earlier than the Paris Peace Conference commenced. The places that were left to the Ottoman State at the Treaty of Mouúdhros were occupied under various pretexts within months following the signing of the treaty.

Unlike the Ottoman government at İstanbul, Turks strictly objecting the occupations rallied under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The National Assembly and the government declared in Ankara led the fight for the independence of the country by freeing of the country from the yoke of occupations. First, Eastern Anatolia then Southeastern Anatolia and finally the Western Anatolia was cleansed from occupations. Lausanne Conference held for determining of the stipulations of peace commenced in November 1922 and lasted eight months. Lausanne Peace Treaty is distinctively different from other treaties both in terms of its preliminary procedures and content. Furthermore, it is evaluated as the first intrusion to the establishment of the new world order that was agreed upon at the Paris Peace Conference.

My article is primarily based on the documents found in the Turkish National War of Independence Collection at the Turkish General Staff Military History and Strategic Studies Department Archives and on the relevant material. The article covers political, military, and diplomatic aspects of the Turkish National Movement, initiated in Anatolia that was being occupied, leading to the founding of the Republic of Turkey.

1) Mouúdhros Armistice and Application

Ottoman State that entered the First World War with great expectations was compelled to accept defeat as of October 1918. Bulgaria's signing of a ceasefire agreement and withdrawing from the war towards the end of September cut all the ties between the Ottoman State and its allies. The British approached the peace proposal made via the intermediary of the British General Townshend, who was held captive in Büyükkada in a positive manner. The twenty-five article Mouúdhros Ceasefire Agreement signed between Admiral Calthorpe – the Commander of the British Fleet in the Mediterranean – and Rauf Bey – the Minister of the Navy – on 30 October 1918, immediately took effect as of next day.¹

¹ For further information on the discussions held in İstanbul concerning the ceasefire, directives given by İstanbul, British proposals, and on the final treaty please see, **Türk İstiklal Harbi, Mondros Mütarekesi ve Tatbikatı, I**, (MMT-I hereinafter), Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Ankara, 1992, pp. 29-49; Rauf Orbay, **Cehennem Değirmi: Siyasi Hatıralarım**, Vol: I, Emre Yayınları,

The Ceasefire Agreement opened the Turkish Straits to Entente fleet; enabled the Entente forces to occupy the fortifications on the Straits; demanded the return of the Entente POWs, surrender of the Ottoman fleet, and the dismissal of the Ottoman Armies. Moreover, the Agreement included terms on Entente forces' making use of Ottoman ports and railways, on supervising of telegraph messages, on employing of the dismissed forces, their arms and ammunitions, in line with the orders they were to give; and in case of any disorder during the occupations of the Taurus Tunnels, as well as of Batumi, and Baku the cities in Eastern Anatolia – Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Erzurum, Sivas, and Harput. The seventh article stipulated that “The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of a situation arising which threatens the security of the Ententes.” With this article Ententes held the right to occupy any region they wanted.

The agreement was very different from the classical notion of ceasefire agreement. In other words, it did not rely on the idea that the belligerents were to keep their positions existing at the time of ceasing of fire. Moreover, the positive attitude Admiral Calthorpe displayed during the ceasefire talks created a sense of hopefulness in the Ottoman delegation. Claiming that he had no authority, he did not allow any changes in the articles put down by the Ententes, he only accepted minor changes. What is more, he gave the impression that he would work to meet the expectations of the Ottoman Government in executing the agreement without any binding term for his government and the Ententes. He convinced the Ottoman delegation claiming that the British government was of the same conviction. In the letter, he gave to Rauf Bey on condition that the content would only be shared with the Sultan and the Grand-Vizier, he wrote that only the British and the French troops would be used in the occupation of the fortifications in the Straits, that he had advised his government that small Turkish forces might take place in the fortifications, that no Greek ship would be allowed to sail to İstanbul and İzmir, and that İstanbul would not be occupied unless it was necessary.²

The attitude exhibited and the words spent that had no binding characteristics at all created a sense of optimism in the Ottoman delegation: Should the Ottoman delegation and the government yielded in signing the agreement they would not have the chance of making small changes to their benefit. The forces to march from Thrace would occupy İstanbul within a week. This would eventually lead to the loss of sovereignty. Ways of saving the unoccupied regions of the motherland were to be sought. However, the sincerity they saw in the English might have been a hope for the future. Thinking thus, they accepted the ceasefire agreement. Rauf Bey declared that he regarded the ceasefire agreement not as an agreement between a victor and a defeated but as a document that two equal powers' of willingness in ending the enmity. He, moreover, added his conviction on the British's desire to help the Ottomans State live.

İstanbul, 1993, pp. 89-147. Ali Türkgeldi, **Mondros ve Mudanya Mütarekelerinin Tarihi**, Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü, Ankara, 1948, pp. 23-73.

² For full text of the letter please see, Turkish General Staff Military History and Strategic Studies Department Archives (hereafter ATASE); Collection: Turkish War of Independence (ISH), Box: 468, Sleeve: 8, Document: 8; **MMT-I**, p. 293.

Grand Vizier Ahmet İzzet Pasha sending a telegraph message to Admiral Calthorpe thanked for the hospitality he had shown to the Ottoman delegation; stressing that the agreement would serve as the first phase of a peace treaty to be signed between Britain and the Ottoman State he voiced his desire for an everlasting relation between the two countries.³

Ahmet İzzet Pasha, Grand Vizier and the Chief-of-Staff at the Supreme Command Headquarters, informed all the armies on the signing of the peace ceasefire on 31 October 1918. He further stated that the representatives of the Entente had also informed their army commanders in Bulgaria, Syria and Iraq. He ordered strict compliance to the terms of the ceasefire agreement.⁴

VIth Army Commander Ali İhsan Pasha, on being informed on the signing of the ceasefire, writing a letter to the British Army Command in Iraq requested the maintaining of the positions as they were on the day the agreement was signed. However, his counterparts claiming that they had received such information continued their reconnoitering activities. They demanded the evacuation of Mosul. Ali Pasha ordered his troops not to open fire but meet the approaching British troops properly in accordance with the terms of the agreement.⁵ The British coming over again on 2 November declared that they would be occupying Mosul. They relied on the 7th Article. Moreover, under the stipulation sixteen, they demanded surrendering of the troops, garrisons and depots. When asked, İstanbul ordered the evacuation of Mosul and surrendering of arms. Hence the evacuation that started on 8 November was completed on the fifteenth.⁶ By the end of November Mosul region as a whole was completely evacuated.⁷

The same incident was seen in İskenderun within a week after the signing of the armistice. A British major, from a French battleship, declared that they would be searching for torpedoes and later occupy the city. The issue was consulted with İstanbul. Grand Vizier Ahmet İzzet Pasha saying that they had the right to look for torpedoes but that they did not have the right to land troops in the city; and if they were to set foot in the city forcibly, they were only to be protested not fired upon. In the second order sent it was stated that “Although the British did not have the right to occupy İskenderun, they might want to make use of İskenderun to send victuals to their armies near Aleppo.” Within this framework, it was stated that they would make use of the port and the roads as guests. In his telegram message he wrote in response to the orders, Commander of the Lightning Armies Mustafa Kemal Pasha stated that the British interest in fact was aimed at marching through the İskenderun-Kırıkhan-Katma road and impede the withdrawing of the VIIth Army and force it to surrender as it was the case in Aleppo rather than the making use of İskenderun to send victuals

³ Orbay, pp. 137-155; Türkgeldi, pp. 55-69. Ottoman Parliament unanimously approved the ceasefire agreement. Ottoman Post and Telegraph and Telephone Office issued stamps to commemorate the signing of the agreement.

⁴ ATASE, İSH, Box: 7, Sleeve: 81, Document: 81.

⁵ ATASE, İSH, Box: 7, Sleeve: 83, Document: 83.

⁶ ATASE, İSH, Box: 250, Sleeve: 77, Document: 77.

⁷ MMT-I, pp. 130-133.

to Aleppo. He drew attention to British's enticing the Armenian gangs in İslahiye. He stressed that he did not find it plausible to tolerate the British whatsoever. He stated that he had given orders to open fire on to those who would land troops in İskenderun, whatever their pretexts might be, and reiterating that he would by no means tolerate the British asked for his resignation from office. In response to his message, it was stated that the prevailing conditions were compelling, and that the Lightning Army Group was abolished and was given to the orders of the VIIth Army Command. As they were not to fight upon the British demands, it was decided, on 8 November, that the city be surrendered to the British.⁸

Occupation of İstanbul created even more severe situation than it was of Mosul and İskenderun. Despite the promises made during the armistice talks, and despite Admiral Calthorpe's written promises İstanbul was occupied on 13 November. In the 55-piece Entente Fleet there were four Greek battleships along with those of the British, French, and İtalian. As it was learned that some non-Muslim communities, being aware of Entente Fleet's coming to city, printed badges some of them were confiscated. On learning that meetings were being held at Phanar High School, near Phanar Patriarchate, to meet the landing troops, and to incite turmoil in which the landing troops would be lured, the Ministry of Interior requested the informing of the British Command.⁹ Some of the troops landed in İstanbul and seized some of the buildings in Beyoğlu in the ensuing days.¹⁰ It became evident that none of the verbal or written promises Admiral Calthorpe made had any importance. What is more, Admiral Calthorpe who had promised that none of these would ever take place was appointed as the British High Commissioner to İstanbul. Muslim Turkish community went through a great disappointment.¹¹

Execution of the armistice was enforced in a similar fashion elsewhere. The British, in contrast to their constructive attitudes they displayed at the Mouðhros talks, enforced the terms of the agreement against the Turks. Along with the dismissal of the armies, gathering of arms, supporting of the non-Muslim communities, their being given places in the occupation forces, turning a blind eye on their upheavals, attitudes displayed in trying to give them an area of influence, convinced the Muslim Turks that neither the British nor the French came for a just peace.

Some of the commanders who did not confined in the Entente forces' practices tried to delay the dismissal of their troops, and hindered the surrendering of the arms. They tried to direct their troops into Anatolia as much as they could. They tried to

⁸ ATASE, İSH, Box: 67, Sleeve: 66, Document: 66; ATASE, İSH, Box: 67, Sleeve: 67, Document: 67; ATASE, İSH, Box: 67, Sleeve: 70, Document: 70; ATASE, İSH, Box: 67, Sleeve: 71, Document: 71; ATASE, İSH, Box: 67, Sleeve: 72, Document: 72; ATASE, İSH, Box: 70, Sleeve: 106, Document: 106.

⁹ ATASE, İSH, Box: 373, Sleeve: 101, Document: 101.

¹⁰ ATASE, İSH, Box: 69, Sleeve: 130, Document: 130; ATASE, İSH, Box: 69, Sleeve: 141, Document: 141.

¹¹ Orbay, p. 227; Ahmet İzzet Paşa, **Feryadım, İstiklal Harbinin Gerçekleri**, Süheyl İzzet Furgaç, Yüksel Kanar (eds.), Timaş, İstanbul, 2007, pp. 203-207; Nur Bilge Criss, **İstanbul Under Allied Occupation, 1918-1923**, Brill, Leiden, 1999; Abdurrahman Bozkurt, **İtilaf Devletleri'nin İstanbul'da İşgal Yönetimi**, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, Ankara, 2014.

hand the arms and ammunition to the National Forces newly being established. The commanders of the abolished armies went to İstanbul. Some of them were arrested by the occupation forces and sent to exile in Malta. Some of the remaining commanders were employed at the Ottoman Chief-of-Staff. Kavaklı Fevzi (Çakmak) and Nihat (Anılmış) were among them. Some commanders like Mustafa Kemal waited without being appointed to tasks.¹²

During all this time İstanbul was in a state of turmoil. Sultan Vahdettin, deemed that acting in unison with the British was advantageous for the future of the country. He did not show any tolerance to the actions that would anger the British. Two of his most trusted men were his relatives Ahmet Tevfik Pasha, and Damat Ferit Pasha. After Talat Pasha cabinet's stepping back, he appointed Tevfik Pasha to form the new government, upon his failure in forming the government he appointed Ahmet İzzet Pasha to the task. Although he insisted on sending Damat Ferit Pasha to Mouðhros, he, facing strong opposition, was compelled to send Rauf Bey. A month later, short-lived Ahmet İzzet Pasha cabinet, task of forming a new government was given to Tevfik Pasha once more. Following his resignation on 10 March 1919, commenced the period of Damat Ferit Pasha governments. The Ottoman Assembly of Representatives was abolished on 21 December; hence no body to supervise the government was left. Under such circumstances Sultan Vahdettin and his grand viziers Tevfik Pasha and Damat Ferit Pasha tried to please the British by blaming and arresting the members of the Committee of Union and Progress thereby purging themselves from the pangs of the opposition.¹³

2) From Samsun to Ankara

As the Mouðhros Armistice was nearing its sixth month, in the words of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who was to lead the National War of Independence, it became clearly evident that the Ententes did not deem it necessary to adhere to the terms of the armistice. Entente fleet and troops arrived in İstanbul under various pretexts. Adana was occupied by the French; Urfa, Maraş, and Antep were occupied by the British. There were Italian troops in Antalya and Konya; and British troops in Merzifon and Samsun. Lastly, İzmir and its environs were occupied by the Greek Army. Officers, officials, and spies of foreign nations were all around. Moreover, Christian associations were at work in every corner of the country, either covertly or openly, working for the immediate fall of the State. While all these developments were happening, armies were being dismissed and their arms and ammunition were being taken away. Nation, who had suffered under the pangs of a long and lasting war, was tired and poor. İstanbul administration was incompetent. They were trying to survive under the

¹² For further information please see, Zekeriya Türkmen, **Mütareke Döneminde Ordunun Durumu ve Yeniden Yapılanması (1918-1920)**, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 2001, pp. 37-79; MMT-I, pp. 255-273.

¹³ For further information on Grand Vizier Ahmet İzzet Pasha, Ahmet Tevfik Pasha, and on Damat Ferit Pasha governments please see, İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, **Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar**, Türkiye İş Bankası, İstanbul, 2013, pp. 1704-1762, 1973-2080; Sina Akşin, **İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele**, Cem Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1983, pp. 17-590.

mercy of the British, and were punishing those who had intimidated the British.¹⁴

Commanders seeing that it was impossible to anything under the prevailing circumstances began moving to Anatolia. The most important personage among them was Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who was soon to unite all the local resistance forces and initiate a National Movement. Pontus gangs were instigating turmoil in the Black Sea region by raiding the Muslim villages, and asking the Entente to intervene. Upon the British warnings suggesting that they would occupy those regions if public order and security were not established, Ottoman Government decided to send Mustafa Kemal Pasha with comprehensive authority as the 9th Army Inspector to the region. He was a reliable commander. He was known to be against Germans and Unionists. An encompassing decree was penned with the help of his friends at the Ottoman General Staff, following the prior consent of the British. He was not only to observe and report the situation but establish order. His duty was both military and political. His area of responsibility covered the Black Sea, Eastern Anatolia, and Central Anatolia regions as a whole. A day after the occupation of İzmir, on 16 May 1919, he left İstanbul on board the *Bandırma*. Landed in Samsun on 19 May.¹⁵

Mustafa Kemal Pasha, in his reports which he started writing as of the very first day of his landing in Samsun, did not only deal with the issues pertaining to his area of responsibility as an inspector, but laid the situation the country was in bare. He wrote that the occupation of İzmir deeply wounded the army and the nation alike, and that such a violation would never be accepted. He openly stated that the British were absolutely unjust in landing troops in the region. Not finding a place under British occupation secure enough, he moved to Havza a week later. Issuing circulars to the civil and military administrators, and associations of Defense of Rights he encouraged them to protest the Greek occupation, to inform the people on the developing circumstances, and expend of the organization. Mustafa Kemal Pasha moving to Amasya sent a declaration both the civilian and military units on 22 June. Stating that the territorial integrity of the country, and the sovereignty of the nation were at stake, and that the central government was not able perform its duties, and that the national sovereignty would only be saved by the determination and will of the nation, he declared that a national congress was to be held in Sivas and requested that the sub-divisions of the provinces send representatives.¹⁶

Soon the British began regarding the activities launched by Mustafa Kemal Pasha with suspicion, and pressurized the İstanbul Government to call him back. Mustafa Kemal Pasha responded the calls of Damat Ferit Pasha Government rather reluctantly. Ministry of Interior announced that Mustafa Kemal Pasha was dismissed from his duties on 23 June. He demanded that none of Mustafa Kemal Pasha's orders were to be met. Later, on 8 July Mustafa Kemal Pasha was called back by the Sultan. Upon Mustafa Kemal Pasha's refusal to return he was dismissed from his office. Mustafa

¹⁴ Kemal Atatürk, **Nutuk**, Vol: I, 13th ed., Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü, İstanbul, 1973, p. 1.

¹⁵ For further information on Mustafa Kemal Pasha's passage to Anatolia please see, E. Semih Yalçın, Salim Koca, **Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın Anadolu'ya Geçişi**, Berikan Yayınevi, Ankara, 2005.

¹⁶ Atatürk, **Nutuk**, Vol: I, pp. 16-29.

Kemal Pasha, on the same day, resigned from the inspectorate and the military. He, thenceforth, continued his activities as a member of the nation.¹⁷

With the aim of defending themselves and raise their voices against occupations local resistance groups began to be established in every corner of Anatolia. Upon learning that the *Elviye-i Selase* – Kars, Ardahan, and Batumi – were to be evacuated, Muslim Turks living those regions founded the Kars Islam Council on 5 November to prevent giving of their lands to the Armenians and Georgians. Ahıska and Aras Councils were founded in the same manner. In November, December and January four meetings were held in Kars and Ardahan to discuss the actions to be taken. Considering that *Elviye-i Selase* was an indivisible part of the Eastern Anatolia, they decided to protect their people with the arms to be taken from the 9th Army, to open branches to reach wider public, and to raise their voice in the newspapers. Convening in Kars on 17-18 January they decided to unite all the Councils under a single government, and founded the Cenub-i Garbi Kafkas Hükümeti [South-western Caucasian Government].¹⁸

Likewise numerous national local associations were formed in Anatolia. Most prominent of these were: Trakya Paşaeli Müdafaa-i Heyet-i Osmaniyesi,¹⁹ İzmir Müdafaa-i Hukuk-ı Osmaniye Cemiyeti, İzmir Müdafaa-i Vatan Heyeti, Vilayat-ı Şarkıye Hukuk-ı Milliye Cemiyeti, Adana Müdafaa-i Hukuk-ı Milliye Cemiyeti, Trabzon ve Havalisi Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti, Trabzon Muhafaza-i Hukuk-ı Milliye Cemiyeti. Other than those associations of Defense of Rights were founded in Ankara, Denizli, Amasya, Mardin, Niğde, Zonguldak, Gümüşhane, Karahisar, Aksaray, Kadirli, Manisa etc. Most of these associations were formed under the leadership of the mayors or of muftis. They represented the Turkish and Muslim peoples in their own regions. They issued proclamations. Sent telegrams. Opened branches in the settlements in their regions. Issued a newspaper or established close contact with a newspaper that was already in circulation.²⁰

İzmir Association for the Protection of Ottoman Rights convened on 17 March 1919, in İzmir, to decide on the actions to be taken in case İzmir was occupied. 165 representatives from İzmir, Manisa, Balıkesir, Aydın, Muğla, and Denizli attended the congress – among them were 37 mayors, 37 muftis, members of city councils, and representatives of various public organizations. Following a three-day congress,

¹⁷ Atatürk, *Nutuk*, Vol: I, pp. 29-48.

¹⁸ Selçuk Ural, *Mondros Mütarekesi ve Doğu Vilayetleri*, IQ Kültür Sanat, İstanbul, 2008, pp. 179-181. For further information on the government established in 1919 and the prevailing conditions of the time please see, Ender Gökdemir, *Cenub-i Garbi Kafkas Hükümeti*, Türk Kültürü Araştırma Enstitüsü, Ankara, 1989; Esin Dayı, *Elviye-i Selase’de (Kars, Ardahan Batum) Milli Teşkilatlanma*, Kültür Eğitim Vakfı, Erzurum.

¹⁹ ATASE, İSH, Box: 67, Sleeve: 48, Document: 48.

²⁰ For further information on the activities of the associations of Defense of Rights and their relations with Mustafa Kemal Pasha please see, Yücel Özkaya, “Ulusal Bağımsızlık Savaşı Boyunca Yararlı ve Zararlı Dernekler”, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, vol: IV, Issue: 10, November 1987, pp. 139-186; For further information on the structure of the Müdafaa-i Hukuk associations please see, Ömer Turan, “Milli Mücadele Lehine Kamuoyu Oluşumunda Din Adamları”, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Vol: XV, Issue: 45, November 1999, pp. 821-834.

mayors and the muftis were chosen as the means of communication between the people and central headquarter of the associations. They based their organization on this.²¹ Other than those in Western Anatolia some local congresses convened in Balıkesir, Alaşehir, Nazilli, Afyon, Edirne, and Lüleburgaz. Talks were held to strengthen and spread the resistance against occupations.²²

However, the most important of the congresses held in Anatolia were Erzurum and Sivas congresses, where the leader of the National Movement personally took part. The former convened by the Vilayat-ı Şarkiye Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti [Protection of the Rights of the Eastern Vilayets] on 23 July – 7 August 1919. The congress where the representatives from the eastern cities and Black Sea region attended it was pronounced that Eastern Anatolia and the Black Sea region were inseparable parts of the Ottoman State and would never be apportioned. At the end of the congress a Committee of Representatives was elected under the chairmanship of Mustafa Kemal Pasha to follow developments on behalf of the convention.

Sivas Congress, convened on 4-11 September upon the call Mustafa Kemal Pasha made from Amasya, is, unlike the other congresses, national. In the decisions taken, the indivisibility of the territorial integrity of the country as it was on the day of the signing of the armistice was accentuated. It was declared that the nation was determined to resist to any attempt of occupation, as it was the case in the Western Anatolia. Mandate regime was refused. It was also decided that all the associations be united under the organization of Anatolian and Roumelian Protection of Rights Association. The Association by appointing the 20th Corps Commandeer Ali Fuad Pasha to the Command of the National Forces in Western Anatolia acted as an executive organ/government. Thus, an important step was taken for the inclusion of the resistance in Western Anatolia within the central organization. A Committee of Representatives was chosen to follow the developments and take due action, as it was chosen in Erzurum, in fact the committee chosen at the Erzurum Congress was expanded.²³

The Committee of Representatives chosen at the Sivas Congress worked as a political executive organ/government until the inauguration of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara. The day following the Congress it was announced that Anatolia would not establish contacts unless the Damat Ferit Pasha Government, far from understanding the National Movement in Anatolia, resigned and a new legitimate government was established in its stead. Anatolia, as a whole, accepted the decisions taken. Damat Ferit Pasha Government's resignation, upon a heavy pressure it received, on 30 September, marked the power of National Movement in Anatolia. It was replaced by the Ali Rıza Pasha Government. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the Chief of the Committee of Representatives, and two of his comrades met a member of the new government in

²¹ Nail Moralı, *Mütarekede İzmir Olayları*, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 2009, p. 64.

²² *Milli Mücadelede Alaşehir Kongresi (16-15 Ağustos 1919)*, İzmir, 1988; Müçteba İlgürel, *Milli Mücadele'de Balıkesir Kongreleri*, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, İstanbul, 1999; Enver Konukçu, *Alaşehir Kongresi (16-25 Ağustos 1919)*, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, Ankara, 2000.

²³ For further information please see, *Sivas Kongresi Tutanakları ve Belgeleri*, Recep Toparlı (Ed.), Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi, Sivas, 2014.

Amasya. They agreed on condition that the territories left as suggested in the Mouðhros Armistice be maintained, resistance against the occupations supported, disagreement between the National Movement and the Government eliminated, and the decisions taken at the Sivas Congress be adopted by the Ottoman Assembly of Representatives. Hence, the İstanbul Government recognized the National Movement in Anatolia, and its representative organ Committee of Representatives. This development buttressed the strength of the National Movement in Anatolia.²⁴

The Committee of Representatives worked both as an executive organ, and did whatever necessary for the organization of the resistance against the occupations and defense of the motherland. The meeting held between the Committee of Representatives and the commanders, on 16-29 November, in Sivas, where domestic and international developments were discussed in length, is of prime importance. The meeting was attended by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, some members of the National Representatives, 15th Corps Commander Kâzım Karabekir Pasha in Erzurum, 20th Corps Commander Ali Fuad Pasha in Ankara, 3rd Corps Commander Selahaddin Bey in Sivas, and the Chief-of-Staff of the 12th Corps Command Şemseddin Bey in Konya. Commanders of the forces who were in Edirne, Balıkesir, Bandırma, and Bursa could not have been invited owing to geographical distance. However, the decisions taken at the meeting were to be conveyed. The issues pertaining to the place where the Assembly of Representatives would meet, the shape the National Organization would take following the convening of the Assembly and the action to be taken against the decisions that were to be taken at the Paris Peace Conference against Turkey. The Chief of Committee of Representatives Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his comrades, completing their evaluations moved to Ankara via Kayseri and Kırşehir.²⁵

Inauguration of the Ottoman Assembly of Representatives on 12 January 1920 in İstanbul is an important development of the period. Rauf Orbay, and most of Mustafa Kemal Pasha's comrades took part in the Ottoman Assembly of Representatives as members. Forming the *Felah-ı Vatan* [Restoration of the Motherland] group they had the Ottoman Assembly of Representatives accept the *Misak-ı Milli* [National Oath], putting forward the aims of the National Movement, on 28 January. According to the *Misak-ı Milli* declared on 17 February, independence was the main principle. The borders held on the day of the signing of the Mouðhros Armistice were indivisible. Plebiscites were to be held in the Middle East, where Arab population held the majority, in *Elviye-i Selase*, and Western Thrace. Straits were to be opened for the international trade and transportation on condition that the security of İstanbul and Marmara is ensured. Within the framework of the principles set in the international treaties, non-Muslim minorities living in Turkey shall be eligible to hold rights as

²⁴ Atatürk, **Nutuk**, Vol: I, pp. 242-249; Tayyib Gökbilgin, **Milli Mücadele Başlarken**, Türkiye İş Bankası, İstanbul, 2011, pp. 279-376.

²⁵ Uluğ İğdemir, **Heyet-i Temsiliye Tutanakları**, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 1989, p. xi; **Türk İstiklal Harbi**, IInd nci Cilt, **Batı Cephesi**, 2 nci Kısım, 3rd ed., Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Ankara, 1999, pp. 37-120; Cemil Özgür, **Heyet-i Temsiliye'nin Ankara'daki Faaliyetleri**, Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, (unpublished PhD dissertation), Ankara, 1987.

much as that of the Muslim minorities in other countries. No political, economic, or judicial records impeding development shall be accepted. The most important service the Ottoman Assembly of Representatives rendered was the adoption of the *Misak-ı Milli*.²⁶

Upon the occupation of İstanbul and ceasing of the activities of the Ottoman Assembly of Representatives on 16 March, the Chief of the Committee of Representatives, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, called on to all the administrative and military units on 19 March. He announced that an assembly composed of representatives endowed with extraordinary authorities was to meet at Ankara. Grand National Assembly convening of 23 April elected Mustafa Kemal Pasha as the president. The regulations of the Ottoman Assembly of Representatives were adopted with some changes. A message of loyalty was sent to the Sultan. Laws were begun to be introduced. Grand National Assembly Government was set up. In performing all these utmost care was given to legitimacy, convenience, and especially doing of the just was sought.²⁷

The new assembly and the government founded in Ankara fought for independence against the occupying forces, and for existence against the İstanbul government. Within this framework they were compelled to contend with the movements that were initiated with the instigations of İstanbul in Anatolia against Ankara. İstanbul government did not only tried to prove that the National Movement in Anatolia illegal but accused those who took part in of insurgency. In order to prevent the people in joining the National Movement it sent committees of counsel to Anatolia in the summer and autumn of 1920. The Sheik el-Islam of the İstanbul government, Dürrizade, issued fatwas claiming the leaving the path of the Sultan Caliph and joining the National Movement was against the principles of the religion. Muftis in Anatolia, gathering under the leadership of the Mufti of Ankara, Rıfat Börekçi, counteracting, penned a fatwa sanctifying the defense of the motherland. İstanbul government formed groups, under the command of Anzavur Ahmet, in the environs of Balıkesir against the National Forces. Numerous uprisings siding with the İstanbul government emerged in places like Konya and Yozgat. Insurgencies reached their peak in the months following the inauguration of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara. National Forces, set up with limited means to fight against the occupying forces, were compelled to fight against those groups as well.²⁸

Another important development that emerged following the inauguration of the Grand National Assembly in the summer of 1920 was the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres between the representatives of the Entente States and that of the İstanbul government. The series of treaties that began with Treaty of Versailles in June 1919 to end the First World War had not had come to an end yet. The representatives of the Entente States

²⁶ For further information please see, Mustafa Budak, **İdealden Gerçeğe: Misak-ı Milli'den Lozan'a Dış Politika**, Küre, İstanbul, 2002, pp. 138-185.

²⁷ For further information on the speech Mustafa Kemal Pasha made at the Sivas Congress on 9 September please see, **Sivas Kongresi Tutanakları ve Belgeleri**, p. 234.

²⁸ For further information please see, **Türk İstiklal Harbi, V'inci Cilt, İç Ayaklanmalar, 1919-1921**, Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Ankara, 1964.

convening in San Remo in April 1920 drew up the draft of the peace proposal to be offered to the Ottoman State. They handed it to the Ottoman Delegation on 11 May. Demanded their views in writing. They, encouraged by the forward movement of the Greek Army in the Western Anatolia, did not consider the counter arguments presented by İstanbul. Under the prevailing conditions, the Sultanate Council, convening under the chairmanship of the Sultan, decided to accept the treaty. The 433-Article treaty was signed on 10 August. According to the treaty, on condition that the minorities are given due respect İstanbul was to be left to Turks. Eastern Thrace was given to Greeks, and Southeastern Anatolia to France. An independent Armenia as well as an autonomous Kurdistan was being formed in Eastern Anatolia. In Western Anatolia which Ottoman administration that was to keep in theory, the rights of sovereignty of the Ottoman State were to be handed over to Greece. It was possible that the region would be appended to Greece. In the tripartite contract signed among England, France, and Italy it was determined that Balıkesir, and the region between Ulukışla and Silifke were becoming Italian area of influence; Diyarbakır, Elazığ and Sivas that of France. Treaty of Sèvres clearly proved that nothing would have been achieved by relying on the mercy of the Entente States. It proved the righteousness of those who were conducting the National Movement in Anatolia. Encouraged them.²⁹

3) Fronts

The battles the National Movement waged against the enemy is studied in three fronts: East, South, and the West. In the Eastern front regular forces fought with the Armenians. First success was gained here. On the Southern Front a long resistance was put forward by the local forces against the English and French occupation. Regular forces arrived much later. On the Western Front they fought against the occupying Greek army. For a while local forces were used, later with the coming of the orderly army occupying forces were thrown out of Anatolia.

As a result of the Bolshevik Revolution, disintegration of the Russian Army, and newly founded Soviet Union's receding from the war Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan declared their independences. Ottoman Forces withdrew from the Caucasus after the signing of the Mouđhros Armistice. It was followed by the evacuation of the *Elviye-i Selase*. Batumi and Kars were occupied by the English. By raiding the parliament they dismissed the Provisionary National Government of Southwestern Caucasus on 19 April 1919, and sent the members to exile in Malta. Armenians wanted to take the opportunity for granted. They were in pursuit of realizing their dream of establishing Greater Armenia by seizing a considerable piece of land from Anatolia with the help of the English. They coerced the Muslim Turks to leave by massacring them. Under such circumstances 15th Corps, under the Command of Kâzım Karabekir Pasha in Erzurum, was transformed into Eastern Front Command. Thus, the Turkish Army launched an offensive as of 28 September against the Armenians, who had been raiding and massacring the region beginning with Oltu, exhilarated by the term

²⁹ For full text of the Treaty of Sèvres please see, https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Peace_Treaty_of_S%C3%A8vres. (accessed on 8 June 2019)

of the Treaty of Sèvres – signed on 10 August – suggesting the establishment of an Armenian State covering the region. Following the securing of Sarıkamış and Kars, Gümrü [Alexandropol] was taken on 7 November. On 2-3 December the Gümrü Treaty (Treaty of Alexandropol) was signed with the Armenians. Gümrü was left to the Armenians. In return Sarıkamış, Kars, and Iğdır were taken. Armenians called the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres void. Georgia, upon a note of the Ankara Government gave Ardahan and Artvin to Turkey. In March 1921 Batumi and Akhalkalaki was appended to Turkish territories.³⁰

Treaty of Alexandropol was the first treaty that the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) Government signed. It is an important military and political gain. It strengthened the credibility of the TGNA Government both at home and abroad. However, the Bolshevik government that came to power in Armenia in 5 December did not renounce the treaty. Asked for a new treaty. Peace in the region was secured with the Treaty of Moscow (16 March 1921) and Treaty of Kars (13 October 1921). The first was signed with the Soviet Union. With this treaty Batumi was left to Georgia, and Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan. Soviet Union declared the Treaty of Sèvres void, and recognized only Turkey within the boundaries set by the *Misak-ı Milli*. The Soviet Union was of the conviction that the capitulations be abolished and accepted providing Turkey with arms and ammunition. The terms regarding the present Northeastern borders of Turkey were approved by the representatives of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia at the Kars Treaty.³¹

Within a few months following the signing of the armistice not only Mosul but Maraş, Urfa, and Antep were occupied by the English. The French occupied the Adana region. However, in October and November 1919 the English left Maraş, Antep, and Urfa to the French in accordance with a new treaty they signed on the sharing out of the Middle East. There were Armenians among the French forces. The 4-battalion Armenian Legion was composed of 66 officers and 4368 soldiers. Armenians abused the Muslim people; they massacred and insulted them. French commanders at first turned a blind eye on their doings. Later they wanted to stop them. But they could not. Meanwhile 170.000 Armenians were brought to region from Middle East and Anatolia. Armenians were planning to establish a state by holding the majority in the future; to this end they were resorting to any means to compel the Turks and the Muslims away from the region.³²

The people of Maraş took action against the on the occupying forces as the pressure exerted on them gradually increased. Following the clashes that lasted for 22 days the French were compelled to abandon the city on 12 February. This victory gained only by

³⁰ İskender Yılmaz, **Gümrü Antlaşması**, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, Ankara, 2001.

³¹ **Türk İstiklal Harbi III ncü Cilt Doğu Cephesi (1919-1921)**, Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Ankara, 1965, pp. 227-265.

³² For further information on the French-Armenian cooperation please see, Stanford J. Shaw, “The Armenian Legion and Its Destruction of the Armenian Community in Cilicia”, **The Armenians in the Late Ottoman Empire**, Ed. Türkkaya Ataöv, **The Grand National Assembly of Turkey**, Ankara, 2001, pp. 155-206; Robert F. Zeidner, **The Tricolor over the Taurus: The Franco-Turkish War for Cilicia, Crucible of the National Liberation Movement**, Peter Lang Publications, New York, 1996.

the local forces at a time when an orderly army could not have been put together, when the TGNA was not inaugurated and its government could not have been formed is of unique importance. It boosted the morale of the movements of resistance carried out elsewhere in the country. Similar victory was gained in Urfa. On 9 February, French forces were surrounded by the National Forces formed under the command of Ali Saip Bey, whom Mustafa Kemal Pasha appointed to Urfa in December 1919. At the end of the clashes that lasted for almost two months the French abandoned the city on 11 April 1920 together with their arms and ammunitions.³³

The clashes in Antep and Adana lasted much longer. Limited achievements were recorded in the resistance the people of Antep displayed themselves but were not continued. Kılıç Ali Bey, sent by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, organized the local forces. Townspeople rebelled against the French administration on 1 April. They continued their resistance despite the overwhelming French forces and their artillery fire. The French appealing to Mustafa Kemal Pasha requested peace. A 20-day ceasefire to take effect as of 30 May was signed. Thus they, in a way, recognized the National Government founded in Ankara. Upon French occupation of Zonguldak and Ereğli the ceasefire agreement was abrogated. Clashes resumed. People of Antep surrounded by the French forces were at the end were compelled to surrender on 9 February 1921 after a long resistance that lasted for months. Resistance in Adana developed under the command and control of the officers Mustafa Kemal Pasha sent. Mustafa Kemal Pasha going to Pozantı on 5 August inspected the struggle put forward, and held talks with the commanders and the executive members of the Defense of Rights. National Forces first seized the towns of Kadirli, Feke, and strategically important points. The French were stuck in the town centers. The French sent Frank Boullion to Ankara to hold unofficial talks. At the end of the talks and gaining of victory at the Sakarya Battle, Ankara Agreement was signed in October 1921. Adana and Antep became under the Turkish sovereignty. The Agreement, moreover, punctured the Entente front. An Entente signed an agreement with the Ankara Government. It recognized the Ankara Government. For this reason, the Agreement is an important political and diplomatic success. Upon the signing of the Agreement the clashes in the Southern front ceased. Forces employed here were then moved to the Western front where the severe clashes were engaged.³⁴

Western Front was, for the national Movement, the longest, the most challenging, and the most satisfactory front. Resistance to occupation, the struggle between Ankara and İstanbul, and the difficulties encountered in setting up of the orderly army and the

³³ For further information please see, Ali Saip Ursavaş, **Kilikya Dramı ve Urfa'nın Kurtuluş Savaşları**, trans. Hüseyin Işık, Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Ankara, 2000; Yaşar Akbıyık, **Milli Mücadele'de Güney Cephesi Maraş**, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, Ankara, 1999; İsmail Özçelik, **Milli Mücadelede Güney Cephesi (Urfa) (30 Ekim 1918 - 11 Temmuz 1920)**, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, Ankara, 2003.

³⁴ For further information on the French occupation of the Adana region, national organization, the struggle given and Ankara Agreement please see, Süleyman Hatipoğlu, **Fransa'nın Çukurova'yı İşgali ve Pozantı Kongresi**, Ankara, 1989; Kemal Çelik, **Milli Mücadele'de Adana ve Havalisi (1919-1922)**, Ankara, 1999; For further information especially on the Southern Front and the military campaigns please see, **Türk İstiklal Harbi, IV'ncü Cilt, Güney Cephesi**, Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Ankara, 1966.

diplomacy all went hand-in-hand. It was opened upon the Greek army's occupation of İzmir on 15 May 1919 on behalf of the Ententes. The İstanbul government requested the keeping of tranquility and equanimity; in other words did not want any opposition, and hence the governor and the commander in İzmir acted accordingly. Greek army's occupation of İzmir, the atrocities and massacres it committed created disturbance and indignation not only in İzmir and Western Anatolia but in all corners of the country, and increased the number of those who joined the National Movement. Upon the application of the Ottoman government, Paris Peace Conference appointed a commission chaired by the US High Commissioner Admiral Bristol and composed of an English, a French, and an Italian member together with a Greek and a Turkish advisor to investigate the atrocities committed in İzmir and its environs on 15 May – 20 July. The commission held investigations in the region between 12 August and 15 October. Recorded the unjust treatments and atrocities. Presented it to the Conference. High Council in its letter to Venizelos sufficed only with disapproving the incidents taking place in the report and requesting that such incidents should not be repeated. Nothing changed.³⁵

Local forces initiated the resistance against the occupations in Western Anatolia. Insults, atrocities, and the massacres committed compelled people to react. Some were personal, such as that of the news correspondent Hasan Tahsin. Although the Ottoman government demanded that no action would be taken against the occupations, those who incurred losses, insulted, and those who lost their relatives launched actions by forming small groups. Deserters of the First World War who had taken refuge in the mountains and had started gangs joined the National Movement. Demirci Mehmet Efe and Yörük Ali Efe were the two prominent figures. Arms and ammunition were provided from some military units. Some officers and NCOs joined the Movement as well. In Ayvalık, units under the command of Lt.Col. Ali Bey fought against the occupation. It was the first opposition launched by the orderly units. Small fronts were set up in Nazilli, Ayvalık, Akhisar, and Salihli. They were affiliated with the associations of Defense of Rights. Associations provided logistic support. They were given the name *Kuva-yı Milliye* [National Forces] as a whole. They were voluntary units gathered around a strong leader. Units/Groups were not acting in a hierarchy. They were not affiliated to a central authority. It was hard to control them. Although their efforts saved Bergama and Aydın from the occupation forces, it did not last long.³⁶

The first year-and-a-half following the landing of Greek troops in İzmir passed in this manner. As we have mentioned above the fight would not have been continued with the *Kuva-yı Milliye* because of the way they were formed. In the months

³⁵ For further information on the Greek occupation of İzmir and its environs please see, **Türk İstiklal Harbi, II nci Cilt, Batı Cephesi, 1'inci Kısım**, 3rd ed., Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Ankara, 1999, pp. 17-84. For the text of the report held by Entente commission please see, Çağrı Erhan, **Greek Occupation of İzmir and Territories: Report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry (May-September 1919)**, SAM, Ankara, 1999.

³⁶ For further information on the organization and regulations of the Kuvay-ı Milliye please see, Adnan Sofuoğlu, **Kuva-yı Milliye Döneminde Kuzeybatı Anadolu 1919-1921**, Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Ankara, 1994, pp. 130-135; Rahmi Apak, **İstiklal Savaşı'nda Garp Cephesi Nasıl Kuruldu**, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 1990, pp. 56-115.

following the inauguration of the TGNA the issue was brought up. After the defeat at the Gediz Battle in October 1920 it was clearly understood that a regular army ought to be established. Western Front was divided into two Western Front was set up under the command of Colonel İsmet Bey, and the Southern Front under Colonel Refet Bey. While regular forces were being formed, the *Kuva-yı Milliye* units were incorporated into the newly formed armies. The process was strenuous. Some of the *Kuva-yı Milliye* commanders who were not used to acting within a chain of command objected to this decision. *Kuva-yı Seyyare* [Mobile Forces] Commander, Ethem Bey, was the leading figure. Regular forces were sent to break him. He was defeated. Most of its forces joined the regular army. He took refuge in the Greek side.³⁷

Greek army tried to make use of the situation on the Western Front. They moved forward in the direction of Eskişehir-Afyon. They were compelled to withdraw in the first clash in January 1921. The First İnönü Battle was the first victory the orderly forces of the TGNA. It was met with great excitement. Entente States convened to enforce the Treaty of Sèvres with minor changes, along with the İstanbul Government, for the first time, TGNA Government was invited to the conference. The greatest gain at the conference was Grand Vizier Ahmed Tevfik Pasha's introduction of Bekir Sami Bey by saying, "I am leaving the ground to the Chief of Delegation of the Turkish Grand National Assembly the rightful representative of the Turkish Nation." Before the returning of the delegation to Ankara Second İnönü Battle had started; and once again ended with the victory of the Turkish Forces. The victory changed the course of the war both politically and psychologically. Italians began to abandon Anatolia, the French withdrawing from Zonguldak contacted the Ankara Government.³⁸

In the battles fought in Kütahya and Eskişehir line in July 1921, Turkish Forces losing Kütahya, Eskişehir, and Afyonkarahisar were compelled to withdraw to the eastern banks of the Sakarya River. The defeat met with deep anguish in the country, harsh debates were made at the TGNA. Nevertheless, losses did not have any political consequences. Political outcome was to be achieved at the Sakarya Battle where the Greek army launched a forward move to rivet its victory. At the end of the battle conducted on 22 August – 13 September the Greek army was compelled to withdraw as far back as Eskişehir-Afyon line. Upon this development the Ankara Agreement was signed with France, and Treaty of Kars was signed with the Soviet Republics in the Caucasus. Eastern and Southern borders were thus secured. Following a year's preparations, the Greek army was utterly defeated in the Great Offensive waged on 26 August 1922. Turkish Army entered İzmir on 9 September. Anatolia was saved. The Asia Minor Adventure of Greece was concluded with an utter defeat.³⁹

³⁷ For the official records on the banning of Kuvay-ı Milliye and their inclusion in the orderly units please see, *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, Year: 51, Issue: 113, January 2002.

³⁸ For further information on the Battles of İnönü please see, **Türk İstiklal Harbi, II'nci Cilt, Batı Cephesi, 3'üncü Kısım, Birinci, İkinci İnönü, Ashhanlar ve Dumlupınar Muharebeleri (9 Kasım 1920 – 15 Nisan 1921)**, Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Ankara, 1966.

³⁹ The battles mentioned are depicted in detail in the following Turkish General Staff publications: **Türk İstiklal Harbi, II'nci Cilt, Batı Cephesi, 4'üncü Kısım, Kütahya, Eskişehir Muharebeleri (15 Mayıs 1921 – 25 Temmuz 1921)**, Ankara, 1974; **Türk İstiklal Harbi, II'nci Cilt, Batı Cephesi, 5'inci Kısım, 2'nci Kitap Sakarya Meydan Muharebesi (23 Ağustos –**

4) From Mudanya to Lausanne

After taking İzmir Turkish Army began its march towards north to save İstanbul and Thrace. The region was under the English control. In order not to cause an undesirable Turkish-English confrontation, the Entente States, with a note they sent on 23 September, invited the representatives of the Ankara Government to a peace conference to convene either in Venice or elsewhere. They requested convening in İzmit or Mudanya, to set the borders of the territories – including Edirne and extending to the banks of Meriç River – they would leave to Turks on condition that the Straits Sector, which they deemed as neutral territory, is transgressed until the signing of the treaty. Turkish Government responded to the note on 29 September. They informed them that the military campaign was stopped, all Thrace up to the banks of the Meriç River be evacuated immediately, and given to the TGNA Government, and asserted that the meeting be held in Mudanya on 3 October.⁴⁰

İsmet Pasha represented Turkey at the Mudanya Conference that convened on 3 October. England, France, and Italy were each represented by a general. Greek representative waited on board a ship anchored off the coast of Mudanya. The Ceasefire Agreement was signed on 11 October following demanding talks. It was decided that the Agreement would go into effect as of 14 October, Meriç River to be borderline between Turkey and Greece, Greek forces be drawn on the western banks of the river within 15 days, the territories evacuated by the Greek forces be handed over to Turkish officials and gendarmerie, and that the procedures ought to be carried out under the supervision of the Entente Forces. It was accepted that the Turkish Forces remain in the southern sector of the Marmara Sea, not to enter Çanakkale and İstanbul Straits sectors or to their environs named as the “neutral grounds,” and that they would not place an army in Eastern Thrace. Greek representative in İstanbul declared that he accepted the Agreement. Both Mouðhros and Sèvres were thus invalidated.⁴¹

Six days after the signing of the Mudanya Agreement, on 17 October 1922, Grand Vizier of the İstanbul government, Tevfik Pasha, sending a telegram to Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha, stated that the victory gained eliminated the dilemma between

13 Eylül 1921) ve Sonraki Harekat (14 Eylül – 10 Ekim 1921), Ankara, 1973; **Türk İstiklal Harbi, II'nci Cilt, Batı Cephesi, 5'inci Kısım, 1'inci Kitap Sakarya Meydan Muharebesinden Önceki Olaylar ve Mevzi İlerisindeki Harekat (25 Temmuz – 22 Ağustos 1922)**, Ankara, 1973; **Türk İstiklal Harbi, II'nci Cilt, Batı Cephesi, 5'inci Kısım, 2'nci Kitap Sakarya Meydan Muharebesi (23 Ağustos – 13 Eylül 1921) ve Sonraki Harekat (14 Eylül – 10 Ekim 1921)**, Ankara, 1973; Şükrü Erkal, **Türk İstiklal Harbi, II'nci Cilt, Batı Cephesi, 6'ncı Kısım, 1'inci Kitap, Büyük Taarruz Hazırlık ve Büyük Taarruz (10 Ekim 1921 – 31 Temmuz 1922)**, Ankara, 1967; Kemal Niş, **Türk İstiklal Harbi, II'nci Cilt, Batı Cephesi, 6'ncı Kısım, 2'nci Kitap Büyük Taarruz (1-31 Ağustos 1922)**, Ankara, 1968. Please also see, **Büyük Taarruzun 90. Yılında Uluslararası Milli Mücadele ve Zafer Yolu Sempozyumu**, Vols: I-II, , Arzu Güvenç, Murat Saygın (eds.), Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, Ankara, 2014.

⁴⁰ For further information on the minutes of the preparations held in the presence of the English, French, and Italian representatives and on the note the Ankara Government gave on 29 September please see, **İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk (1919-1938)**, Vol: IV, (Ed.) Bilal N. Şimşir, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 2000, pp. 517-527, 625-636.

⁴¹ For the text of the Mudanya Armistice please see, İsmail Soysal, **Türkiye'nin Siyasal Antlaşmaları**, Vol: I, (1920-1945), 3rd ed., Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 2000, pp. 63-66.

Ankara and İstanbul, and that it secured national unity; and that as he was aware of the fact that both governments would be called to the peace talks to be held it was necessary to discuss the important issues to be covered beforehand in order to be able act together. The possibility of İstanbul government's invitation to the peace conference, its attending the conference upon invitation caused discontentment at Ankara. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, in his harsh rejoinder he sent the next day, stated that the TGNA Government was already following the developments directed against the Turkish Government, that it was the only body that was responsible of the Turkish State, and that the developments experienced as of its foundation have already proven it. He, moreover, asserted that Turkish State would only be represented by the TGNA Government at a peace conference to be held after a victory the TGNA Armies gained.⁴²

On the second day of the Mudanya Ceasefire Conference, 4 October 1922, the Ankara Government, with a note it sent to the Entente States, suggested to give start to the peace talks on 20 October in İzmir.⁴³ The answer expected was received on 27 October. Entente States invited the Ankara Government to the peace conference to be held in Lausanne on 13 November. The same invitation was sent to the İstanbul government as well. Ententes, although they had signed the armistice with the Ankara Government, by inviting the İstanbul government to the peace conference were planning to exploit the dilemma to arise between the Ankara and İstanbul governments at the conference. In its response, Ankara Government stated that although it accepted the invitation for the conference, stressed that should the İstanbul government attend it would not attend conference. Entente States did not find Ankara Government's attending the conference alone inconvenient. However, a radical solution had to be found to the problem. TGNA, following long debates, decided to abolish the sultanate keeping the Caliphate on 1 November 1922. Upon the developments Tevfik Pasha resigned. Refet Pasha, the representative of the Ankara Government in İstanbul, ordering all the ministries ceased all their activities.⁴⁴

Turkey and the Entente States attended the Lausanne Peace Conference. The Ententes were led by Great Britain. France and Italy followed her. Greece, Serbia-Croatian and Slovenia Kingdom, Japan, and Romania were also at the table. The US presented as an observer. Some countries like the Soviet Union and Belgium attended the talks concerning them – i.e., Straits, and capitulations. İsmet Pasha, who had represented Turkey at the Mudanya Ceasefire Talks, represented Turkey once again at the Lausanne Conference. Minister of Health Rıza Nur, and the Minister of Finance Hasan Bey were two other delegates representing Turkey.⁴⁵

During the talks there have always been two proposals on the table between the

⁴² For further information on the telegrams please see, Atatürk, **Nutuk**, Vol: III, Document No. 260-261.

⁴³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, **Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl Lozan**, Ankara, 1973, p. 2.

⁴⁴ For text of the report British High Commissioner Rumbold wrote on Refet Bey's visits to Mayor and the Governor of İstanbul please see, **İngiliz Belgelerinde Lozan Barış Konferansı (1922-1923)**, Mim Kemal Öke (ed.), vol.: I, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, İstanbul, 1983, p. 229.

⁴⁵ For further information on the biographies of those who attended the Lausanne Conference please see, Gökhan Erdem, "Lozan Heyeti", **Yaşayan Lozan**, Ed. Çağrı Erhan, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, Ankara, 2003, pp. 869-880.

newly founded Turkish State in Anatolia and the Entente States. Both were related to the Paris Peace Conference where the victors of the First World War convened to determine the conditions of peace, and the principles of the new world order. The first was the *Misak-ı Milli*. The other was the Treaty of Sèvres. After every victory gained during the National Movement, the Entente States proposed softer versions of the Treaty of Sèvres as their conditions for peace. Turkish side taking the *Misak-ı Milli* as its guideline defended the territorial integrity of the motherland and its independence. The directives the Ankara Government gave to the Turkish delegation relied on the principles of the *Misak-ı Milli*. It set the borders, rejected the idea of keeping of foreign troops in the Straits, and strictly refused the capitulations and the establishment of Armenia on the Turkish soil.⁴⁶

The representatives of the Entente States had an air of signing another treaty that would end the First World War as the victors. Turkish side had the self-assurance as the representatives of a nation that had fought for the defense of their motherland and won. While İsmet Pasha propounding that “I am not coming from Mouðdhros, I am coming from Mudanya,” Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, Lord Curzon was claiming that Turkey won a victory over the Greeks not on the Entente. Prime Minister of Greece, Venizelos, was complaining that they were left alone although had attempted to occupy Anatolia upon the will of the Entente States. France and Italy felt dejected as they were not taken into consideration by Great Britain during the occupation of Anatolia.⁴⁷

Lausanne Conference that commenced under such circumstances on 20 November 1922 worked in two periods. First period ended on 4 February 1923. In fact, the Entente States prepared a 160-Article peace draft among themselves. Presenting it to the Turkish side on 29 January demanded it be accepted. Although some issues were found to be acceptable, there were highly controversial issues as well as issues that were not to be discussed or agreed upon at all. Turkish delegation did not approve the draft. Conference dismissed. Delegates returned their homes. Later, claiming that it was a brief suspension, convened once again on 23 April, and resumed the talks. Completing their talks on 24 July signed the peace treaty. During the conference both the Turkish side and the Entente discussed the issues for months on equal terms. No pressure was applied as it was at the Paris Peace Conference. Entente representatives did whatever they can. But they could not achieve any result.⁴⁸

The greatest difficulty at the conference emerged during the talks held on the capitulations. In the first period an agreement was reached on territorial grounds/borders. But no agreement could have been reached on capitulations, especially on the legal capitulations. Entente representatives demanded that the foreigners be conferred

⁴⁶ For further information on the 14-Article directives please see, **Atatürk’ün Milli Dış Politikası (Milli Mücadele Dönemine ait 100 Belge) 1919-1923**, pp. 494-498.

⁴⁷ **Lozan Barış Konferansı, Tutanaklar-Belgeler**, trans. Seha L. Meray, 3rd Ed., vol.: I, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001, İsmet İnönü’s “Foreword,” p. v; İsmet İnönü, **Hatıralar**, Sabahattin Selek (ed.), 3rd Ed., Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara, 2009, pp. 395-396.

⁴⁸ For further information on the Entente’s draft treaty and its appendices please see, **Lozan Barış Konferansı, Tutanaklar-Belgeler**, Vol: II, pp. 53-129.

special rights on the Turkish soil as they had during the Ottoman Era. Turkish side was determined on independence. The directive the Turkish Delegation was given clearly stated that they return home should the Entente assumed an assertive stance. They did so. They did not refrain from dismissing the conference. Upon understanding the sensitivity of the Turkish side, Entente representatives did not insist on the legal status of the foreigners. Upon reaching an agreement on the sharing and installment of the remaining Ottoman debts, on indemnities, and on correcting of the borders the treaty was signed.⁴⁹

As is evident, the Entente States did not abide by the terms of the Mouádhros Armistice. They regarded as an opportunity in exploiting the territories that the defeated Ottoman State had in Anatolia without fighting. Moreover, they used the non-Muslim communities in Anatolia against the Turkish peoples. Turkish Nation did not tolerate the atrocities and injustice. They chose resistance despite the exhaustion and poverty they suffered in the wars that they entered one after another. Organized under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The powers of the associations of Defense of Rights were united, and converted into a national movement. Furthermore, a new government relying on the will of the nation was founded in Ankara, against that of İstanbul which preferred not to resist the occupations. A fight for independence was put forward against the occupying forces with forces available and limited means. The military success achieved was crowned in Lausanne. The success the Turkish Nation recorded is the first violation of the new world order that the Entente States pursued at the Paris Peace Conference.

⁴⁹ For further information please see, Sevtap Demirci, **Strategies and Struggles, British Rhetoric and Turkish Response: The Lausanne Conference 1922-1923**, The ISIS Press, Istanbul, 2005; For further information on the full text of the Lausanne Peace Treaty please see, https://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne. (accessed on 8 June 2019).

HORNET'S NEST SMYRNA 1922–1923
The strange case of Dutch gunboat diplomacy in Turkish waters
in the end phase of the Greek-Turkish War/Turkish War of Independence
Drs. Anselm van der Peet (The Netherlands)

At anchor in Smyrna, current Izmir, Turkey, 5 February 1923, Captain Hans Rendorp, commanding officer of the Dutch ironclad HNLMS *Tromp* on this location, was not a happy man. On the contrary; he and his vessel had stumbled on that day into a rather awkward diplomatic and military position, caught between threatening Turkish gunners of the local fortress, at the best non-interested commanders of nearby Western naval ships, a suspicious Dutch consul, and his own Foreign and Naval departments that reacted with confusing and non-realistic orders, or kept radio silence regarding requests for new instructions. How did Rendorp and his crew end up in this mess?

Introduction

Many global operating navies deliver security on and from the sea. One kind of operations is securing national interests and their own nationals abroad. This paper analyses such a deployment by the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN), by showing the flag in Smyrna in the final phase of the Greek-Turkish War or Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923). First the context will be given why this mission came about, hereafter the deployment itself will be described and analyzed, as well as international political-military developments, and finally some conclusions will be made on the policy behind the whole enterprise as well as its results.

Spheres of influence and protecting (western) citizens

Around 1900, the great powers searched the globe for the last gains regarding overseas territories or spheres of influence. In this context the Dutch government used the RNLN for expeditionary naval operations on worldwide missions by which it could protect its citizens and other national interests such as trade. These maritime operations, in which other western states were involved as well, and with whom The Netherlands had at forehand contact on its own manoeuvres and motivations, mostly took place during (civil) wars, with or without consent of the local authorities.¹

**The Greek-Turkish War/Turkish War
of Independence 1919-1923 and the fire of Smyrna**

The Dutch would carry out their naval mission in Smyrna, Turkey, from November 1922 until March 1923. At that moment Turkey was a country in turmoil. On the 30th of October 1918 the Armistice of Mudros had ended hostilities in the Middle Eastern

¹ Anselm van der Peet, *Belangen en prestige. Nederlandse gunboat diplomacy omstreeks 1900* (Amsterdam 1999); Anselm van der Peet, 'Guardian angel. De Koninklijke Marine als beschermer van Nederlandse ingezetenen overzee', *Marineblad* 114, 4 (2004) 122-127.

theatre between the disintegrating Turkish Ottoman Empire and the European Allies of World War I. As part of the armistice, the Ottomans opened their ports to the Allies. The armistice was followed by the allied occupation of, among others, Istanbul. It also came to incursions by the Italians, French and Greeks in Anatolia. The Ottoman Parliament in Istanbul hereafter never ratified the following Treaty of Sèvres of the 10th of August 1920. This parliament was disbanded earlier by the Allies on 11 April 1920 due to opposition of many of its members to the provisions discussed in Sèvres. In what is known as the Greek-Turkish War or Turkish War of Independence (1919–1923), the Grand National Assembly in Ankara, established in April 1920 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his followers (the so-called Kemalists), rejected the treaty which was signed earlier by the Turkish government in Istanbul. Kemalist nationalist forces took control of most of the Anatolian Peninsula. Heavy fighting took place between these forces and Greek and French forces, while parts of the former Ottoman Empire remained occupied by the Allies or were partitioned by them like the territories in the Middle East.²

On the 9th of September 1922 Kemalist forces regained control of Smyrna, three years after Greece had landed troops in this port. On the 13th of September a large fire started in the Greek and Armenian quarters of the city. The fire raged for days and it is estimated that more than 15.000 Greek and Armenian inhabitants were killed. Also dozens of building blocks were destroyed. The Muslim and Jewish and some West-European quarters escaped the damage.³ During the fire western naval vessels anchored in the Bay of Smyrna and provided help and refuge to their own and other western citizens. Lots of Italians were evacuated, but also French citizens, British, and Americans, as well as over 150 Dutchmen.⁴ The whole situation made the government in The Netherlands worried about the fate of the remaining 150 own citizens in the Turkish port. In these circumstances and especially after alarming reports of the acting consul-general Arnold Lamping in Smyrna in the weeks hereafter, it was felt that an own naval mission was necessary.⁵

Dispatch of HNLMS *Tromp*

In the night of 26-27 of October 1922, Captain Rendorp received a cable from the Ministry of the Navy to sail his ship *Tromp* (5.000 GRT), which operated near the Canary Islands, immediately to the port of Alger, French North Africa. There he would receive further instructions. Arriving in the latter port the Dutch officer read in his orders that he should proceed to Smyrna, consult the Dutch consulate there and


² David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*. Macmillan.(2009) 360-373; <https://www.britannica.com/event/Armistice-of-Mudros>

³ Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge 2002) 52.

⁴ George Horton, *The Blight of Asia* (London 2003) 96; 'De oorlogsschepen te Smyrna', *Nieuwsblad van Friesland*, Rubriek Over de Grenzen, no. 13, 13-2-1923.

⁵ <http://resources.huylgens.knaw.nl/bwn1880-2000/lemmata/bwn2/lamping>

assist Dutch citizens where necessary. Furthermore he had to refrain from possible demonstrations by other western warships against the Turkish government or the Kemalists.



No other information was given, for example not on the fact that Smyrna was in the hands of the Kemalists. Neither was it indicated how the Captain should deal with the new authorities. Also, Rendorp was not informed on the fact that the Dutch Foreign Office had not asked the Turkish authorities' official permission to visit the port with a (relatively) large man-of-war like the *Tromp*. Last but not least Rendorp was unaware of the fact that western powers with naval assets nearby Smyrna had not been informed on his mission. For eventualities the Dutch skipper was instructed to operate to his best knowledge and according to good seamanship.⁶

Nevertheless, Rendorp read (foreign) newspapers and he received an update on certain developments during an informal meeting with the Dutch consul in Malta. The Turkish government as recognized by the international community (the Netherlands included) had only some authority in the region of Istanbul, which as mentioned was occupied by Allied troops. Given these circumstances, the Dutch Captain asked the Ministry of the Navy whether it was wise to salute the local authorities when arriving in Smyrna. The cryptic answer he received was that he should salute the Turkish flag. By this, Rendorp could only assume that he should salute the Turkish government that the Dutch officially recognized; meaning that in Istanbul.⁷

⁶ National Archives (NaNA), The Hague, Netherlands Consulate-General Smyrna/Izmir (Turkey), (1905) 1922-1932 (1947), 2.05.95, inv.nr. 1, Documents regarding the visit of the man-of-war *Tromp* 1922-1923, Secretary of the Navy E.P. Westerveld, Instructions for the commanding officer of the ironclad *Tromp* destined for Smyrna, 10-11-1922; H. Rendorp, 'Een Nederlandsch oorlogsschip in moeilijke omstandigheden', *Marineblad* 35 (1930) 28-41, 28; *Jaarboek van de Koninklijke Marine 1922-1923* ('s-Gravenhage 1923) 10.

⁷ Rendorp, 'Een Nederlandsch oorlogsschip', 29.

Arriving in Smyrna the 11th of November, the Captain understood from the Dutch consul Lamping, that not only the Foreign Department in The Hague knew for some time that the city was in the hands of the Kemalists, but also that they flew the same flag as the old regime. Given the official Dutch diplomatic stand, Lamping advised not to salute the Kemalist authorities. Rendorp did not agree: such a non-gesture would in his eyes heat up things and was not in the interests of local Dutch citizens. He therefore visited the Kemalist port and city authorities, saluted the Kemalists/Turkish flag and also hosted this flag on board. The consul was not amused. Rendorp reported this all to his own ministry but got no reaction.⁸

Given the earlier dramatic events and the tense international situation, several Western men-of-war could still be found in Smyrna harbour. These vessels were the British light cruiser HMS *Carysfort*, the Italian light cruiser *Venezia*, the French armoured cruiser *Ernest Renan* and the American destroyer USS *Gilmer*. Consul Lamping, who as mentioned disagreed with the skipper of the *Tromp* in approaching the local authorities, had another clash with Rendorp regarding the wish of the latter to leave Smyrna for a period of 2-3 weeks in order to bunker coal in Malta. This was something the Ministry of the Navy had ordered him to do in an earlier instruction. The diplomat got his way: the ironclad was instructed to stay in the Turkish port. With some difficulty and with help of his Royal Navy counterpart, Rendorp was able to buy coal from a British company, which delivered these goods in Smyrna. Although the incident heated up the already tense relationship between Lamping and the Dutch Captain, the former proved he had good sense for future military political developments. In late December 1922 the Dutch envoy in Istanbul received from the Kemalists the message that foreign men-of-war were no longer tolerated in Turkish ports without their permission. Also, the port of Smyrna became a no-go area for foreign warships of more than 1.000 GRT. Had the *Tromp* left for Malta, it was foreseeable that it would have been impossible to return to the Turkish port.⁹

The Dutch envoy in Istanbul immediately informed his government on the Kemalist message, as well he reported that Western foreign powers with warships in Turkish waters rejected this ultimatum. The Truce of Mudros of 1918 gave them the right to station men-of-war in Turkish ports. For the Netherlands, which as a neutral state was not involved in WWI and was no participant in the Truce, the situation was different. It had no permission of whatever Turkish government to station a warship in Smyrna. And it made no attempt to ask for such a permission. Apart from that, Rendorp received on the 8th of January 1923 the order to remain in Smyrna until further notice. Not amused, the Dutch Captain asked his American colleague commanding the USS *Guilmer* what his instructions were. In WWI the US never declared war on Turkey and it was no participant in the Truce of Modrus. The American skipper

⁸ Rendorp, 'Een Nederlandsch oorlogsschip', 30-31; *Jaarboek KM 1922-1923*, 10.

⁹ HANA, NLS Consulate-General Smyrna, inv.nr. 1, Lamping to the Foreign Secretary, 12-12-1922, Lamping to the Dutch envoy in Istanbul, 15-12-1922; Turkish Note-Verbale to the Dutch legation, no. 158/13, 26-12-1922; Van Rendorp, 'Een Nederlandsch oorlogsschip', 31-32; *Jaarboek KM 1922-1923*, 10.

stated that his envoy had asked and received permission for his vessel to stay in the port of Smyrna. The commanding officer of the *Tromp* was therefore on his own in this strange military diplomatic situation. Rendorp considered leaving Turkish waters but again consul Lamping blocked such an idea by informing the Dutch legation in Istanbul as well as his superiors in The Hague. He also wrote to Rendorp stating that a departure would be in conflict with his orders to assist the Dutch community in Smyrna. The blunt and short reaction of the Foreign Office and the legation in Istanbul was that the *Tromp* had to remain in the Turkish port.¹⁰

Rendorp meanwhile followed his own course and improvised. Contrary to other western ship skippers and not supported by his consul, he started to make friends with the Kemalist port authorities and the Kemalist Vali, the governor of the local province. Not only did he visit them regularly but he also invited them on board. Despite these good relations, Rendorp, like all the other western skippers, received on the 5th of February the order from commanding officer of the fortress of Smyrna, to leave port within 48 hours. Hereafter all the commanding officers and their consuls organised a meeting. They decided that the Kemalists should have send the ultimatum to their governments and not to the ship captains, and that they would therefore officially ask the Kemalists to do this. Although the western commanding officers send a collective message on this matter, Rendorp and Lamping (finally working together) sent a similar message unilaterally to the regional Vali, given 'the different position of the Netherlands'. Rendorp also informed his Ministry of the Navy that he intended to stay for the moment, despite further threats of the fortress commander and the fact that Kemalist forces mined parts of the harbour entrance. To his despair, the captain only received a message from his superiors that he should act in consultation with other commanding officers.¹¹

Escalation

However, the other officers received from their governments the order to stay and return Kemalist actions with own fire. Given the fact that most of them were participants in the Truce of Modrus and had some sort of rights to station their ships in Smyrna, the situation for the *Tromp*, as earlier remarked, was different. Worse, the only other vessel which was in a kind of similar situation, the USS *Gilmer*, had received permission to stay. Rendorp could only hope that his Kemalist 'friends' would inform him in time that an attack on his ship was eminent. In the meanwhile he made his man-of-war ready for battle to emphasise its combat credibility. The other western skippers made similar preparations. The French in the meanwhile were embarking their colony on board of the cruiser *Ernest Renan*. Lamping stressed to his ministry that he foresaw panic and feared an artillery duel between the western ships

¹⁰ HANA, NLS Consulate-General Smyrna, inv.nr. 1, Rendorp to Lamping, no. 11, 14-1-1923; Lamping to Rendorp, no. 67, 16-1-1923; Dutch legation in Istanbul to Lamping, January 1923; Rendorp, 'Een Nederlandsch oorlogsschip', 32-33.

¹¹ HANA, NLS Consulate-General Smyrna, inv.nr. 1, Telegram Lamping to Foreign Office, 5-2-1923; Lamping and Rendorp to Moustafa Abdul Halik Bey, 5-2-1923; Lamping to Foreign Office, 6-2-1923; Rendorp, 'Een Nederlandsch oorlogsschip', 33, 35.

and the Turkish fortress. He therefore asked permission to evacuate the Dutch colony on board of the *Tromp*.¹²

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs concurred with this view and the Dutch consul therefore went to the Vali of the province, asking if he would allow such an embarkation. The governor by all means did, but he also advised not to do so. Furthermore he would ask the fortress commander, over which he officially had no say, to extend the ultimatum with 48 hours, among others to make a proper embarkation possible for the Dutch. To add to the already complicated situation, the other western skippers received a message from the fortress commander that the ultimatum would be postponed by 24 hours.¹³

Notwithstanding these developments, the Kemalists continued mining parts of the harbour entrance and were - out of sight of the naval vessels - reinforcing artillery in nearby hills. Rendorp in the end got Lamping to go as far as to ask the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to get in contact with the Kemalists authorities and request the kind of permission to stay at the Smyrna anchorage like the Americans did. After a tense night in the morning of the 8th of February, a strong British maritime task force appeared near Smyrna. Two British cruisers steamed into the anchorage and a Royal Navy flag officer made clear to the local authorities that he would use all the firepower of his battle squadron to retaliate any Turkish fire. Although the Smyrna fortress commander still made some threats, Rendorp considered it now unlikely that the Kemalists would act and decided to remain with his vessel in Smyrna. Also, consul Lamping wrote a letter to the Vali in which he stated that the matter in casu of the *Tromp* should be settled between both governments. The Dutch diplomat did not hesitate to mention that the Netherlands had earlier represented and defended Turkish interests in Greece. Rendorp gave this letter in person to the head of the Kemalist port authorities which he had befriended. The latter stressed that he thought it was unlikely that the fortress commander would open fire on the Dutch vessel. Further on, Lamping was informed by his Foreign Office that international negotiations in Lausanne between Kemalist representatives and the Allies took a more positive turn. Also, in a meeting of all the western consuls of Smyrna, a British diplomat declared that the local Turkish army commanders and civil authorities had accepted a status quo after the arrival of the Royal Navy task force.¹⁴

After his meeting with the port authorities and the news on the international developments, Rendorp asked to the Ministry of the Navy what his further orders were. To his astonishment he received on the 13th of February the confusing message that he could leave the anchorage of Smyrna when hostilities between the Kemalists

¹² HANA, NLs Consulate-General Smyrna, inv.nr. 1, Telegram Lamping to Foreign Office, 6-2-1923; Rendorp, 'Een Nederlandsch oorlogsschip', 36-37.

¹³ HANA, NLs Consulate-General Smyrna, inv.nr. 1, Telegram Lamping to Foreign Office, 7-2-1923; Rendorp, 'Een Nederlandsch oorlogsschip', 37.

¹⁴ HANA, NLs Consulate-General Smyrna, inv.nr. 1, Telegram Lamping to Foreign Office, 8-2-1923; Telegram Lamping to Foreign Office, 11-2-1923; Rendorp, 'Een Nederlandsch oorlogsschip', 39.

and the allies would start, or when there was a chance that stationing his ship in the Turkish port would run into diplomatic difficulties...¹⁵

Soon hereafter the port authorities gave Rendorp permission to stay at the anchorage for a longer period. On the 9th of March however, out of the blue, the Dutch Ministry of the Navy ordered Rendorp to make his ship ready for departure. Consul Lamping was neither told beforehand nor asked for any advice (he took a negative stand in this) to end the deployment of the *Tromp* in the Turkish waters. The ironclad left harbour four days later and returned in The Netherlands on the 4th of April.¹⁶ In July 1923 the borders of the Turkish nation-state were set in the Treaty of Lausanne between the Allies and the Kemalist representatives.

Conclusion

Around 1900 colonial and other national interests had dominated decisions by the Dutch Foreign Office to send men-of-war to Venezuela, China or other countries outside of Europe. But contrary to these actions before WWI, in the Smyrna case no fine tuning took place at forehand with western great powers with interests in the area of operations. Even worse, the commanding officer of the naval unit involved received no information on the crisis situation he was heading for, and had an unclear mandate. The local Dutch diplomatic representative was of no help and acted only in line with the vague guidelines from the Foreign Office in The Hague. The Ministry of the Navy seemed out of touch with the whole situation. Probably not coincidentally this department was at that time involved in intense and difficult discussions on its budget and the very future of the fleet. The almost automatism with which the Foreign Department had sent the ironclad *Tromp* to Smyrna, made, given the complex international situation in this port city, the neutral Netherlands nearly become militarily involved in the Turkish War of Independence. It was a strange mishap of this ministry because it was no stranger to this kind of diplomatic naval missions. Only by pragmatic thinking and personal contacts with local authorities, some luck and in the end British naval power, Captain Rendorp was able to dodge real trouble for him and his crew. The Dutch government nor the RNLN did in the end gain anything with the showing the flag mission of the old ironclad. Disappointed, the troubled commander of the *Tromp* not much later left the navy and wrote a sarcastic article on his mission impossible in the Turkish port. An experience by the way, which echoes later operations of Dutch military units operating in a multinational context in the 1990s.

¹⁵ HANA, NLs Consulate-General Smyrna, inv.nr. 1, Telegram Secretary of the Navy Westerveld to Rendorp, 14-2-1923; Rendorp, 'Een Nederlandsch oorlogsschip', 40.

¹⁶ Rendorp, 'Een Nederlandsch oorlogsschip', 40-41; *Jaarboek KM 1922-1923*, 14-16.

“THE PETRICH INCIDENT” FROM 1925 AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Radoslav Simeonov, Kristina Aleksova (Bulgaria)

Armed conflicts on the Balkans are an inseparable part of the development of this region. Oftentimes they are perceived as its “business card”. Therefore, the fact that the first peaceful resolution of a military conflict between two states in the arbitrage of an international organisation happened precisely on the Balkans, sounds quite paradoxical.

During the 1920s, the Balkans still gave cause for anxiety, since interstate relations were disturbed by territorial disagreements and minority problems. On 19 October 1925, just 7 years after the end of the World War I, in the area of Demir Kapia Pass in the Belasitsa Mountain, guns were fired. They started yet another incident on the border between Bulgaria and Greece, but one that was to shake Europe and put the League of Nations to the test after its recent post-war establishment. In just a matter of days, the events from the end of October quickly developed from an ordinary border incident into a mass Greek armed invasion into Bulgarian territory with a front of 35-40 km and a depth of 15 km.

The first two works written a few years after the incident are *La Matin*’s Sofia correspondent F. de Gerando’s “*L’Incident Greco-Bulgar d’Octobre*” (Sofia, 1926) and Georges V. Sarailieff’s “*Le Conflict Greco-Bulgar d’Octobre 1925 et son Reglement par la Societe des Nations*” (Amsterdam, 1927)¹. The causes, the character, results and response of this event were revealed by Krishna Ahooja-Patel in the publication from 1974 of Universite de Geneve, Institut universitaire de hautes etudes internationales – “The Greco-Bulgarian Dispute Before the League of Nations, 1925-1927: An Experiment in Peaceful Settlement”.

In Bulgarian historiography, due to different political reasons and the current conjuncture, this event has been neglected and has not been popularized. This is especially true if the years of the Communist Regime are considered, when in the span of a few decades historians kept complete silence on the matter or just briefly mentioned it as an unimportant event. In the 1990s particular historians published a few extensive researches on the matter, based on archival materials including a number of materials of the League of Nations and Foreign Ministries. The first Bulgarian serious and detailed study of the incident is the book of Katerina Danailova “The Petrich Incident and the League of Nations – 1925” (2011).

At the same time, it cannot escape one’s attention that despite the fact that a few publications on the matter have been issued, it continues to be called with the incorrect term “The Petrich Incident”. This is quite peculiar and inappropriate. In reality, the events from the end of October 1925 started as a merely border incident but later developed into a much bigger matter and escalated into a situation of serious proportions, for which there are objective reasons.

¹ James Barros, “The Greek-Bulgarian Incident of 1925: The League of Nations and the Great Powers.”, in: *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* Vol. 108, No. 4 (Aug. 27, 1964), 354-385.

The main goal of this article is to reveal the events from 1925 and their escalation from an ordinary border incident into a military invasion and occupation of Bulgarian territories – ruthless and aggressive violation of the international law and the territorial status quo in Europe in the years after the end of World War I. A special emphasis is placed upon the efforts of the Bulgarian Government to peacefully resolve the conflict and the leading role of the recently established League of Nations. The position, actions and the findings of the League of Nations, as well as its timely, efficient and objective intervention contributed to the adjudication of a decision, which is often pointed to be the greatest political success of this international organization during the interwar years.

One of the main reasons for the events near Petrich has to be sought in the unfair articles of the Treaty of Neuilly from 1919 that cut out territories from Bulgaria and subjected it to heavy economic and military restrictions. Huge territories populated by Bulgarians were left outside the country's borders and due to this they were subjected to targeted assimilation. In order to preserve their national identity, some of them sought refuge in Bulgaria. The situation in Petrich area was similar, where many Bulgarians from Vardar and Aegean Macedonia resettled. The situation on the other border was not any different. Many Bulgarians continued to live in Greek territory together with Greek refugees from Asia Minor and Caucasus after Greece lost in its military conflict with Turkey. After many incidents, including the Tarlis incident from July 1924 in which Bulgarians were killed, the tension between the two countries increased. As result on 29 September 1924 a protocol was signed at the League of Nations in Geneva by the two countries' foreign ministers, Nikolaos Politis and Hristo Kalfov, concerning the "Protection of the Bulgarian minority in Greece." This agreement constituted the official acknowledgement by Greece that a Bulgarian minority existed there. Greece was obliged to treat all members of this minority according to the terms of the Treaty of Sevres. However the protocol was not ratified by the Greek side which led to escalation of the negative relations between the two countries and to the increase of the border incidents.

Another premise for the Greek invasion in October 1925 is the fact that in the years after the First World War Bulgaria was a "convenient opponent". Under the Treaty of Neuilly Bulgaria was not only weakened territorially, economically and politically, but also disarmed. According to Article 66 of the peace treaty with the victorious countries, the army was not to exceed 20 000 men, while under Article 69 its gendarmes, customs officials, forest guards, local or municipal police were not to exceed 10 000. Furthermore, it could establish a special corps of frontier guards not exceeding 3 000 men, of which no more than 150 officers and 200 non-commissioned officers². Therefore, the total army in Bulgaria were not to exceed 33 000. In addition, the regular conscript army had to be replaced with an unpopular and expensive volunteering system, which made it difficult to protect the almost 2400 km state border. The Bulgarian military command was forced to recruit volunteers from the local male population, who lived in the border area and were fit for military service.

² Petar Iliev and others, *Almanac – The Protection of the Bulgarian Borders: Past, Present, Future* (Sofia 2007), 41.

The volunteers were civilians, who were unpaid, did not belong to border military formation and did not possess weapons³. In this situation the Bulgarian population perceived as their guardians the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO). Many armed groups of the IMRO crossed the artificially drawn border between Bulgaria and Greece. Therefore, the border region was in a state of unrest and the border incidents between the two countries were an everyday occurrence.

By the beginning of 1925 the internal political situation in Greece drastically changed for the worse, especially after the government of General Theodoros Pangalos came to power. In order to raise the prestige and authority of the government, as well as to divert attention from the acute socio-economic problems, the Greek authorities were inclined to take actions and measures to eliminate the insecurity of the Greek refugees from Asia Minor and Caucasus in the border area with Bulgaria. A good excuse was the border shooting at the end of October 1925.

The autumn of 1925 appeared to have ushered in a new Europe. On 16 October 1925, after long negotiations the Locarno Pacts had been signed, which marked the beginnings of a Franco-German reconciliation, establishing the Franco-Belgian-German frontiers and readmitting Germany once more into the family of nations. For the moment Europe was at peace.⁴ Until the border incident that occurred on the early afternoon of 19 October at the Greek-Bulgarian frontier near Demir Kapia Pass. A sentry from the 69th Greek guard station crossed the border. The Bulgarian border was guarded by a soldier-volunteer from the 1st Bulgarian guard station. At that time the number of the Greek guard station was 89 soldiers while the number of the Bulgarian guard station was only 6 soldiers⁵. A conflict arose between the sentries, caused an exchange of shots and the Greek border sentry was killed. Soon at the location arrived the soldiers from both Greek and Bulgarian guard stations and the shooting along the border became general. The Greek soldiers were determined to take the body of their killed soldier and thus to hide his intentional violation of the state borders.⁶ Events during these hours had moved with such speed that the civilian armed formation of IMRO came to the assistance of cessation of the conflict. Volunteers and war veterans from the whole region took part in the defence.

Immediately after the start of the border conflict, the Bulgarian Border Headquarters, considering it as merely another frontier incident, ordered the implementation of the usual practice so far to restore peace in the area by establishing contact with the Greeks at the frontier, appointing a Bulgarian-Greek investigating commission of inquiry to ascertain the causes and responsibilities for the incident and bilaterally resolving of the conflict. The Bulgarian border authorities and the Army General Staff from 19 to 22 October repeatedly requested the Greeks to cease fire in order to create favourable conditions for a peaceful work of the mixed commission

³ Katerina Danailova, "The Population in Petrich district and Invasion of General Pangalos through October 1925", in: *Military History Review*, No 3/1996, 26-27.

⁴ Barros, "The Greek-Bulgarian Incident of 1925", 354.

⁵ Katerina Danailova, "*The Petrich Incident and the League of Nations – 1925*", (Plovdiv 2011), 59.

⁶ Danailova, "The Population in Petrich", 28.

and to settle the dispute⁷. In spite of the efforts of the Bulgarian border authorities, who had hoisted the white flag a number of times in an attempt to contact their counterparts at the frontier, firing continued.

At the same time the efforts of the Bulgarian government and diplomatic circles are no less important than the successive attempts of the border authorities. On 20 October the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made its first representations to the Greek ambassador in Sofia to restore peace on to border in order to make possible a settlement of the incident. The Greek Foreign Ministry was also informed that, until the evening of 21 October, no Greek officer had presented himself at the border to put an end to the shooting in conjunction with the Bulgarian officers there. After the Bulgarian authorities received no answer to their requests as many as three times and in no position to resist a Greek advance because its demilitarisation under the Treaty of Neuilly, they asked for specific assistance. Orders were issued to the Bulgarian missions in Belgrade, Bucharest, London, Paris and Rome requesting intervention with the government in Athens so that the military operations might be stopped. The dispatch of these orders perceptibly widened the international scope of what had until this point been solely a Greek-Bulgarian affair. Bulgaria declared at the same time that she was prepared to submit the incident to investigation by an impartial commission of inquiry⁸. On 22 October, when no reply had been received from Athens, it became clear that the Bulgarian attempts to solve the conflict bilaterally are futile. With the firm belief that they have the right cause and the Bulgarian government submitted to the Secretary General Sir Eric Drummond a *note verbale*, in which it made a referral to the League of Nations and peacefully awaited for its arbitration. It was noted that the Bulgarian proposals for a mixed commission to establish responsibilities had remained unanswered by Athens. On the contrary Greek troops had advanced into Bulgarian territory, where the Minister of War general Ivan Valkov issued an order for the Bulgarian troops not to resist, to avoid all provocation and not to reply to any Greek fire. The Bulgarian appeal therefore protested against the flagrant invasion by the army of a League Member, of a country known to be disarmed. Thus, in virtue of Articles 10 and 11 of the Covenant Sofia requested that Sir Drummond convene the League Council to take the necessary steps without delay. Convinced that the Council would do its duty, the Bulgarian government and the Army General Staff took a stand for the peaceful settlement of the conflict, that had arisen along the Struma Valley and continued its passive position, maintaining its orders to the Bulgarian troops not to resist the Greek advance and waiting for the intervention of the League of Nations⁹.

In the meantime, at 4 o'clock in the morning on 22 October General Pangalos ordered the army forces to commence an armed attack on Bulgaria. The divisions of the III Army Corps of the Greek Army numbering around 100 000 men invaded Bulgaria's territory via the Struma Valley. There were dozens of villages in the area occupied by the Greek Army and the civilians in many other villages were under fire

⁷ Lyudmil Petrov, "The Petrich Incident from 1925", in: Military History Review, No 6/1994, 138-139.

⁸ Barros, "The Greek-Bulgarian Incident of 1925", 360.

⁹ Danailova, "The Petrich Incident", 93-97.

from both the artillery and the aviation, including the town of Petrich. The Greek troops instilled fear, panic and insecurity into the local Bulgarian population and around 15 000 people were forced to leave their homes and belongings to seek refuge in the inner regions of the country. This area of the border of Bulgaria had only around 300 soldiers in the border sentry who had to be the first to take the Greek military strike. But what the Greeks did not take into account were the civilian armed formations of IMRO and the civilian volunteers that made a sacrifice and took part in the defence of their mother land¹⁰.

A few hours after the Bulgarian government submitted the note to Sir Drummond and after the Greek invasion on Bulgarian territory, the Greek government composed the demands that would form the basis of Greece's subsequent note to Bulgaria, which was delivered late on the evening of 22 October. Bulgaria was held entirely responsible for the incident. The Greek ambassador in Sofia stressed that his government, feeling that its national honour had been injured and that it was just to grant indemnities to the families of the victims, hoped that the Bulgarian Government would consent to the following: to inflict an exemplary punishment on the military commanders responsible; to express its regrets to the Greek Government; and lastly, to pay an equitable indemnity of three million French francs to the families of the victims. In addition, there was a possibility that the Greek troops in the Salonika region "unaware of the intentions of the Bulgarian troops" might deem it necessary to proceed to the occupation of certain strategic points of Bulgarian territory to assure their own security¹¹. Nevertheless, the occupation by the Greek troops was already a fact.

During the coming days Bulgaria had to concentrate on an energetic political and press campaign abroad. A key role in popularising the event to the international community was played by the National Committee of the Macedonian Brotherhoods in Sofia and the Macedonian Bulgarian Emigration in the USA and Canada. By synchronizing their actions and joint efforts, they started a successful worldwide propaganda campaign and thus brought timely clarity to the issue in the League of Nations. Through the circulation of indisputable information materials and publications they were able to protect the Bulgarian national interests and to cause widespread public pressure on the League of Nations for its intervention as an arbitrator to sanction the initiators of a violation of the territorial status quo in Europe since the end of World War I¹².

An Extraordinary Session of the Council of the League of Nations was called on 26 October at Paris. The League was now actively involved in the whole question, which was examined during that meeting, with Bulgarian and Greek ambassadors in Paris present. The Council was not satisfied that military operations had ceased and that the troops had been withdrawn behind their respective national frontiers.

¹⁰ Danailova, "The Population in Petrich", 29.

¹¹ Barros, "The Greek-Bulgarian Incident of 1925", 356.

¹² Trendafil Mitev, "The International Campaign Organized by the Connection with the Intervention of General Pangalos in Petrich District in 1925 ", in: *Military History Review*, No 6/1996, 53-60.

The Council reminded both Athens and Sofia of their solemn obligations as League Members under Article 12 of the Covenant, not to resort to war, their responsibilities and the grave consequences which followed and called for the Bulgarian and Greek governments to immediately stop military actions, withdraw their troops and cease all hostilities within 60 hours, without undertaking on further movements¹³. To assist the Council and the two States, military attaches from Italy, France and Great Britain in Belgrade were sent to the place of the conflict in order to report directly to the League Council as soon as the troops of both States had been withdrawn and hostilities had ceased. Lastly, Athens and Sofia were requested to afford to these officers all facilities that would be required for the execution of their mission¹⁴. Due to these circumstances, with the threat of sanctions looming on the horizon and under the observation of the military attaches, Pangalos' government was in no position to resist and was forced on 28 October to issue an order to withdraw its troops from Bulgarian territories. On the night on 28 October and the following day the evacuation of the territory, occupied by Greek forces, was carried out without incident. Soon after that the status quo from before the conflict was restored and the civilians began to return to their homes¹⁵.

After the military attaches executed their mission, the Council of the League of Nations in its session on 29 October established a special Commission of Enquiry into the Incident on the Frontier between Bulgaria and Greece, which was tasked with the investigation of the circumstances surrounding the armed conflict between the two countries, as well as with the ascertainment of the causes and responsibilities, compensations and reparations. Furthermore, the Commission was empowered to propose a final settlement and had to outline preventive measures and recommendations in order to prevent future conflicts and disputes¹⁶. The Commission had Sir Horace Rumbold, the British ambassador in Madrid, as its chairman, and also included representatives from France, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands. Sir Rumbold was experienced diplomat. In 1921, during the Greek-Turkish war, he investigated the crimes, committed by the Greek troops in Asia Minor. Reports found that Greek forces committed systematic atrocities against the Turkish inhabitants. The fact that exactly Sir Rumbold was appointed as the chairman of the Commission in connection with the Petrich incident attached great importance to the new inquiry. He was respected and known as one of the best experts in Europe with deep understanding of the policy, applied and enforced by Greece in newly occupied territories and has already ascertained and reported crimes, committed in 1921 by the same initiators¹⁷.

The Commission had to meet in Geneva on 6 November and leave for Belgrade, where they examined closely and carefully the report of the military attaches. After that the Commission was sent to the Bulgarian-Greek conflict area. The Commission

¹³ Barros, "The Greek-Bulgarian Incident of 1925", 373.

¹⁴ Momchil Ionov, Katerina Kalinska, "New Documents for Intervention of the Greek Army in Petrich District through October 1925", in: *Military History Review*, No 5/1995, 125-126.

¹⁵ Petrov, "The Petrich Incident from 1925", 145-146.

¹⁶ Petrov, "The Petrich Incident from 1925", 146-147.

¹⁷ Mitev, "The International Campaign", 54-55.

members arrived in Demir Hisar on 12 November and on the next morning they were on Bulgarian territory. Three subcommittees were appointed to ascertain with no delay the causes and circumstances of the occurrences at the frontier in the 10 villages and the town of Petrich.

The Rumbold Commission completed its task quickly, and thus its report was available for the usual session of the Council in December. One of the conclusions of the Commission ascertained that the occurrence was a merely border incident, which had to be peacefully settled without delay. But no attempts were made by the Greek authorities to verify the information given on the matter, which caused the escalation of the conflict. The report confirmed that Bulgaria had acted according to the Covenant and Greece had violated the Covenant. Greece was reprehended as the aggressor and had to pay 30 million leva in reparations based on the report that the inquiry committee put together. The money was received in 1926. In the last part of the report the Commission outlined military and political recommendations and preventive measures, designed to avoid a reoccurrence of the Demir Kapia incident and its proposals included improvements in the quality of frontier guards of both countries¹⁸.

Another point of interest is the decision of the Bulgarians from the city of Petrich – the city that was the most affected from the conflict. The citizens of Petrich gave up the compensations they were entitled to receive for the damage they sustained, and decided to use the funds to build a high school in the city. Construction of the school began on the 15th August 1926 and was finished three years later.

The events in the Petrich area from the autumn of 1925 are a tragic episode from Bulgarian history. The timely and effective actions of the LN contributed to the resolution of the armed conflict between Bulgaria and Greece, combined with the principled position of Bulgaria which remained true to its moral obligations as a member-country of the international organisation and as a country that signed the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses. As a result, the Greek-Bulgarian dispute was often interpreted as a turning-point in the history of the peacekeeping role of a League soon to be strengthened. The uniqueness of the Covenant of the League of Nations over all previous attempts at international organizations was its provision for collective security. The Greek-Bulgarian conflict therefore offers an excellent contrast and insight into the possibilities of collective security and peaceful settlement under the League of Nations and international organisation in general¹⁹.

The lessons that can be learnt from the resolution of this international case of conflict are many. It seems the most important one is that it is not normal for the relations between two countries to be defined on the basis of facts of the past in this day and age. The past should not be neglected or covered-up because its mistakes should be analysed and of course, not repeated.

¹⁸ P. J. Beck, "From the Geneva Protocol to the Greco-Bulgarian Dispute: The Development of the Baldwin Government's Policy Towards the Peacekeeping Role of the League of Nations, 1924-1925", *British Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Apr., 1980), 12-15.

¹⁹ Barros, "The Greek-Bulgarian Incident of 1925", 377-378.

BULGARIA AND THE “SECRET” MILITARY BUILDUP IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

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In 1915 Bulgaria entered the First World War in order to regain what had been lost after the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1913. Three years later the state found itself in the losing camp once again and was forced to sign the Armistice of Thessalonica on 29 September 1918. It called for an immediate demobilization of all Bulgarian military services with the exception of 3 infantry divisions and 4 cavalry regiments (needed for guarding tasks) and a temporary and partial occupation of the Bulgarian territory by the Allied Powers¹. The Armistice also stipulated that all Bulgarian servicemen west of the Skopje meridian were to remain as prisoners of war. This provision affected thousands of officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers².

On 4 October 1918, the day after his ascendance to the throne, Tsar Boris III issued a Decree for an overall demobilization of the Bulgarian Armed Forces. Twenty days later, however, he issued a next Decree transforming the requirements for the demobilization from overall to partial³. The act clearly shows the striving of the political leadership in Sofia for keeping the peacetime composition of the Armed Forces as huge as possible. Obviously, there was an expectance that in the near future limitations on the Bulgarian Army would be imposed. In fact, in the next months the occupation authorities in the country signalled the same. On their insistence in 1919 a number of units, including 4 infantry divisions were completely disbanded⁴. But the worst was yet to come

On 27 November 1919 the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine was signed. It marked the official end of the Great War for Bulgaria. The Treaty was considered back then as a “national catastrophe”. It had a deep impact on the country as a whole and the Army in particular. The Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine defined that the Bulgarian Armed Forces were to be seriously limited in numbers and armaments. The compulsory military service had to be replaced by voluntary one. The Bulgarian Army could not exceed 20 000 people, of whom only 1 000 could be officers. All means for mobilization were strictly forbidden. Still Bulgaria had the right to maintain a Gendarmerie of 10 000 people (with 150 officers) and a Border Guard of 3 000 people. The exact number of weapons the country was supposed to have was strictly defined – 1 150 rifles or carbines, 15 machine guns, 3 artillery guns or howitzers and 2 mine throwers per 1 000 servicemen. The exceeding amounts of weapons had to be handed over to the Allied Powers. Furthermore, Bulgaria was deprived of possessing poison gases, flamethrowers, armored cars, tanks, battleships, submarines and aircrafts. In addition,

¹ Българска военна история. Подбрани извори и документи. Том трети [Bulgarian Military History. Selected Sources and Documents. Volume Three], (София, 1986), pp. 243–244.

² Николов, Ст. Забравените герои. Пленническият въпрос от войните на България 1885–1918 г. [Nikolov, St. Forgotten Heroes. The Bulgarian Prisoners of War Issue, 1885–1918], (София, 2018), p. 169ff.

³ Държавен вестник [State Gazette], Issue 228, 8 October 1918; Issue 245, 30 October 1918.

⁴ Българската армия 1877–1919 [The Bulgarian Army, 1877–1919], (София, 1988), p. 307.

all military education structures were to be closed in a quarterly period after the ratification of the treaty except the Military School. Moreover, no Bulgarian military staff could be accredited abroad. Last but not least, an Allied Military Control Commission (AMCC) had to supervise the adherence to the restrictions by the state⁵.

It is obvious from this dry statistics that the Neuilly treaty had three major impacts on the Bulgarian Army. First, the Army was restricted to the sanitary minimum and thus, it could not answer properly to external menaces. Secondly, the provisions created serious obstacles to the training of command staff. Third, Bulgaria was actually bereaved of the right to possess almost all types of modern armament. Dealing with these three problems became the main objective for the Bulgarian military policy during the next twenty years. The attempts of the governments in Sofia to circumvent the imposed limitations resulted in a process of “secret” military buildup. In terms of time this process can be divided into three periods.

First period

The first period was between 1920 and 1927, when the Allied Military Control Commission (transformed in 1922 into an Allied Winding-up Body) functioned in Bulgaria. Its presence made the Bulgarian authorities extremely cautious in their actions. The main feature of the state’s policy during this period can be summarized with the following sentence: “Keep what is possible by vesting it in eligible form without officially violating the treaty”. In pursuit of this goal the Bulgarian governments laid the foundations of a policy that can be without any reservation defined as protectionist and double-natured with a bit scent even of duplicity. Several examples clearly display it.

One of them concerns the reorganization of the Bulgarian Army after the treaty’s ratification on 9 August 1920. In the archival sources there is a memorable note of 1919 for the future reorganization of the Army. Authors were no less than 9 Bulgarian generals, including 4 former Ministers of War. According to them even under the restrictions of the Neuilly Treaty the peacetime Army had to consist of units which to become cores for creating bigger formations if needed⁶. The Ministry of War accepted the idea and developed it even further. A view was shaped that retaining the backbone of the existing structure could be done by adjusting the divisional system in regimental one. In order to avoid the disconnection between the different kinds of troops, the Bulgarian military leadership considered that some larger staffs must be created in secret⁷. Thus, the Army could easily deploy if necessary.

On 19 December 1920 Tsar Boris III issued a Decree for the reorganization of the Army. All military educational institutions except the Military School, 5 out of 8 divisional headquarters, some command structures of the Artillery, all regimental

⁵ Central State Archive (*TsDA*), Fond 284K, Opis. 2, File. 218, p. 1–63.

⁶ *TsDA*, Fond 695K, Opis 1, File 7.

⁷ Йонов, М. *Българската армия като държавна институция след Първата световна война 1919–1929 г.* [Йонов, М. *The Bulgarian Army as a State’s Institution after the First World War, 1919–1929*], (София, 1995), pp. 66–67.

military districts' administration, the Railway Regiment, the Aeronautical Battalion, the Army General Hospital and the divisional hospitals were to be dissolved. The Decree determined that the Infantry shall consist of 8 regiments including 24 battalions. The Artillery was to be reduced from 8 artillery regiments and 3 heavy artillery regiments to 8 artillery battalions and 3 fortified points. The Cavalry shall include 3 regiments and the Engineer Forces – 3 battalions. The Railway Regiment was to convert into one railway battalion. Most of the transformed units kept the same numeration and dislocations as before. Additionally, the rest divisional headquarters had to transform into headquarters of 3 military areas' headquarters⁸. Pursuant to the Decree, on 23 December 1920 the provisional Minister of War Marko Turlakov issued an order all units to be clustered into three military areas incorporating 8 regimental groups. This was necessary so that there would not be interruption in the command chain⁹. Even a cursory glance reveals one simple fact – the new organization reflected the notion of the Bulgarian military leadership to preserve the previous one by just transposing the units' size one step backwards.

The Allied Military Control Commission actually came to the same conclusion. As early as December 1920 the Inter-Allied Military Committee in Versailles (IAMCV) put on a discussion the Bulgarian Army's reorganization issue and drew a conclusion that the territorial command had to be forbidden. In accordance with this view, in mid-January 1921 the Allied Military Control Commission in Bulgaria insisted on alterations in the plan for the reorganization of the Army. A month later AMCC informed Bulgarian government that the creation of military areas was totally implausible¹⁰.

Still, the Bulgarian government tried to introduce its own view on the Army's organization by passing a Law on the Army and the Border Guard in the spring of 1921¹¹. The IAMCV concluded that the Law was unacceptable and insisted on alterations. After two years of procrastination the Bulgarian government finally adopted a next Law on the Army and the Border Guard at the beginning of 1923¹². It very much repeated the basic points of the previous one but with one important exception – the reduction in the officers' number in every single regiment. Nevertheless, the organization of the Army was preserved and that was a success for the Bulgarian leadership. In addition, although the headquarters of the three military areas were disbanded in 1921, they actually continued their existence in the form of three first-class garrisons¹³.

In the next few years, regardless of the Allied Powers' numerous estimates that the Army's structure was retained to and that concealed divisions and regiments existed, the situation remained unaffected. This was due to two principal circumstances. On

⁸ Military History Library in Rakovski National Defence College (VIB), Collection P, File 773/2.

⁹ *Bulgarian Military History. Selected Sources and Documents. Volume Three*, pp. 301–303.

¹⁰ Станев, Вл. *Междусъюзническият военен контрол в България (1920–1927)* [Stanev, Vl. *The Inter-Allied Military Control in Bulgaria (1920–1927)*], (София, 2018), pp. 185–186.

¹¹ *State Gazette*, Issue 43, 27 May 1921.

¹² *State Gazette*, Issue 292, 29 March 1923.

¹³ VIB, Collection III, File 491, p. 33.

one hand, the protests of the Allied Winding-up Body were marked by remissness. Secondly, the question about the Army's structure was extremely stretchy. In turn this allowed the Bulgarian authorities to maneuver successfully and to negate all kinds of accusations. In reality, the Allied Powers gradually accepted that all efforts in this direction was futile and acknowledged the status quo¹⁴.

A second example is the overstepping the limitations on the Army's abundance. Excellent conditions for such type of policy begot the allowed existence of other kind of military forces under Article 69 of the Neuilly Treaty. These were the Gendarmerie and the Border guard. In fact, from the very beginning the Bulgarian authorities endeavored in converting them into an appendix to the Army. For instance, the organization of the Border Guard was defined by the same laws as the Army. At the same time the Law on the Gendarmerie of 1920 explicitly stated that the Gendarmerie was a force "with military organization and discipline". It consisted of Gendarmerie battalions and squadrons and was of submission to the Minister of War¹⁵. The last two features provoked serious discontent on the side of the Allied Powers. On their insistence, in 1925 a new Law on the Gendarmerie was adopted. The text said nothing about units but the Gendarmerie remained subjected to the Minister of War¹⁶. Actually, the Law was a compromise between Bulgaria and the Winding-Up Body¹⁷.

Since 1919 Bulgaria endeavored to keep what is possible from the Navy and the Aviation as well. For instance, the former continued its existence as a Sea and River Commercial Police Service in submission to the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Labour. There was also one Coastal Gendarmerie Squad. Initially, it was a part of the Gendarmerie but due to the objections from the AMCC in 1921 the Squad was transferred to the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Labour¹⁸. Serious efforts were made for the saving the Aviation, too. After the dissolution of the Aeronautical Battalion at the end 1920 the sole aeronautical structure that remained was the Aeronautical Compartment. In February 1921 its establishment was set. The compartment encompassed all pilots who were veterans from the First World War. The AMCC quickly noticed these efforts and forced the Aeronautical Compartment's dissolution in March 1922. The Bulgarian accession to the International Aeronautical Convention in 1923, however, made way for the maintenance of civil aviation. As a result, an Aeronautics Office was established as a hidden form of the country's military aviation. The military character of the Aeronautics Office can be traced in its staff which included primarily Bulgarian combat pilots from the Balkan Wars and the First World War. Major Penyu Popkrastev became its first Director¹⁹.

As it was already mentioned, according to the Neuilly Treaty Bulgaria could not maintain military educational structures with the exception of the Military School

¹⁴ Stanev, *The Inter-Allied Military Control*, p. 195.

¹⁵ *State Gazette*, Issue 185, 16 November 1920.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Issue 24, 2 May 1925.

¹⁷ Stanev, *The Inter-Allied Military Control*, p. 208.

¹⁸ *The History of the Bulgarian Navy*, p. 65; VIB, Collection III, File 491, pp. 73–74.

¹⁹ Миланов, Й. *Авиацията и въздухоплаването на България през войните 1912–1945. Част втора* [Milanov, J. *The Bulgarian Aviation and Aeronautics during the Wars, 1912–1945. Part Two*], (София, 1997), pp. 10–11.

and dispatch military personnel abroad. The compliance with this obligation did not last long. As early as 1923 the disbanded Military Academy resumed its functioning in a secret form –the so-called Teaching course within the Military School. In that same year more than 20 officers started their education in the Teaching course. In 1925 the next admission of 14 people was effected. On 16 July 1927 the Minister of War General Ivan Valkov issued a confidential order wherein he officially registered the name of the course²⁰. In the meantime, although they were officially proclaimed as civilian educational structures, the Railway School (formed in 1922) and the Bozhurishte Aviation School also provided military training²¹. What is more – in 1924 the Bulgarian military leadership took steps towards the restoration of the practise of sending officers abroad. In October 1924 a Statute for detailing Bulgarian officers in foreign countries was adopted. Because of the Neuilly Treaty, they were officially sent for foreign language courses²².

Yet, some serious problems remained unresolved during this period. One of them regarded the compulsory military service that was completely removed until 1923. On the other hand, there was the question of armament. Although Bulgaria organized a whole campaign for hiding weapons immediately after the peace treaty, the AMCC succeeded in confiscating or destroying a great amount of the Bulgarian armament. This was especially valid for the Navy and the Aviation, most of which equipment was seized as early as 1919–1920. At the same time a considerable percentage of the hidden arms were kept in inappropriate conditions. At the end it turned out to be irreparably damaged.

Second period

In the autumn of 1927, after seven years of operation, the Allied Winding-up Body in Bulgaria was dissolved. This act marked the beginning of the second phase in the Bulgarian “secret” military buildup between the two world wars. The surcease of the military control over Bulgaria provided the governments in Sofia with much more space for action. One immediate manifestation of the new spirit was the Ministerial order from 20 December 1927 which introduced serious alterations in the organization of the Land Forces. In peace time they had to include 8 infantry divisions, 24 infantry regiments, 8 artillery regiments, 4 engineer regiments, 10 cavalry regiments, 4 military inspection districts and other services²³. From a practical point of view, the fresh organization nearly restored the one in existence before the Treaty of Neuilly enured. On 11 January 1928 the Minister of War General Ivan Valkov issued an extremely confidential order that supplemented the previous one. The necessity for giving these second prescriptions was related to the fact that the 20 December 1927 order did not contain establishment plans. That was why the order

²⁰ Georgy Stoykov Rakovsky Defence and Staff College, (Sofia, 2006), pp. 26–27.

²¹ Йосифов, А. *Железопътните войски на България 1888–1945* [Yosifov, A. *The Bulgarian Railway Forces 1888–1945*], (София, 1991), pp. 174–175; Milanov, J. *The Bulgarian Aviation and Aeronautics during the Wars, 1912–1945. Part Two*, pp. 11–12.

²² VIB, Collection P, File 778/1.

²³ State Military History Archive (DVIA), Fond 1, Opis 1, File 201, pp. 314–326.

dated 11 January 1928 provided detailed description of how the formation of the new units has to be done²⁴.

Besides, a steady growth of the Bulgarian Army's size began. In September 1927, for example, the Land Forces comprised of 28 151 servicemen. A couple of months later they included 38 328 people which made a difference of more than 10 000. By 1934 the Bulgarian Armed Forces had already reached 54 000 men. At that time only the Land Forces incorporated more than 100 medium-size units of which 25 infantry, 13 artillery, 8 cavalry, and 4 engineer regiments²⁵. This was mainly due to the silent and progressive reinstatement of the compulsory military service that started as early as 1928. In fact and unofficially, of course, until 1934 the compulsory military service was entirely restored²⁶. New kinds of troops appeared as well. In 1929 services for anti-aircraft protection were formed for the first time²⁷. The rapid increase in the Army's numbers naturally led to an increment of officers as well. At the beginning of the 30s the command staff of the Bulgarian Armed Forces closed 2 500 men already. This was twice and a half the Neuilly treaty allowed²⁸.

Meanwhile, in 1928–1929, the Bulgarian military leadership prepared the first post-WWI plan for mobilization and deployment of the Land Forces in wartime. It defined that in an eventual conflict the Land Forces should consist of three parts – an Acting Army, a Territorial Army, and an Economic Army. The first one was tasked with conducting hostilities in and outside the country, the second one had to prepare reserves of personnel and material resources, and the third one was intended to meet the needs of the Land Forces and the population²⁹. For increasing the mobilization capabilities of the Bulgarian Army on 26 May 1928 a special Statute regarding the training of reserve officers was adopted. It provided that the Ministry of War had the right to summon reserve officer every year for enhancement of their military training. For conducting this training special schools were to be formed³⁰. Just in case, in 1933 started a process of dispensing battle banners to each peacetime infantry battalion that was to form an infantry regiment in case of mobilization³¹.

An extremely important feature of the “secret” military buildup in this period was the official rebirth of the Bulgarian Navy and Aviation. As early as December 1927 a

²⁴ VIB, Collection P, File 782/2.

²⁵ Станчев, Ст., Р. Николов. *История на Сухопътните войски на България. Том втори* [Stanchev, St., R. Nikolov. *The History of the Bulgarian Land Forces. Volume Two*], (София, 2017), p. 53, 55.

²⁶ *История на българите. Том V. Военна история* [The History of the Bulgarians. Volume V. Military History], (София, 2007), p. 492; Петров, Л. *Проблеми на военната политика на България 1934–1939* [Petrov, L. *Issues about the Bulgarian Military Policy, 1934–1939*], (София, 1990), p. 157.

²⁷ *Кратък обзор на бойния състав, организацията, попълването и мобилизацията на българската армия от 1878 до 1944 г.* [A Brief Overview on the Combat staff, the Organization, the Replenishment and the Mobilization of the Bulgarian Army from 1878 to 1944], (София, 1961), p. 215.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 128, 137.

²⁹ Ionov, *The Bulgarian Army as a State's Institution*, pp.234–236.

³⁰ DVIА, Fond 1, Opis 5, File534, p. 198–199.

³¹ *Bulgarian Military History. Selected Sources and Documents. Volume Three*, p. 392–393.

brand new organization of the Navy was introduced. It defined that the Navy should consist of Black Sea units, Sea Training units and Danube units. The Commander of the Navy was to be of direct submission to the Minister of War³². The next decisive step towards the recovering of the Navy was made in 1932 when a new organization was created. According to it the Bulgarian Navy included Headquarters located in Sofia, a Black Sea Brigade in Varna, a Danube Regiment in Ruse and other units. In January 1933 the Navy Headquarters rendered that all civil denotements in use since 1920 were obsolete and replaced them with military ones. At that time the Navy comprised of circa 1 500 servicemen, of whom 84 officers. In 1932–1933 lots of officers were tasked with elaborating new statutes on the personnel's training and conducting the combat activities. In addition, as early as the beginning of the 30s a Statute and training courses for the Maritime School were also prepared³³.

The reviving processes did not pass by the Aviation as well. In 1930 an Aeronautical Regiment headed by Colonel Ivan Mihaylov was formed on the basis of the Aeronautics Directorate. The new unit owned a Staff, a Meteorological Service, a Mixed *Orlyak*, a Training *Orlyak*, a Seaplane *Yato*, an Aerostatic Service, a Technical Department, and Stores. Its personnel numbered 644, of whom 76 airmen. Two years later the Aeronautical Regiment was redesigned the Air Regiment³⁴. By a confidential order №78 of 28 July 1934 an entirely new organization of the Aviation was introduced. The Air Regiment transformed into Air Forces. They incorporated Headquarters, two combat *Orlyaks*, one training *Orlyak*, a Naval *Yato*, a Balloon Company, and Logistic Services (Meteorological, Technical, Supply, Healthcare, and Accounting). The two combat *Orlyaks* were stationed at Bozhurishte Airfield near Sofia and at Plovdiv Airfield, while the Naval *Yato* was located at Chaka Seaplane Station in the vicinities of Varna. The Balloon Company was positioned at Yambol Airfield³⁵.

One key moment in the Army buildup in the second period was the full restoration of the Bulgarian military presence abroad. As early as 1927, however, a Statute for detailing officers from the Bulgarian Army abroad was adopted. This practice pursued “to elevate” the officers’ military training by familiarization with the acquisitions in tactics, technical innovations, and military art of the armies in Western Europe. Because of the Neuilly Treaty this practice continued to be covered under the form of sending officers to language courses. According to the Statute the three officers graduated from the Teaching course with highest results were to be detailed in France, Germany and Italy. All officers sent abroad had the obligation to present when they got back home a detailed account on the questions the Army Headquarters assigned to them³⁶.

At the end of 1928 a Statute for the military attachés was adopted as well. It defined

³² DVIA, Fond 1, Opis 1, File 201, p. 307.

³³ *The History of the Bulgarian Navy*, pp. 68–69.

³⁴ Nedialkov, D. *The History of the Bulgarian Air Power*, pp. 121–122.

³⁵ *Bulgarian Military History. Selected Sources and Documents. Volume Three*, p. 395.

³⁶ VIB, Collection P, File 846/2; Станчев, Ст., Р. Николов, Й. Баев. *История на българското военно разузнаване. Том 1* [Stanchev, St., R. Nikolov, J. Baev. *The History of the Bulgarian Military Intelligence. Volume 1*], (София, 2017, p. 105.

that such attachés were to be appointed in foreign countries of particular military interest for Bulgaria. The military attachés were tasked with collecting information about the internal political situation, the military and economic conditions, “and in general about the overall military might” of the states concerned. Their duty was “to organize military intelligence in peacetime in order to lay the foundations of our wartime military intelligence” in the country they were sent to. All military attachés could serve as such no more than two years. One officer that had been a military attaché in one state could not be detailed immediately in another before serving three years at home³⁷. The last, actually, demonstrates the intentions of the Bulgarian military leadership to send as much as possible officers abroad.

Since the end of the 20s Bulgaria also tried to restore its military contacts with some foreign countries. One of them was Italy – a victorious state in the First World War. The time was right as Rome was striving to activate its policy in South-East Europe as well. For instance, at the beginning of 1927 a Bulgarian military delegation visited Italy and discussed some issues regarding the training of Bulgarian pilots in the Italian Aviation Academy. From 1929 Bulgarian officers went to Italian military educational structures every year. An important prerequisite for closing the ties with Italy became the appointment of General Nikola Bakardzhiev, who had graduated from the Turin Artillery Academy in 1907, for Minister of War in January 1929. For instance, at the beginning of the 30s the Italian Statute on tactics translated by General Bakardzhiev was heavily used in the combat training of the Bulgarian Army³⁸. Of paramount importance, however, was the restoration of the military contacts with Germany. In 1931 Colonel Todor Radev was appointed for a military attaché in Berlin. Two year later he was succeeded by Colonel Parvan Draganov, who enjoyed authority in Germany. In return, in 1933 General Wolfgang Muff started to perform the functions of German military attaché in Sofia. It is obvious from his reports about the situation in Bulgaria is obvious that the Bulgarian military circles saw Germany as the suitable partner that could help for the revival of the Bulgarian Armed Forces. In fact, since 1933 detailing Bulgarian officers in German military educational structures became a practise³⁹. By the end of the decade the Third Reich had become a favourite foreign destination for the Bulgarian command staff.

In the period between 1928 and 1934 the Bulgarian authorities continued their efforts to recover the Armed Forces. Unconditionally, their primary success was the refund of compulsory military service and the increase in the Army’s abundance. A second positive feature was the re-establishment of military contacts with some countries like Italy and Germany. Nevertheless, one significant problem remained unsolved. It referred to the armament.

³⁷ VIB, Collection P, File 782/2; Stanchev, St., R. Nikolov, J. Baev. *The History of the Bulgarian Military Intelligence. Volume 1*, pp. 106–107.

³⁸ Димитров, И. *Българо-италиански политически отношения 1922–1943* [Dimitrov, I. *Bulgarian-Italian Political Relations, 1922–1943*], (София, 1996), pp. 143–144.

³⁹ Златарски, Вл. *Райхът и Царството. Германското присъствие в България 1933–1940 г.* [Zlatarski, Vl. *The Reich and the Kingdom. The German presence in Bulgaria, 1933–1940*], (София, 2014), pp. 38–41, 70.

Third period

In mid-30s several events shook the existing European order. In 1933 Adolf Hitler came in to power in Germany. Two years later the Third Reich unilaterally rejected the military restrictions of the Versailles Treaty and proclaimed an overall restoration of the German military might. It was in this setting when the third period in the Bulgarian “secret” military buildup began. German revisionist policy stimulated the leadership in Sofia to intensify its efforts in the Army’s recovery. An uppermost task in this regard was to resolve the question of armament. Just that represents the main trait in Bulgaria “secret” military buildup in the second half of the 30s. It is worth mentioning that in time the adjective “secret” was losing more and more its meaning as everybody knew about the Bulgarian steps towards buying modern weapons.

The analysis of the rearmament process of the Bulgarian Army highlights that several European countries were principally involved in it. One of them was Italy which in 1935 granted Bulgaria with 14 light tanks, motor vehicles, 5 000 rifles and 50 machine guns⁴⁰. Yet, in order to avoid protests, the Italian leader Benito Mussolini warned the Bulgarian Minister of Plenipotentiary in Rome Svetoslav Pomenov that all deliveries should be kept in secret, especially from the other Balkan states⁴¹. Closer ties were created between Bulgaria and Poland, especially in the field of aviation. For instance, at the beginning of 1935, the two countries concluded a contract for the delivery of 12 reconnaissance plane and 12 fighters from Poland to Bulgaria. In the next years these contacts continued to develop in upward direction by the deliveries of more airplanes. For keeping the secret and avoiding protests from the Little Entente and the Balkan Pact states most of the machines were transported by sea⁴².

Actually, France and England – the two states that upheld the Versailles system since 1919, also proved willing to participate in the Bulgarian rearmament program. This was due to their thinking that hereby they would control the process and not let Germany play the leading role in it. At the beginning of 1936, for instance, France provided the Bulgarian Army with 48 artillery guns. But the French attempt to sell Bulgaria 60 mine throwers failed because of the Romanian protests and the high prices⁴³. Bulgarian attempts to buy British armament were much better developing. In September 1936 the government in Sofia approved the purchase of 8 tanks from England⁴⁴. Obviously, the Bulgarian plans to get British armament continued. In the archival sources there is a telegram from the Bulgarian Minister Plenipotentiary

⁴⁰ Stanchev, St., R. Nikolov. *The History of the Bulgarian Land Forces. Volume Two*, pp. 86–87.

⁴¹ *Bulgarian Military History. Selected Sources and Documents. Volume Three*, p. 408.

⁴² Дамянова, Е. Полски военни доставки в България (1931–1939) [Damyanova, E. *Polish Military Supplies for Bulgaria, 1931–1939*], in: *Военноисторически сборник [Military Historical Corpus]*, 1982, № 6, p. 86–92.

⁴³ Stanchev, St., R. Nikolov. *The History of the Bulgarian Land Forces. Volume Two*, pp. 89–90.

⁴⁴ TsDA, Fond 284K, Opis 1, File 6479, p. 3.

in London Nikola Momchilov dated 10 June 1938, in which he commented the opportunities for buying airplanes and artillery guns, too⁴⁵.

Nevertheless, it was the Third Reich which played a major role in the Bulgarian rearmament policy. It was not a deliberate Bulgarian choice but rather a necessity. This was due to a couple of circumstances. On the one hand, Italian and Polish military industry could not fully satisfy the increased needs of the Bulgarian army. Secondly, negotiating deals with France was a tough job as Paris had to consider the opinion of its Balkan allies, especially Yugoslavia and Romania. Apart from the successful tank deal, the latter was absolutely true for England as well.

As early as the spring of 1935 Germany showed considerable willingness to take part in the Bulgarian rearmament program. During his visit in Sofia in May 1935 the commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe Hermann Göring made a generous promise for help in that direction⁴⁶. As a consequence, the Bulgarian Ministry of War started a feverish preparation and formed a special commission for the future negotiations. The Technical Department in the Army's Headquarters listed the necessary equipment. On the basis of the research done by the Bulgarian military attaché in Berlin Lieutenant Colonel Asen Sirakov the government in Sofia determined that the best way to pay for the German equipment was via credits⁴⁷. On 19 July 1935 the Bulgarian government approved the purchase of German weapons totalling 342 000 000 leva⁴⁸.

In 1936 the first contracts with German companies were concluded. They provided for the delivery of training and reconnaissance vehicles, 320 mine throwers, 270 anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank rifles, 40 mountain artillery guns, and thousands of shells. In 1937 the first batches of weapons started to arrive in the country. For instance, "Rheinmetall-Borsig" sent 196 mine throwers and 250 20-mm anti-aircraft guns, 35 000 mines, and 213 000 shells. Meanwhile, "Waffenfabrik Solothurn" delivered 100 anti-tank rifles. Until mid-1937 Bulgaria received armament that costed 20 809 000 German marks. In order to avoid diplomatic complications, however, in April 1937 the Bulgarian side made a request to the German weapon companies to forbid the visits of foreigners in the days when shipments for Bulgaria were accepted⁴⁹. From the end of 1936 until the summer of 1937 Bulgaria received 48 German planes as well – 24 fighters, 12 reconnaissance, and 12 bombers⁵⁰.

On 12 August 1937 the Bulgarian government provided the Minister of War with the right to make armament deals totalling 1 250 000 000 leva, of which 1 000 000 000 leva for transaction to Germany. This act marked the beginning of the second phase in the Bulgarian rearmament with German weapons. In just seven months, on 12 March 1938, Sofia and Berlin signed the first "secret" arms delivery protocol⁵¹. On

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Fond 176K, Opis 7, File 946, p. 113.

⁴⁶ Petrov, L. *Issues about the Bulgarian Military Policy, 1934–1939*, p. 95.

⁴⁷ *TsDA*, Fond 316K, Opis 1, File 138, p. 385–388.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Fond 284K, Opis 1, File 6232, p. 1.

⁴⁹ Petrov, L. *Issues about the Bulgarian Military Policy, 1934–1939*, p. 101, 104–105.

⁵⁰ Milanov, J. *The Bulgarian Aviation and Aeronautics during the Wars, 1912–1945. Part Two*, p. 26.

⁵¹ Марков, Г. *Българо-германските отношения 1931–1939* [Markov, G. *The Bulgarian-German Relations, 1931–1939*], (София, 1984), p. 144, 153.

its basis until the summer of 1938 Bulgaria started to obtain anti-aircraft guns, mine throwers, howitzers, long-range field artillery guns, torpedo boats, etc.

The foreign arms deliveries in the second half of the 30s gave impetus for a mass formation of new army units. For instance, on 15 April 1935 the Bulgarian Minister of War General Pencho Zlatev issued an order for the creation of 4 machine gun battalions, a tank company and 25 new infantry battalions. Two year later a second tank company was created with the tanks delivered from England⁵². In 1938 the Minister of War General Teodosi Daskalov authorized the transformation of 3 infantry battalions into infantry regiments⁵³. The deliveries of airplanes started led as early as 1936 to the completion of a large three-year plan for the development of the Air Forces. It was the first such document in the history of the Bulgarian aviation⁵⁴. A vivid manifestation of the Army's rebirth actually became the military parade on 6 May 1937. It was at the parade when endless columns of troops armed with most modern weapons passed in front of the National Assembly in Sofia and the eyes of thousands of spectators. The picture was supplemented by the formations of aircraft that overflew Sofia and even the British military attaché Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Ross had to admit conciliatory: "There are no everlasting treaties."⁵⁵

With the Thessaloniki Accord between Bulgaria and the Balkan Pact states (Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey), signed on 31 July 1931, the military restrictions of the Neuilly Treaty were officially revoked. On the same day General Daskalov issued order № 308 which stated: "From this day on our state restores its right to organize freely the protection of its territory, to guarantee the peaceful development of its people, and to provide for them brighter future⁵⁶. In fact, this process had developed for many years but in "secret".

Conclusion

On the whole, in the nearly 20-year period from 1919 to 1938 Bulgaria stubbornly tried to deal with the negative effects of the Treaty of Neuilly in the military field. This led to a process of a "secret" military buildup. The spirit of secrecy was especially noticeable during the first post-war decade because of the direct supervision of the Allied Powers over the state. Since 1927 Bulgaria went intently on its way towards a full-scale army recovery. By the end of the 1930s its armed forces had already reached their previous numbers, possessed advanced command staff and modern military equipment. All these features converted Bulgaria and its armed forces into an attractive partner for the Great Powers on the eve of the coming Second World War.

⁵² *Bulgarian Military History. Selected Sources and Documents. Volume Three*, p. 410–411; *Военна техника и технически служби в българската войска и в БНА [Military Equipment and Technical Services in the Bulgarian Army and BPA]*, (София, 1986), p. 166.

⁵³ VIB, Collection P, File 892/2.

⁵⁴ Nedialkov, D. *The History of the Bulgarian Air Power*, p. 127.

⁵⁵ Stanchev, St., R. Nikolov. *The History of the Bulgarian Land Forces. Volume Two*, p. 90.

⁵⁶ VIB, Collection P, File 892/2.

THE RUSSIAN ALL-MILITARY UNION (ROVS) AND BULGARIA

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The end of the year 1919 was the first mass evacuation of white guardsmen in the wake of Odessa operation – a major Bolshevik success and a devastating blow to the White Armed Forces of South Russia. The white guard began leaving Odessa via sea after Yugoslavia and Bulgaria gave their consent to take in a part of general Denikin's army. By November of 1920, the war was over, and the whites led by general Wrangel evacuated the Crimean Peninsula. Around 150 000 Russian soldiers sailed to the safety of the Ottoman Empire, which accepted them under diplomatic pressure from the French Government. Sofia had been arming the white guard armies in the Caucasus and the Crimea long before they were forced to leave their homeland for Bulgaria, which was also made possible with French diplomatic effort. The Bulgarian authorities require from those seeking to enter its territory to represent compact, organized military units with an intact chain of command and discipline.¹ Another major requirement is for those units to be chosen by the Chief headquarters of the Russian army¹, but be that as it may, the military contingents entering the country were picked by the French military command. How many Russian military emigres were admitted into Bulgaria is unknown, Bulgarian and foreign studies have been unable to come up with an exact number. The main reason is the constant re-emigration and the fact that though staged, the terms for the admittance were often disregarded. According to the official inquiry conducted by the International Labor Organization of the UN, after the process of re-emigration had died down in 1925 there were a total of 29.640 refugees, from which 22.884 men, 4.110 women, and 2.646 children.² Around 19-19 500 guardsmen arrive in the country, mainly from the camps on Lemnos and Gallipoli.

The First Army Corps, the core unit of the White Guard which included the Volunteer army of general Kutepov, was dispositioned in Northern Bulgaria. Kutepov took command of the corps and made his headquarters at the town of Veliko Tarnovo, with his 10 000 guardsmen spread across 27 smaller cities. The Don Cossacks Corps led by general Fyodor Abramov, future head of the Russian All-Military Union, was settled across Southern Bulgaria. The corps consisted of around 4 thousand guardsmen based in 17 cities. The Ministry of Defense used the circumstances to conceal arms, disregarding the risks posed by the Russian military factor in the country.

The political situation in Bulgaria in this period was complex - it fought in the Great War on the losing side and was subject to serious restrictions under the peace treaties it had signed. The Bulgarian army was almost completely disbanded, with most of the military academies being dissolved. By contrast, the Bulgarian state has just allowed into the country as many as seven Russian military schools with nearly 3,000 cadets and junkers. Throughout their initial stay, they were not subject

¹ Карпов, Н. Крым – Галлиполи – Балканы. [Crimea - Gallipoli – Balkans. Moscow], (Москва, 2002) p. 105

² Николов, Д. Бежанците и условията на труда в България. [Refugees and Working Conditions in Bulgaria] (София, 1925), pp. 12-13

to the Disarmament Act, which allowed for the headmasters to maintain the pre-revolutionary organization of their schools and to preserve their structure intact. They also re-established their paramilitary youth organizations such as the Russian Falcon, Russian Scouts, sports clubs and more.

Bulgarian authorities created a Committee on Russian Refugees, operating under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Confession Department. The committee assisted in finding employment and housing for Russian emigres. It also established scholarships for Russian students, provided financial benefits for orphans and disabled soldiers. The committee worked with Russian charities, participated in fundraising and assisted the distribution of aid from Bulgaria and France. Post-war Europe is dominated by poverty, finding employment and housing in the Kingdom of Bulgaria was extremely difficult as in addition to the Russian refugees, 300,000 Bulgarian refugees were admitted to the country. They came under similar circumstances from across the territories lost as a result of the wars fought between 1912-1919. The struggle with poverty will lead many to desperation, some to suicide, but most to using all available means to make ends meet, including working for police and intelligence agencies, Bulgarian and foreign ones.

The cabinet of Al. Stamboliyski fears the possible spread of Bolshevik ideas through the refugees, which Bulgaria has admitted into its territory. The police find it difficult to assess their trustworthiness and the issue of the communist influences in the country only grows over the next few years.

By order of general Wrangel, the counter-espionage program of the White Guard was restored, presided over by general Klimovitch.³ Without a doubt, every action has an equal and opposite reaction. The Russian refugees were a prime recruitment target for the Bulgarian police services, which at this stage still lacked a well-developed informant network, but at the same time and for the same reasons they were also easily susceptible to the recruitment efforts of OGPU.

In 1922 the Bulgarian government allowed the Russian Society of the Red Cross of the Soviet Union to operate in the country to assist the Union for repatriation of Russians abroad. The two organizations help with arranging the return of Russian refugees to the Soviet Union. Among the official Bolshevik representatives, tens of agents and emissaries of the Comintern enter the country.⁴ The amount of people who went back to the USSR between 1922 and 1923 varies in studies with estimations ranging from 10 000 – 11 000. The exact figure is unclear as many are smuggled illegally out of the country.⁵ The bulk of the volunteers are prisoners of war left in Bulgarian captivity after the great war.

As commander in chief, general Wrangel relied predominately on the military unions created by the Russian emigration, but also placed great hopes in cooperating

³ Спасов, Л. Врангеловата армия в България 1919-1923. [Wrangel's Army in Bulgaria 1919-1923] (София, 1999) p. 104

⁴ Central State Archive (TsDA), Fond 2123K, opis 1, File 261, p. 1

⁵ Карпов, Н. Крым – Галлиполи – Балканы. [Karпов, N. Crimea - Gallipoli – Balkans. Moscow], (Москва, 2002) p. 129; Ревякина, Л. БЗНС и Съветска Русия 1917-1923. [BZNS and Soviet Russia 1917-1923] (София, 1981), p. 109

with some civil non-political organizations. Amongst them is the most prominent response of Western European nationalism to the Bolshevik revolution – the International Entente Against the Third International. It was based in Switzerland where it was unofficially tolerated by local authorities. Even after the establishment of the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS), Wrangel depended heavily on this relationship, so much so that he remained its member until the end.⁶ The Russian divisions of the league from across the world will also work with ROVS, going as far as conducting joint covert missions in the USSR in the 1930s.

In 1922 Wrangel, along with his entire HQ, moves to Sremski-Karlovci in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Thus, the political center of the Russian civil and military immigration was Paris, while the military center with a portion of the exile's leaders remaining in the Balkans, close to the USSR, ready for the next offensive.

Several major contributing factors lead to the formation of ROVS. The internal divisions amongst the generals regarding the future of the White Army, the spread of Bolshevik ideas and most important of all - the demoralization of the army, in turn, lead to its marginalization on the Balkans.

The immediate cause for the founding of ROVS is the split between the Russian exiles caused by the conflict between the heirs to the Russian throne, the Grand Dukes Kiril Vladimirovich and Nikolay Nikolaevich. In their majority, the Russian military support Nikolay Nikolaevich, who consistently petitions France to allow as much of the white guard into their territory as possible. Another immediate cause for the creation of the union is the political scandal from the spring of 1922. Probably inspired by the Comintern, the Bulgarian communists, at this stage a party with parliamentary representation, falsified instructions supposedly developed by Wrangel for conducting a coup d'état in Bulgaria.

The Bulgarian authorities were left with no choice, but to expulse to Yugoslavia 20 Russian soldiers – 6 generals, amongst which was general Abramov and the rest were lower-ranking officers. After the 9 June 1923 coup d'état, half of them will return to Bulgaria, while the Bulgarian authorities begin disarming the Russian contingent. The fact that the full list of more than 100 deported refugees is yet to be uncovered is truly remarkable. Studies show differing data for the detained and deported.⁷

With Order № 35 from the 1 September 1924, issued at Sremski Karlovci, the commander in chief of the Russian army general Wrangel created the biggest military union of the Russian emigration. It takes the leading role in uniting all military organizations, unions, societies, from all continents. As ROVS is supposed

⁶ Голдин, В. Солдаты на чужбине. Русский обще-войнский союз, Россия и Русское зарубежье в XX-XXI веках, б.м. (электронное издание) [Soldiers in a foreign land. Russian All-Military Union, Russia and Russian Abroad in the XX-XXI Centuries, (electronic edition)], s.l., 2011, p. 39

⁷ Ревякина, Л. БЗНС и Съветска Русия 1917-1923 [BZNS and Soviet Russia 1917-1923] (София, 1981), p. 59; Кьосева, Ц. Руската емиграция в България 20-те – 50-те години на XX в. [Russian emigration to Bulgaria of the 20's–50's years of the XX century.], (София, 2002), p. 56

to preserve the ties between them, it allows all other organizations to join, except for those who are still involved in party or political activities. This guiding principle will become a core value of the organization, which some will argue has lasted until today.

Gen. Wrangel relied on transferring command of the army to N. Nikolaevich, he believed this will preserve it. He handed over the responsibilities of commander in chief to the Great Duke as early as the 16 November 1924.⁸ When the founding of ROVS was announced, Wrangel also announced that its supreme commander was the Great Duke Nikolay Nikolaevich. Thus, all the finances go through the political center in Paris. The leadership of the Union is concentrated at the headquarters of Wrangel, with the organization structured into five divisions, corresponding to the countries with the highest numbers of Russian military exiles. Initially, the Bulgarian division was assigned the number 5 and managed the guardsmen in the territory of Bulgaria and Turkey. The division was headed by general F. F. Abramov, who was also serving as deputy commander-in-chief. In 1925 the division number was changed to 3, at the same time most of the ROVS funding started coming from donations and member fees.

During the mid-twenties finding employment for the former Russian military men was a matter of great importance. Bulgarian authorities settled the Russian Military contingent across many cities partially to make the task of making a living easier, but also out of concern for the national security. As discussed earlier, the total number of ROVS members is not confirmed. According to ROVS headquarters, they had 40.000 members in 1924 with the count reaching 50-60.000 in the next few years.⁹ After the introduction of membership cards and accounting books, those statistics became a lot more accurate. With order № 11 gen. Abramov from the 1 June 1930, every member of ROVS was obliged to verify his affiliation by being issued with an ID card.¹⁰ According to the statistic 1931 gathered by the III-rd section, ROVS was made up of 2.880 officers, 2.173 soldiers, and cossacks, 1.752 women and children in Bulgaria.¹¹ The majority belonged to the “Gallipoli Society” and the “Union of the former Don’ Corps”, with the minority being members of the “Union of the Russian Officers” and the “Union of St. George Cavaliers”.

After its public announcement, the Russian All-Military Union takes first place in the list of counterrevolutionary formations of the soviet intelligence services. Soviet agents try to gather as much intelligence data as possible in Bulgaria. Their work was made a lot easier by the exchange of diplomatic missions between the Tzardom and the USSR in 1934 and the establishment of diplomatic relations. Soviet intelligence activities are conducted in all possible fields –military, political (parties, movements, trends, ideologies, press, tourism, culture), economics and all related to the Russian exiles. Their operations are aided by the many divisions within the Russian immigrants themselves – military, civilian, Russian, Ukrainian, Cossack, etc.

At the same time, the Soviet Diplomatic mission had serious concerns regarding

⁸ Цветков, В. Исторические портреты. Петр Николаевич Врангель [Historical portraits. Peter Nikolaevich Wrangel], In: Вопросы истории [Questions of History], p. 77

⁹ Бортневский В. Избранные труды. [Selected Works] (Санкт-Петербург, 1999), p. 384

¹⁰ State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) , fond 9116, opis 1, file 9, p. 14

¹¹ GARF, Fond 9116, opis 1, file 51, p. 208

its safety and was keen on defending itself from a “white-emigrant attack”.¹² The same concern was shared by all soviet missions in Europe and rightfully so as the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS) engaged in unofficial activities along with the official ones. Many authors categorize as “white activism” the terrorist displays of the white army exiles, but they eventually made the USSR officially demand from the League of Nations to condemn them. The matter was under discussion from 1934 until 1937 when the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism was adopted by the League of Nations.

In 1927 Wrangel, along with his entire family, moved to live in Brussels, at the request of the Grand Duke Nikolay Nikolaevich, who believed the Balkans are not a suitable location for the headquarters of ROVS. There he passed away at the age of 49 from tuberculosis in 1928. General Kutepov succeeded Wrangel as head of the Russian army and immediately prioritized the espionage and counterespionage operations of the union. He transformed the different clandestine initiatives which already existed into structured operations and initiated the raising of money for the “Special Fund”. The funds in this special treasury were provided by N. Nikolaevitch, managed by gen. Kutepov and aimed at funding illegal activities, such as the terrorist groups which infiltrated the USSR from Finland, Lithuania, and Estonia. As an example, we can point out the attempted assassination of Jan Antonovich Berzin, soviet ambassador in Vienna. The attempt was organized by gen. Anton Tourkoul who returned to Bulgaria in 1923 and had a major part in developing the intelligence operations of ROVS.

Operation “Trust” marks the beginning of the Bolshevik infiltration in the white emigration. Renowned military and civil representatives of the Russian diaspora in Europe easily believed that in the USSR there is a major organized group of people aimed at overthrowing the Soviet government. What they did not realize was that Stalin was conducting a major counterintelligence operation against the dissenting and malicious elements of soviet society. The state apparatus was carefully monitoring for any civil or foreign anti-government activities. Operation “Trust” went a long way in destabilizing ROVS. Gen. Kutepov re-assessed the role of counterintelligence in the organization, now organized under the so-called “Inner Line”. Sofia at this stage became the second most important center for ROVS after Paris.

OGPU proved on several occasions that if the leadership of ROVS stands in the way of the soviet intelligence, every “enemy” can be made to “disappear”. Kutepov is associated with one of the most famous covert actions of the OGPU – namely his kidnapping. In 1937 the NKVD kidnaps and takes to Moscow the next commander in chief of ROVS – general Miller. This operation was successful largely due to the effort of the famous white army general Skoblin, who cooperated with the OGPU. Skoblin was also amongst the first wave Russian immigrants and relocated from Bulgaria to Paris after some time in the country. As it turns out, the quarters of the military organization in Paris was bugged from 1936 to 1941, when the german army searched it and discovered hidden microphones, and the OGPU operative turned out to be the former minister of trade and industry in the interim government of Kolchak.

¹² TsDA, Fond 370K, opis 6, File 432, p. 29

General Abramov inherits the duties of head of ROVS, which he fulfills from September 1937 to the summer of 1938. Let's take a step back to Bulgaria wherein 1926 a special unit called "Vnutrennaya Liniya" or "Inner Line" was created to monitor the infiltration of Bolshevik agents into the midst of the Russian army. Admission to this select group was based on receiving a personal invitation, rather than volunteering. Its activities have not been fully researched so far, but it is claimed that this unit was led by captain Klavdij Aleksandrovic Foss, who also served as an adjutant to general Abramov. In 2001 the chairman of the restored ROVS – Butkov states in an article that Foss also worked in the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense and was awarded medals for his service.¹³ This information has never been verified and proven to be fact, but due to its popularity is present in the works of almost all researchers. Foss does not figure in any Bulgarian document, except for some police reports mentioning him as Skoblin's superior - a doubtful statement. In all cases, the Bulgarian police suspected Foss was connected to the Soviet spies in Bulgaria and thus they suspected the head of the 3rd Division general Abramov, along with one more of their assistants. The Bulgarian political police suspected every foreign citizen in having ties with the Bolsheviks or other intelligence services.

The most trusted person of captain Foss was Alexander Alexandrovich Brauner, who was head of the Russian section of the international "International Anticommunist Entente" in Russe and was also head of the secretariat and the National Union of the New Generation in Bulgaria.¹⁴ Starting in 1934 г. he was an operative of the Bulgarian Ministry of Internal Affairs, head of the department in charge of surveying the Soviet diplomatic mission. The Bulgarian police and military records state he came to the country with a special mission from Moscow. He came under suspicion after WWII began. The law enforcement services were likely looking for a scapegoat to explain how the Comintern keeps aiding the Bulgarian communists, and at the same time gather intelligence regarding German and Bulgarian military facilities. It is worth pointing out that many prominent figures in Bulgarian society participated in soviet intelligence gathering. As it turns out the soviet spy network was far more developed than they imagined and reached to exarch Stefan, who participated in every session of the Bulgarian government. The secretary of Sofia Municipality Petar Slavinski handed over the keys of the town hall for soviet agents to meet in safety.

It is no wonder that the Bulgarian police were also infiltrated by soviet operatives, especially the department in charge of monitoring their activities in the country. How the rest of the agents in the department performed their daily tasks depended on Brauner. Judging by the documents, they are mainly from Russian and Ukrainian origin. The Bulgarian operatives of the department are tasked only with recording the movements of the Soviet diplomats.

The Sofia municipal police service conducted an internal investigation into A.

¹³ Бутков, В. Исторические записки и воспоминания члена Русского обще-воинского союза. – В: Белая борьба. На Родине и на чужбине. (сост. Е. Семенова) [Historical notes and memoirs of a member of the Russian All-Military Union.] in: [White fight. In the Homeland and in a foreign land] (Москва, 2017) p. 258

¹⁴ GARF, fond. 9232, opis 1, file 2, p. 10

Brauner's activities. As a result, he and several other emigres were added to the "List of foreign agents in Bulgaria". It is claimed that Brauner arrived in Sofia from Ruse in 1932 when the police already "*had suspicions that from this moment on the entire ROVS headquarters went to serve the bolsheviks*".¹⁵ There is no indication the police took any steps to bring him to light. Such reports are a part of the witch hunt taking place at the time and there was no concrete evidence against Brauner. The facts around Brauner's work are shrouded in mystery. He was used as an informant and a translator by the Germans on the Eastern Front. Brauner disappears without a trace just before he was officially charged by the People's Tribunal after the end of WWII. As we all know, good intelligence operatives do not leave traces that you can use to put together the pieces of the puzzle.

Slowly, but surely, we have come to the third important scandal which will shake ROVS. Of course, there is again a Bulgarian trace -the son of General Abramov. **Nikolay**, who stayed in the USSR when his father left the shores of the Crimea with the Russian army. He was recruited by OGPU even before he arrived in Bulgaria in 1931 and was uncovered only in 1937 when he was extradited to France. While he was in Bulgaria, he gathered intelligence data on ROVS, the "Inner Line", NSPN. He served as an instructor for the "Inner Line" and he facilitated military courses regarding firearms training, martial art and according to some sources with gymnastics as well.

According to some later sources, Abramov arrived in Bulgaria with the help of gen. A. von Lampe, who also provided him with money and sent him on his way to Bulgaria in 1931.¹⁶ Of course, N. Abramov's journey required arrangements of an official character, but researchers do not focus on them or the legal challenges for crossing Europe from Hamburg to Sofia, especially for a soviet fugitive from the USSR. The records of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs keep the correspondence between the ministry and the Bulgarian embassy in Berlin regarding Nikolai. Crossing the Bulgarian border requires any foreign citizen to follow a standard procedure. The person wishing to enter the country needs to begin by applying through a Bulgarian embassy, which sends his details to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who forward it to the Ministry of Interior for review and approval. The Bulgarian ambassador sent a letter with the application of a Nikolai "Avramov", but the police replied with an approval for a Nikolai "Abramov". The request submitted by the ambassador and the reply of the police is for a person matching his details – birth name, surname, age 23, current country of stay Germany and it is dated 1931. With an eye on the aforesaid, we can safely assume that the entire correspondence is regarding the same person. Nikolai's application has another interesting peculiarity – it is missing mandatory details, such as his full name, his middle name to be exact, it also does not list a purpose for entering the country, an address where he will stay and any contacts for reference.

Even before the kidnapping of gen. Miller, Nikolay Abramov was suspected by

¹⁵ TsDA, fond 370K, opis 6, file 1171, p. 14

¹⁶ Русская военная эмиграция 20-40-х годов XX века. Документы и материалы. Том 9. Перед бурей 1928-1939 гг. [Russian military emigration of the 20-40s of the XX century. Documents and materials. Volume 9. Before the storm 1928-1939] (Кырк, 2016) p. 712

captains Foss and Brauner, but they lacked the necessary evidence for his collaboration with the OGPU, even though there were registered leaks of secret information from the organization. After the disappearance of general Miller, gen N. Skoblin and the “Inner Line” section in Sofia underwent an internal investigation. The process of gathering evidence and exposing Nikolay progressed slowly from 1936 to 1938. The Bulgarian police were told about the findings made during this time and Nikolay Abramov was expelled to France. The spread of this information did not affect in any way the authority of gen. F. Abramov or A. Brauner. However the results of the internal investigations, published by the new chairman of ROVS gen. Arhangelskii did damage the image of the “Inner Line” outside of Sofia.

Nikolai Fedorovitch Abramov was listed in the 1941 report of the Bulgarian political police on the activities of the persons convicted, expelled and under arrest for collaborating with the soviet embassy for 1934-1941. His record with number 38780 says, that he was a Nansen citizen and that he was “one of the best informants of the soviet embassy and he was in the pay of the embassy.”¹⁷ Unfortunately, I have been unable to find any evidence of what his plans were and exactly what activity he was involved in. This scandal had a severe impact on “Inner Line”, captain Foss, Brauner, and general Abramov. Due to the scandal, general Abramov lost the trust of the rest of the generals in ROVS and is forced to name a successor – general Archangielski. General Abramov alone has not been kidnapped by the OGPU, which leaves the question – why?

The Russian All-Military Union was an unstable military organization. An army without a state spread across six continents, it faced serious challenges in preserving its unity and achieving its goals. Terror plays a major part in its arsenal, but the union itself is plagued by major failures in defending from it. Two of the commanders in chief are kidnapped, the rest of them, including Abramov, died under mysterious circumstances. During the interwar period in Europe the military, paramilitary, sports organizations with political agendas are in their prime (the Yugoslav Sokol, the Komsomol, Hitlerjugend, Ballila). Political assassinations, purges, sabotages, terrorist attacks, espionage, and ideological struggles characterize every European state. ROVS is no exception, it is a steadfast supporter of the Yugoslav authorities, while at the same time involved in unlawful activities across many other countries. Due to the compact diaspora of Russian immigrants in Bulgaria, western and soviet intelligence services monitor them in addition to their normal intelligence gathering in Bulgaria.

Wrangel’s goal was to unite all military fractions under his command to make sure the Russian army is preserved as an independent entity. The military unions making up ROVS do not disappear and do not change. However, if we recognize the rules and regulations of ROVS as the main military law of the Russian army, its members are interacting with the organization mostly through their member fee alone. This way ROVS never evolves and never accumulates power in stark contrast to the Red Army.

¹⁷ Russian State Military Archive (RGVA), fond 1362K, opis 1, file 5, p. 28

Thursday, 22 August

SHATTERING SIEGFRIED'S SWORD: IMPOSING DISARMAMENT ON GERMANY FROM 1918 TO 1926

Dr. Thomas N. Hauser (USA)

Introduction

When the First World War ended, Great Britain and France were the last great powers of old Europe left standing. As a condition of peace, these allies resolved to nullify the German threat once and for all, and disarmament became inextricably connected to their national security vis-à-vis German power. Scarcely two months following the Armistice, military maneuvers resumed but not on the battlefield. Instead, Allied combatants wielded statistical tables to preserve an uneasy peace, a conflict by other means, no less protracted than the war.

The contrasting approaches to German disarmament between Britain and France during the years 1918 to 1926 are largely explained by their opposing security postures. The French went to great effort to negate the threat of a resurgent German army, while the British aggressively pursued German air and naval disarmament as part of their newfound concern to protect the island nation from new military technologies. Their security dynamic also explains Britain's sway over France in directing Allied disarmament policy and British leniency toward Germany regarding violations of the Versailles Treaty's military clauses.

When the Paris Peace Conference convened in 1919, the French were conscious of their political deficiencies. During the war, without British and American assistance, France would have faced an impending defeat at the hands of Germany. When the United States reverted to an isolationist foreign policy in 1920, the French could not afford to lose Britain as insurance against future German aggression. Despite defeat on the battlefield, Germany's demographic and economic advantage remained intact. Anticipating a revitalized, unchecked German army, ready to cross their borders, the French military leadership expressed little satisfaction with the Armistice, despite witnessing the surrender of thousands of German canons and machine guns as a condition of peace. Moreover, the ensuing Paris Peace Conference was nothing short of a disappointment made clear when the United States and Britain neglected to follow through with their commitments to a defensive alliance.¹ Consequently, the French had to rely on the mechanism of disarmament itself, stipulated in the resulting Treaty of Versailles, as their primary means of security.

For the British, security had a different meaning.² The Armistice compelled

¹ Even after the war, perhaps in a reflexive memory of old balance-of-power politics, a strong faction in the British Foreign Office imagined that France might attempt to gain unilateral hegemony over the Continent.

² In examining this issue in terms of security, the British domestic position drifted toward reconciliation with Germany. The size and structure of the German army did not directly affect British security. Without a navy or air force, British officials saw no imminent threat, and public opinion motivated succeeding British governments in the 1920s to end verification and enforcement. In the interest of withdrawing British forces of occupation in the Rhineland, which were needed for service in the colonial empire, British leaders could only hope for the completion of German disarmament.

the Germans to deliver most of their capital ships and submarines to British naval bases. Only a month later, the Allied Naval Armistice Commission's inspectors were ensuring that German naval fortifications, aerial bombers, and dirigibles were demilitarized. Before the Allies had even convened the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919, the two immediate threats—air and naval attack—to British national security were fated to disappear.³

To ensure compliance, the Treaty of Versailles stipulated a fifteen-year Allied occupation of the German Rhineland territory. The withdrawal of troops was contingent upon a number of limitations, including a Reichswehr—Germany's new peacetime army—no larger than one hundred thousand effectives (or soldiers), complete prohibition of an air force, and a navy no larger than a coast guard. In this way, the Allied verification process had the necessary leverage to coerce German cooperation.

To oversee the surrender and destruction of all excess German war material and the reduction of the German armed forces to prescribed levels, the Treaty mandated the creation of three control commissions—Military, Aeronautical, and Naval—each with a president from either France or Britain.⁴ The presidency of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission (IAMCC) to oversee the disarmament of the Reichswehr was given to a French General, Claude Nollet. The French general staff considered General Nollet a first-rate staff officer, capable of deciphering the arcane details of the German military industrial complex.⁵ The Inter-Allied Aeronautical Control Commission (IAACC) was entrusted to a British air commodore of the Royal Air Force, Edward Masterman, and the Inter-Allied Naval Control Commission (IANCC) was placed under a British Admiral, Sir E.F.B. Charlton.⁶

The Inter-Allied Military Control Commission

The provisions of the Treaty for disarming the Reichswehr proved the most difficult to enforce. French military advisors believed the question of effectives was the primary issue. The British were more concerned with war material, such as the reduction of artillery and munitions. While war material was easily taken into account, verifying the reduction of effectives was problematic: determining who counted as an effective was subjective. Thus, eliminating paramilitary organizations and demilitarizing police forces became a protracted endeavor for the French yet appeared unnecessary to the British.

Within the IAMCC, two senior officers clashed over its operative direction. As president, General Nollet was eager to press Germany in every possible way

³ Terms of the Armistice with Germany, 11 November 1918, Papers of General Tasker Howard Bliss, box 308, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

⁴ The German government was responsible for salaries, accommodations, and all other expenses of the Allied commissions.

⁵ Foch carefully considered his appointment of president of the IAMCC: General Nollet had been a formidable staff officer under his command during the war.

⁶ Organization of IACC, 7 July 1919, Bliss Papers, box 327, S.W.C. 436.

to ensure German commitment to the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty. In contrast, General Sir Francis Bingham, the ranking British officer on the IAMCC, was reluctant to push the Germans on what he saw as insignificant matters. Infighting, mainly between two factions represented by these officers, only served to make their task more political.

Bingham and Nollet frequently debated over the significance of figures. Nollet held that the Germans had enough equipment for an army of 600,000. Bingham, on the other hand, reciting a recurring British argument first used in the Paris Peace Conference, argued that an army of that size is ineffective without artillery; he went on to explain that the Germans had themselves destroyed or surrendered 30,000 guns with only a few more remaining. Indeed, as early as 1922, Bingham, backed by the British embassy in Berlin, was reporting to London that the German threat on land had all but been eliminated.⁷

By 1922, the Reichswehr consisted of one-hundred thousand regulars and was by international standards little more than an internal police force. At this point, the British were satisfied that Germany was no threat to their security or to Europe. Believing in the higher military value of manpower, demography, training, and fighting spirit, the French dominated IAMCC remained wary. They resisted British suggestions of leniency in interpreting the definition of war production in civilian factories and insisted on counting police and militia as military effectives. Consequently, when the IAMCC was disbanded and replaced on 31 January 1927 by the Committee of Experts, answering directly to the British and French embassies in Berlin, the security issues most important to the French remained unresolved. Finally, on 31 January 1930, the Allies disbanded the Committee of Experts yet the issues such as war production, effectives, or fortifications remained unsettled.⁸

The Inter-Allied Aeronautical Control Commission

In contrast to their stance with the Reichswehr, the British did not offer the same leniency in treating the reduction of the German air and naval forces.⁹ For the same reasons that the French felt their security was in jeopardy from the threat of land forces, the British considered air raids or domination of the seas by Germany an unacceptable danger to their national security. Britain, alone among the Allies during the First World War, had experienced sustained strategic bombing from Zeppelins and German aircraft—the Gotha and the Giant. Furthermore, British strategic thinkers

⁷ David G. Williamson, *The British in Germany, 1918-1930: The Reluctant Occupiers* (Oxford, UK: Berg Publisher, 1991), 68; J.H. Morgan, *Assize of Arms: The disarmament of Germany and her Rearmament (1919-1939)* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 155.

⁸ Williamson, 321.

⁹ During the negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference, British air and naval advisers were resolute in demanding that the Germans could have no air force and only a greatly minimized navy, and from this standpoint, British military appointments to the IAACC and IANCC reflected a different attitude in comparison to their more permissive stance toward Germany in matters related to the IAMCC, a source of frustration to the French.

envisioned apocalypse due to the extreme vulnerability of populations and industrial centers to large-scale aerial attack.¹⁰

At the outset, German officials probed for weaknesses in the Treaty's air clauses. They denied inspectors access to aircraft factories. Their deception grew more sophisticated in later months when the German government employed former military aircraft in what they called an "aerial police force" to suppress revolutionaries. The IAACC investigated the matter and reported battle-ready planes at military airfields across Germany. Not long after, Masterman's inspectors discovered a large cache of aerial material hidden in Berlin.¹¹ In response to these violations, the Allied Supreme Council at a conference in Hythe, England, held in May 1920, extended a six-month suspension of German civilian aviation. Unwilling to endure a protracted cessation of commercial air service, German authorities relented and ordered the destruction of the prohibited material. Furthermore, Masterman now had unlimited access to plants and facilities.¹²

In May 1922, the Allies agreed that Germany had reached acceptable targets of aerial disarmament and disbanded the IAACC in favor of a guarantees committee, under British leadership. Finally, in September 1926, the Allies discharged the committee and transferred its functions to the League of Nations.¹³

The Inter-Allied Naval Control Commission

The cooperative relationship between France and Britain was also demonstrative in the workings of the IANCC. Naval security had always been of paramount importance to the British. Before the war, the German surface fleet posed a serious threat to the Royal Navy and to the British lifeline of overseas trade. Germany had also become identified with the submarine, an asymmetric weapon, capable of

¹⁰ Ronald H. Bailey, *Air War in Europe* (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1979), 26-27; The widely read writings of William Mitchell and Giulio Douhet in no small part created a climate that assumed the extreme vulnerability of populations, governmental facilities, and industrial centers from aerial attack, and that future wars would be won or lost through air power.

¹¹ Masterman's Report, CA 40, April 21, 1920, 180.03381/24, NA, RG 256; At the outset, German officials probed for weaknesses in the air clauses. With regard to the inspection of factories for aviation production, the Germans refused the entry of inspectors unless accompanied by a German officer and interpreter. Their refusals were based on an interpretation of articles 202, 205, and 206, which specify the German obligation to provide escorts and interpreters; however, after hearing Masterman's report of such incidents, Foch, immediately followed up with a ruling from Allied governments, giving inspectors of all control commissions the authority to enter any facility at any time. According to Masterman, German authorities were also adept at playing one department against another: "There were no less than 5 departments directly or indirectly responsible for executing the Aeronautical Peace Clauses."

¹² Letter and Annexes from Marshal Foch Concerning Execution of Article 205 of the Treaty: 5th Meeting of February 24th, Conference of Ambassadors 32, February 24, 1920, 180.03301/11, National Archives, Record Group 256; Germany Secret Report: Aerial Police, Conference of Ambassadors 56, October 8, 1921, 180.03301/141, National Archives, Record Group 256; Masterman's Report, Conference of Ambassadors 40, 21 April 1920, 180.03381/24, National Archives, Record Group 256.

¹³ Foreign Office memorandum on Article 213, 26 August 1926, British Archives, FO [Foreign Office], 371/11306/C9498/681/18.

disrupting the naval order. The work of the IANCC, as a means to eliminate German naval power, was considered most critical to British security. In this regard, Britain and France each strived toward a commonly understood goal.

Abiding by the Armistice, the German Navy had already surrendered its surface and submarine fleets into the custody of British naval bases, where they were scrapped or distributed among the Allied navies. According to stipulations in the Treaty, the IANCC was ordered to preside over demobilization of personnel, to take the surrender of warships, and to destroy excess naval material, all within three months.¹⁴ Much of the work left to the IANCC involved uncovering noncompliance with that directive and thereby confiscating any remaining banned German vessels and submarines.

For the most part, the task at hand for the IANCC was picking up the smaller pieces of a once great navy. Nevertheless, the British Admiralty remained concerned about the possibility of an eventual German resurgence on the seas, which necessitated the hunt for any ancillary material that might support naval warfare. As was the case with the Reichswehr and German air forces, the British (believing weaponry won wars) were most concerned with material disarmament.¹⁵

After two years of operating in Germany, the officers of the IANCC grew tired of typical German obstructive tactics and delays. At first the German requests for adjustments of timetables seemed valid; however, by the fall of 1921, Charlton's reports clearly indicated a deliberate obstruction of IANCC efforts. The Allies therefore responded to this problem as well as an earlier act of large-scale sabotage by imposing a material penalization, thereby ordering the German navy to deliver 275,000 tons of floating docks, cranes, tugboats, salvage ships, and dredgers to Allied ports. Under Allied concerted pressure, the German government submitted and fell in line with IANCC expectations. Charlton proved as rigorous an enforcer of the naval clauses of the Treaty as Nollet was of the military clauses. Furthermore, the admiral's attitude toward disarmament stood in stark contrast to that of the British officers in the IAMCC toward Reichswehr reductions. The IANCC disbanded on 30 September 1924 following the results of a comprehensive inspection of all German forces.¹⁶

Conclusion

In examining the issue of disarmament in terms of security, the British position is telling. They were willing to support the operations of the IAACC and IANCC to the fullest extent. British officers commanded both of these commissions, and their staffs were largely composed of their own experts. Moreover, British and French officers

¹⁴ Naval, Military, and Air Conditions of Peace, Conference of Ambassadors, 25, June 25, 1919, 185.116/1, National Archives, Record Group 256; Article 54 of the Versailles Treaty called for the IANCC to function in all German naval yards concerning execution of the naval clauses to supervise the break-up of unfinished ships, and to take delivery of surface ships, submarines, docks, salvage ships, and related material.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Conference of Ambassadors Minutes, Conference of Ambassadors, 43, May 21, 1920, 180.033/43, National Archives, Record Group 256; Final Quarterly Report of Progress, 30 September 1924, British Archives, ADM [Admiralty], 116/2113.

in these commissions worked well together toward what they sensed as a common purpose. Unlike Bingham and his supporters in the IAMCC, Masterman and Charlton made few exceptions for German violations, and their work measured up to British and French satisfaction such that the major issues of aerial and naval disarmament were resolved by 1924. The IAMCC, on the other hand, still had open issues of serious contention going into the next decade.¹⁷

The German leaders of the next decade, particularly those of the Nazi regime, were keenly aware of contrasting Allied political interests based on security. In the same way that the famous war theoretician, Karl von Clausewitz, once proclaimed that “war was nothing but the continuation of state policy by other means,” the politics of German disarmament was the continuation of war (World War I) by other means (ongoing toward World War II). Strategically, Germany had overturned the old European order to become the dominant power before the First World War had started, and during the interwar period, Germany remained intact and retained the potential to threaten Europe with the creation of a new war machine.¹⁸ Without a carefully concerted security policy, the Allies could not hope to contain Germany. Accordingly, British and French security required cooperation, and coerced German disarmament had to succeed. Only after its implementation, however, did the Allies come to realize that security could also be a divisive issue, impeding their efforts to disarm Germany.¹⁹

¹⁷ French concerns about their security were somewhat satisfied in the Locarno agreements of 1925 as they had a firm guarantee from Britain against German aggression as well as assurances from Germany to honor the existing boundaries of Western Europe. Under German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann’s guidance, the Germans provided a token of compliance toward the outstanding military control issues. By February 1927, the Allies withdrew the IAMCC, even though the disarmament issues for the Reichswehr remained unsettled. Despite festering resentment in France over military disarmament, the political atmosphere no longer supported an Allied front to coerce the German government into complying. After the Ruhr crisis (1923 to 1925), the French realized that German disarmament could only extend as far as British support would allow, and the acceptance of the Dawes Plan of 1924 effectively deprived the French of diplomatic initiative against Germany in European affairs. Consequently, they followed the British lead to seek security through the diplomacy of reconciliation with Germany, starting with the Locarno agreements.

¹⁸ The strategic problem in Europe for the Allies was that Germany had long been a major security concern. Its growth in power since the 1890s reshaped the international system. The situation after the First World War was no different; remaining relatively intact, Germany retained the potential to build a new war machine and threaten the political stability of Europe. Unless Germany was pacified or partitioned, the power structure of 1919 was vulnerable to revision.

¹⁹ Michael Howard, *Clausewitz* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 34.

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UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF IMPERIAL AIRPOWER: CANADA, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGES OF CREATING A NATIONAL AIR FORCE 1919–1924

Dr. Richard Mayne (Canada)

A number of former British colonies, such as Canada, made a significant contribution to the air campaigns of the First World War. Indeed, this Dominion in particular had an impressive record as over 15,000 Canadians served with British forces in the Royal Flying Corps (RFC), Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS), and later the Royal Air Force (RAF); not to mention the fact that it was also responsible for some of the Empire's greatest aces.¹ The pride that Canadians felt in these achievements led to the creation of their own national air force between 1920 and 1924, which was completely independent from the RAF as it had its own separate uniform, maple leaf emblazoned badges, motto, as well as culture. Yet only a few years later this fledgling and distinctly Canadian Air Force (CAF) did a complete reversal as in the words of one of Canada's leading military historians: "On April 1st 1924... the Royal Canadian Air Force [RCAF] was re-born as, in most respects, a faithful colonial replica [of the RAF]."²

The key question to this mystery, therefore, is why Canada, which was so emboldened by an impressive combat record between 1914 and 1918, abandoned these postwar efforts to develop an air force that was distinctly Canadian in nature? At first glance the most obvious culprit is Great Britain who was in the process of building an Imperial Air Force that needed its Commonwealth partners to help respond to the Empire's postwar defence requirements. For the sake of standardization, therefore, they assumingly would want these forces to mimic and be integrated into the RAF in times of emergency. Yet this paper will argue that the British actually understood and respected Canada's specific needs, and as a result the answer to this key question not only rests much closer to home, but also with the unresolved air power issues that emerged after the First World War. It will further use this story to draw larger conclusions on how Western style militaries transition from war to peace, and the impact, as well as unresolved issues, which these trends have had on their ability to provide airpower in future times of need.

Canadian interest in developing a national air force did not have an auspicious start. The first venture was led by civilians whose 1909 attempt to show the military value of aviation to a disinterested Canadian government did little more than result in

¹ Canada's top aces include Billy Bishop, William Barker and Raymond Collishaw. While Canada should be proud of this achievement it is interesting to note that one of these aces, Collishaw, felt that "there is a strong belief in Canada that Canadians generally did better in the air than the English pilots did. This belief was fostered by the Canadian press, which tended to glorify [matters]. However, the whole idea is fake." Collishaw to Wilf Curtis, 23 October 1965, Library and Archives Canada [hereafter cited as LAC], Curtis Papers, MG 31 G9, File 8.

² Desmond Morton, "A Non-Operational Air Force, 1924-1931," in William March, ed. *Sic Itur Ad Astra: Canadian Aerospace Power Studies, Vol. 3, Combat if Necessary, but not Necessarily Combat*, (Canadian Forces Publication, Trenton, ON, 2011) 1.

the crash of the demonstration aircraft. The next attempt did not fare much better. In response to the outbreak of the First World War, another civilian managed to convince the Minister of Militia, Sir Sam Hughes, to authorize the creation of the Canadian Aviation Corps (CAC) in September 1914. Lasting a mere four months, the CAC ended with the near arrest of its founder and the death of its only pilot in February 1915.

The next two attempts to establish a Canadian Air Force were more serious. Consisting of an overseas Canadian Air Wing in 1918, as well as a naval air service, these attempts were more tangible and caught the attention of British officials. As noted in British planning documents, thirty five percent of the RAF at this time consisted of Canadians and that led one RAF officer to the troubling conclusion that “under the Air Force Act every one of them can walk out of the door to-morrow [sic] and return to the Canadian service unless this service is definitely part of the Royal Air Force.”³ Other RAF reports sounded a similar alarm and went even further as it was noted that the development of independent Canadian air services would drain future RAF recruitment, and, worse yet, could set a dangerous precedence that other Commonwealth countries, most notably Australia, might follow. As such, some key RAF planners saw the Canadian desire to create its own wartime national air services as a very serious matter, one that had to be “boldly” discouraged so as to avoid a “wastage of man power and a lack of cohesion to the war effort.”⁴ In the end, however, both the Royal Canadian Navy’s Air Service and the overseas Canadian Air Force failed due to a lack of interest from the government.

Yet the concept of a national Air Force stumbled along into the postwar period, and some in Britain again remained leery of these efforts. Indeed, postwar planners faced a world where Great Britain had a considerable empire to police, but after four years of global conflict they would have limited resources to do so. Documents related to Canada’s role in Imperial Defence identify that some RAF officers saw Britain’s Commonwealth as the key to the Empire’s future air defence needs, particularly since it was observed that “the enemy of tomorrow might be closer to a Dominion than to England.” It was therefore felt that one option for Great Britain would be to get Canada and the other Dominions to commit to an Imperial air force that was standardized with common aircraft, equipment, as well as uniform and would be ready “to strike at a moment’s notice” because, it was determined, “if we fail again [in the global arena] retribution will be swift and final.” As such, this particular view of a postwar Canadian air force called for a singular, and interoperable, service that could work as closely as possible with the RAF, but there was a realization that such a force also had to be designed to meet the defence needs of Canada.⁵ In fact, a closer examination of key postwar diplomatic papers between the two nations indicate that while it made more operational sense from a British perspective to have its Commonwealth contribute to

³ Canadian Naval Air Service; Important points, nd (circa 1918), National Archives (United Kingdom) [hereafter cited as NA (UK)], AIR 1/461/15/32/108.

⁴ FO2 document, 8 June 1918, NA (UK), AIR 1/461/15/32/108

⁵ Royal Canadian Air Service proposal, nd (circa 1919), NA (UK), AIR 1/461/15/32/108; The future of Air Power, nd (circa 1919), NA (UK), AIR 1/461/15/32/108

one Imperial Air Force, it nevertheless fully understood and appreciated the growing nationalism among its ex-colonies.

Aviation in Canada had developed quickly over the course of the war as, aside from directly helping to man Britain's air services, the country was also responsible for the creation of a large aircrew training plan known as the "RFC in Canada," and had developed an aircraft industry that was feeding a burgeoning national air infrastructure. The problem was that Canada had not given much thought to how it would regulate a new technology that had grown by leaps and bounds since the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. It was for this reason that the Canadian government started to explore the concept of creating air-related policies, and it was only natural that they turned to Great Britain for help in early 1919 for advice.

The RAF took this matter seriously and recommended a number of structures that differed in size and scope. For instance, one modest proposal looked to create an air force that would consist of one day fighter and one bomber squadron, as well as an Air Directorate, Wing Headquarters, Repair Depot, and Training Squadron, which would be supported by a total complement of 75 officers and 625 Men.⁶ Realizing that a war weary Canadian government was unlikely to spend large sums on any peacetime military forces, the aim here, therefore, was to create a Canadian Air force that was small enough to maintain during a period of postwar retrenchment, but also had a core capability that quickly could expand in time of emergency. Other recommendations were more elaborate including one that called for a force of five day fighter and six bomber squadrons, but overall the RAF was offering realistic advice that was sensitive to unique Canadian requirements and their desire to have an organization that was independent from the Empire's needs.⁷ In fact, this direction came from the very top as the RAF's Assistant Chief of the Air Staff wrote to his boss on 17 March 1919 that "we cannot be too careful as regards the arguments put forward."⁸

In the end, the RAF passed on some truly sage advice to the Canadians. First, it was considered essential that the Canadian government have ultimate responsibility over its own air policy (both military and civilian). Second, learning from its own experience with command and control, the RAF stressed that Canadian aviation had to be placed under one single authority within the government or it will suffer from "every sort of muddle and abuse." In their view, this was particularly important for Canada "with its vast distances and unlimited possibilities for expansion," as a lack of central control could easily become "a matter of very deep regret in the years to come."⁹

⁶ Air Staff of proposed Canadian Air Force Establishment, nd (March or June 1919), NA (UK), AIR 2/122.

⁷ Minute sheet dated 16 June 1919 and Aerial Expansion – with particular care to Canada, NA (UK), AIR 1/461/15/32/108

⁸ A/CAS to CAS, 17 March 1919, NA (UK), AIR 2/122; Minute note to CAS, circa 25 March 1919, NA (UK), AIR 2/122.

⁹ Aerial Expansion – with particular experience to Canada, (nd June 1919), NA (UK), AIR 2/122; Leckie, Proceedings of CAFA Convention, 22 June 1921, Directorate of History and Heritage [Here after cited as DHH], 181.003 (D2716).

But it was the next set of recommendations that were perhaps the most significant because they actually captured a key part of the Canadian Air Force's identity that has survived to this day. In specific, the British observed that there should be an "Imperial side" to any new Canadian Air Force as the Canada's security would always depend on larger geopolitical and alliance commitments. Equally important, in their view, was the need for a Canadian air force to remain relevant to its own government in times of peace by conducting non-military activities such as forestry patrols, assistance to civil law enforcement authorities (such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police), survey and mapping work as well as maritime customs air reconnaissance. Put simply, by telling Canadian planners that they had to create an air force that would always be "more efficient and economical to the government," the RAF had laid out the blue print for the RCAF's infamous "bush pilots in uniform" whose pioneering efforts as a military force with civilian applications ensured the survival of the Canadian Air Force during the lean interwar years.¹⁰

Nor did the assistance end there. With a surplus of wartime materiel at their disposal, an offer was made by the British government on 4 June 1919 to provide aircraft free of charge to any Commonwealth member that wanted to start an air force of its own to assist with Imperial defence.¹¹ Slated to receive approximately one hundred aircraft, Canadian negotiators quickly realized that the types of aircraft being offered, while good for Imperial defence, were not ideal for Canadian conditions. Canada needed at least some flying boats since its rugged and largely undeveloped wilderness produced many lakes and rivers that made wonderful impromptu natural runways for seaplanes in a country where airfields were few and far between.¹² The Canadians fought hard to get their way as in late October 1919, one negotiator wrote how "In the meantime Major MacLaren and I are having a wonderful battle with the Air Ministry regarding types of machines and it looks as if we are going to win," while yet another observed that "I have at last gotten a little satisfaction from the Air Ministry regarding flying boats...and I am sure will greatly facilitate the carrying out of flying operations in Canada."¹³

At this juncture, therefore, it appeared that Canada, with the active support of Britain, was well on its way to creating a uniquely national air force that met both its Imperial obligations and its own distinctive requirements. As result, while this exonerates the British, it still leaves unanswered the question of why the CAF

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Milner to Governor General of Canada, 4 June 1919, LAC, RG 24, Vol 5088, file HQ 1021-3-14, vol. 1.

¹² JA Webster to Director Air Serves Canada, 26 June 1919, LAC, RG 24, Vol 5088, file HQ 1021-3-14, vol. 1; Vice Chairman memo, 28 July 1919, LAC, RG 24, Vol 5088, file HQ 1021-3-14, vol. 1.

¹³ Leckie to Wilson, 30 October 1919, LAC, Wilson Papers, MG 30 E 243 vol.1 reel C17709-5. This letter indicated that F2a flying boats were much better for Canadian needs than Sopwith Camels or SE5As. MacLaren to Biggar, 20 November 1919, LAC, RG 24, Vol 5088, file HQ 1021-3-14, vol. 1; Unknown author (likely MacLaren) to Wilson, 23 October 1919, LAC, Wilson Papers, MG 30 E 243 vol.1 reel C17709-5. This letter in particular shows the Canadians working hard to get aircraft they need to meet Canadian requirements and environments.

reinvented itself as a colonial replica called the Royal Canadian Air Force four years later. The first real hint to this mystery can be found from one Canadian official who, having met with the RAF's Chief of Air Staff, Sir Hugh Trenchard, in October 1919 observed how:

I had a short interview with General Trenchard, who, I am afraid is rather disappointed with the Canadian Government not seeing their way to maintain a fighting force. I assured him I thought it would not be very many years before a Force such as he wished would be in being in Canada but that at present we had to be content with a start on a small scale and must convince our government and educate our public before any large development could be expected. He agreed that it was far better to start on a small scale and work up than have a large programme have to be out down and perhaps disrupted altogether. ...¹⁴

These words perfectly capture what would happen next as the birth and demise of a distinctly post war Canadian Air Force began and ended with the national government.

The first thing that must be understood in this process was that the desire to create a national air force was not truly spearheaded by the government. Instead, it originated with a group of proud Canadians who felt that their hard-earned victories with the RFC and RNAS over the battlefields of the First World War were often unfairly lumped into those of the larger British Empire, rather than reflecting the efforts of a young and independent nation that was coming of age through the blood of its sons and the cruelty of war. It was this spirit that created the desire to form an air force, which, while still supporting the Empire, would be completely identifiable as a separate and independent Canadian organization. Thanks to the British, the Canadian were well on their way to achieving this aim as they now had an instant air force of over 100 aircraft as well as having received advice from an ally that had learned much during its own path to creating the organization that would become the RAF.

Unfortunately that was as about as far as the Canadian Air Force's luck lasted. Despite the passing of the Air Board Act in 1919, which created the postwar organizational framework for how both civilian and military aviation would be administered in Canada, the government's financial cuts in a period of post war austerity began almost immediately which meant that the force was never given the support that it needed to be viable.¹⁵ Comments from one politician that the cost of the CAF was "a pretty high price to pay for an air service in peace time," were matched by others who argued that the "high cost of a military [aviation] force would cause it to be so small in peacetime as to be negligible in war."¹⁶ Perhaps the most concerning

¹⁴ Unknown author (likely Wilson) to Bigger, 16 October 1919, LAC, Wilson Papers, MG 30 E 243 vol.1 reel C17709-5

¹⁵ Aviation in Canada, 16 September 1920, DHH, 74/273; James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1964), 196; JA Wilson, "The Influence of Civil Aviation in the Development of Canadian Air Power," DHH, Wilson Papers, 76/271, Box 2, file 15. The Air Board Act created three main branches and two smaller ones – namely, a civilian Certificate (or Licencing) branch, flying operations branch and a militia-based air force, along with two smaller Engineering and Administrative branches – that were designed to govern all aeronautics in Canada.

¹⁶ Hansard, 1921 Session, Vol. IV, (23 May 1921), pp. 3899-3906; Hitchins, *Air Board, CAF, and RCAF, 1919-1939*, 11.

comment, however, came from the Minister of Reconstruction who, it was reported, had argued that he doubted that “Canada would ever need an air service.”¹⁷

Given these attitudes it should not be surprising that the CAF never rose to being anything more than an air militia of ex-wartime flyers who were effectively members of what one observer noted was an “air force in name but not fact.”¹⁸ Accounts from men who served in this air force between 1920 and 1924 clearly bear this out as one called it the organization’s “bow and arrow days,” while others wondered “...why enlist in the CAF when the civil Operations Branch pays more. There are excellent mechanics who would be very willing to serve if they got permanent employment... [rather] than a large number of [part time] men who are hard up, and come up simply for a job and to have a holiday.”¹⁹ Even blunter was the observation that the lack of funding and support from the government had created a situation among the CAF’s members where “It leads to a policy which seems to be Eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we are fired.”²⁰

For the military leadership of the CAF the answer to these problems was simple, if their organization was to survive they had to become a permanent as well as professional force that, as the British had advised, could make itself relevant to the government by performing domestic civilian tasks as well as military ones.²¹ And in their mind there was no better model of a professional or stable air organization than the RAF. It therefore became something that not only was worth emulating, but also in a brilliant manoeuvre it was realized that acquiring Britain’s permission to add the “Royal” title to the Canadian Air Force’s name and adopting its customs and traditions offered the best chance to ensure the future of military aviation in Canada. Put simply, this tactic meant that future cash strapped Canadian governments could not simply scrap a newly minted RCAF without the fear of embarrassing the British monarchy.²²

¹⁷ JA Wilson, *The Influence of Civil Aviation in the Development of Canadian Air Power*, DHH, Wilson Papers, 76/271, Box 2, file 15.

¹⁸ Hitchins, *Air Board, CAF and RCAF, 1919-1939*, vol.1, (Ottawa, Canadian War Museum Mercury Series, 1972), p.106; No author, “The Second Oldest Air Force,” *Pathfinder*, Issue 114, June 2009, 2.

¹⁹ Logan to Hitchins, 18 October 1959, DHH, Logan Papers, 75/117, file 26; Col. Joy, Proceedings of CAFA Convention, 22 June 1921, DHH, 181.003 (D2716).

²⁰ Col. Joy, Proceedings of CAFA Convention, Camp Borden, 22 June 1921, DHH, 181.003 (D 2716); Rachel Lea Heide, “After the Emergency: Political Statements, and the Moral Economy in Canada’s Air Forces, 1919-1946,” in Howard Coombs ed., *The Insubordinate and the Non-compliant: Case Studies of Canadian Mutiny and Disobedience, 1920 to Present*, (Toronto, Dundurn, 2008), 179-183, 202. There were at least two known cases of mutiny among Canadian air members around the end of the First World War and in both instances the causes of the insurrection, which consisted of air men refusing to parade or carry out orders, were attributed to a desire for better treatment, conditions of service, pay and clarification on demobilization policies. “Poor leadership and transgressing the men’s sense of self-respect” were also attributed as mitigating factors’ to the disturbances, while “slovenly deportment” within the Air Force was seen as contributing to the general state of low morale.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Logan, Proceedings of CAFA Convention, 22 June 1921, DHH, 181.003 (D2716); Logan to Hitchins, 12 July 1955, and Hitchins to Logan, 21 July 1955, DHH, Logan Papers, 75/117, file 26; Logan to Manning, 29 June 1960, DHH, Logan Papers, 75/117, file 26; Proceedings of

In the end, this strategy worked. After five failed previous attempts to establish a national air force, the RCAF came into existence and has survived to the point where it is now quickly approaching its Centennial. While the civil servants and military men responsible for the creation of the RCAF received accolades for making the best use of the Imperial gift of aircraft,²³ and fortunately had received good, although at times admittedly self-serving,²⁴ advice from the RAF, they nevertheless had to make the difficult choice to abandon an air force with a uniquely Canadian identity to ensure that the organization had a fighting chance to live. That they had to do so was the product of Canadian governments that have historically had little interest in supporting the cost of preparing for war in times of peace. As such, the story of its birth shows that from the beginning, the RCAF's survival was the product of its ability to have "plug and play interoperability" with its principle benefactor, which was Britain but now is the United States, as well as justifying its relevance through domestic responsibilities; all of which is designed to maintain a core capability that can expand effectively in times of emergency. But the true problem for modern air force planners, much like those who built the Canadian Air Force in the early 1920s, is that they rarely get the resources they need to do these international and domestic requirements properly and this results in a systemic problem where an inability to maintain that core capability in peace can lead to disaster in times of emergency, or worse yet, war.

CAFA Convention, 22 June 1921, DHH, 181.003 (D2716). The CAF's most senior officer was not convinced and he instead used this occasion to shore up fissures within the CAF by observing that: "The King would grant the privilege if only having regard to what Canadians did in the RAF during the war. We do not like the King to be mentioned with a thing that is not going to be a success... Unless we are certain, unless we are quite satisfied the CAF is going to go on, we do not like to ask members of the Royal Family to accept posts, when some threatens resignation. It fills one with sinister forebodings."

²³ JA Wilson, Proceedings of CAFA Convention, 22 June 1921, DHH, 181.003 (D2716). Wilson noted at this conference that "One other point, we have only been able to start and maintain the CAF because of the gift material we have received from the old country..." Departmental Committee, 7 February 1922, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 3517, file 866-17-1 (Report from Director of flying operations. The opinion had been expressed also that Canada had made more profitable use of the gift of aircraft than any other Dominion); Interdepartmental Committee Member, 15 November 1923, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 3577. (Notes how British Government gifted aircraft and material in the amount of 6 million dollars. Wing Commander Gordon notes that "it was only through the medium of this gift material, we [were able to] do any flying.") JS Scott, Memorandum on Civil Operations by the Royal Canadian Air Force during 1925, 25 February 1925, LAC, RG 24, Vol 3577, file 866-20-23 This latter memo noted that "The work of the past four years has been done, to a very large extent, on aircraft which were received a [sic] gifts from the Imperial Government after the Armistice. The replacement of those war type machines by other more suitable for the conditions met with in Canada, was commenced two years ago and some progress has been made in developing new types specifically designed for the work. Apart from financial limitations, the production of new types of aircraft takes time, as the conditions of our civil operations are particular to Canada and our own experience is therefore our only guide."

²⁴ Committee of Imperial Defence, 4 and 12 October 1923, NA (UK), AIR 19-116, 4740; Empire Air Co-operation, 16 January 1924, NA (UK) CO 886-10-6318.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS, AND SLOVENES: THE ROLE OF THE COOLIDGE MISSION

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Serbia in 1914 was a sideshow that evoked no great importance in or from the United States. The Impression conveyed by *The New York Times* is that for most Americans the Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia was of little importance except for the fact that it might lead to a greater European conflict. On July 29, 1914, the day that Austria declared war on Serbia, *The New York Times* expressed sympathy and understanding for Austria. It editorialized, "It was natural that the Austrian government and people should resolve to punish not only the immediate perpetrators of the crime, but the people they held to be responsible for it."¹ In an editorial on August 4, 1914, the *New York Times* paraphrased Bismarck. It declared, "All that Europe is preparing to fight for is 'not worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier.'" It expressed no sympathy for Serbia but lamented the breach of the balance of power in 1908, "when Austria rent the Treaty of Berlin in twain by annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina. Germany countenanced that lawless act and protected the perpetrator. Nothing that Austria now threatens can so seriously affect the interests of Russia as that foray."²

Dr. David Starr Jordan, former president of Stanford University and peace activist, agreed that the Serbian conflict was of little consequence in itself. It was significant only because of the general conflict which it precipitated. "When the war began, it had very little meaning. It was the Third Balkan War brought on as the other wars by intrigues of rival despotisms."³

The official representative of the United States to Romania, Serbia, and Bulgaria, Charles Vopicka, thought differently. According to Vopicka, "The hand of tyranny was raised against a people whose freedom had been bought with their own blood." He viewed, "the subjection of a free people as only the first move to gain (Austro-Hungarian and hence German) commercial and political supremacy ... Serbia was only a pawn to be swept aside as the first obstacle in the path of world conquest."⁴ Vopicka left Belgrade on the last steamer before the Austrian attack.⁵ For the remainder of the war he concentrated on Romania, the interests of which he became a fervent supporter.

The eventual entry of the United States into World War I ultimately benefitted Serbia. However, the United States was not expressly concerned about Serbia, and especially not in the creation of a greater Serbia. The entry of the United States tipped the balance in favor of the Allies. Its entry prevented a German victory, and prevented the war from resulting in a draw with a compromise settlement. The complete defeat

¹ Editorial "Austria's War with Servia," *New York Times*, 29 July 1914, p. 8.

² Editorial, "Kings going forth to War," *New York Times*, 2 August 1914, p. 14.

³ David Starr Jordan, "The Meaning of the War," *New York Times*, 23 Sept. 1914, p. 2.

⁴ Charles Vopicka, *Secrets of the Balkans: Seven Years of a Diplomat's Life in the Storm Centre of Europe* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1921), p. xi.

⁵ Vopicka, p. 30

of Germany and the defeat and collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire provided the opportunity to create a Greater Serbia. This unintended consequence was not the objective of the United States.

When the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917, it did not declare war on Austria-Hungary. In fact, it long opposed the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Instead, it supported autonomy for the constituent nationalities of Austria-Hungary. Although the United States did eventually declare war on the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it did not do so until December 7, 1917, eight months after its declaration of war on Germany. It only did so then because of concern that the intervention of the United States might be required to prevent the collapse of Italy. In addition, the United States never declared war on Bulgaria, and, to the end was sympathetic to Bulgaria. The United States continued to regard Bulgarian claims to Macedonia justified on the basis of ethnicity. The United States also supported the retrocession of Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria.⁶ All of this was of no avail.⁷

The United States with its self-described and vaunted support for the principle of nationalities was to a degree a by-stander to the epic creation of a Greater Serbia. Wilson informed Congress on December 4, 1917, three days before the United States declared war on Austria-Hungary, that the United States did not desire to “impair or rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire.”⁸ On January 8, 1918, Wilson in his Fourteen Points denounced secret treaties, called for autonomy within the Austro-Hungarian Empire rather than dismemberment, and merely the evacuation and restoration of Serbia rather than the fulfillment of its national aspirations.⁹

⁶ Sherman David Spector, *Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study of the Diplomacy of Ioan I.C. Brătianu*. (New York: Bookman Associates, 1962), p. 57. In London the ambassadors of Serbia, Romania, and Greece lodged a protest with the United States ambassador against Wilson's failure to recommend a declaration of war against Bulgaria. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917*. Supplement 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946), I:476-7. Henceforth *FRUS*

For the US government's “Memorandum Regarding the Inadvisability of a Declaration of War by the United States against Turkey and Bulgaria at the Present Time,” and “Notes on Arguments Why the United States should not declare War against Turkey and Bulgaria Just at Present,” see *FRUS, 1917*. Supplement 2, I:448-452. See also *FRUS 1917*, sup. 1 (Washington, 1931), p. 116.

⁷ Gerwarth, Robert, *The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016), p. 209. According to Gerwarth, “Proportionate to its size and GDP, Bulgaria faced the highest reparations bill of all the Central Powers.”

The Treaty of Neuilly, in the opinion of American analysts, was unduly harsh. Bulgaria, in addition to losing territories that were indisputably Bulgarian, was forced to hand over the strategic border towns of Strumica, Caribrod, and Bosilegrad to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes [henceforth KSCS], as well as livestock, railroad equipment, and 50,000 tons of coal a year.

⁸ <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29558>

“We owe it, however, to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not propose or desire to dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters, great or small. We shall hope to secure for the peoples of the Balkan peninsula and for the people of the Turkish Empire the right and opportunity to make their own lives safe, their own fortunes secure against oppression or injustice and from the dictation of foreign courts or parties.”

⁹ President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, 8 January 1918, Avalon Project, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp

Nevertheless, on October 19, 1918, Wilson in reply to Emperor Karl's request for an armistice announced that Article 10 of the Fourteen Points had been altered. Instead of calling for autonomous development of nationalities within Austria-Hungary, the United States now called for self-determination for these nationalities. That change accommodated the earlier support of the United States for an independent Czechoslovak state. It also accepted a limited expansion of Romania beyond its 1916 frontiers and the creation of the new state of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.¹⁰

The United States had not been alone in initially ignoring South Slavic calls for independence. Although the United States recognized the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes on February 7, 1919,¹¹ it was not recognized by Great Britain and France until June 1919 with the conclusion of the Versailles Treaty.¹²

The most significant contributions of the United States to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were to oppose the maximum claims of Italy along the Dalmatian coast, to call for a partition of the Banat along linguistic and community lines, and to accept the absorption of the state of Montenegro by the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

All of these decisions were influenced by the Coolidge Mission. Archibald Cary Coolidge was assigned on December 27, 1918, by the US delegation to the Paris Peace Conference to set up a Mission based at Vienna "to observe political conditions in Austria-Hungary and neighboring countries," and "to enter into appropriate negotiations with the Governments of Germany and Austria Hungary."¹³ Coolidge was a Harvard Historian, who had been appointed earlier to Wilson's Inquiry group to provide data and recommendations to President Wilson with regard to the post-war settlement. Coolidge chose for the staff of his Mission six American soldiers and two professors, assisted by four other officers, who served as couriers.¹⁴ The highest ranking of Coolidge's military agents was Col. Sherman Miles, who had been the US military attaché to the Balkans from 1912 to 1914.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

¹⁰ Gerwarth, p. 215. Despite Wilson's attacks on the Italians for violating the principle of nationality, his hypocrisy was evident when it came to the fate of ethnic Germans, Hungarians, and colonial peoples. Gerwarth was absolutely correct when he wrote, "The large ethnic minorities in these new nation states (formed at the end of the war) made it abundantly clear that 'self-determination' was only granted to peoples considered allies of the Entente, and not to their wartime enemies."

¹¹ Gerwarth, p. 180.

¹² Gerwarth, p. 326.

¹³ The Secretary of State to U.S. Department of State to Pleasant Alexander Stovall, the US Ambassador in Switzerland, 26 Dec 1918, Paris Peace Conference 184.011/9a, *FRUS 1919, The Paris Peace Conference*, (Washington: Government Printing House, 1931), II:218.

¹⁴ Coolidge to the Secretary of the US Commission to negotiate the Peace (Grew), 27 Dec 1918, Paris Peace Conference 184.011/15, *FRUS 1919, The Paris Peace Conference*. II:219.

The issue of the Banat was settled through compromise. Charles Vopicka before November 1918, had supported the transfer of the entire Banat to Romania.¹⁵ The invasion of the Banat by Serbia on November 15, led him to argue for partition based upon language and culture, which would and did give Romania approximately two thirds of the Temes district.

Coolidge sent representatives of his Mission to the Banat. Their interviews supported Vopicka's revised assessment. Coolidge summarized their findings: "The Banat should be divided. The arguments in favor of its unity are weak. The Roumanians should be given the eastern portion, the Serbs a block in the south, and the rest left to the Hungarians." Coolidge added, "a boundary established on these principles will satisfy nobody, but will represent an approximation to justice."¹⁶

The Conference gave Romania all of Krossó-Szörény or Caras-Severin, two-thirds of Temes, and a small portion of Torontál. The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes received most of Torontál and one third of Temes. Hungary was allowed to retain a small section near Szeged.

The issue of Montenegro proved more problematic. Mischa Glenny writes, "Insurgency had gripped large parts of Kosovo, Montenegro, and Macedonia where the Serbian army and assorted vigilantes were imposing a centralized regime in the teeth of dogged resistance by the non-Serb populations."¹⁷ Civil war had erupted in Montenegro between the "Greens," who were unwilling to see their state absorbed by Serbia and its royal family ousted, and the "Whites," who supported a greater Serbia. The Italians did their best to thwart the development of a strong South Slav state. Italy shipped 300 "Greens" across the Adriatic to Montenegro, where they were joined by 3,000 opponents of Serbia. However, their attempt to take the capital Cetinje failed and they were forced to retreat by the "Whites."¹⁸

On January 9, 1919, after receiving a personal appeal from King Nicholas, Wilson wrote to Lansing, "I am inclined to advise and request that you have a very frank talk with the representatives of Serbia and say how much distress and what serious questions are arising in our minds because of the dealings of Serbia with Montenegro. Undoubtedly the sympathies of the people of the United States are as much with Montenegro as with Serbia. Our people have always admired the sturdy independence of the little kingdom, and feel that the whole cause of Yugoslavia is being embarrassed and prejudiced by the apparent efforts to decide by arms what ought to be decided by pacific arrangement and consent."¹⁹

¹⁵ Vopicka, 264. Vopicka to Lansing, December 19, 1918, 763.72119/3769, *FRUS, The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, II:399-400.

¹⁶ "New Frontiers in Former Austria-Hungary," Memorandum by Professor A. C. Coolidge, March 10, 1919, 185.212/5, *FRUS 1919, The Paris Peace Conference (1919)*, XII:276.

¹⁷ Mischa Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999* (New York: Viking, 2000), p. 369.

¹⁸ Gerwarth, p.198. See Srdja Pavlovic, *Balkan Anschluss: The Annexation of Macedonia and the Creation of a South Slavic State*, (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2008), p. 153.

¹⁹ Wilson to Lansing, Secretary of State, 9 January 1919, 772.73.7, *FRUS 1919: The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 12:367-368.

On May 30, 1919, Secretary of State Robert Lansing recommended that Wilson accept the recommendations of Col. Sherman Miles. Miles recommended that “the solution of the Montenegrin question, which would best meet the wishes of the people concerned, is the incorporation of this country into Yugo-Slavia under guarantees of autonomy and the protection of local rights.”²⁰

Miles warned, “It is practically certain that even under these conditions the Serbians would use means of repression for political control of Montenegro...” Miles added, “There are two other solutions. One is to abandon Montenegro wholly to Serbian control, which would be a political crime.” Which, it should be noted, is exactly what happened. “The other,” in which he displayed a typically American form of cultural arrogance, “is to reconstitute Montenegro as an independent state. I think this latter solution would be almost as great a mistake as the former because the barren mountainous district called Montenegro is geographically unfitted for self-sustained independence, and there is no possible government for an independent Montenegro except the dynasty of King Nicholas ... all indications seem to show that he is discredited and despised by a majority of his people ... he is an old man and his sons are degenerates, utterly unfit to rule.” Miles added in a paternalistic imperial fashion, “the country as a whole would profit ... by direct contact with the higher civilization of the other Yugo-Slav States.”²¹ In line with the suggestion of Miles, the United States did not support the continued existence of a separate Montenegrin state.

One area where the United States played a role in restraining the ambitions of the Croats and Slovenes, if not the Serbs, was in regard to Carinthia and Styria. In late 1918 and early 1919, 10,000 Serbian and Slovenian soldiers fought in ethnically mixed Carinthia in an effort to forcibly annex it. Resistance against the Serb occupation by Austrian paramilitaries continued until a referendum was held in October 1920.²²

In January 1919, Col. Miles led a delegation from the Coolidge Mission, which played an important role in the determination of the frontier in Carinthia in favor of Austria. Miles and Lieut. LeRoy King traveled to Graz on January 27, 1919, to meet with delegations representing the Austro-Germans and the Slovenes. When the parties reached an impasse, and Miles feared that fighting between the two groups would resume, he intervened. He offered to demark a frontier between the two sides. Instead of a border along the Drava River, which had been favored by the Yugoslavs as well as the British and French, Miles successfully promoted a border further to the south along the Karawanks, which preserved the economic unity of the Klagenfurt basin. Miles asserted that many Slovenes preferred this solution. The initial response of the US Commission to Negotiate the Peace at Paris was quite negative. It complained to Coolidge that he and his Mission has no authority

²⁰ Lansing to Wilson, 184.01802/14, *FRUS 1919. The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, 12:744.

²¹ Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles to the Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew), May 19, 1919, United States Department of State, 184.01802/14, *FRUS 1919. The Paris Peace Conference (1919)*, XII:738.

²² Gerwarth, P.196..

to negotiate or to draw up frontiers. Coolidge admitted that Miles had exceeded his instructions, but asserted that the desperate situation demanded initiative in order to prevent a resumption of fighting.²³

The United States Commission eventually acceded to Coolidge's recommendation²⁴ and demanded a plebiscite. It was held on October 10, 1920, and the majority, including a large number of Slovenes, voted in the southern section of Carinthia to remain with Austria. Since that was the section about which the Slovenes were most confident, a plebiscite was obviated in the other section of Carinthia. Miles' border proposal for Carinthia became the actual frontier.²⁵

The proposal of Col. Miles and Lieut. King that Marburg/Maribor remain with Austria²⁶ was rejected. However, Villach remained with Austria. The mission of Col. Miles and Lieut. King, to Marburg on January 27, 1919, to urge peace and a negotiated settlement of the frontier in Styria was not auspicious. A large crowd of German inhabitants, attempting to convince the American Mission that the locals preferred to remain with Austria, demonstrated. When they manhandled a Slovenian officer, the Slovene troops responded, raking the crowd with machine

²³ Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace No. 31 Vienna, January 20, 1919, "Boundaries in Carinthia between German Austria and Yugoslavia," *FRUS 1919, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, XII:498 "In order to prevent a fresh outbreak of hostilities, Lieutenant Colonel Miles then proposed, subject to my approval, that he and Lieutenant King should visit the regions in dispute and should draw a line which should be accepted temporarily by both parties. This suggestion was enthusiastically accepted, and a paper was drawn up and signed... This outcome has put me in an embarrassing situation. My instructions, both oral and written, in no way authorize me to deal with matters of this kind. I can see the dangers and disadvantages from the point of view of the United States in having its agents act as unauthorized arbiters in such delicate international matters. On the other hand, like Colonel Miles, I feel the urgency of what I am told may mean the saving of the lives of hundreds of people, and believe that one should be willing to risk incurring grave responsibilities in a case of this kind. I am therefore authorizing him in a letter of which I inclose a copy¹⁸ to go on with the undertaking, on condition that his decision is to be given out subject to my approval and control."

²⁴ Memorandum by Professor A.C. Coolidge 10 March 1919 "New Frontiers in Former Austria-Hungary." 185.212/5, *FRUS 1919, Paris Peace Conference*, XII:276-277.

²⁵ "The materials from the Miles Mission served to orient the U.S. delegation in Paris. As mentioned above, because of this information the U.S. experts decided to give precedence to topological and economic considerations over ethnological ones. And, more important, the U.S. delegation succeeded in convincing the British and French delegates to adopt the same policy." Fräss-Ehrfeld, Claudia, "The Role of the United States and the Carinthian Question, 1918-1920" *Slovene Studies* 8/1 (1986), p. 8.

Coolidge wrote that the boundary suggested by Miles, was "based upon the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants, that is to say the principle of self-determination."

Miles and Lieutenant Le Roy King to Professor A.C. Coolidge, 7 February 1919, "Provisional Line of Demarcation in Carinthia" and "The Coolidge Commission", United States Department of State. *FRUS 1919. The Paris Peace Conference* (1919), attachment to 184.01102/80, pp. 500-510, and 184.01102/91 from Professor Coolidge, 14 February 1919, XII:513-519.

²⁶ Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Miles, Major Lawrence Martin and Lieutenant LeRoy King to Professor A.C. Coolidge, Report No. 13, Vienna, 12 February 1919.

Subject: Study of the final frontier between Austria and Yugoslavia in the provinces of Carinthia and Styria. *FRUS 1919, The Paris Peace Conference*, XII: 5 15-519.

gun fire killing 11 demonstrators and wounding 60.²⁷

Col. Miles's assessment of the Fiume question agreed with the position of President Wilson that the port not be given to Italy.²⁸ However, Miles, based on on-site interviews and observations, called for the city to be made a free port under Yugoslav mandatory. This he asserted "is by far the best solution, short of complete internationalization." If the port were to be placed under Yugoslav "mandatory," he recommended a border between Fiume and Italy be set "as far west as the Tschitschen Boden (or Mt. della Vena), those sharply defined and barren hills which cut across the northeastern corner of Istria."²⁹

The United States was a latecomer to the issue of Serbia and Yugoslavia. When it finally did become concerned, it employed knowledgeable observers on the ground, who were able to provide the US Commission to Negotiate the Peace with accurate information. As Claudia Fräss-Ehrfeld observed, "The materials from the Miles Mission served to orient the U.S. delegation in Paris...because of this information the U.S. experts decided to give precedence to topological and economic considerations over ethnological ones. And, more important, the U.S. delegation succeeded in convincing the British and French delegates to adopt the same policy."³⁰ Her positive observation should be extended to the entire Coolidge Mission.

²⁷ Andreas Fraydenegg-Monzello, "Die Steierische Heimatschutz und österreichische Politik 1918-1934," in *Volksstaat und Ständeordnung: Der Wirtschaftspolitik der Steirischen Heimwehren 1927-1933* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2015), p.15.

Lt. Col. Sherman Miles, Gen. Staff, U.S.A. to Professor A.C. Coolidge. "Riot in the Town of Marburg, January 27th. Klagenfurt, January 29, 1919." National Archives, Record Group 84, American Mission Vienna, General Correspondence, 1919, Vol. V. in Siegfried Beer and Eduard G. Staudinger, "Grenzziehung per Analogie. Die Miles-Mission in der Steiermark, in Januar 1919. Eine Dokumentation," in Stefan Karner and Gerald Schopfer, eds. *Als Mitteleuropa Zerbrach: Zu den Folgen des Umbruchs in Österreich und Jugoslawien nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, (Graz: Leykam Buchverlagsgesellschaft, 1990). pp. 143-144.

²⁸ President Wilson, because of his opposition to secret treaties such as the 1915 Treaty of London, which would have given Italy all of Austria-Hungary's Adriatic littoral, supported Belgrade's claim to Fiume. Wilson made his ultimatum to Italy concerning Fiume public in April 1919. Wilson concluded "that Italy was guilty of imperialist bullying. It followed that he had a moral duty to make a stand on behalf of the Yugoslavs." Gerwarth, p. 223; see Glenn, *The Balkans*, p. 372.

²⁹ Miles to Coolidge, Report No. 16, Fiume, 15 March, 1919, *FRUS 1919*, Paris Peace Conference, XII:483.

³⁰ Fräss-Ehrfeld, Claudia, "The Role of the United States and the Carinthian Question, 1918-1920," *Slovene Studies* 8/1 (1986), P. 8.

FROM THE 1919 PEACE CONFERENCE TO THE 1926 MILITARY DICTATORSHIP, PORTUGAL AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Dr. Jorge Manuel Lima da Silva Rocha (Portugal)

In the years prior to the outbreak of World War I, Portugal witnessed the gradual establishment of a political and social environment where a number of opposing and conflicting private interests converged and acted.

In 1914 Portugal, unlike other small states involved in the Great War, had more than eight centuries of independence, thus being one of the oldest states of the “old” European continent.

Clinging to the myth of the vast Portuguese colonial empire always threatened by the greed of the great powers, the Portuguese authorities continued their longing for the maintenance of Portugal’s living space, a small fragile state, vulnerable to the voracity of the great potentates.¹ In 1914 Portugal was a nation-state holder of several overseas colonies, a common combination in Europe at the time, although the longevity of the Portuguese colonial experience was unique.²

In the four years between the implantation of the Portuguese First Republic in October 1910 and the beginning of the First World War, Portugal witnessed the consolidation of a general scenario characterized by the existence of different types of cleavages within Portuguese society.³

The gap between rural Portugal, conservative and deeply rooted in the traditional values and teachings of the Catholic Church, and the urban, reformist, and internationally inclined country, was too deep and prevented the immediate implementation of the Republican political program. The young republic was “condemned to face a country with stilted cultural structures that lacked openness to the outside world and was politically deformed by the vicious practice of democracy”.⁴

Under these conditions, it was impossible to peacefully implement any Republican program. The implementation of such profound and radical transformations led inevitably to conflict and confrontation, many times direct and physical, between various actors in the Portuguese political and social scene.⁵

¹ DUARTE, António Paulo, “Exercício comparativo: Os Pequenos Beligerantes na Primeira Guerra Mundial”, In *A Inserção Internacional das Pequenas Potências: Primeira Guerra Mundial*, Lisboa: Instituto da Defesa Nacional, 2019, pp. 74-77.

² MENESES, Filipe Ribeiro de, “A África Portuguesa na Rota das Grandes Potências: Perspetivas e Constrangimentos”, In LOUSADA, Abílio Pires e ROCHA, Jorge Silva (Coord.), *Portugal na 1.ª Guerra Mundial - Uma História Militar Concisa*, Lisboa: Comissão Portuguesa de História Militar, 2018, pp. 247-266.

³ FREIRE, João, *Portugal Face à Grande Guerra em 1914-1915*, Lisboa: Edições Colibri, 2014. ISBN 978-989-689-433-7, p. 9

⁴ FRAGA, Luís M. Alves de, *O Fim da Ambiguidade: A Estratégia Nacional Portuguesa de 1914 a 1916*, Lisboa: EDIUAL, 2012. ISBN 978-989-8191-32-8, P. 70.

⁵ ROCHA, Jorge Silva - “Da Conjuntura Política e Social - Percepções e Revoluções”, In LOUSADA, Abílio Pires e ROCHA, Jorge Silva (Coord.), *Portugal na 1.ª Guerra Mundial - Uma História Militar Concisa*, Lisboa: Comissão Portuguesa de História Militar, 2018, pp. 75-92.

At the heart of the reasons for social unrest was still the division between republicans and monarchists who did not hesitate to publicly demonstrate their opposition to the regime, criticizing the successive republican governments and opposing to most of their governmental initiatives.

The so called “religious question“, with very strong reflexes among the Portuguese society and, in particular, the determinations of the “Law of Separation of Churches”⁶ published in 1911 maintained its timeliness and caused serious conflicts and confrontations between the highest Catholic and political spheres of the country and favoured the estrangement of the more traditional Catholic sectors from the republican ideals of the regime.

The Portuguese political and social conjuncture of the Great War years was also seriously affected by the resurgence and affirmation of a social movement, especially of the working classes, with strong ideological links to anarchism, that seeking to ensure the success of its social and political action, gradually stepped away from its founding reformist ideals to embrace the doctrine of anarcho-syndicalism.⁷

The instability of the Republican political system has also contributed to the constant relentlessness and confrontation against the regime by large sectors of the Portuguese population. A system with a dominant political party that the republican propaganda had proclaimed secular and founded in parliamentarism, but that for a long time would refuse to recognize the right to vote to the majority of the Portuguese citizens. In the period between 1914 and 1918, government instability in Portugal was a constant. More interested in obtaining political profits, often a mere facade for the pursuit of personal interests, Governments succeeded one another in a political environment characterized by the dependence on parliamentary majorities and also by the inability to forge agreements with the opposition parties.⁸ Between 1914 and 1918, 10 Governments took the seat and 4 Presidents fell, one of them shot to death, following armed movements, revulsions or political crimes. In the same period of time there were a total of 98 serious violent events of different nature.⁹

* * *

Social misery had become widespread in Portugal long before the war began. The forced involvement of Portugal in the war “only” led to the aggravation of the already very difficult financial situation of the Country and forced the Portuguese rulers to request large loans to the English authorities. A scenario that showed that it was not possible to spend the large sums of money required for the lifting and modernization

⁶ “Lei da Separação do Estado e das Igrejas” - 20th April 1911.

⁷ FREIRE, João, *Portugal Face à Grande Guerra em 1914-1915*, Lisboa: Edições Colibri, 2014. ISBN 978-989-689-433-7, p. 13 *et seqs.*

⁸ MARQUES, A. H. de Oliveira, *História de Portugal*, Vol. III, *Das Revoluções Liberais aos Nossos Dias*, Lisboa: Editorial Presença, 1998. ISBN 978-972-23-2334-5, p. 303 *et seqs.*

⁹ 1914 – 22 events; 1915 – 46 events; 1916 – 10 events; 1917 – 16 events and 1918 – 4 events. See ROCHA, Jorge Silva – “Da Conjuntura Política e Social – Percepções e Revoluções”, In LOUSADA, Abílio Pires e ROCHA, Jorge Silva (Coord.), *Portugal na I.ª Guerra Mundial – Uma História Militar Concisa*, Lisboa: Comissão Portuguesa de História Militar, 2018. pp. 75-92.

of the Portuguese military apparatus that the Republicans aspired to and had been widely publicized by them.

In 1914 the transformations that the Portuguese Army had undergone since the Republic's implantation in 1910 were not enough to face the challenge of belligerency because the organizational reforms had been scarce and incomplete, but also because the processes taken to prepare, organize and make both troops and supplies ready for battle were very incipient.¹⁰ In practical terms, at the time of the first contacts of the Portuguese population with the conjuncture of war, little more had been done than to promote the implementation, in purely administrative terms, of the organization of the National Defence defining its constituent Branches and, in parallel, the creation of the National Republican Guard (GNR)¹¹, the paramilitary police force that theoretically would allow the Army to move away from police tasks that, almost exclusively, it had been carrying out.

Within the Army there was widespread discontent among a large number of officers dissatisfied with the military policy pursued by the various governments. The indiscipline that had been growing since the first moments of the Republic ultimately led to the breakdown of internal cohesion of the Army. "The outbreak of the First World War unquestionably marked the beginning of a new phase in the relations between the military institution and the republican regime".¹²

Thus, due to circumstances resulting from the actions of political decision-makers, in 1914 the Army's operability was far from that expected and therefore far from what was needed to fight a war. The Republican regime, that since 1910 had been engaged in an ambitious plan for the transformation of the Armed Forces, had failed both to modernize and to pacify them. In other words, it had failed to create the two most important conditions for an effective involvement of Portuguese military forces in the conflict.¹³

The main pillar of the construction of the much-desired "Nation in Arms", a personal and compulsory military service, was also found to be set on weak basis and rapidly crumbled due to the prevalence of so-called "exceptions", the main escape mechanism to the provision of military service used by the most privileged classes of Portuguese society.

From 1915 onwards, there was a certain inability of the Armed Forces and, in particular, of the Army to avoid the free movement within its ranks of destabilizing agents belonging to various political organizations and different secret societies.

¹⁰ FRAGA, Luís Alves de, *Do Intervencionismo ao Sidonismo – Os Dois Segueamentos da Política de Guerra na 1.ª República: 1916-1918*, Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2010, p. 95 et seqs.

¹¹ Diário do Governo nº 103 de 4 de Maio de 1911.

¹² FERREIRA, José Medeiros, "Forças Armadas e a República: Antes, Durante e Depois da Primeira Guerra Mundial", In BARATA, Manuel Themudo, TEIXEIRA, Nuno Severiano (coord.), *Nova História Militar de Portugal*, vol. IV, Lisboa: Círculo de Leitores, 2004, p. 267 et seqs.

¹³ ROCHA, Jorge Silva - "Organização do Exército Metropolitano", In LOUSADA, Abílio Pires e ROCHA, Jorge Silva (Coord.), *Portugal na 1.ª Guerra Mundial - Uma História Militar Concisa*, Lisboa: Comissão Portuguesa de História Militar, 2018. pp. 133-153.

After the German declaration of war on Portugal in March 1916, a rapid succession of legal diplomas established the country's industrial mobilization and authorized the military authorities to mobilize the troops deemed necessary for the war effort.

At the political-military level, the direct involvement in combat operations in the European theatre of the Great War required an adequate military and logistical preparation of the expeditionary forces to be sent to the field, but also an identification of its military personnel, especially of its officers and sergeants, with the interventionist objectives drawn by the political power. None of these conditions existed.¹⁴

At the end of 1916, the Portuguese Army continued, with regard to preparation, armament and equipment, to struggle with many of the difficulties that existed in the time of the. This circumstance, along with the discontent within the Armed Forces and the increasing number of military personnel opposing the sending of troops to France, raised serious doubts that the country would be able to prepare its army to play the role it should have in a War context.

The beginning of the sending of troops to France in January 1917 led to the definitive disappearance of any possibility of understanding between the political power and the Army. The variety of reasons given by a large part of the military for this divorce was vast and encompassed accusations of inadequate military instruction; lack of proper armament and equipment and also, the difficult living conditions of the military and their families.¹⁵

On the western front of the European theatre of the Great War, the Portuguese military forces ended up being exposed to a new reality with regard not only to equipment and weapons, but also to new military strategies and tactics. A kind of trench warfare very different from the one for which they had been trained at home. Gradually, throughout 1917 the protests and escape to embarkation grew inside various military units and led the government to order the police forces the establishment of extended security perimeters around the rail stations and maritime piers.

It is against this background of continuous tension and hostility between the military and politicians, that the conditions favourable to the success of a coup d'état carried out by Sidónio Pais on December 7 1917, an Artillery Major and former Portuguese diplomatic representative in Berlin would emerge.

In France, in the last months of 1917, the operational capability of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps entered irreversibly into decline, undermined by the indiscipline of the soldiers caused by the long stay in the trenches; lack of reinforcements and by the problems caused by a leave management system that served almost exclusively the upper echelons of the Portuguese Corps and that let them, with the collusion of the Lisbon authorities, to leave the battlefield when they were vital to the continuity

¹⁴ TEIXEIRA, Nuno Severiano, "Como foi Portugal para a Guerra: o Instrumento Militar e a Conduta da Guerra", In BARATA, Manuel Themudo, TEIXEIRA, Nuno Severiano (coord.), *Nova História Militar de Portugal*, vol. IV, Lisboa: Círculo de Leitores, 2004, p.26.

¹⁵ FERREIRA, José Medeiros, "Forças Armadas e a República: Antes, Durante e Depois da Primeira Guerra Mundial", In BARATA, Manuel Themudo, TEIXEIRA, Nuno Severiano (coord.), *Nova História Militar de Portugal*, vol. IV, Lisboa: Círculo de Leitores, 2004, p. 274.

of operations. A practice that would later be known by the expression “one-way roulement”.¹⁶

In the following months, there was a significant decrease in the war effort that had previously been pursued due to domestic and, above all, external constraints. A circumstance that was inline with the particular interests of those who, in Portugal or France, kept on insisting on the lack of human and material conditions to, stubbornly, continue sending men to Flanders.

In April 1918, and more concretely after the Battle of La Lys (Armentiers)¹⁷, the crisis settled definitively within the remaining troops of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps, and at home the last links that were holding-together the Armed Forces as an institution vanished. In the last months of the war, “the army ceased to be an instrument of the foreign policy of the Republic (...) disintegrated itself and began to operate internally around revolutionary factions”.¹⁸

Between 1914 and 1918 the effective intervention of the military in politics continued and had serious repercussions in the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps. During these four years the main political party, the Democratic Party, was able to attract a large number of officers to its ranks in an attempt to achieve a more complete acceptance and identification of the military with the objectives of the republican regime, two conditions that were vital to ensure the security and the survival of the Republic. In the cantonments at home and among the expeditionary forces in France, politics and partisanship played a major role in the breakdown of discipline and efficiency of the troops.

During the Great War, at least 6232 Portuguese died in the African and European Theatres of the First World War. European and native people, military and civilian: 2101 in France, 568 in Angola, 6 in Cape Verde, 3345 in Mozambique serving the Army, the Aeronautics and various other militarized forces and the Navy (209), in different places, on board ships or on land.¹⁹

The end of the Great War brought back the active intervention of the military in the Portuguese political sphere. At a time when the country was again embroiled in a civil war, the remaining troops of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps were repatriated and disembarked exhausted and demoralized in Lisbon, the capital of their country, “looked at by their compatriots with apathy, without commotion and without interest”.²⁰

¹⁶ *Idem, ibidem*. See also FRAGA, Luís Alves de, *Do Intervencionismo ao Sidonismo – Os Dois Segueamentos da Política de Guerra na 1.ª República: 1916-1918*, Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2010, p. 500 - 516.

¹⁷ April 9th 1918.

¹⁸ FERREIRA, José Medeiros, “Forças Armadas e a República: Antes, Durante e Depois da Primeira Guerra Mundial”, In BARATA, Manuel Themudo, TEIXEIRA, Nuno Severiano (coord.), *Nova História Militar de Portugal*, vol. IV, Lisboa: Círculo de Leitores, 2004, p. 281.

¹⁹ TAVARES, João Moreira – “Mortos, Feridos e Desaparecidos”, In LOUSADA, Abílio Pires e ROCHA, Jorge Silva (Coord.), *Portugal na 1.ª Guerra Mundial – Uma História Militar Concisa*, Lisboa: Comissão Portuguesa de História Militar, 2018, pp. 781-794.

²⁰ MARTINS, Ferreira, *Portugal Na Grande Guerra* Lisboa: Empresa Editorial Ática, vol. II, 1935, p. 128.

It can be said that taking part in the great Peace Conference that would take place at the end of the hostilities was one of the main motivations for Portuguese participation in the Great War. Beyond calculations of a more political nature, there was a strong desire for recognition by a republican regime that, since its advent in 1910, had not had an easy life in its relationship with some of the great powers, especially Great-Britain, an ally and a “tutor” of Portugal on the international scene. A significant part of the Portuguese republican elite argued that only a co-belligerence in the European theatre of operations, where the outcome of the conflict would most likely be decided, would guarantee the Portuguese republican regime unequivocal international recognition.

However, the setbacks caused by the war during the period between the departure of the first Portuguese Expeditionary Battalions to France in January 1917 and the announcement of the Armistice on November 11th, 1918, ended up showing the numerous problems resulting from the approach taken by those who have defended the involvement of Portugal in the conflict. At the end of the conflict the invoice of belligerency was very heavy, the country was again torn apart by violent social and political antagonisms and the promoters of the Portuguese intervention had been removed from power²¹.

Portuguese authorities began the preparatory work for the Peace Conference announced to Paris immediately after the Armistice with three main objectives outlined:²²

First of all, to get financial compensation for the country’s war effort. In the course of the talks the Portuguese delegates to the Peace Conference informed their interlocutors of the country’s public debt trajectory between the years 1914 to 1918 (from 145 to 227 million pounds sterling) and sought to sensitize them to what they understood to be the just and deserved compensation for the sacrifice of the Portuguese in favour of the Allied cause.

The second issue that deserved special attention of the Portuguese delegates to the Paris Conference was the colonial question. Portugal’s imperial-overseas dimension was considered to be a distinctive factor in the country’s international status, an identity mark that the republican elites had refused to negotiate since the late nineteenth century and that, in 1914, had been insistently singled out as the main reason for the Portuguese involvement with the Allied cause. It was on the basis of this dimension that Portugal expected to achieve an international recognition and an economic compensation for its war effort greater than it would be if only its European dimension were taken into account.

Finally, the third major question that emerged during the Peace Conference’s work was to guarantee the right of Portugal to hold a seat in the League of Nations that was then created.

²¹ OLIVEIRA, Pedro Aires – “Portugal na Paz de Versalhes” In LOUSADA, Abílio Pires e ROCHA, Jorge Silva (coord.), *Portugal na 1.ª Guerra Mundial. Uma História Militar Concisa*, Lisboa: Comissão Portuguesa de História Militar, 2018, pp. 769-780.

²² *Idem*.

Thus, although it was hoped that the possession of a vast colonial empire would be enough to secure a prominent position in that Forum, Portugal took part in the Paris Peace Conference with reduced capacity to influence the outcome of the general negotiations and played a secondary role at the said conference.

At the end, and given the initial Portuguese expectations, the results of the negotiations could hardly have been more disappointing since the final text of the Treaty almost omits Portugal. The maximum that Portugal reached was to be compensated with a 0.75% share (£ 49.5 million) of the total amount allocated for the German reparations (£ 6.6 billion), a financial compensation equivalent to that one granted to Japan, but inferior to those of Greece, Romania or Yugoslavia.²³

By 1920 everything was still too undefined with regard to war reparations (exact amount and payment arrangements), and in fact the years that followed would prove to be very haphazard as regards Germany's compliance with its commitments.

Portugal also resorted to international arbitration seeking also to obtain compensations from Germany for its military incursions into the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique prior to the declaration of war but the ensuing diplomatic and legal battle did not result in any decision favourable to the Portuguese aspirations. Even more offensive to the Portuguese expectations was the attribution, to the detriment of Portugal, of a non-permanent seat at the Executive Council of the League of Nations to Spain, a country that stayed neutral during the conflict and that, sponsored by the American President Woodrow Wilson, ended up occupying the seat of "representative of the neutral countries".²⁴

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In the immediate aftermath of war the main factor of concern throughout Europe was the Soviet revolution. A revolutionary wave eventually swept through Central Europe, gradually spread to other parts of the continent and would eventually arrive in Portugal.

At the end of the conflict, (...) the economic bill of the [Portuguese] belligerency was very heavy, and the country was torn apart by violent social and political antagonisms.²⁵

The barrier between the Republican regime and the military, labelled conservative and accused of being supporters of pro-monarchy movements, grew once the war was over.

Portuguese political power, aware of the lack of support from the Armed Forces and especially from the Army, insisted on the development of the Republican National Guard, a paramilitary police force that throughout time had largely kept its loyalty to the regime.

²³ MARTINEZ, Pedro Soares, *A República Portuguesa e as Relações Internacionais (1910-1926)*, Lisboa: Editorial Verbo, 2001, p. 290.

²⁴ OLIVEIRA, Pedro Aires – "Portugal na Paz de Versalhes" In LOUSADA, Abílio Pires e ROCHA, Jorge Silva (coord.), *Portugal na 1.ª Guerra Mundial. Uma História Militar Concisa*, Lisboa: Comissão Portuguesa de História Militar, 2018, pp. 769-780.

²⁵ *Idem*.

The State thus publicly assumed its lack of confidence in the military apparatus to overcome the serious changes in public order resulting from the frequent insurrections against the regime.²⁶

In a more or less disguised way, the republican rulers sought to blame the military leaders for the failures of Portuguese belligerency, while the military considered that they were being used as a “scapegoat” to disguise all the errors and disabilities revealed by the politicians who were responsible for military involvement of Portugal in the Great War.

In general terms, one can say that the exhausted and decadent condition of the Portuguese Army in 1919 was not significantly different from that of other countries directly involved in the conflict. However, there are great differences between the reality of the Portuguese army and that of the armies of other allies that were able to reborn once the conflict ended and, even more important that were able to capitalize the respect and the general admiration of the population for all the suffering and lives of their soldiers lost in combat.

In Portugal the picture was quite different. A few months after the end of the war, the main branch of the Armed Forces was very close to self implode due to the unmeasured and disproportionate effort it had been subjected to during the four years of the conflict, but above all because, as an institution, the Portuguese Army had not been able to eliminate the web of constraints that had been undermining its organization and cohesion since the late nineteenth century. Constraints that resulted directly from its military activity but also, and in particular, that were the result of the constant interference of different political actors within the Army.

In summary, at the end of World War I the Portuguese Army was in a pitiful state and its most important element, the soldier, deeply demoralized and disillusioned by the way in which the republican regime had insisted on the continuation of a military commitment that turned out to be inglorious and, ultimately, humiliating.

Amid mutual accusations of responsibility for the outcome of Portugal’s participation in World War I, the military and the political power began to confront each other openly and the republican regime stopped trusting the Army.²⁷

* * *

In this context of deep tension between the military institution and the political power, from 1919 onward there was an increase in the number of uprisings and revolts aimed at overthrowing the regime, violent actions planned and executed with the approval and direct involvement of several top rank commissioned officers that in the previous years had fought in France.

Encouraged by the paralysis of the public institutions, by the breakdown of the

²⁶ BORGES, João Vieira, “Subsídios para o Portugal Militar do Armistício ao Tratado de Paz de Versalhes”, *In Actas XIII Colóquio de História Militar*, CPHM, Lisboa, 2004, pp. 115-133.

²⁷ ROCHA, Jorge Silva – “Organização do Exército Metropolitano”, *In LOUSADA, Abílio Pires e ROCHA, Jorge Silva (Coord.), Portugal na 1.ª Guerra Mundial – Uma História Militar Concisa*, Lisboa: Comissão Portuguesa de História Militar, 2018, pp. 133-153.

Congress and by the serious economic and financial crisis, the Portuguese society asked for the intervention of the military with a view to “the establishment of a strong State capable of defending the national honour”.²⁸

A decade after its foundation, Portugal’s First Republic was doomed to failure because the various political, social, and military actors did not know how to put aside personal ambitions and agendas, and allowed themselves to be involved in a web of spats and hatreds that, far from serving the much-vaunted defence of national interests, have ruined every possibility of building a truly republican and democratic regime. Portugal’s involvement in the war and its nefarious consequences “only” led to a more rapid decline of a regime that had failed in all respects not only to fulfil the promises made to the Portuguese people but also that had regressed in several matters in relation to the political experience and social structure that existed during the monarchy.

The belligerency caused a deep division of the Portuguese nation, a division that, coupled with the miserable conditions that affected the Portuguese troops in Flanders in the last years of the war, resulted in the establishment of a Military Dictatorship that would be in force between 1926 and 1933, the year from which Portugal would go through a dictatorial and authoritarian government called “Estado Novo” (the second republic), which only in 1974 would be overturned, once again by a decisive intervention of the military.²⁹

The First Republic was unable to change either the structure or the configurations of Portuguese society. “It lacked the definition of an institutional framework that enabled not only economic development but also the adoption of a series of social measures that would improve the lives of the Portuguese”.³⁰

During these first 16 years of republican parliamentary experience (1910-1926) the military were deeply involved in the political life of the country and directly and actively intervened in different revolutionary coups that on several occasions were successful and were taken to the last consequences but also in a much higher number of other initiatives that, because of poor preparation or changing circumstances, eventually failed.

During this period, and without distinction or separation of interests of any kind, politicians and the military were key players in a political confrontation that affected and promoted public disorder and disrespect for state institutions all over the country and followed the expeditionary forces to the Western Front of the Great War with serious negative repercussions on the cohesion and discipline at all levels of Portuguese military forces.

In the second half of the 1920s the Portuguese political setting was following

²⁸ MADUREIRA, Arnaldo, *28 de Maio – A génese do Estado Novo*, Lisboa: Clube de Autor Editora, 2016, p. 22 et seqs.

²⁹ MARTINEZ, Pedro Soares, “A 1.ª Grande Guerra Através dos ‘Livros Brancos’ Portugueses”, In LOUSADA, Abílio Pires e ROCHA, Jorge Silva (Coord.), *Portugal na 1.ª Guerra Mundial – Uma História Militar Concisa*, Lisboa: Comissão Portuguesa de História Militar, 2018, pp. 59-73.

³⁰ MADUREIRA, Arnaldo, *28 de Maio – A génese do Estado Novo*, Lisboa: Clube de Autor Editora, 2016, p. 25.

closely the echoes of the triumph of authoritarian and totalitarian forces and ideals throughout Europe, especially those about the new Italian regime.

The Portuguese Republican Party (or Democratic Party), which as a dominant political party since the establishment of the republic had over the years “entrenched itself in civil and military bureaucracy (...) became disunited, conservative, immobilised and showing a lack of requisites (...) to disrupt the extremists and prevent the military coup” that the fragmented and impotent oppositionist political forces insistently urged the military to put into practice. “The armed insurrection became a substitute for the traditional change of government by constitutional means”.³¹

Challenged by a scenario of evident state paralysis and total disruption of the parliamentary system, a group of officers then decided to take control of the State apparatus putting into practice the long-assumed role of sole defenders of national independence and guardians of public liberties. “State control by the Democratic Party was then replaced by that of a more vigorous but conservative faction of Army officers”³², many of them veterans of the Great War.

The military coup that took place on May 28th, 1926, rehearsed in successive plots and attempts since 1921, resulted from a conspiratorial movement carried out by soldiers grouped around four factions that, just because they existed in such a number, revealed the inexistence of any solid plan of action and therefore of any unity of purposes of the various actors that would allow a full and unanimously accepted solution to the “salvation of the motherland”.³³ Cleavages between reformist military factions; constitutionalists; apologists for a strong and dictatorial democracy or; defenders of an authoritarian and totalitarian regime were profound and therefore, in many respects, contrary to the concept of “moral reserve of the nation” long attributed to the military by the majority of the Portuguese population.

The faction that won was the most conservative of the four and was led by General Gomes da Costa, former commander of the 2nd Division of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps in France, the only Division still in combat and the one that most suffered during the Battle of La Lys (Armentières). Anti- parliamentary and favourable to the establishment of an authoritarian and totalitarian regime, he intended “to radically transform the public administration, to restore business confidence (...) and to end the harmful influence of politicians in the life of the country”.³⁴ However, this victory would prove to be ephemeral since dissensions within the winning faction will prove to be equivalent to those of other socio-political groups who wanted to have a say in the future of the republican regime in Portugal.

Unsurprisingly, and initially without any opposition on the part of the Portuguese population, the early years of dictatorship were clearly in favour of the rise to political power of many junior and top rank officers of the Armed Forces, who gradually

³¹ WHEELER, Douglas L., “A Primeira República Portuguesa e a História”, *In Análise Social*, Vol. XIV (56), 1978-4.º, Lisboa: ICS-ULisboa, 1978, pp. 865-872.

³² *Idem*.

³³ See ROSAS, Fernando, *Salazar e o Poder - A Arte de Saber Durar*, pp. 56-64.

³⁴ MADUREIRA, Arnaldo, *28 de Maio - A génese do Estado Novo*, Lisboa: Clube de Autor Editora, 2016, p. 35.

started to replace common civil servants in most of the offices of the metropolitan and colonial public administration as well as in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³⁵

The emergence of a movement against this type of government was inevitable and became visible at different times and with varying degrees of violence. Many people began to publicly demonstrate their disaffection for the military dictatorship because, as one can read in a contemporary text, because they were against this kind of “personal and military government that was leading the Country to an “abyss of perdition”. It was the duty of the military, more than that of any other citizen, to serve the Country and its people, obey and not to give orders, to be ruled and not to rule the Nation“.³⁶

During the seven years between 1926 and 1933, the year in which a new Constitution was approved and the so-called “Estado Novo” (successor to the Military Dictatorship) became official, there were two coups d’état (1926); seven armed rebellions with the involvement of military forces (1927, 1928, 1930, 1931, 1933) and at least thirteen other armed rebellions that failed.

The duration of the Portuguese Military Dictatorship contributed definitely to the decline of the parliamentary Republic and paved the way for the establishment of another kind of dictatorship that would share, though more subtly, many of the features of the previous regime: ““Personalism, factionalism, malaise and insubordination in the Armed Forces, violence, economic and financial debility and social conflict“.³⁷

From 1933 onwards many of the political circumstances that had pushed the first Portuguese Republic into disrepute and contributed to its frustrated and ambiguous objectives continued to be felt. Gradually and with an unexpected effectiveness, the dictatorial state apparatus, protected by an uncivilized political police, has implemented an intense program of centralization and concentration of power and authority.

This “Estado Novo” dictatorship would eventually endure over more than four decades and become the authoritarian regime of greater longevity of the History of Western Europe.

It would fall in April 1974 and again by the action of a group of middle rank army officers who were against the regime and its colonial policy and who were tired of the wars that during the previous thirteen years they had been forced to fight against the pro-independence movements in the Portuguese colonies in Africa.

³⁵ WHEELER, Douglas L., *A Ditadura Militar Portuguesa 1926-1933*, Mem Martins: Publicações Europa-América, 1988, pp. 15-16.

³⁶ SALDANHA, Eduardo de Almeida, *A Obra da Ditadura Militar - Contributo para o seu Estudo*, pp. 18-19.

³⁷ WHEELER, Douglas L., *A Ditadura Militar Portuguesa 1926-1933*, Mem Martins: Publicações Europa-América, 1988, pp. 76-77.

THE AIRCRAFT IN THE TWENTIES BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND NEGLECT

Prof. Allon Klebanoff (Israel)

World War I ended in November 11, 1918. This war had been the proving ground for military aviation at large, particularly the aircraft. When the fatal shots were fired in Sarajevo, the aircraft was not even 11 years old, as the first flight of the Wright brothers took place in December 1903. In the summer of 1914, the aircraft was regarded as little more than a toy, and not totally without justification. This view was not to last long. In four years of war, the advance in aviation could just about be measured in light-years. Heraclitus of Ephesus famously maintained that “War is the father of all things”. World War I indeed fully proved this saying, by pushing the limits of the technology of the period, providing the canvas for new engines, with corresponding airframes, developed to certain military specifications. Many designs proved pioneering in their nature and solidified both the fighter and the bomber as capable tools of war to be used in conjunction with land and naval forces. Many an ace were made thanks to the impressive achievements leading to extraordinary machines in a field in which it proved just as important to outmatch your opponent through sheer power as by skill alone. From the slow and cumbersome flimsy constructions of 1914, which depended on engines producing around 100 horsepower and a maximum speed of around 60 mph, rose nimble and manoeuvrable fighters with engines of over 300 horsepower and a speed of 150mph. From a bombload of around 25-60 kg the planes of 1914 could carry, formidable bombers emerged, some carrying more than half a ton of bombs, like the mighty Russian Ilya Muromets, which carried a bombload of up to 700 kg.

Then the war was over. The guns fell silent on November 11, 1918. Even before the official signing of the peace treaties, the situation had now changed profoundly, and the consequences for the youngest of all armed services, the air arm, were too be more severe than all. The end of war may have brought peace to Europe, yet the continent itself and its infrastructure had been ravaged by four years of warfare, and the scars left behind were not just physical. As a result, it was going to take time for society, economy and industry to recover.

In spite of the continuation of many conflicts, and the eruption of a great many new ones, all the major military powers now completely revised their military policies. The costs of the Great War were horrific, far beyond any war in the past with many of the belligerents' economies suffering beyond measure and stretched to the limit. It is therefore not surprising that national tasks of rebuilding and reconstruction of the economies ranked much higher in the minds of the statesmen, politicians, economists and indeed many leading figures in all the countries involved. Let us take Britain as an example. The “Ten Year Rule” was a British government guideline, first adopted in August 1919, according which the armed forces should draft their estimates “on the assumption that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years”. The suggestion for the rule came from Winston Churchill, who in

1919 was Secretary of State for War and Air. Former Prime Minister Arthur Balfour unsuccessfully argued to the Committee of Imperial Defence, which adopted the rule that “nobody could say that from any one moment war was an impossibility for the next ten years ... we could not rest in a state of unpreparedness on such an assumption by anybody. To suggest that we could be nine and a half years away from preparedness would be a most dangerous suggestion.”

In 1928 Churchill, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, successfully urged the Cabinet to make the rule self-perpetuating, and hence it was in force unless specifically countermanded. In 1931 the Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald wanted to abolish the Ten Year Rule because he thought it unjustified based on the international situation. This was bitterly opposed by the Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson, who succeeded in keeping the rule. There were very large cuts as a result of this rule, with defence spending going down from £766 million in 1919–20, to £189 million in 1921–22, to £102 million in 1932. In April 1931 the First Sea Lord, Sir Frederick Field, claimed in a report to the Committee of Imperial Defence that the Royal Navy had declined not only in relative strength compared to other Great Powers but “owing to the operation of the ‘ten-year-decision’ and the clamant need for economy, our absolute strength also has ... been so diminished as to render the fleet incapable, in the event of war, of efficiently affording protection to our trade”. Field also claimed that the navy was below the standard required for keeping open Britain’s sea communications during wartime and that if the navy moved to the East to protect the Empire there would not be enough ships to protect the British Isles and its trade from attack and that no port in the entire British Empire was “adequately defended”.

Even when the Ten Year Rule was finally abandoned by the British Cabinet on 23 March 1932, the decision was immediately countered with: “this must not be taken to justify an expanding expenditure by the Defence Services without regard to the very serious financial and economic situation“ which the country was in due to the Great Depression.

Let us, then, observe the immediate effect of this decision on the Air arm of Great Britain. The RAF is the world’s oldest independent air force: i.e. the first air force to become independent of army or navy control. The RAF was founded on 1 April 1918 by the amalgamation of the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service and was controlled by the British Government Air Ministry which had been established three months earlier. The Royal Flying Corps had been born out of the Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers and was under the control of the British Army. The Royal Naval Air Service was its naval equivalent and was controlled by the Admiralty. The decision to merge the two services and create an independent air force was a response to the gradual and significant growing importance of air power and its impact upon the war. The creation of the new force was based on the Smuts Report prepared by Field Marshal Jan Smuts for the Imperial War Cabinet on which he served.

The newly created RAF was the most powerful air force in the world on its creation, with over 20,000 aircraft and over 300,000 personnel (including the Women’s Royal Air Force). The squadrons of the RFC kept their numerals while those of the RNAS were renumbered from 201 onwards. At the time of the merger, the Navy’s air service

had 55,066 officers and men, 2,949 aircraft, 103 airships and 126 coastal stations. The remaining personnel and aircraft came from the RFC.

Following the end of World War I and the accompanying British defence cuts, the newly independent (and still temporary) RAF waited nine months to see if it would be retained by the Cabinet. 6,500 officers, all holding temporary commissions or seconded from the Army and Navy, applied for permanent commissions. The Cabinet sanctioned a maximum of 1,500 and the Air Ministry offered 1,065 to the applicants, publishing the first list on 1 August 1919, 75% of them short-term (two to five years). The service as a whole had been reduced in strength to 35,500.

The situation was not radically different in any other army on the side of the victorious allies. In fact, the situation in Britain was better than most...

The principle is simple. With peacetime defence budgets a fraction of the wartime budgets, the competition between the services became fierce. Unsurprisingly, the youngest service, had the least political connections and real power originating from veterans who developed a political career, but remained loyal and had a moral obligation to their old service.

Nowhere was it more evident than in the United States. During almost all the war, the aerial warfare service of the United States was called Aviation Section, U.S. Signal Corps. On May, 1918, it was re-named as the United States Army Air Service. The Air Service was the first form of the air force to have an independent organizational structure and identity. The history of this young air arm, especially the first eight-year period of the post-war Air Service was marked by a prolonged debate between adherents of air-power and the supporters of the traditional military services about the value of an independent Air Force. Airmen such as Brig. Gen. Billy Mitchell supported this concept. The Army's senior leadership from World War I, the United States Navy, and the majority of the nation's political leadership favored integration of all military aviation into the Army and Navy. Aided by a wave of pacifism following the war that drastically cut military budgets, the opponents of an independent air force prevailed. The Air Service was renamed the Army Air Corps in 1926 as a compromise in the continuing struggle.

The American officer Billy Mitchell was one of a few individuals from the allied forces who became advocates for Air Power, like Britain's Sir Hugh Trenchard and Italy's Giulio Douhet. Each one of these three is absolutely central, carving a unique place in aerial history, and making an essential contribution to the survival of aerial forces under the problematic circumstances and their future establishment as functioning services. The story of Billy Mitchell is particularly famous both for his conduct during the famous ship-bombing demonstrations and because of his blatant criticism of the political and the military establishments, "earning" him a court-martial, which he cleverly used to greatly enhance his attacks, and expose the dire situation of the Army Air Corps. The defence witnesses provided scathing evidence regarding the desperate condition of the Air Arm. Eddie Rickenbacker, the top American ace of the war and a known celebrity, claimed that most of the planes in the service were worthless, and that flying without a parachute was suicidal. Carl Spaatz (who was to become a famous general during WWII), claimed, that in case the

USA was attacked, it had only nine available planes for its defence. In spite of having an on-paper force of 1800 planes, he maintained, 1400 were obsolete, 331 have not been technically brought up-to-date since the war and too dangerous to fly, and 60 were training aircraft. Therefore, only nine available modern aircraft were left. The venerable and much-respected Admiral Sims (retired) bluntly shattered reactionary naval tradition by stating that any invading fleet could be destroyed by a properly organized land-based air force. He charged that most admirals were uneducated; that the battleship was no longer a capital ship, having been replaced by the aircraft carrier. Coming from the most respected naval officer in the country, this was explosive stuff. Effectively harnessing the press, Mitchell made all these testimonies public, causing huge embarrassment for the administration and for the armed forces.

The 1920's also brought new challenges for the airplane. The RAF took up the task of policing the British Empire from the air. It was argued that the use of air power would prove to be a more cost-effective way of controlling large areas than by using conventional land forces. Sir Hugh Trenchard, the Chief of the Air Staff, had formulated ideas about the use of aircraft in colonial policing and these were first put into practice in 1920 when the RAF and imperial ground units defeated rebel Somaliland dervishes. The following year, in 1921, the RAF was given responsibility for all British forces in Iraq with the task of 'policing' the tribal unrest. The RAF also saw service in Afghanistan in 1925, where they were employed independently for the first time in their history, then again in 1928, when following the outbreak of civil war, the British Legation and some European diplomatic staff based in Kabul were cut off. Generally speaking, one can claim that during the inter-war years, air forces had to fight for their survival when the need for a separate air force, especially in peacetime, was questioned.

Surprisingly, aviation was not to die out or stagnate, but not thanks to the military establishment, but as a result of a remarkable spirit of innovation and pioneering, entirely led by adventurous individuals, in a way, following the spirit of the Wright brothers, the aviation pioneers par excellence. A further incentive was the fact prizes were on offer for a variety of achievements, some of which continuing a pre-war tradition, like the Daily Mail prize. Between 1906 and 1930, the Daily Mail newspaper, initially on the initiative of its proprietor, Alfred Harmsworth, 1st Viscount Northcliffe, awarded numerous prizes for achievements in aviation. The newspaper would stipulate the amount of a prize for the first aviators to perform a particular task in aviation or to the winner of an aviation race or event. The most famous prizes were the £1,000 for the first cross-channel flight awarded to Louis Blériot in 1909 and the £10,000 given in 1919 to Alcock and Brown for the first non-stop transatlantic flight between North America and Ireland.

Another famous prize was the Schneider trophy. The Coupe d'Aviation Maritime Jacques Schneider, commonly called the Schneider Trophy or Schneider Prize (sometimes incorrectly referred to as the Schneider Cup, a different prize), was a trophy awarded annually (and later, bi-annually) to the winner of a race for seaplanes and flying boats. Announced in 1912 by Jacques Schneider, a French financier, balloonist and aircraft enthusiast, the competition offered a prize of approximately

£1,000. The race was held twelve times between 1913 and 1931. It was intended to encourage technical advances in civil aviation but became a contest for pure speed with laps over a (usually) triangular course (initially 280 km, later 350 km). The race was significant in advancing aeroplane design, particularly in the fields of aerodynamics and engine design, and would show its results in the best fighters of World War II. The Schneider trophy provided the inspiration for famous names like J.R. Mitchell (the future designer of the Spitfire) and Jimmy Doolittle, one of the most illustrious names in the history of aviation. Doolittle, who was involved in a great deal of pioneering work, was awarded another important international award, the Harmon Aviator Trophy, for his extraordinary achievements in the field of instrument flying. The Harmon Trophy was awarded annually by the International League of Aviators (Ligue Internationale des Aviateurs) to the world's outstanding aviator, aviatrix, and aeronaut (balloon or dirigible).

The most famous prize of all, was the Orteig Prize, which was a \$25,000 reward offered to the first Allied aviator(s) to fly non-stop from New York City to Paris or vice versa. This prize encouraged considerable investment in aviation, sometimes many times the value of the prize itself, advancing both public interest and the level of aviation technology. Several famous aviators made unsuccessful attempts at the New York–Paris flight, some even tragically losing their lives, before the relatively unknown American Charles Lindbergh won the prize in 1927 in his aircraft “Spirit of St. Louis”.

To conclude, in spite of the highly problematic official attitude and the neglect of the air arm by all the World War 1 allies after the war, the 1920's are sometimes dubbed “the Golden Age of Aviation”, because of the huge achievements, reached mainly by civilians, creating a revolution in both commercial and military aviation.

WORLD WAR ONE AND ITS IMPACT IN MIDDLE ASIA: THE THIRD AFGHAN WAR

Prof. Dr. Gianluca Pastori (Italy)

Although commonly associated to Europe, and especially to the long stalemate on the Western front, World War One did not impact only on Old continent, nor only on the several theatres directly affected by military operations; rather, through different channels and in different ways, it reverberated its effects worldwide, even in regions quite far from the battlefields. Fighting took place from the waters of the South Pacific to the deserts of Arabia and people from Mozambique to the Falkland Islands were affected by the conflict's direct and indirect effects. In the same way, soldiers and labourers from China to the Punjab found themselves involved in conflict across the globe. Colonies provided men and goods to support the efforts of the imperial powers, while neutral countries were widely engaged in selling their products to the belligerents. In the long run, the conflict led to the weakening of the 'traditional' Powers, draining human, material and financial resources and overstressing their external position. In several colonial territories, World War One coincided with the first nationalist turmoil, due partly to the effects of mobilisation and the difficulties of demobilisation, partly to the ideological challenge embodied in Woodrow Wilson's 'Fourteen points', partly to the anti-colonial message of the Soviet revolutionary authorities.

Quite unsurprisingly, imperial territories were among the most affected by these dynamics. Native troops were widely mobilized both at home and abroad, while local workforce, in Asia and Africa played a fundamental role in supporting the different imperial powers in their war effort. "The mobilization of millions of imperial subjects proved essential for nearly all of the combatant states, from Germany to the Ottoman, Habsburg, and Romanov empires and, of course, the Entente powers. Indian, African, Canadian, and Australian soldiers among others all served on the Western Front, as well as in a range of ancillary theaters and hundreds of thousands of them died. Noncombatant laborers – notably from China – also proved vital to the conduct of the war, as did the involvement of the Japanese Empire, which used the war as an opportunity not only to try to penetrate further into China but also to stage an extensive occupation of Siberia that lasted until 1922. Fighting also took place in many locations outside the European theater of war – from Siberia and East Asia to the Middle East, from the South Pacific to the protracted campaigns in East Africa. The impact of the war was profoundly felt by hundreds of millions living across the imperial world, as the war brought conscription, occupation, inflation, and economic dislocation, while also in many instances kindling new opportunities, ideas, plans, and hopes"¹.

World War One led to the desegregation of the great multinational empires – the

¹ R. Gerwarth - E. Manela, *The Great War as a Global War: Imperial Conflict and the Reconfiguration of World Order, 1911-1923*, "Diplomatic History", Vol. 38 (2014), No. 4, pp. 786-800 (786). A glimpse of this 'imperial' dimension of World War One is in R. Gerwarth - E. Manela (Eds), *Empire at War, 1911-1923*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014.

German, the Russian, and the Habsburg ones – as well as of the Ottoman empire, by 1918 just a living relic of its glorious past. However, France and Britain too, despite appearing, at the end of the conflict, at the apogee of their power, were less well-placed, in general terms, than in pre-war age. The drain of financial as well as material resources, together with the rise of the United States and the emerging of the Soviet regime as global powers openly challenged British supremacy; a challenge expressed – at the political level – in their efforts to impose the rules of the ‘new diplomacy’ to the old game of the European governments. In the same way, the war triggered a brand-new series of ‘domestic’ challenges. Within the empire, the war led to the emergence of different patterns of relation with the dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland and South Africa, and paved the way to the adoption of the Statute of Westminster. In the same way, in India, the conflict resulted in the strengthening of the national sentiment and of the ambitions of its most radical fringes; an especially worrying development in Bengal and the Punjab, this one a region that – between 1914 and 1918 – provided 349,688 combat troops out of a total 683,149².

British India and the difficult quest for regional security

India, as well as the Dominions, was on the forefront in supporting the British war effort. Despite the German tentative to stir up an effective anti-British movement, during the conflict domestic situation remained quite stable. The Indian nationalist movement (in which the Indian National Congress played a key role) agreed to co-operate with the government, believing that the cause of Indian independence was better served by helping out Britain in whatever capacity the country could. Despite pre-war fears of a possible unrest, Britain could take many troops and most of her military equipment out of India as fears subsided. However, the conflict put a heavy strain on India’s military establishment. In 1914, the strength of the Indian Army was some 155,000³ but the force was devoid of heavy artillery, machine guns and modern weapons, and its training emphasized combat in open terrain against a mobile enemy not equipped with artillery⁴. By comparison, in the same period, the British Army accounted for some 735,000 men in British, divided in fewer than 248,000, regulars (of whom almost half serving overseas, predominantly in India) and different kinds of reservists (but only 145,000 in the army reserve, made with ex-regulars, liable for immediate call-up in the event of war⁵). By November 1918, the Indian Army establishment had grown to slightly less than 573,500 men with slightly more than 563,000

² T. Tai Yong, *An Imperial Home Front: Punjab and the First World War*, “Journal of Military History”, Vol. 64 (2000), No. 2, pp. 371-410 (374).

³ *The Army in India and Its Evolution. Including an Account of the Establishment of the Royal Air Force in India*, Superintendent Government Printing, Calcutta, 1924, p. 219.

⁴ C. Markovits, *Indian Expeditionary Force*, in U. Daniel et al. (Eds), *1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, 2018, DOI: 10.15463/ie1418.11057.

⁵ H. Strachan, *Pre-war Military Planning (Great Britain)*, in U. Daniel et al. (Eds), *1914-1918-online*. DOI: 10.15463/ie1418.11218.

Indian ranks⁶. In the same period, over one million Indian troops served overseas, some 62,000 died and 67,000 were wounded. As well as preserving internal security and guarding the turbulent borders of the Raj, Indian troops fought in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, grouped in seven Expeditionary Forces ('A' to 'G') and several independent brigades⁷.

Since 1918, domestic situation started deteriorating. The revival of the nationalist movement coupled with the economic difficulties following the end of the war led to widespread turmoil, while in March 1919 the adoption of the Rowlatt Act (Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act 1919), extending the provision of the Defence of India Act 1915 and giving extensive powers to the Raj's security authorities was met by large scale protests, especially in Bengal and the Punjab. The Amritsar massacre of 13 April, when British troops fired on an unarmed crowd in the enclosure of Jallianwala Bagh killing some 379 people and wounding some 1,200 more (in its turn a product of the adoption of the Rowlatt Act), further heightened tensions. Along the border too instability prevailed, especially in western and north-western regions due also to the German and Ottoman efforts to destabilize Persia and Afghanistan. As a result, the Government of India was forced to commit a relevant (although not always effective) military presence to preserve stability and avoid the spreading of violence in the adjoining districts. Despite the mostly friendly attitude of the Afghan *amir* Habibullah (r.: 1901-19) and of the Ahmadzai *khan* of Kalat, Mir Mahmud II (r.: 1893-1931), between 1914 and 1918 six campaigns had to be mounted against the Raj's neighbouring tribes: in Tochi (1914-15); against the Mohmands, Bunerwals and Swatis (1915); in Kalat (1915-16); the Mohmand blockade (1916-17); against the Mahsuds (1917), and against the Marris and Khetrans (1918). Moreover, since during the war most highly experienced pre-war regular regiments were sent overseas and their under-officered and poorly equipped replacements had far less training and experience in mountain warfare, by 1919, despite the efforts made in 1917 and 1918 by the Mountain Warfare School (hastily assembled in Abbottabad during 1916) to improve training, the efficiency of the border garrisons plummeted well below pre-war standards⁸.

As a result, although in 1919 the Indian Army could call upon some 491,000 men, its efficiency was sapped by a shortage of experienced officers, most of them having been killed or wounded in the war. Together with the political need to expand the participation of Indians in the government of the country, the need to replenish their ranks was one of the reasons behind the process of Indianization of the Army, started with the Government of India Act 1919 (Royal assent: 23 December). Moreover, although the war had promoted modernization in both weapons and equipment, Indian troops

⁶ *The Army in India*, p. 219.

⁷ On the role of the Indian Army in World War One see K. Roy, *Indian Army and the First World War, 1914-1918*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2019; on its role on the Western front see, G. Morton-Jack, *The Indian Army on the Western Front. India Expeditionary Force to France and Belgium in the First World War*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2014.

⁸ T.R. Moreman, *The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947*, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, 1998, pp. 93 ff.

still lack appropriate tactics in employing modern equipment in mountain warfare; a key factor in preserving security along the country's rugged frontier. Finally, the quality of troops in comparison with their opponents had steadily declined as the war progressed: units remained in India had been steadily 'skimmed' of officers, NCOs and men, to act as instructors or replace casualties and primarily consisted of reservists and raw recruits of doubtful fighting value. At the same time, by 1917, the tribes of the North-West Frontier had increased their armaments substantially, equipping themselves on a massive scale with breech-loading magazine-fed rifles using smokeless cartridges. Gun-running and local production supported this process, whose effects were evident in the 1917 campaign in Waziristan, when tribal made versions of the Martini-Henri and Lee-Enfield rifles had become "the principal Mahsud weapon"⁹. In this perspective, the lack of trained, soldiers combined with the improved weaponry of the tribes would lead to what General Sir Charles Monro (Commander-in-Chief India in 1916-20) later called "unparalleled hard fighting and severity"¹⁰.

Against this background, on May 3, 1919, few months after the end of the war in Europe, Afghan troops entered Indian territory via the Khyber Pass and occupied the border village of Bagh, triggering the British war declaration (May 6). The war (fought on the territories of the North-West Frontier and in the tribal areas adjoining them, and partly overlapping with a large-scale uprising of the local Pashtun population) was short, with the major combat operations ending on June 3, upon Afghan request, after the British troops had defeated a massive Afghan concentration around Thal¹¹. On August 8, the treaty of Rawalpindi formally closed the hostilities. With the treaty, Afghanistan ceded the privilege of importing arms and ammunition through India; the previous British subsidy was discontinued, and funds granted in appreciation of Afghanistan's neutrality during World War One confiscated. The Afghan frontier was to be demarcated west of the Khyber, and a treaty of friendship was to be concluded after a six-months waiting period. But the key point appeared in a letter attached to the treaty, in which the head of British delegation, Sir Alfred Hamilton Grant, Foreign secretary to the Government of India (in office: 1914-19), acknowledged Afghanistan's full independence, declaring that "the said Treaty and this letter leave Afghanistan officially free and independent in its internal and external affairs"¹².

In a purely military perspective, the Third Afghan War was quite a limited confrontation. The disparity in numbers, assets and operational capabilities was evident

⁹ A. Warren, *Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi and the Indian Army. The North-West Frontier Revolt of 1936-1937*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 37. See the same source for the impact of this process of British casualties.

¹⁰ H. de Wateville, *Waziristan, 1919-1920*, Constable, London, 1925, p. 5.

¹¹ The official account of the war is: General Staff Branch, *The Third Afghan War 1919: Official Account*, Government of India Central Publication Branch, Calcutta, 1926; for further details see G.N. Molesworth, *Afghanistan 1919. An Account of Operations in the Third Afghan War*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1962, and B. Robson, *Crisis on the Frontier: The Third Afghan War and the Campaign in Waziristan 1919-20*, Spellmount, Staplehurst, 2004.

¹² M. Drephal, *Afghanistan and the Coloniality of Diplomacy. The British Legation in Kabul, 1922-1948*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2019, p. 50.

since the beginning and the result (despite the surprise effect that the Afghan Army was able to attain) never really in doubt. The reasons that pushed Amanullah to start the conflict are still an object of speculation and range (according to the different authors) from the will to strengthen his power after the killing of the father and the troubled succession to the throne, to the deeply felt nationalist and anticolonial sentiments that the *amir* would have nurtured also after the end of the war and that pushed him, e.g., to support the Indian *khalifat* and *hijrat* movements in the early Twenties¹³. However, for the Indian Army and for the British role in India the experience was not without consequences. Rather, the Third Afghan War marked a sharp discontinuity at the political level and led to fundamental changes in the traditional vision of imperial security. From this point of view, the *lato sensu* 'national' dimension of the Afghan 'jihad' and the crude disillusionment about the local militias' trustworthiness forced the Indian authorities to deeply revise their approach to both the kind of paternalistic relation existing with Kabul and the best way to preserve border security 'on the field', especially in front of what it was seen as the emerging Bolshevik threat to India¹⁴.

The Third Afghan War and the legacy of World War One

The Third Afghan War is related to World War One in several aspects. The strain that the latter placed on the Indian military establishment (already stressed by the growing need to preserve the internal order) was one of the reasons of its timing, while the weakening of the Russian pressure in the north after the outbreak of the October revolution was one of the reasons why the new *amir*, Amanullah Khan (r.: 1919-29) could muster in a relatively short portion of Afghanistan's southern border the relevant (according to local standards) strength of 50,000 men (both regulars and irregulars) and some 280 modern guns and howitzer. The British forces involved were eight divisions, five independent brigades, and three cavalry brigades as well as some armoured cars. On the Afghan side, the war was quite an effort at both strategic and organizational level. The operations developed along four axes, with the main thrust along the Khyber and the Peiwar Kotal routes supported far north by limited operations in Chitral and in the south by a more substantial push between Kandahar and Quetta, arrested on 23 May by the British capture of the Afghan fortress of Spin Baldak. On the quantitative side, in the siege of Thal (25 May-1 June), on the British side of the Peiwar Kotal, Afghan general Nadir Khan [then Minister of war (1919-24) and later king Mohammed Nadir Shah (r.: 1929-33)] was able to muster a force of

¹³ For a sketch of the different positions see C.M. Wyatt, *Change and Discontinuity: War and Afghanistan, 1904-24*, "Asian Affairs", Vol. 47 (2016), No. 3., pp. 366-85 (373); a special emphasis on the 'modernizing' and 'nationalist' interpretation is placed, e.g., by L. Dupree, *Afghanistan*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1973, pp. 441 ff.

¹⁴ On British perception of the Bolshevik threat to India in the wider context on the British-Soviet relations see S. White, *Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Study in the Politics of Diplomacy, 1920-1924*, Palgrave Macmillan, London - Basingstoke, 1979, esp. pp. 79 ff.; in further detail see also G. Bentivoglio, *The Empire Under Attack: Anglo-Soviet Relations and Bolshevik Infiltration in India in the Early 1920s*, in V. Lomellini (Ed), *The Rise of Bolshevism and its Impact on the Interwar International Order*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2020, pp. 93-111.

3,000 infantry regulars and two cavalry regiments supported by ten 100mm Krupp guns and seven 75mm Krupp howitzers, plus some 20,000 tribesmen, most of them defecting from British service when the Waziristan militias “virtually melted away and sided with the Afghans”¹⁵.

This effort strikingly contrasts with the previous situation. The ‘Iron amir’ Abdul Rahman (r.: 1880-1901), usually credited with having imposed the state’s monopoly of force over the tribes and communities of Afghanistan with the strengthening of centralised armed forces, had to rely massively on tribal *lashkars* (militiamen) e.g. for the subjugation of the Hazaras in 1891-93 or for the conquest of Kafiristan in 1896, while during Habibullah’s reign, when the Afghan armed forces underwent their first large-scale modernization, the only big-sized units existing in the country were the four mixed brigades stationed in Kabul, each formed by three battalions of infantry with a machine guns battery, field and pack artillery and a cavalry unit. One of these battalions on paper accounted for around 620 infantrymen, 260 artillerymen and 400 cavalrymen; however, their ranks were usually severely depleted, especially cavalry units, normally accounting for around one-third of the sanctioned strength. Not surprisingly, among Amanullah’s modernizing efforts after the end of the Third Afghan War there was the reform of the army, with a special focus on increasing the efficiency of the conscription system and on improving training and literacy rates among officer; an effort frustrated by chronic financial problems that, since 1923, led to a gradual reduction in the quantitative strength of the establishment, to the disbandment or the amalgamation of several units, and to widespread cuts in military expenditure.

On the British side, the Third Afghan War was a test bed for doctrines and innovations already introduced on other fronts, such as motor transport, wireless communication, armoured cars, and aircrafts. While troops reached the Frontier from other parts of India (between May 6 and 25, four new reserve brigades were created: the 60th in Ambala, the 61st in Jubbulpore, the 62nd in Dhond, and the 63rd in Lucknow), local units had to oppose the Afghan initiative and stop the gaps left by the mutinous militia troops. In this effort, technology proved a key force multiplier. When operations concentrated in and around the Khyber, motor transport was used to hasten troops to Bagh and later to Dakka, at the western tip of the pass, the advanced base of the Afghan forces. Motor transport played a role also in suppressing the unrest in and around Peshawar, on the Khyber’s rear, where troops started concentrating on May 10, coming from Rawalpindi, Nowshera and Abbottabad. On May 11, a thirty-minutes artillery preparation preceded the attack that routed the Afghan positions in Bagh. Artillery, Lewis guns, and motor transport were also employed on June 1 by general Dyer and its relief column to break the Afghan siege of Thal; in this occasion and in the following days, armoured cars were also employed together with horse-mounted cavalry to pursue the Afghan troops withdrawing on Yusef Khel, and

¹⁵ F. Foschini, *The 1919 War of Independence (or third Anglo-Afghan War): a conflict the Afghans started (and ended)*, Afghanistan Analyst Network, 21 Sept. 2019, <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/context-culture/the-1919-war-of-independence-or-third-anglo-afghan-war-a-conflict-the-afghans-started-and-ended>.

four aircraft successfully co-operated with the relieving column. Broadly speaking, mechanisation was pushed well ahead than in any previous experience. Additional equipment and the extra ammunition required by a more extensive use of artillery and machine guns increased the transport needed to maintain the troops in the field and made necessary the thorough consolidation of the lines of communication as the advance progressed, reducing the mobility of the forces and affecting the way in which they engaged the enemy¹⁶.

Air force (RAF Nos. 31 and 114 Squadrons¹⁷) was another a key asset in British hands, and in cooperation with ground forces largely contributed to the success. While having been already employed to both patrol the Frontier and support military authorities in dealing with protests across India, the war the first occasion when the air force was employed on large scale against an external enemy. RAF performed multiple roles; bombing and ground attack against enemy concentrations played the lion's share, while recce and artillery direction accounted for only six missions; however, air-land coordination proved important in the operations around both Bagh and Thal. The first tactical bombing took place on May 11, during the battle for Bagh, and in the following days other strikes were carried out in the Khyber area and, since May 26, in Thal and Spin Baldak. On May 17, Jalalabad was raided, and on May 24 Kabul was air-bombed: in this occasion, one 112- and three 20-pound bombs hit the Amir's Palace, and three 112- and seven 20-pounders hit the Royal arsenal, with great psychological impact¹⁸. According to the official account of the war: "moral effect was undoubtably great and the bombing of Dakka, Jalalabad and especially Kabul were factors which probably decided the Amir to sue for peace [...] They proved the value of the aeroplane in long-distance strategical reconnaissance, in bombing areas of concentration, supply depots and transport, but in short-distance in tactical reconnaissances they were of no great value. The terrain was difficult and the tribesmen soon learnt how to break into small groups and to keep still when an aeroplane was overhead"¹⁹.

This experience fuelled a lively debate on the use of air power in border control and – more generally – in imperial policing. As a result, the Twenties saw a massive

¹⁶ According to the official account of the war, "[f]ormerly our object was to forestall the enemy, and to occupy his country before serious opposition could be organised. In previous campaigns, long advances were usual. Under modern conditions it is almost certain that advances into tribal country will be deliberate and by short stages, and every endeavour will have to be made to bring the enemy to action and to defeat him in the field as soon as possible after the opening of hostilities" (General Staff Branch, *The Third Afghan War 1919*, p. 136). On how these previsions evolved into practice see Moreman, *The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare*, pp. 138 ff.

¹⁷ During the war, the aircrafts of No. 31 Squadron co-operated with land forces in the Khyber and in the Kurram valley, whilst No. 114 Squadron (headquartered in Lahore) maintained a flight in Quetta to co-operate with land forces present in the Baluchistan theatre.

¹⁸ On RAF operations during the Third Afghan War see A.J. Young, *Royal Air Force North-West Frontier, India, 1915-39*, "The RUSI Journal", Vol. 127 (1982), No. 1, pp. 59-64, and A. Walters, *RAF Inter-War Operations on The North-West Frontier*, "Air Power Review", Vol. 21 (2018), No. 1, pp. 110-39.

¹⁹ General Staff Branch, *The Third Afghan War 1919*, p. 133.

use of the air force in suppressing local insurgencies, the largest one being the Iraqi revolt (May-October 1920). In the interwar period, RAF was assigned similar tasks – among the others – in Somaliland (January-February 1920), Aden (1928), and Palestine, where it was heavily engaged during both the first (1929) and the second (1936-39) Arab revolt. The aim was reducing the costs of imperial policing while at the same time reducing the role of local forces, whom during the war had proved largely untrustworthy²⁰. From the strategic point of view, the Third Afghan War taught, in fact, that keeping ‘boots on the ground’ in such a complex environment like the NWF was extremely difficult and required far more personnel than India’s finance and security needs could afford. Worth noting, Afghanistan too, largely due to the experience developed during the Third Afghan War, decided to establish its own air force, which started operating between 1923 and 1924 thanks to the aircrafts, assistance and technical support provided by the Soviet Russian Red Air Force as part of Moscow’s wider effort to enhance its global position and spread its influence in Asia.

Concluding remarks

Finally, the Third Afghan War had long-term impacts also in Waziristan. When militias started to be evacuated from Gomal, Upper Tochi, and Spinwam, mutiny spread among the Afridis composing them, as well as among the Afridis and the Orakzais of the Khyber Rifles. The General Staff estimated that, due to these desertions, 2,600 modern rifles and nearly a million rounds of ammunition fell into tribal hands. Between May and November 1919, the Tochi Wazirs carried out 50 raids, costing nearly 100 British casualties; the Mahsuds staged over 100 raids, killing and wounding more than 200; and the Wana Wazirs managed 32 raids, with more than 200 casualties. As a result, the Indian Army’s Waziristan Force was engaged in re-establishing the posts and restoring the lines of communication from November 1919 to May 1920. Wana, the largest town in South Waziristan, was finally reoccupied in December 1920. In 1921, work began to build a road along the Tank Zam from Jandola, under the protection of the Waziristan Force. The following year, works on a northern road began at Idak, shielded by the Razmak Force. The two roads met in 1924, linking North and South Waziristan, enabling the Indian Army to reorganise the two areas as one single military district and to transform the Waziristan and Razmak Field Forces brigades, with units permanently based in Manzai, Razmak, Gardai, and Bannu²¹.

²⁰ On RAF air policing between the two world wars see D.E. Omissi, *Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990; see also D. Killingray, “A Swift Agent of Government”: *Air Power in British Colonial Africa, 1916-1939*, “Journal of African History”, Vol. 25 (1984), No. 4, pp. 429-44, and M. Paris, *Air Power and Imperial Defence 1880-1919*, “Journal of Contemporary History”, Vol. 24 (1989), No. 2, pp. 209-25; a general history of RAF’s activity in this period is in S. Ritchie, *The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-39*, Royal Air Force - Air Historical Branch, Shrivenham, 2011.

²¹ On the Waziristan campaign see *Operations in Waziristan 1919-20. Compiled by the General Staff Army Headquarters India*, Superintendent Government Printing, Calcutta, 1921; on the following events see Warren, *Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi and the Indian Army*, pp. 43-79.

The pacification that these efforts promoted proved, nonetheless, short lived. In July 1924, operations resumed against several Mahsud tribes in southern Waziristan and in March 1925 RAF's No 2 (India) Wing had to start a fifty-day air campaign against the most irreducible element of the same tribes ('Pink's war', March 9-May 1)²². The influence of the Afghan authorities, the spreading of the 'greater Pashtunistan' ideology, advocating the union of the Pashtun tribes on the two sides of the Durand line under Afghan sovereignty, the subsidies that Kabul granted to the trans-border tribes, as well as the pressure of an increasingly active nationalist movement, all contributed in keeping the situation tense; at the same time, the need to preserve the order within the Raj's territories made the need for an effective internal security force more urgent. The contested reform of the Indian Army started in 1921 somehow tried to keep these needs in balance dividing the establishment into a covering force "to deal with minor frontier outbreaks and, in the event of major operations, to form a screen behind which mobilization can proceed undisturbed", a field army, "India's striking force in a major war", and an internal security force, to let the field force's hands free in time of war "to carry out its legitimate role, undisturbed by internal calls"²³.

In any case, the British tactical success was largely overshadowed by Amanullah's strategic victory. The treaty of Kabul (December 2, 1921), a follow up of the treaty of Rawalpindi, allowed the *amir* to strengthen his grip on Afghanistan and freed his hands, giving him back the freedom of action that his country had lost – at international level – after the first phase of the Second Afghan War (treaty of Gandamak, May 25, 1879). During the Twenties, Amanullah (who assumed the title of king in 1926), tried to assert Afghanistan's independence by establishing bonds among the others with the Soviet Union, Italy and, later, Germany. His modernizing efforts proved, nonetheless, too much disturbing for the most conservative segments of the Afghan society. At the same time – as the same Third Afghan War had largely demonstrated – the king was never able to really assert his control over the unruly tribes of the Frontier. In this perspective, despite the treaty of Rawalpindi ended the thorny issue of the Indo-Afghan border formally recognizing the Durand line (1893) as the official border between his country and the British Raj, it did not end neither the raids of the most relentless elements nor the claims that, periodically resurfacing, still contribute in making the Afghan southern hinterland one of most troubled spot in the world.

²² A. Roe, 'Pink's War' – *Applying the Principles of Air Control to Waziristan, 9 March to 1 May 1925*, "Air Power Review", Vol. 13 (2010), No. 3, pp. 97-117. A wider discussion of the role of air force in the NWF during the inter-war years is in C. Richards, *Substitution or Subordination? The Employment of Air Force over Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier, 1910-1939*, in "Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal", Vol. 48, 2010, pp. 63-87.

²³ *The Army in India*, p. 41-42.

THE AWAKENING AND RESISTANCE IN TURMOIL: THE SEQUELAE OF PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S ANTI-JAPANESE WAR

MG Shen Zhihua (China)

This year marks the 100th anniversary of the Paris Peace Conference, the 100th anniversary of the May 4th Movement and the 88th anniversary of the outbreak of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan. After the First World War, the Paris Peace Conference and Washington Conference not only established a new pattern of postwar international relations, but also had a great impact on the process of modern Chinese history. The intense turbulence after the meetings not only laid a hidden danger for Japan to launch the war of aggression against China, but also contributed to the historic leap of the Chinese revolution, and accumulated the original force for the final victory of the Chinese War of Resistance. Today, on the 100th anniversary of the Paris Peace Conference and with China approaching the center of the world stage, it is necessary for us to examine the sequelae of the Paris Peace Conference and the rise and development of China's Anti-Japanese War from a broader perspective. Next, I will speak on this issue, and discuss and share my views with you from four aspects.

I. The intensification of contradictions, both old and new, among the world's major powers prompted the unprecedented rampancy of Japanese militarism and buried the curse for Japan's deliberate war of aggression against China.

After World War I, the new Versailles-Washington system of international structure was reconstructed, but the distribution of rights and interests among the victorious countries was not balanced, and the righteous demands of China and other weak countries were not fulfilled. Therefore, it seemed that this international system and order were "built on volcanoes", which not only failed to solve the "chronic diseases" that had existed before the war, but also had many defects and contradictions, which laid hidden dangers for new international conflicts and wars. Among them, Japan's ambition to dominate China was curbed by resolutions such as the Nine-Power Convention adopted at the Washington Conference, which brought China back to the situation of being jointly dominated by several imperialist countries. As a victorious country, Japan resented such post-war arrangements. After the world economic crisis began in 1929, class contradictions in Japan became increasingly intensified. In order to ease domestic contradictions and get rid of the difficulties brought by the crisis, the Japanese ruling group was eager to launch a war of aggression against foreign countries.

The war of aggression against China launched by Japan was not only the necessary result of the evolution of the world's major contradictions under the new international pattern after the First World War, but also the inevitable outcome of Japan's long-term policy of foreign aggression and expansion on the continent. Since the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan had become a typical militarist country. In the process of modernizing capitalism, Japan had gradually formed a continental policy of aggression and expansion against neighboring Asian countries, such as Korea and China, and had launched and participated in many wars and actions of aggression against China. In 1927, the Japanese government convened the Eastern Conference

to establish a “positive and fundamental policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia”, which turned its continental policy into a concrete strategic plan and practical steps of external expansion, and became the general program for Japan to launch a war of aggression against foreign countries in the 1930s and 1940s. Accordingly, the Japanese militarist forces deliberately created the September 18th Incident in 1931 and launched a war of aggression against China aimed at dominating China. The war lasted for 14 years. Japan’s move was the first major action to carve up the world by force after the First World War, which came as a powerful shock to the Versailles-Washington system. It marked the formation of the source of war in the east.

II. The awakening of China’s national consciousness and the great power of patriotism provided the momentum for China to gather national forces in the anti-Japanese war.

In the early 20th century, China was still in the abyss of semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. The unfair treatment at the Paris Peace Conference directly stimulated and catalyzed the overall awakening of China’s national consciousness, and helped the national spirit burst out in an instant. The patriotism deep at the hearts of the Chinese people was the core of the national spirit. After China formally participated in the First World War in 1917, it enhanced the strength of the allied powers and accelerated the failure of the central powers. Especially 140,000 Chinese laborers, recruited by the British and the French governments, went all the way to Europe to participate in the war through numerous hardships and made great sacrifices and important contributions to the victory of the First World War. The Chinese government, which participated as a victorious nation, had high hopes for the conference, but its legitimate demands for amending unequal treaties and recovering Shandong’s sovereignty were totally rejected. Therefore, with the refusal to sign the Paris Peace Treaty as the fuse, the majority of young students came forward and cried out for “fighting for sovereignty abroad, eliminating traitors at home”; all sectors of society responded, vowing that “the land cannot be forfeited, people’s heads cannot bow down”, forming a grand scene of joint struggle by industry, education and commerce, demonstrating the unprecedented patriotic enthusiasm and political participation consciousness of the Chinese people. This patriotic mass movement, which spread over more than 20 provinces and more than 100 cities in China, unified the survival of the country with the salvation of the people, and unified strengthening the country with enriching the people. It realized the first comprehensive awakening of the Chinese nation since the Opium War, served as a rehearsal of the general mobilization of the whole nation in the War of Resistance Against Japan, and accumulated tremendous potential for the rise and development of China’s War of Resistance Against Japan.

After Japan launched the war of aggression against China, facing the serious crisis of national subjugation, the Chinese nation showed the most thorough and profound collective awakening and unprecedented unity, and the great national spirit with patriotism as its core was sublimated. “Fighting for the nation, for the motherland, for dignity” became the strongest slogan all over China. Under the general goal of resisting Japanese invasion and saving the nation, all classes and strata of China, all parties and groups, patriots from all walks of life, compatriots from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan and overseas Chinese, got united, fought against the national

calamity, built a great wall of national will that invaders could never surmount, and supported this poor and weak country with high patriotic enthusiasm and resolute will of sacrifice. Wolfgang Franke, a Western historian who had lived in China for a long time at that time, later recalled that “at the beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japan, a wave of national sentiment and determination to resist the enemy to the end permeated the whole of China”, “Chinese resistance to the invading enemy exceeded all the Japanese’s initial expectations.”

III. The turning point of China’s national destiny stemmed from the birth of an advanced political party which became the banner leading China’s final victory in the Anti-Japanese War.

The May 4th Patriotic Revolutionary Movement, which was directly triggered by China’s diplomatic failure at the Paris Peace Conference, reversed the declining trend of China after the Opium War and became a great turning point from the old democratic revolution to the new democratic revolution. A remarkable feature of the May 4th Movement was that it broke through the narrow scope of intellectuals and became a nationwide mass movement with the participation of the working class, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. Especially the Chinese working class, which had grown up gradually, played a leading role in the movement with its own revolutionary, organizational traits and firm struggle, and began to embark on the historical stage as an independent political force. Subsequently, spread through Marxism and organized by advanced intellectuals, the Chinese Communist Party, the vanguard of the working class, was born. Since then, the Chinese revolution took on a new look, the Chinese people had a strong cohesive force, and China’s destiny had a bright prospect for development.

At the beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japan, facing the important issue of whether we could win and how to win, the Communist Party of China (CPC), as the vanguard of the liberation of the Chinese nation, advocated with sincere patriotism the establishment and resolute maintenance of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and rallied the strength of the whole nation to resist foreign aggression. The CPC formulated and implemented the overall line of resistance for the whole nation and the general strategic principle of a lasting war with a keen strategic vision, and led the correct direction of persisting in the protracted war of resistance and winning the victory of the war of resistance. The CPC promoted the formation of a people’s war with heroic and extraordinary courage, in which all the people were soldiers and all the people participated in the war, resulting in a vast ocean of resistance in which the enemy was doomed to extinction. The CPC pioneered and developed the battlefield behind the enemy with a strong sense of responsibility, elevating the guerrilla war behind the enemy to a strategic position and creating a strategic situation conducive to the national war of resistance. The central role played by the CPC in the united nationwide resistance was the key to the victory of China’s anti-Japanese war.

IV. China’s ideological emancipation opened a new path, highlighting the innovative spirit of exploring ways to save the nation and survive, and was in line with China’s anti-Japanese war in seeking victory.

After the First World War, facing the dual themes of striving for national independence

and realizing national prosperity and strength, China's advanced elements took saving the nation, saving the people and reforming the society as their duty, and unremittingly explored the way forward for national survival and rejuvenation. At that time, China witnessed complex social contradictions and corrupt political rule. Stimulated by the crisis of Western capitalist civilization and the shock and shame brought to China by the war, Chinese advanced elements began to question the model of western system. Then the May 4th Movement broke out, holding high the banner of democracy and science, and postured to thoroughly oppose imperialism and feudalism. The May 4th Movement inspired the consciousness of the broad masses of people, promoted the spread of Marxism, ushered in China's ideological emancipation, and promoted the rise of socialist ideological trend. Thus, the Chinese people abandoned the model of modern western capitalism and chose the road of Marxism and socialism, demonstrating valuable pioneering spirit and truth-seeking consciousness, and embodying the spirit of openness and the quality of conscious practice.

The innovative spirit of the Chinese people to adapt with the times in the national crisis was further inherited and developed during the Anti-Japanese War, and became a sharp weapon for China to triumph over a much stronger enemy and to save the nation from peril. The Communist Party of China made a profound summary of the historical experience of the Chinese people's war against aggression since modern times, and grasped the basic characteristics of China vs. Japan in terms of strengths and weaknesses. It realized that the enemy was smaller in size but militarily more powerful, that the enemy was retrogressive while we were progressive, that the enemy lacked popular support while we had strong public support. This realization effectively helped to solve a series of fundamental problems such as mobilization and organization of the war, aggregation of forces, strategic layout and direction of development, and to pave the road to victory by establishing a unique system of China's war of resistance. Under the banner of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, the battlefield behind the enemy led by the Communist Party of China and the front battlefield under the command of the Kuomintang cooperated and supported each other. This unique style of war was a pioneering work of the Chinese nation and a spectacle in the history of war, which laid a solid foundation for the victory of the Anti-Japanese War. After 14 years of heroic struggle, the Chinese people, with the support of the people of all countries in the world, finally defeated the Japanese aggressors, established a historical turning point for the Chinese nation from the deep crisis in modern times to the great rejuvenation, and also made great contributions to the victory of the world anti-fascist war.

The value of history lies in warning the present and illuminating the future. In the past, at present and in the future, the determination of the Chinese people to safeguard world peace and promote common development was, is and will be unswerving, and their will to oppose reversing history and curb aggression and expansion will remain unchanged. In today's world, the historical trend of peace, development, cooperation and win-win situation is irresistible. The Chinese people are willing to work with the people of all countries to draw wisdom and strength from history, constantly promote the construction of a community with a shared future for mankind and create a better future hand in hand.

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE AND KOREA'S INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT AGAINST JAPAN DURING THE 1920S

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I. Preface

The 1910s was an era of revolution. The Chinese Revolution of 1911 caused the collapse of the Qing dynasty. In 1917, the Bolshevik revolution took place in Russia. In 1918, the German government collapsed and the Weimar Republic was launched. As World War I, which broke out in 1914, was terminated in 1918, the world situation was in a new era. According to these times and situations, Korean independence activists searched for a new direction of independence movement. Among the 14 principles that President Wilson proposed in America, national self-determination has given many hope to Korean independence activists. Koreans surprised the world through a massive popular uprising called the 3.1 Movement.

The 3.1 movement has had a transitional effect in Korean history. Independent movement leaders gathered the enthusiasm of the 3.1 movement to establish a provisional government in Shanghai, China, and the Koreans turned from the traditional monarchy to democratic republicanism. Koreans actively engaged in armed independence struggle and diplomatic activities in order to restore the sovereignty deprived of Japan by the provisional government. The Provisional government enacted the Korean Constitution and Provisional Charter and became the centerpiece of the Korean Independence Movement.

The independence struggle of Japan against the temporary government was combined with the armed struggle and diplomatic methods. Although both methods were not powerful enough to oppose Japanese imperialism, it was an opportunity to show the world the strong will of the Koreans for independence.

The armed struggle led to the formation of independent military units in China and the Soviet Union, and military education through the establishment of a military education institution such as the *Shinheung* military school. These armed struggles have resulted in enormous damage to the Japanese military in the battle of Cheng San ri and Bongo-dong.

Diplomatic efforts have made diplomatic activities for the independence of Korea by dispatching diplomatic personnel to the powerful countries such as Europe, America and China. The Provisional government has been actively engaged in diplomatic activities with international conferences, international organizations and national leaders for the necessity of Korean independence and the international recognition of provisional government.

In this paper, I will look at the Korean people's various struggles for independence from Japan in the 1920s. The year 2019 is the 100th anniversary of the 3.1 Movement and establishment of the Provisional government of the Republic of Korea. Looking back on past history is an essential process to create a new future. I hope the history of the dark and hard struggle of independence in the 1920s will be the light to make Korea's future brighter.

II. The 3.1 Movement and Establishment of Provisional Government of Korea

1919 was a meaningful year that left a big mark on world history. In Europe, after the end of the First World War, the Versailles system emerged and many new nations established from the bondage of the defeated nations. However, in the East, the invasion of Japanese imperialism, one of the victorious countries of the First World War, began in earnest in China.

In 1919, the 3.1 Movement took place in Korea. It was strongly influenced by Wilson's national self-determination. It was a peaceful demonstration that Korean people who were united with religious organizations to oppose the unreasonable colonization of the Japan.¹ Through the 3.1 Movement, the common people who failed to play a leading role in traditional oriental political system came to appear in front of history.

According to the records of the Chosun Government General during the 3.1 Movement, until on March 4, 1919, 760 meetings were held nation-wide, and 463,000 people participated in the demonstration and reported that 1,400 casualties were committed. However, the actual number of rallies, protesters and casualties were much higher.²

The 3.1 Movement has expanded internationally and has played a key role as a driving force for independence movement. The 3.1 Movement failed as a result, but it completely changed the view of Koreans and Japanese. Koreans recognized the need to change the methods of the independence movement and thought that it was necessary to establish a single government that would lead the independence movement. Koreans also recognized the need for an armed independent struggle to counter the Japanese imperialism's suppression of the peaceful 3.1 Movement by force.

Through the 3.1 Movement, Koreans became aware that the people who were suppressed under the total monarchy and Japanese imperialism could become the masters of the nation. They thought it was revolutionary to overthrow the dynasty or imperialist power and build up the nation's nation.

The 3.1 Movement became an opportunity to unite the sporadic independence movements. Immediately after 3.1 Movement, there were six Korean Provisional Governments at domestic and in the Soviet Union and China, but in September 1919 it was incorporated into one Provisional Government of Shanghai, China. The Provisional Government pronounced its name as the Republic of Korea and proclaimed the Constitution. The Provisional Government was the first democratic republic government in the history of Korea.³

¹ Lee yeonbok, *The Background of the Korean Provisional government's Establishment and Democratic Republicanism*(Seoul: 1993), pp.2-3.

² Committee of the Military History Compilation, MND, *The History of the Independence Activities against Japan*(Seoul: 1985),p.40.

³ Jungyoungdae, *The History of the Korean Provisional Government's Diplomacy*(Seoul: 1992), pp.30-66.

The Korea's Provisional Government left an unprecedented long history of colonial liberation movement in the international colonial liberation movement. It sustained about 27 years which was the longest history among colonized country's provisional government. Based on these efforts, the great powers left the first case of guaranteeing Korea's independence through the Cairo Declaration (December 1, 1943).

The Provisional government had the character of a government organization as the guiding agency of the Korean Independence Movement and had the following features not found in other colonial countries. First, it was the oldest provisional government in world history. Second, it was the only provisional government among the former colonial countries. Third, it represents Korea, not an ex-member of the defeat government. Fourth, it acted as a practical government by virtue of Korean and foreign advocates. Fifth, even though it was nominal constitution, it had its own constitution and established a concrete democratic system.⁴

III. The Changes of Korean Society after the 3.1 Movement

1. Proliferation of Socialist Thought and Development of Social Movement

Social movements such as the labor movement, the peasant movement, and the student movement spread with the influx of socialist ideas into Korean society after the 3.1 Movement. In the late 1920s, the organization of the socialist movement was further advanced, and workers strikes and farmers' protests were intensively happened. The Socialists first launched economic struggles, but since the mid-1920s, they have been fighting against Japanese imperialism through political struggles.⁵ In particular, in 1929, the socialist movement, the labor movement, and the peasant movement were combined in the Korean peninsula under the influence of the Great Depression.

<Table> 1920s labor disputes, tenancy disputes incidence and number of participants

year		1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929
Division	Labor									
	disputes									
	Number	36	46	72	45	55	81	94	119	102
	Personnel	3,403	1,799	6,041	6,751	5,700	5,984	10,523	7,759	8,293
	Tenancy									
	disputes									
	personnel	2,967	2,539	9,060	6,929	2,646	2,118	3,285	3,567	2,620

* Source: "The Chosun's Security Situation" (Tokyo: Police Department of Chosun Governor General, 1930), p.202.

⁴ Chanpseung Park, *The International Characteristics of Social Movement under the Rule of Japanese*(Seoul: 2005), pp.303-304

⁵ The Committee of National History Compilation, *The National Independence Movement after the 3.1 Movement*(Seoul:), p.125.

Labor disputes and tenancy disputes increased in 1923, which was the result of a large number of disputes as labor groups and peasant associations were created. In 1925, labor disputes and tenancy disputes were largely reduced due to the enforcement of the law on the Maintenance of Security and the reduction of labor costs by landowners due to the flood. However, since 1926, labor disputes and tenancy disputes have increased again, especially in labor disputes. This reflects the fact that the recession has made the situation worse.

When the social movement became serious in 1923, the Chosun Governor General began to apply the law of Maintenance of Security to keep it in the full control. Japan made and promulgated the law in 1925 to suppress communists and anarchists within its own country. In Korea, by the violation of this law, 2,501 persons were arrested from 1925 to 1929.

In 1925, the Communist Party of Korea was established as the leader of the Korean social movement. It was a vanguard organization aimed at the liberation of Chosun and the establishment of a communist state. The Chosun Communist Party made it a priority to liberate Korea from the oppression of Japanese imperialism through its alliance with the international communist movement. To this end, the Communist Party of Korea, with a strong interest in international solidarity, sought to establish friendly relations with the international communist movement, especially the *Comintern*. The Korean Communist Party resisted Japanese imperialism through social movements and international solidarity.

2. The roller coaster of the nationalist movement of the self-help and the modernization

On the other hand, the nationalists pursued modernization at the crossroads between autonomy and modernization, which had been controversial through the provisional government. First, it adopts a non - empire, the Republic, on this basis. Second, it formed a temporary parliament. Third, Adoption of the Republic of Korea as the first agenda in the provisional parliamentary opening council; Fourth, The provisional charter was enacted. Fifth, the provisional government laid the cornerstone of the modern nation by having six divisions within the administration. However, the division among the nationalists occurred during the 1920s. Domestic based autonomous nationalists attempted to go abroad and try to do armed struggle, while the foreign based nationalists tried to cooperate with domestic powers which were friendly with Japan.⁶ Both of these routes have caused to conflict and cooperation during the Japanese colonial period as to how to establish relations with Japan.

⁶ Namkijung, *The establishment of Korea's Nationalism and the Legacy of Japanese Colonialism*(Seoul: 2019), pp.53-55.

IV. Two routes for independence struggle: armed struggle and diplomatic routes

1. Armed Struggle

The Provisional Government developed the line of armed struggle in earnest when diplomatic efforts were not successful in the process of the Treaty of Versailles. The Provisional Government organized military forces in different regions and she began to build military schools to train young people who moved from homeland to resist the Japan.

Korea's armed struggle can be divided into two periods. The first period was from the 1919 to the 1931 Manchurian affairs, and the second was progressed in China until 1945 after the Manchurian Incident. The Korean army bases are located in the Gando and the Manjuria Provinces where many Koreans live and are easily accessible to Korea. In addition to these regions, there were also military organizations in Siberia and the Americas for independent struggle, but the armed conflict was mainly in the Manjuria Provinces and inside of the China. Most of the independent movement groups organized their own independent forces. It is well known that about 50 military organizations were organized after the 3.1 Movement.⁷

The independence forces of Korea grew into a major threat to Japan in the early 1920s. The independence forces seized Japanese military mail and attacked the border posts in the border regions of Korea and China. During this period, there were 1,700 large and small collisions among the independence forces, Japanese soldiers and the police.⁸

Accordingly, the Japanese army dispatched a force of one brigade size which was belonged to 19th Division, on October 7, 1920, to defeat the independence forces. However, the independence forces killed 1,200 Japanese soldiers in the battle of Chongsanri and Bongodong. The Japanese army attacked the Gando area to retaliate their defeat where a lot of Koreans resided. Japanese Army killed more than 3,600 Korean people and destroyed their houses.⁹ The independence army continued to be attacked by the Japanese army and eventually moved to the Soviet Union's Svobodnyi due to lack of troops and equipment. The independence forces, with the help of the Soviet enemy forces, they prepared to either enter the Korean peninsula directly or back to the Gando. However, this effort was abandoned by the uncooperative attitude of the Soviet Union, which did not want to clash with Japan in the Far East. Independent troops moved back to Manchuria and independently combated to Japan.¹⁰ From 1920 to 1925, the number of independence troops dispatched was 3,934 during which 16,726 soldiers were engaged in battle with Japanese troops.¹¹

⁷ Leeyeonbok, *The Independence Army and the Liberation Army*(Seoul: 1989), p.29.

⁸ Chanpseung Park, *The Modern History of Korea*(Seoul: 2010), p.242

⁹ Ibid,p.244.

¹⁰ Ibid, p.245.

¹¹ Parkseungsoo, *The Korean Emperor's Army and Righteous Forces*(Seoul: 1989), p.15..

2. Diplomatic Activities

The Provisional Government dispatched diplomatic agents to the world powers such as the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France and Germany, and conducted diplomatic activities for the independence of Korea. However, the provisional government suffered a lot due to the lack of diplomats who could carry out diplomatic missions.

La Mission Coreene Paris(Paris Commissioner) was established to actively promote diplomacy in Europe. It established the Bureau d'Information Coreene in Paris, published the Circularie, and sent it to government agencies and media to emphasize the legitimacy of Korean independence.¹² In the Americas, the Korean Commission to America and Europe for the Republic of Korea(Korea Commission) was set up to carry out diplomatic activities at the civilian level. It focused on propaganda activities through lectures, publications, and articles on Korean issues in newspapers.¹³ It also founded the League of Friends of Korea and sponsored Korea's diplomatic activities. The Provisional Government signed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in January 1920.¹⁴ The diplomacy of the interim government, however, failed because the Soviet Union had a willingness to intervene with the interim government to achieve the communist revolution.

V. Conclusion

After the end of World War I, the post-war process was discussed at the Paris Peace Conference. Many colonial nations, including Korea, were inspired by Wilson's national self-determination, the central idea of the conference. The 3.1 movement has many meanings in Korean modern history.

Various ideas newly introduced in the 1920s were used as a countermeasure against unjust occupation and oppression of Japanese imperialism. There have been numerous social movements linked to socialist ideas. In nationalist camps, conflict and cooperation have frequently occurred in relation to the selection of new routes. Socialist and nationalist's thoughts were just differences in methodology, and they were part of efforts to escape the forced occupation of Japan.

After the 3.1 movement, the Provisional Government developed an independence movement through armed struggle and diplomatic lines. The armed struggle and diplomatic lines of the Provisional Government have accomplished many achievements and became a catalyst to guarantee the independence of Korea from the great powers in the future.

Today, Korea can exist because Koreans had a strong will and effort to escape the status of colonialism. The spirit of independence for Koreans has been highly regarded over the past 100 years, and it will serve as a lamp that will lead Korea's development and overcome adversity in the future.

¹² Jungyoungdae, *The History of the Korean Provisional Government's Diplomacy*(Seoul: 1992), pp.102-108.

¹³ Ibid, pp.123-139.

¹⁴ Ibid, pp.155-169.

ENGLAND'S RETURN TO PALESTINE AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR. REASONS, MOTIVES AND CONSEQUENCES.

Capt. (Guardia Civil) Joaquín Mariano Pellicer Balsalobre (Spain)

1. Introduction

Allenby's entry into Jerusalem, getting what Richard the Lionheart could not, on December 11, 1917 was the "official-style performance that Mark Sykes's imagination had invented"¹ of the definitive tipping point in the First World War in the Middle East. On the one hand, Jerusalem did not have a strategic value beyond being the access door to Damascus. On the other hand, her symbolic value was enormous. First, because her surrender for the Turks followed those of Mecca and Baghdad². Second, because it meant the "Christmas gift that Lloyd George had requested for the British people"³, because that meant the end of Whitehall's geopolitical unveiling on the Turkish front. And third, because it opened the door to the restoration of a state that had disappeared two thousand years ago. The later British Mandate for Palestine gave the legal entity in international law to this restoration. In words of Lord Snell: "the most important international obligation ever entrusted to a single nation"⁴, and certain another neglect in British managing the conquest⁵.



Fig. 1: Allenby's entry into Jerusalem, ceremony in Jaffa Gate
(<https://www.publicchristianity.org/allenby-enters-jerusalem/>).

¹ LAWRENCE, T.E.: Los siete pilares de la sabiduría. [*Seven pillars of wisdom*] Barcelona, 2007: Ediciones B, p. 624.

² ROGAN, E.: La caída de los otomanos. La Gran Guerra en el Oriente Próximo. [*The fall of the Ottomans*] Barcelona, 2016: Memoria Crítica, p. 565.

³ ROGAN, E., *Op. Cit.* p. 563.

⁴ TUCHMAN, B.: Bible and sword. New York, 2014: Random House, p. 293.

⁵ TUCHMAN, B., *Op. Cit.* p. xviii.

Paris Peace Conference of 1919 meant the establishment of a model for the organization of the International Affairs, in which the victors of the First World War played the legal and political tutelage of the territories conquered from the Ottoman Empire. The article 22 of the final Covenant of the League of Nations, enshrined in Part I of the Treaty of Versailles (28 June 1919), established a Mandates System⁶ in which Mandatory Powers would administer its territories without annexing them. However, this system was actually the legal mechanism for partitioning the Ottoman Empire⁷. Type A mandates were applied to parts of the Ottoman Empire, were certain communities that had “reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory”⁸.

The distribution of the mandates was not only as a result of the Peace Conference, but as a result of a complex combination of circumstances that must be understood within the previous war context. It was the official seal of approval to the distribution of zones of influence that Britain and France had been negotiating since the beginning of the war. For England, the control of Suez Canal was the main and most vital of her reasons. However, it was not the only one, and it was the question of the design of the mandate with which Whitehall was endowed resulted the product of a collage, which constituted a veritable exercise of political and diplomatic engineering in an environment in which the fuse of conflict had ignited nationalism encouraged with promises and recognitions of ancestral rights⁹ on a land with a fatal geography¹⁰, as scarce as full of history.

There were three events that set up the design of the British Palestine Mandate during the war: Husayn-McMahon Correspondence (1915-1916), Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) and Balfour Declaration (1917). Correspondence and Declaration were the propagation of the flame of nationalism in the Middle East, the Agreement was the basis for the territorial design of the Mandates System through which England ensured the control of Palestine¹¹.

2. Hypothesis

The complex story surrounding England's return to Palestine cannot be understood without delving into the reasons that led her to make that complex decision. The “return” is due to two fundamental reasons. The first, more immediate, what might

⁶ Clasified in type A, B and C.

⁷ ROGAN, E., *Op. Cit.* p. 621.

⁸ YALE LAW SCHOOL (N.D.): *The Covenant of the League of Nations*. The Avalon Project, Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, 2011. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp

⁹ GARCÍA PICAZO, P.: La configuración de oriente próximo tras la Primera Guerra Mundial. [*The Middle East's Configuration after First World War*] UNISCI /, N° 37 Enero, 2015. Madrid. p. 67.

¹⁰ TUCHMAN, B., *Op. Cit* p. 267.

¹¹ ROGAN, E., *Op. Cit.* p. 640.

be called “Lloyd George’s type motivation“, was a strategic necessity born during the war, which consisted in the safeguarding of the Suez Canal, both of the scope of its former *protégé*, the Ottoman Empire, and of any French whim¹². The second, biblical and cultural in nature, consisted of the “England’s redemption of Palestine from the rule of Islam“¹³. It might be termed as “Balfour’s type motivation“.

3. Methodology

The process that led England’s decision-making process can be explained by a hybridization of Graham Allison’s models¹⁴:

- **The Rational Actor:** Britain, France, Arabs and Zionist Movement acted with a specific strategic aim. Their behavior is the combination of actions perpetrated by governmental organisms and individualities^{15,16}.

- **Organizational Behavior:** conditioned by interests of the multiple parties. The action is an organizational product, provided by a corpus of “semi-feudal“ organizations¹⁷ with leaders in the top¹⁸.

- **Governmental Policy or Bureaucratic:** a game of negotiation between the different hierarchical positions, where each player uses their skill for political orientation, limited to their affairs, generating “collage decisions“ and “blunders“¹⁹.

4. The “Mandates System“ in former Ottoman’s possessions

Paris Peace Conference of 1919 set the peace terms for the defeated Ottoman Empire assigning the sovereignty’s possession of its ancient domains mainly to Britain and France, and whose touchstone lay in the Mandates System²⁰, established by article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations²¹. Paradoxically, this article was written by American president Woodrow Wilson himself, contrary to any form of territorial gain based on the conquest after war, an anathema to his idea of self-determination^{22,23}. Under the basis of a tacit, but incomplete, application of *uti possidetis iuris*²⁴, as witnessed at XLIV Congress of the International Commission

¹² FROMKIN, D.: *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*. New York 2009: Holt Paperback, p. 286.

¹³ TUCHMAN, B., *Op. Cit.* p. 268.

¹⁴ ALLISON, G.: *La Esencia de la Decisión. Análisis Explicativo de la Crisis de los Misiles en Cuba [The Essence of the Decision. Explanatory Analysis of the Missile Crisis in Cuba]*. Argentina: 1988. GEL. pp. 119-198.

¹⁵ Located at lower hierarchical levels, where fear is a rational variable: *Ibidem*, pp. 129-131.

¹⁶ Lloyd George, James Balfour, François Picot, Mark Sykes, T. E. Lawrence or Feisal ibn Hussayn.

¹⁷ Foreign Office, War Office, Indian Office, Government of India or the Cabinet

¹⁸ ALLISON, G., p. 142.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 156.

²⁰ GARCÍA PICAZO, P., *Op. Cit.* p. 67.

²¹ GARCÍA PICAZO, P., *Op. Cit.* p. 68.

²² LARSON, M.: *The lesson of Middle East involvement. Federal Governance* 1, 1, 2004 p. 14, <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-47046-8>

²³ PELLICER BALSALOBRE, J., *Op. Cit.* p. 24.

²⁴ “The principle of *uti possidetis iuris* assigns precedence to the legal title of the effective

of Military History held in Israel in 2018²⁵, sovereign rights over Palestine were transferred from Ottoman Empire to Great Britain on the basis of its effective possession after its conquest by Allenby in 1917, converting Britain, *de facto*, into her possessor. Mandatory administration was sanctioned by the San Remo Conference of 1920, where former Ottoman domains were divided up in mandates between Britain and France. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, a scapegoat blamed for outlining the fatal borders of the region, was the basis over on San Remo Conference established the Mandates System.




Fig. 2: Ottoman Empire in Middle East ca. 1900 (left), Sykes-Picot Agreement (centre) and Mandate System (right) (<http://www.theendofhistory.net/global-issues/middle-east-history-politics/french-mandate-british-mandate-middle-east-history-podcast-part-4/>).

The establishment of the Mandates System was revealed as an arduous task when promises and negotiated agreements in wartime were put on the table of the Paris Conference. President Wilson wrote his well-known Fourteen Points, a declaration of principles that would serve as the basis for peace negotiations between the Entente

possession as the base of sovereignty. Its main aim is to guarantee respect for the borders that existed at the time when independence was achieved. When those limits were nothing more than delimitations between different administrative divisions or colonies, all of them subject to the same sovereign, the application of that principle resulted in their transformation into international borders [...]. The obligation to respect pre-existing International Borders stems from the general rule in International Law relative to the succession of States". UN, *Resúmenes de los Fallos, Opiniones Consultivas y Providencias de la Corte Internacional de Justicia 1948-1991*. [Summaries of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders] (New York, 1992).

²⁵ PELLICER BALSALOBRE, J.: *Hussayn-McMahon Correspondence versus Sykes-Picot Agreement and Balfour Declaration*. Conference held in XLIV International Congress Military History "Consequences of wars: disappearance or fragmentation of old empires and creation of new states", International Commission Military History (ICMH-CEHISM), Jerusalem (Israel) 2-8-September, 2018, Unpublished manuscript.

and the Central Powers, in order to end the War. Among them, the XII was referring to how the Ottoman Empire was to be dismembered and was formulated in the following way:

“The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees”²⁶.

The first of the controversies was revealed from the beginning, when in January 1919 Feisal ibn Husayn, the son of the Sherif of Mecca, before the Supreme Council of the Paris Conference, demanded the immediate and absolute independence of the Ottoman territories that England had been promised presumably in a correspondence that his father and Sir Henry McMahon have had on it²⁷. One of the pledges derived from it was the British guarantee for the establishment of an Arab nation in the region on the basis of the ambiguous acceptance of the inadmissible Sherif’s territorial conditions. The region in question was no other than the defendant in the letter of correspondence and that that Feisal had previously demarcated in the *Damascus Protocol*²⁸, a document drawn up by the leaders of the Arab secret societies *Al-Fatat* and *Al-Ahd* in March 1915, with their claims to England of independence of the mostly Arabs Ottoman domains and Arabian peninsula²⁹, the abolition of the Capitulation Regimen and a defensive alliance between the nascent Arab State and Britain. McMahon, faced with the premature of a negotiation of the territorial limits, decides to postpone any territorial concessions in Syria, in the west of the *districts* of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, which were to be left out because the region could not be considered purely Arab³⁰.

An important aspect to bear in mind contained in the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence was that Britain would act “without detriment to the interests of our [her] ally, France”³¹. Something that British Prime Minister Lloyd George, who needed

²⁶ ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (N.D.): *Fourteen Points*, (Jan. 8, 1918), declaration by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson during World War I outlined his proposals for a postwar peace settlement. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Fourteen-Points>.

²⁷ ROGAN, E., *Op. Cit.* p. 633.

²⁸ FRIEDMAN, I.: *The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and the question of Palestine. Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 5, No. 2, (1970), 83-122: https://www.jstor.org/stable/259746?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents; FROMKIN, D., *Op. Cit.* p. 175

²⁹ “... bounded on the north by the line Mersin-Adana to parallel 37° N, to include the whole of the Arabian peninsula (except Aden), Mesopotamia, Syria, what was later Transjordan, and Palestine”, FROMKIN, D., *Op. Cit.* p. 88.

³⁰ “...and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab and should be excluded from the limits demanded” McMahon’s 4th Letter 24 October 1915, Husayn-McMahon Correspondence, Parliamentary Papers. Cmd. 5957, Miscellaneous No. 3, Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon His Majesty’s High Commissioner at Cairo and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, July, 1915-March, 1916 (London: H. M. Stationer Office, 1939): <https://palestinianmandate.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/cm-5957.pdf>.

³¹ Cmd. 5957, 1939, p. 7.



Area of Arab independence as defined by Sherif Hussein in his letter dated 14 July 1915 to Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt.

----- Area excluded from Arab independence as defined by Sir Henry McMahon in his letter to Sherif Hussein No. 4 dated 24 October 1915 and further explained by letter No. 6 dated 14 December 1915.

Fig. 3: Arab independence defined by the Sharif under the basis of Damascus Protocol (<http://www.users.cloud9.net/~recross/israel-watch/Chronology.html>).

France's approval to consolidate his position in Mesopotamia and Palestine, would not be able to grant Feisal, despite waivers offered compensation and acceptance of international mediation to resolve controversies with Jews in Palestine³². But France was not willing to make any concessions on Syria, which she aspired to from the beginning of the war³³ and, although reluctantly, was accepted by England.




Fig. 4: Marginal note from Gilbert F. Clayton, Arab Bureau Chief, can be observed on the minutes of the meeting held on 23 November 1915. In it can be seen how much Clayton concerned about French interest (FO 882/2. Miscellaneous correspondence, 1915 July 12-1918 Dec 27).

³² ROGAN, E., *Op. Cit.*, pp. 633-634.

³³ ROGAN, E., *Op. Cit.*, p. 634.

Feisal, who had concluded an agreement with Chaim Weizmann in 1918 and signed on January 3, 1919 on the basis of “racial kindship and ancestral ties”³⁴, did not get to persuade the Supreme Council. He did not speak English or French, so he was assisted by his military adviser and friend during the Arab revolt, Colonel T. E. Lawrence. Without questioning the intimate personal ties that united both³⁵, Lawrence’s loyalty to England is no less true. And So, when the first news of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and its “rumours of fraud came to Arab ears from Turkey”³⁶ in 1917 on the verge of the Battle of Aqaba, Lawrence assured Feisal that “England would keep his word, both in his handwriting and in his spirit”³⁷ in a clear reference to the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence, which denies know it. In his book: *The seven pillars of wisdom*³⁸, Lawrence confesses in a note concerning 1919 that he was convinced that the interests of the British Empire and of the peoples concerned were not sacrificed in the slightest, “leaving the Middle East with clean hands”³⁹.

France was unwilling to give way to an Arab nationalist demand that could ruin her aspirations over *Syrie Intégrale*⁴⁰. At the end of hostilities, England, negotiating with Turks and French at one time, tried to consolidate her position in the Middle East, something that jeopardized the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which finally managed to be saved by the resignation of Clemenceau to Mosul and Palestine, in exchange for Lloyd George to alienate France on the Rhine. But she would not give up control of Lebanon and Syria⁴¹.

Incorporated the draft mandates to the Covenant of the League of Nations on February 10, it was the time for the complicated task of reconciling the pledges to the Sherif contained in Husayn-McMahon Correspondence and to correspond to France with the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

After the Paris Peace Conference and the Turkish delegation returned to Constantinople, the final negotiation took place for the partition of the Ottoman Empire. On April 19, 1920, they met in San Remo, under the auspices of the United States, Lloyd George by Great Britain, Millerand by France, Nitti of Italy and Matsui of Japan, this latter as an impartial observer. The result was the *San Remo Resolution* which, on the basis of the Balfour Declaration and article 22 of the final Covenant of the League of Nations, laid the foundations for the establishment of the British Mandate for Palestine⁴²:

³⁴ BENLOLO, A.: *The Times of Israel: Faisal-Weizmann Agreement Between Arabs and Jews About Palestine* (2017), <https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/then-came-the-faisal-weizmann-agreement/>

³⁵ LAWRENCE, T. E., *Op. Cit.* pp. 101-102. Lawrence makes a very detailed and intimate description of Feisal, which reveals a very intimate knowledge of his personality and character, characteristic of someone with whom he had kept a very close relationship.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 388.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 389.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 388.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 389.

⁴⁰ For France, Syria encompassed the current Syria, historic Palestine, Lebanon and Jordan GARCÍA PICAZO, P., *Op. Cit.*, p. 62.

⁴¹ GARCÍA PICAZO, P., *Op. Cit.*, p. 65.

⁴² “It was agreed: (a) To accept the terms of the Mandates Article as given below with reference to Palestine, on the understanding that there was inserted in the process-verbal an undertaking by

As can be seen, the resolution specifically noted that the Mandatory Power responsible of Palestine would carry out the implementation of Balfour Declaration in all of its terms. In this way, England was made with the Mandate of Palestine and Mesopotamia, while France on her part with that of Syria. England fulfilled one of his engagements with Sherif Husayn Correspondence and acted “without detriment to the interests of our [her] ally, France”⁴³, leaving Syria to France and Feisal to his own devices, who returned to Syria in May of that year where he waved again the flag of the revolt.

A series of riots had their response in Lebanon to account Christians Maronites and instigated by France. A situation that made President Wilson, concerned about the failure of his civilizing process based on tutelage and the right to self-determination, in June 1919 a commission, formed by Henry King and Charles Crane, was sent in order to know the will of its inhabitants. What the King-Crane Commission noted was the existence of a complex multi-ethnic society with hardly any evidence of convergence⁴⁴. In the report submitted by the Commission at the end of August 1919⁴⁵ were made some recommendations⁴⁶.

the Mandatory Power that this would not involve the surrender of the rights hitherto enjoyed by the non-Jewish communities in Palestine; this undertaking not to refer to the question of the religious protectorate of France, which had been settled earlier in the previous afternoon by the undertaking given by the French Government that they recognized this protectorate as being at an end. (b) that the terms of the Mandates Article should be as follows: The High Contracting Parties agree that Syria and Mesopotamia shall, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 22, Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations), be provisionally recognized as independent States, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The boundaries of the said States will be determined, and the selection of the Mandatories made, by the Principal Allied Powers. The High Contracting Parties agree to entrust, by application of the provisions of Article 22, the administration of Palestine, within such boundaries as may be determined by the Principal Allied Powers, to a Mandatory, to be selected by the said Powers. The Mandatory will be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 8, 1917, by the British Government, and adopted by the other Allied Powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country“. MIS JUDERÍAS (N.D.): 1920 - Resolución de San Remo sobre Palestina (25 abril): la Carta Magna de Israel, [1920-Resolution of San Remo on Palestine (April 25): *The Magna Carta of Israel*], <https://sites.google.com/site/misjuderias/israel/historia/1918-1948---dominio-britanico--sigue-la-gestacion-del-estado-de-israel/1920---la-resolucion-de-san-remo-para-palestina-25-nov>

⁴³ Cmd. 5957, 1939, 7.

⁴⁴ PELLICER BALSALOBRE, J., *Op. Cit.* p. 26.

⁴⁵ Which would not be made public until its ratification by the United States Congress in 1922.

⁴⁶ “1) Because the Middle East was not prepared for independence, a Mandates System would be achieved; 2) International administration would not be as colonizing powers, but League of Nations Mandate to facilitate self-government when conditions allowed it. The Mandate prevents such powers from claiming benefits from allocation and the obligation to ensure religious freedom; 3) That all Syria would be a single Mandate exerted by the United States.; 4) Because the Holy Places were for the three religious communities, it was recommended that Palestine should be integrated into Syria with a special status with the holy places controlled by a Christian-Muslim inter-religious Commission in which the Jews were Represented.; 5) Report was against the establishment of a Jewish State in Syria-Palestine, because it would require an armed force for its

Faisal, much more reasonable than his father, was willing to renounce the commitments acquired in the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence, aware that the Syrian opposition to the union with the Hejaz of Sherif Husayn, who considered the Syrian pariahs among the Arabs, was an impediment to the territorial chimera of the *Damascus Protocol*. T. E. Lawrence wrote: "A sheikh from one tribe cannot give orders to men from another...Do not mix Bedou and Syrians, or trained men and tribesmen...I have never seen a successful combined operation,..."⁴⁷.

Feisal offered to Clemenceau his resignation to his father's aspirations over the Great Syria, limiting himself to rule the Syrian State under French influence. But, when in March 1920 the Syrian Congress proclaimed Feisal King of the Great Syria⁴⁸, any possibility according to France faded away, leaving the way to General Goudard to exercise the rights of France as a Mandatory Power over Syria⁴⁹. Feisal left Damascus bound for Palestine under the British Mandate⁵⁰.

5. Motivations, reasons and concerns

Britain's eclectic performance tried to harmonize commitments, of legal value as doubtful as their trustworthiness, undertaken with the Sherif, France and the Jews through the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence, Sykes-Picot Agreement and Balfour Declaration respectively.

It is necessary to know the geopolitical context that motivated the Lord Kitchener's⁵¹ decision to start negotiations with the Hachemites. A context that had occupied Britain's political thought before the war and of important government departments, with a more than questionable coordination between them because of a series of bureaucratic and personal conflicts that pervaded their relations⁵². Barbara Tuchman wrote: "The War Office was negotiating with the Arabs, sometimes with one set, sometimes with another, sometimes through Arab Bureau, sometimes through Colonel Lawrence in the field"⁵³. For its part, the Government of India considered that Mesopotamia should be under their control rather than Cairo, "let alone even allow an Arab nationalist claim to end up turning it into a new and self-sacrificing Burma"⁵⁴, besides being contrary to any Anglo-Arab approximation, due to the problems that

imposition. However, and in accordance with the spirit of the Balfour Declaration on the rights of non-Jewish communities, there should be nothing wrong with the arrival of Jews in Palestine as "Jewish Syrian citizens". BRECHER, F. W.: *Charles R. Crane's Crusade for the Arabs*, 1919-39. Middle Eastern Studies, XXIV, January 1988; pp 46-47.

⁴⁷ LAWRENCE, T.E: *The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence. The Arab Bulletin*. August 20, 1917, https://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_27_Articles_of_T.E._Lawrence

⁴⁸ Region comprising the current Syria, historic Palestine, Lebanon and Jordan also known as *Syrie Intégrale* (GARCÍA PICAZO, P., *Op. Cit.*, p. 62).

⁴⁹ Franco-Siryan War, March-25 July 1920.

⁵⁰ GARCÍA PICAZO, P., *Op. Cit.*, p. 69.

⁵¹ Secretary of State for War

⁵² HAMM, G.: *British Intelligence and Turkish Arabia: Strategy, Diplomacy, and Empire, 1898-1918*. PhD Thesis (University of Toronto), Toronto, 2012, pp. 239.

⁵³ TUCHMAN, B., *Op. Cit.* p. 276.

⁵⁴ LAWRENCE, T. E., *Op. Cit.* p. 75

with the Muslims of the British Raj could generate any alliance with the Sherif.

There was no chain of command to manage the respective spheres of influence and intelligence operations, which were based on personal relationships of agents from different departments, colonial administrations and military organizations, with their own interest, generating, according to Sykes, too many pressures on Whitehall⁵⁵.

5.1. Hussayn-McMahon Correspondence and rational fear

First of all, to approximate the reasons and motives why England approached the Arabs of the Hejaz at the beginning of the war, so fickle on the part of the Hejazi as of scarce strategic value⁵⁶. Between July 1915 and March 1916 there was an exchange of correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt, and Husayn ibn Ali, Sharif of Mecca. England pledged to recognize and uphold the independence of an Arab state outlined in the *Dasmascus Protocol*, if the Sharif lead an uprising against the Ottoman Empire.

The rational actor performance can be observed in motives that drove to the Anglo-Hashemite rapprochement. Even before the war outbreak, Sharif Husayn fear Young Turks overthrow him. Furthermore, if the Sharif intended to establish such independent Arab Kingdom, he was going to need the support of a Great Power. England had also made her steps trough an initiative in the Arabs-speaking areas of the Ottoman Empire. Before Turkey joined the war in October 1914, Lord Kitchener cabled demanding Sir Joshua Cheetham⁵⁷ to send a message to Abdullah⁵⁸, the other son of the Sharif , to determine whether, in the event that an armed force coerced the sultan to carry out an attack against Great Britain, his father and the Arabs of the Hejaz would be with them or against them⁵⁹. Cheetham suggested verifying the positions of other Arabian sheikhs, reminding them that England had always supported the Arabs against the Turks^{60,61}.

There are two elements in the telegram would foment the Sharif's imperial desires. In one hand, the ambiguity regarding the Arab nation and the Arabs was as Kitchener

⁵⁵ HAMM, G., *Op. Cit.* p. 240; TUCHMAN, B. (276)

⁵⁶ TABOADA, H.: El fin de un sistema: el imán Hussein y la Primer Guerra Mundial. [*The end of a system: the Imam Hussein and the First World War*] Estudios de Asia y Africa Vol. 39, No. 1 (123) (Jan. - Apr., 2004), pp. 117-138.

⁵⁷ Acting High Commissioner of Great Britain in Upper Egypt until McMahon's arrival.

⁵⁸ A friend and habitual correspondent of Sir Ronald Storrs, Kitchener's Oriental Secretary

⁵⁹ KEDOURIE, E.: In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations 1914-1939 , Routledge, London and New York, 2nd Edition, 2014. p. 15.

⁶⁰ KEDOURIE, E., *Op. Cit.* p. 75.

⁶¹ Approved by Edward Grey: "Germany has bought the Turkish Government with gold, notwithstanding that England, France and Russia guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire if the Turks remained neutral in this war. The Turkish Government have, against the will of the Sultan, through German pressure, committed acts of aggression by invading the frontiers of Egypt with armed bands of Turkish soldiers If the Arab nation assist England in this war, that has been forced upon us by Turkey, England will guarantee that no internal intervention takes place in Arabia, and will give Arabs every assistance against external foreign aggression. It may be that an Arab of true race will assume the Khalifate at Mecca or Medina, and so good may come by the help of God out of all the evil that is now occurring" (F. O. 371/2139, 655689/44923, Grey's telegram no. 303, 31 Oct. 1914, in KEDOURIE, E., *Op. Cit.* p. pp. 17-18).

neglected allusion to the inhabitants of Arabia instead of those of the Hejaz. A lack of knowledge about the diversity and internal quarrel between the Sheiks in Arabia. In the other hand, was the reference to the Khalifate, a commitment that seems to be the reason why Britain was reluctant to make public the content of the correspondence, perhaps because it would have been a source of disagreement with France⁶² and the Muslims under the British rule⁶³.

Military experts at Whitehall and at the Residency in Cairo were foreseeing the military disasters of Gallipoli and the Kut in Mesopotamia, which could compromise the stability of the Muslim communities of their colonies, decided that it would be very Convenient an alliance with Sherif Husayn. The idea was to neutralize the calls to Jihad that the Ottoman Sultan and Caliph⁶⁴ had done to Muslim communities around the world, that must be sanctioned by the Emir Husayn in his facet of Sherif of Mecca⁶⁵. It can be seen the eclecticism of England, which harmonizes the actions of the subordinate units with semi-autonomous functioning of a rational actor, moved by the strategic and military necessities and the fear to a Muslim uprising, aimed at safeguarding her imperial interests in the course of the war⁶⁶.

The correspondence Hussayn-McMahon broke out with an agreement, in principle, advantageous for England, because the vague limits negotiated by the High Commissioner, without specifying borders, as ordered by the Foreign Affairs Minister⁶⁷, Edward Grey, allowed to keep Damascus, Homs and Hama in Zone A of agreement that they were secretly negotiating British with French.

5.2. Sykes-Picot Agreement the outlining of the mandate border

Pledges derived from the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence was the British guarantee of the establishment of an Arab nation in the region on the basis of the ambiguous acceptance of the territorial inadmissible conditions of the Sherif Husayn. McMahon, faced with the premature of a negotiation of the territorial limits decides to postpone any territorial concessions in Syria, in the west of the *districts* of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, which were to be left out because the region could not be considered purely Arab⁶⁸.

One of the most controversial aspects of the later Sykes-Picot Agreement was the situation of Palestine, the exclusion of which was supported by the exclusion in McMahon's pledges. The defense of the French and British colonial interests in the region led to the negotiations between the French Minister, Théophile Delcasse, with his British counterpart, Edward Grey, about partitioning of control zones after the

⁶² FRIEDMAN, I.: The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and the Question of Palestine. *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 5, No. 2, (1970), p. 84.

⁶³ FRIEDMAN, I. *Op. Cit.* p.93.

⁶⁴ At the instigation of Germany

⁶⁵ ROGAN, E., *Op. Cit.* pp. 447-451.

⁶⁶ GARCÍA PICAZO, P., *Op. Cit.*, p. 65.

⁶⁷ KEDOURIE, E., *Op. Cit.* p. 94.

⁶⁸ "...and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded" McMahon's Letter 24 October 1915, Husayn-McMahon Correspondence.

Ottoman collapse⁶⁹.

A whole series of reproaches on unfulfilled pledges to the Hashemites, who hoped to gain control of the old Ottoman territories, were going to rain on British when the Agreement irrupted as a media and political scandal in November 1917. The situation seems as unlikely as it probably was, because the various bodies involved were not too permeable to each other. The coup *d'état* in Russia could not have come at a worse time. Trostki made public the Agreement in *Izvestia*, as an example of imperialist action without hiding the dissatisfaction with the distribution in a maneuver of discredit⁷⁰, at the time *The Times* published Balfour Declaration. The protection of British interests through the establishment of a Jewish homeland, obeyed more the criteria of political pragmatism than supposed support of the British elite for the Zionist cause⁷¹.

When Sykes, began to negotiate with French the Agreement was aware McMahon's negotiation with the Shariff, although he did know anything about the existence of Zionism. It is well known that his protector, Lord Kitchener, send Sykes to Middle East without further instructions than "just go there and come back"⁷². The truth is that he was Kitchener's counterweight to the pro-Arabism of Sir Percy Cox, T. E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell. When Kitchener died in 1916, Maurice Hankey, his something of a substitute, was not very interesting in the Middle East question, so the enthusiastic and well related Mark Sykes was as free to act as misinformed about the intentions of new Lloyd George's Cabinet⁷³.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement established a series of areas of control and influence for France and Great Britain over the Ottoman demarcations to which the Sharif laid claim. If one accepts the exclusion of the demarcations west of the Jordan river⁷⁴, rendering the establishment of the agreement's Brown Zone and the correspondence are consistent. Also coherent is the French presence to the north, if the British commitment towards her ally France, expressed in McMahon's fourth letter, is considered accepted. What it was clear in the dark of the Agreement is the "special treatment" of Palestine in similar terms of the Hussayn-McMahon Correspondence: excluding it from the negotiation with the Hashemites⁷⁵.

⁶⁹ Initially Russia was included (Sykes-Picot-Sazanov Agreement) in the negotiations anxious for an exit to the Mediterranean Sea.

⁷⁰ GLOBAL JUSTICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY, The Failure of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East, <https://richardfalk.wordpress.com/category/special-relationship-israel/>

⁷¹ GARCÍA PICAZO, P. *Op. Cit.* p. 65.

⁷² TUCHMAN, B., *Op. Cit.* p. 276.

⁷³ FROMKIN, D., *Op. Cit.* p. 284.

⁷⁴ PELLICER BALSALOBRE, J.: *Husayn-Mcmahon Corresponce versus Sykes-Picot Agreement and Balfour Declaration*. Conference held in XLIV International Congress Military History "Consequences of wars: disappearance or fragmentation of old empires and creation of new states", International Commission Military History (ICMH-CEHISMI), Jerusalem (Israel)

⁷⁵ TUCHMAN, B., *Op. Cit.* p. 282; PELLICER BALSALOBRE, J.: *Husayn-Mcmahon Corresponce versus Sykes-Picot Agreement and Balfour Declaration*. Conference held in XLIV International Congress Military History "Consequences of wars: disappearance or fragmentation of old empires and creation of new states", International Commission Military History (ICMH-CEHISMI), Jerusalem (Israel).




Fig. 5: Territorial analogy between the demarcations of the Ottoman Palestine and the Sykes-Picot Agreement (*) The sanjak of Nablus was made up of a single kaza, subdivided into its respective nahiyas (Author, on maps from the British Library).

It can be concluded the Agreement is a mixture of the three Allison's model can be observed, where "Governmental Policy or Bureaucratic model" drive the negotiation between France and Britain. The "Rational Actor model" can see in the objective of both, France and Britain, trying to consolidate their influence in Middle East. For last, and not less, "Organizational Behaviour model" rules the idea of the "Intruders"⁷⁶: "to make a new nation, to restore a lost the influence, to give twenty millions of Semites the foundation on which to build an inspired dream-place of their national thoughts"⁷⁷. That includes, of course, the Jews, in order to achieve the collective image in the thoughts of many western people, among them some of "Intruders".

5.3. Balfour Decision

To consider Balfour Declaration as a reward to Chaim Weizmann for the acetone or the Fear Zionist Movement that did not encompass much more than the four small rooms of Piccadilly Circus in which it was confined at the beginning of 1917⁷⁸ is an erroneous assumption. The cornerstone was Suez Canal, the "Lloyd George's type motivation" and the main reason. Churchill, Kitchener and George had been decided from the very beginning of the war that the Middle East was "the major theater

⁷⁶ Clayton's group in the Arab Bureau in Cairo, a name they called themselves to expressed that they had broken into Whitehall's foreign policy. Formed by Ronald Storrs, George Lloyd (not Lloy George), T. E. Lawrence, Chedwood, Gertrude Bell and Mark Sykes among others. LAWRENCE, T.E., *Op. Cit.*, pp.72-73.;

⁷⁷ TUCHMAN, B., *Op. Cit.*, p. 281.

⁷⁸ SEGEV, T.: *One Palestine Complete. Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate*. New York, 1999: Henry Holt and Company LLC. p. 45

of English effort⁷⁹. But there was another reason, cultural, sentimental, moral or religious⁸⁰, it can be called “Balfour’s type motivation“, necessary because, as Turner said “history originated as a myth and becomes in social memory to which men can appeal, knowing it will provide justification for their present actions or convictions⁸¹. Both types converge in the final result.

British Government moved through geopolitical pragmatism rather than sympathy for the Jewish people. The primary objective of the British Government was to ensure its hegemony in the middle East through effective control of communications. On the one hand, the protection of the Suez Canal and on the other, the securing of a land bridge that would unite Suez with the Persian Gulf securing the route to India. The Sykes-Picot Agreement facilitated it partially, as an international zone in Palestine prevented the closure of the aforementioned bridge.

That Mark Sykes participated in the process that generated the Declaration has provided it with a component of conspiracy⁸². The fact is that it was commissioned by Prime Minister Lloyd George, a convinced anti-Semite, who faced the strategic need saw an opportunity in the support that the Jewish influence could have in the war effort⁸³. Sykes’s proposal, which knew nothing of George’s plans that sought a British Palestine⁸⁴, was that of a Jewish entity in Palestine under an Anglo-French condominium. George’s political pragmatism led him to keep France away from Suez⁸⁵. Weizmann met Sykes in February 1917 and showed his opposition to such condominium, Sykes reminded him about French objections to any concession to the Zionists, as it would imply the intention of establishing a British protectorate in Palestine⁸⁶. Sykes concluded that the Arabs would agree on a national status for the Jewish community in Palestine, the reference of which would be the Ottoman *millet*⁸⁷, something that in principle would not have to be more difficult because of the tradition of self-government of the issues Religious who operated in the Ottoman Empire.

⁷⁹ TUCHMAN, B., *Op. Cit.*, p. 275.

⁸⁰ TUCHMAN, B., *Op. Cit.*, p. xviii.

⁸¹ TUCHMAN, B., *Op. Cit.*, p. xix.

⁸² TOYNBEE A. & FRIEDMAN, I.: The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence: Comments and a Reply, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 185-201: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/259872>, p. 197

⁸³ ROGAN, E., *Op. Cit.*, p. 559.

⁸⁴ FROMKIN, D., *Op. Cit.* p. 286; GARCÍA PICAZO, P., *Op. Cit.* p. 66.

⁸⁵ French senator Pierre-Etienne Flandin demanded the British Foreign Ministry the continuation of the French dominion from the coast Syria, Lebanon until Arish in Sinai, while publicly accusing his compatriot Picot of treason, something which it put in danger the agreement with Britain (FROMKIN, D., *Op. Cit.*, p. 288).

⁸⁶ FROMKIN, D., *Op. Cit.* p. 286.

⁸⁷ FROMKIN, D., *Op. Cit.* p. 289.




Fig. 6: FO 882/16, fragment Sykes's telegram 30 april 1917
(Fuente: U.K. National Archives)

Considering Britain's fear of any threat to Suez, it does not seem likely that it was Whitehall's intention to relinquish control of the strategic port of Haifa. This statement was hold in George's decision to invade Palestine, securing British control⁸⁸. Sykes proposed the creation of an Arab Legion with Ottoman army defectors operating alongside Lawrence behind enemy lines⁸⁹. When he brought his proposal to Lloyd George and Lord Curzon, the Prime Minister emphasized securing the addition of Palestine to the British area and warned Sykes not to make promises to the Arabs, "particularly about Palestine"⁹⁰. It is Not a secret the interest of the British Prime minister for dismantling Sykes-Picot Agreement with regard to Palestine which deprived England of the effective possession of a territory that was the buffer of Suez based on *uti possidetis iuris* like right after a conquest.

6. British Mandate for Palestine. A perfect "collage"

Palestine was a Class "A" Mandate, so it was not provided by law as an independent state. Although England avoided to show herself as an applicant for Palestinian Mandate at the Paris conference, there was a doubt about her intentions⁹¹. The fact that only the Catholic community wanted a French mandate in Syria would make things easier for Britain when America refused to become a Madatory Power⁹², so the way was opened for a British "strategical buffer"⁹³. Weizmann at Versailles had pressed for Britain to receive the Mandate for Palestine and to include in it the implementation of the Balfour Declaration, in the hope that a British Palestine would lead to another Jew⁹⁴. British efforts were in the same direction. And Finally, during the San Remo Conference, on 24 April 1920, a resolution was adopted which aligned the article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and Balfour Declaration,

⁸⁸ FROMKIN, D., *Op. Cit.* p. 286-287

⁸⁹ FO 882/2, p. 55

⁹⁰ FROMKIN, D., *Op. Cit.* p. 287.

⁹¹ TUCHMAN, B., *Op. Cit.*, p. 294.

⁹² GARCÍA PICAZO, P., *Op. Cit.*, p. 67.

⁹³ TUCHMAN, 295.

⁹⁴ GARCÍA PICAZO, P., *Op. Cit.*, p. 55.

resulting in the British Mandate for Palestine, drafted in substance by England⁹⁵. A genuinely *Realpolitik* exercise become in a political and juridical instrument to facilitate, not only the restoration of the ancient Israel, but a territorial gain under the form of a Mandate or *de facto* a protectorate, of course, on behalf of League of Nations⁹⁶.

With a clear conscience, it can be said that Balfour Declaration is exactly that, a “declaration” without juridical value. Notwithstanding, the Mandate was the legal instrument in Public International Law to implement the contents of the James Balfour’s political statement. But legal consequences of the incorporation of the content of the Declaration to the articulate Mandate gave footing in law to “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, “... nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country”⁹⁷. It can be found aspects which extend special and differential treatment to two group of actors, Jews and non-Jews, without mention Arab population. England recognized civil and religious rights of non-Jews people, as well as did it with political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country, but without taking account of non-Jews political rights. That implied that political rights lead to political personality, which lead itself to political independence: the *sine qua non* of statehood⁹⁸.

7. Conclusions

First World War was a war among empires. Winners were empires, as well losers were too⁹⁹. Any performance, agreement or commitment undertaken during war must be understood in her context and warring parties.

The British Mandate for Palestine was the legal and political concretion of a *Realpolitik* exercise performed –and drafted– by England, animated by a combination of strategic and cultural reasons: Lloyd George’s and Balfour’s type. The military context of the moment explains the behavior of England and her officials based

⁹⁵ L. S. Amery in TUCHMAN, B. *Op. Cit.*, p. 296.

⁹⁶ The Mandate contained 28 articles, mostly juridical to rule its administration. But the political core of the mandate lied in the flowing:

“Art. 2: The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home...”

“Art. 4: An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine...”

“Art. 6: ...Shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish agency referred to in Art. 4...”

“Art. 8: ...There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine...”

British Palestine Mandate: Text of the Mandate. Jewish Virtual Library: <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/text-of-the-british-mandate-for-palestine>

⁹⁷ THE AVALON PROJECT. Balfour Declaration 1917, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/balfour.asp

⁹⁸ TUCHMAN, B., *Op. Cit.*, p. 299.

⁹⁹ FROMKIN, D., *Op. Cit.*, p. 575.

only in her national interest, whose sole aim was imperial expansion for strategic purposes¹⁰⁰: to get a “strategical buffer“ in the Middle East. Both, England and her policy makers, did “what they were supposed to do“¹⁰¹ in their world of 1914-1922.

Lloyd George’s type motives can be traced by the making decision process conditioned by strategic need and ruled by *Realpolitik*. Balfour’s are veiled in myths, legends and traditions¹⁰² guided by men

The final result in 1922 was a consequence of western cosmovision, an Anglo-Saxon new variant of Kant’s *Eternal peace*¹⁰³, about the communities under the former Ottoman rule, considered unable to stand alone. The Mandates System tried to harmonize the theses President Wilson’s against *World Politics-Weltpolitik* and the self-determination of the peoples with the territorial gain based on the right of conquest in force¹⁰⁴.

The implementation of the Balfour Declaration in Mandate was a discretionary Britain’s move as a Mandatory Power, sanctioned by San Remo Conference, converting her, *de iure*, into the possessor of sovereign rights over Palestine, obtained on the basis of its effective possession after its conquest by Allenby in 1917.

It is a peculiar event in History in which the conquering power assumes a moral obligation with a people and gives it legal and political nature. By reconstructing a national Jewish home in Palestine would lead to a more stable geopolitical scenario for British interests.

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¹⁰⁰ ROGAN, E., *Op. Cit.*, p. 640.

¹⁰¹ FROMKIN, D., *Op. Cit.*, p. 575.

¹⁰² TUCHMAM, B., *Op. Cit.*, p. xviii.

¹⁰³ GARCÍA PICAZO, P., *Op. Cit.*, p. 52.

¹⁰⁴ Right of Conquest, which grants the possession of a territory acquired in a war, abandoned after the *Briand-Kellog Pact* of 1928.

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MILITARY CONFLICTS IN PALESTINE: 1920-1921 AND SAN REMO CONFERENCE

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Conflict's background

The British Army took Palestine from the Ottoman Empire in 1917–1918. The Army administered the region as Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (South), “O.E.T.A. (S)”, until a civil administration headed by High Commissioner Herbert Samuel was installed in June 1920.

The British remained in control of Palestine until they left in 1948. During this time, there were series of violent incidents that the British preferred to call “disturbances”. These mostly took the form of riots by the Arab population against the Jewish population and later, against the British administration.

Nebi Musa riot

The first major “disturbance” occurred in Jerusalem on April 4–7, 1920. It is often called the **Nebi Musa riot** after the Islamic festival that occurred during that period.¹

The Jewish community had anticipated the Arab reaction to the Allies’ convention, who scheduled in the same month in San Remo – Italy (see below) and was ready to meet it.

Jewish affairs in Palestine were being administered at the time from Jerusalem by the *Vaad Hatzirim* (Council of Delegates), appointed by the World Zionist Organization (WZO) which became the Jewish Agency in 1929. The Vaad Hatzirim charged Ze’ev (Vladimir) Jabotinsky with the task of organizing Jewish self-defense. Jabotinsky was one of the founders of the Jewish Battalions, which served in the British Army during the First World War and had participated in the conquest of Palestine from the Turks. Acting under the auspices of the Vaad Hatzirim, Jabotinsky lead the HAGANA (self-defense) organization in Jerusalem, which succeeded in repelling the Arab attacks. Six Jews were killed and some 200 injured in Jerusalem in the course of the 1920 riots. In addition, two Americans, Jakov Tucker and Ze’ev Scharff, both WWI veterans, were killed resisting an Arab attack, one month earlier, on the Jewish settlement of Tel Hai in March 1920. Had it not been for the preliminary organization of Jewish defense, the number of victims would have undoubtedly been much greater.

The *British* Army appointed a commission headed by **Major-General Palin** to enquire into the circumstances of the riot. Unlike many other official reports, this one was filed away in the archives and never published. By the time the report was complete, the civil administration had commenced, and both the British government and the Zionists—apparently nobody asked the Arabs—thought it should be kept secret.

Some of the conclusions of Palin’s report said:

¹ <https://ecf.org.il/issues/issue/1351>

1. "That the Military Governorate of Jerusalem failed to make adequate preparations for a possible disturbance at the Nebi Musa Pilgrimage in spite of the receipt of warnings and ample knowledge of the situation, such failure being probably due to over confidence induced by the success of the police authorities in handling earlier demonstrations.

2. That in spite of the prohibition of political demonstrations no definite instructions were issued by the Military Governorate to the police to prevent the delivery of inflammatory speeches on the occasion of the Nebi Musa pilgrimage..

3. That the decision to withdraw the (British) troops from inside [p82] the city at 6 a.m. on Monday, April 5, whoever was responsible for it, was an error of judgement.

4. That the Military were slow in obtaining full control of the city after Martial Law had been proclaimed.

5. That the situation at present obtaining in Palestine is exceedingly dangerous and demands firm and patient handling if a serious catastrophe is to be avoided."²

The 1921 Riot

Riot perpetrated by Palestinian Arabs, including attacks on Jews, in and around Jaffa, started on the 1st of May 1921. The riots were sparked by clashes over the May Day Parade, and later spread to numerous Jewish localities. They were met with armed response by *Mandatory* security forces and Jewish militias. Overall, 47 Jews and 48 Arabs were killed during the riots.

While British Secretary of State for Colonies, Winston Churchill, visited Jerusalem two months earlier, during March 1921, he spoke sternly to the Arab leaders telling them: „It is manifestly right that the Jews, who are scattered all over the world, should have a national center and a National Home where some of them may be reunited. And where else could that be but in this land of Palestine, with which for more than 3,000 years they have been intimately and profoundly associated“.³

After the 1921 riots, Churchill envisaged Britain holding the ring in Palestine until such time that the Jews formed majority of the inhabitants, whereupon the Jewish State would come into being. Pressed as to whether he meant that the Jews would have „control of the government“, Churchill replied (to the Canadian Prime Minister at the Imperial Conference on 22 June 1921): „If, in the course of many years, they become majority in the country, they naturally will take over.“⁴

This, the Arabs refused to accept, and in London on 22 August 1921, they once more urged Churchill to bring a complete halt to Jewish immigration. Churchill rejected this appeal telling the Arabs: „The Jews have a far more difficult task than you. You have only to enjoy your own possession; but they have to try to create out of the wilderness, out of the barren places, a livelihood for the people they bring in... they were in Palestine many hundreds of years ago. They have always tried to be

² Palin Report, (1920, REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY CONVENED BY ORDER OF H.E. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, 12 April 1920.

³ Martin Gilbert, **Winston Churchill and the foundation of Israel**, Sir Martin Gilbert's website, May 2, 2016.

⁴ Gilbert, **Ibid**, *ibid*.

there. They have done a great deal for the country. They have started many thriving colonies and many of them wish to go and live there. It is to them a sacred place.”⁵

The Haycraft Commission

This commission was established in order to investigate the riots and its report was presented to the British Parliament in October 1921. The commission found that the primary cause for the „disturbances“ was Arab discontent over the political and economic consequences of continued Jewish immigration, as well as perceived pro-Jewish bias by Mandatory authorities.⁶ The report was followed by the 1922 Palestine White Paper (see below), a policy document aimed to confirm its findings.

The 1922 British White Paper

A government policy document was prepared by Churchill himself and published on 3 June 1922. While reiterating British support for the Balfour Declaration, it attributed tensions in Palestine to “exaggerated interpretations” of that Declaration, clarifying its intent to mean that while the “Jewish national home” is to be established in Palestine that does not mean Palestine is to be wholly Jewish. It stressed that Jewish immigration should be limited by the country’s economic capacity, and that Palestinian independence is impracticable at that time. It also specified **the separation of Transjordan from Palestine**, later enshrined in the San Remo Convention.⁷

Conferences of San Remo – 1920, 1922

On April 19–26, 1920, an international meeting convened at San Remo, on the Italian Riviera, to decide the future of the former territories of the Ottoman Empire; it was attended by the prime ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy, and representatives of Japan, Greece, and Belgium.

During the Conference of San Remo, two “A” mandates were created out of the old Ottoman province of Syria: the northern half (Syria and Lebanon) was mandated to France, the southern half (Palestine) to Great Britain. The province of Mesopotamia (Iraq) was also mandated to Great Britain. Under the terms of an “A” mandate the individual countries were deemed independent but subject to a mandatory power until they reached political maturity.

A legal document was adopted by the League of Nations on 24th of July 1922. It established the United Kingdom as a Mandatory in control of Palestine, which had been officially under military government since the British occupied it (from the Ottoman Empire). It was based on the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the understandings reached at the Paris (1919 peace conference) and San Remo Conferences. The document provided for the administration of Palestine by the British with the aim of establishing the Jewish national home as mentioned in the 1917 Balfour Declaration, ensuring that the rights and positions of other communities in Palestine, as well as the holy places, be preserved.

⁵ Gilbert, *Ibid*, *ibid*.

⁶ Palestine. Disturbances in May, 1921. **Reports of the Commission of Inquiry with correspondence relating thereto ...** by Great Britain. Colonial Office; Haycraft, Sir – 1921.

⁷ Churchill White Paper 1922, **British White Paper of June 1922 on Palestine**, Colonial Office 1922.

Article 25 of the Mandate allowed the British, with the consent of the League of Nations, to “withhold or postpone” the application of certain provisions of the Mandate with regard to *the territory east of the Jordan River* and administer it separately from the rest of Palestine, a right which it exercised with the Transjordan Memorandum later in 1922.⁸

By that, San Remo 1922 conference, accepted a two state solution: a Jewish state on the territory west of Jordan River – based on Balfur declaration and an Arab state with the name Transjordan, east to the Jordan River.

The Palestine Police in the Mandate era

In 1920, the British set up a civilian government, in anticipation of the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine. With the civilian British government came the establishment of the Palestine Police Force, consisting of 18 British officers supported by 55 Palestinian officers and 1,144 rank and file. With a total population of 639,228 in 1920 (consisting of 512,090 Muslims, 60,883 Christians, 66,102 Jews, and 153 Samaritans), the relatively small number of 18 British officers (commanders) is striking.

Almost immediately, the role of the police force, or lack thereof, was called into question. During the riots of 1920, Jews accused the “lower police officials” of standing by and allowing violence to be done to them. When **Herbert Samuel**, the first High Commissioner for Palestine, met with his advisory council and discussed how the Palestine Police should be set up, he encountered tensions concerning the potential conflicts between the authority of District Governors and the head of the Mandate-wide police. At this same meeting, it became clear that the British did not recognize the indigenous security system in villages and towns of Palestine (*ghafir*) and that a new (British) police system was envisioned to supersede it.

Although the number of British police officers grew from 18 in 1920, to 120 by 1931, this was still relatively small in comparison with the population. One might be tempted to interpret the Palestine Police of the 1920s as rather heroic for maintaining security with such a small number of officers. But the new Mandate Government was also moving toward bringing in some form of military or supernumerary units.

The idea of having a special unit of British supernumeraries worried the few Palestinian Arabs who were aware of the plan. The members of the local Palestinian Arab community who served, in the early years of the Mandate period, on the Advisory Council for the High Commissioner objected to the idea of British gendarmerie, questioning whether the British intended to rule Palestine as a colony or as a country under Mandate. They felt that any gendarmerie should be made up of locals, pointing out that even the language barrier would make it difficult for a British gendarmerie. But their concerns went unheard.

The Mandate Government decided that the task of maintaining public security would best be accomplished by forming two gendarmerie units. Both were called Palestine Gendarmerie. One consisted of Arabs and Jews under British officers and was established in 1921, after the riots, and the second, established in 1922, consisted exclusively of British recruits.

⁸ **Mandate for Palestine** - League of Nations, 12 August 1922.

The members of this second gendarmerie were former “Black and Tans”.⁹ In April 1922, approximately 650 former “Black and Tans” arrived in Haifa, Palestine and commenced their duties as the British Palestine Gendarmerie. They were not transferred there as a unit. Rather, there seems to have been a personal connection. The Inspector-General of Police and Prisons, **Major-General H. H. Tudor** (who also served as the General Officer Commanding), was in charge of the British military, Palestine Police, and the Palestine Gendarmerie. Coincidentally, Tudor had been the Chief of Police in Ireland during the Irish Rebellion. As the “Black and Tans” were being disbanded in Ireland, enrolment sheets were being circulated. So it was the case that 75 to 95 percent of the new British Palestine Gendarmerie were former members of the “Black and Tans.”

According to their own reports, these former “Black and Tans” were brash and anxious for action. They delighted in skirmishes with bandits in the hills.

The British Gendarmerie in Palestine was short lived. In 1924 General Tudor handed over the command in Palestine and in 1926, the British Gendarmerie dissolved due to financial constraints. Some of its men were absorbed into the newly established “British section” of the police, which operated alongside the larger “Palestinian section.”

During Tudor service and the “Black and Tans” the situation in Palestine remained calm and riots not repeated, while three years later, in 1929, when not the Gendarmerie and not their commander existed, things got out of control. That led to a massacre by Arabs of 133 Jews and 339 wounded among the Jewish population in Palestine.

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⁹ **The “Black and Tans”** were British ex-soldiers recruited to reinforce the United Kingdom’s police force in Ireland. The “Auxiliaries” were a temporary force of paramilitary police, composed of British ex-officers. Both the “Black and Tans” and Auxiliaries fought against the Irish Republican Army during the Irish War of Independence (1919-1921).

FROM NOTHING TO SOMETHING NEW? USING INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY IN THE GERMAN NAVIES, 1918-1945

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(The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author, and do not reflect those of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense or the United States government.)

This paper originates in my bus rides in the city of Freiburg-im-Breisgau, for dissertation research, from which I recognized a continuity in the German understanding of the sacrifice demanded by maritime warfare. Specifically, this paper seeks to identify the origins and persistence of the German naval expectation that crews would fight their ships until they sank, with the flag flying or at least to the last shell. I believe this naval and popular expectation started with the Battle of Coronel, in November 1914, only to be extended after the German defeat at the Falkland Islands a month later. The sentiment continued through the Second World War, expressed in the heavy loss of life on board the ships *Bismarck* and *Scharnhorst*, to its utmost during the German U-boat campaign, when almost 60% of the submarine arm's personnel died. Most significantly, this extreme self-sacrifice did not mean just captains died in action; German attitude expected crews to go down with their ships, too. This last point represents what I see as a sharp contrast with the prevailing English-speaking military ethos wherein commanders prioritize, in order, the mission, their people, and themselves.¹

The roots for the unique viewpoint lie in the slender record of German naval operations before the 20th century. The *Kaiserreich*, and Prussia before it, were land powers. Unsuccessful during the wars of unification, the pre-1914 Navy was obscured by the successes of Germany's four armies, so it looked beyond national boundaries for a role model. Chief amongst these was Britain's Royal Navy, and historian Holger Afflerbach attributes the expectation of crews honorably going down with their ships as having been derived from that service. The Germans learned these examples from the writing of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Stafford Corbett. Reflecting awareness of the attitude, Afflerbach notes a March 1885 missive of Kaiser Wilhelm I, which stated: "I hope that even in adversity an honorable sinking will keep my ships from having to strike their flag."² His successor, Wilhelm II, made it a direct order: the "flag is for the man the symbol of loyalty. He may never leave it and when it is in danger he must defend it until his last drop of blood."³

Just before the First World War, a foreign, negative example of naval surrender

¹ Carol Off, *The Lion, The Fox and The Eagle: A Story of Generals and Justice in Yugoslavia and Rwanda* (Toronto: 2001), 278, and also derived from Romeo Dallaire, *Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, (Toronto: 2003).

² Holger Afflerbach, "'Mit Wehender Fahne Untergehen' Kapitulationsverweigerungen in der deutschen Marine," *Vierteljahrhefte für Zeitgeschichte* 49:4 (2001), 598-600.

³ As quoted in Mark Jones, "Graf von Spee's *Untergang* and the Corporate Identity of the Imperial German Navy," in Duncan Redford (ed.), *Maritime History and Identity: The Sea and Culture in the Modern World* (London and New York: 2014), 195-196.

took place. In 1905 Rear Admiral Nicolai I. Nebogatov saw his force decisively out-ranged by the Japanese battle line after the main part of the Russian fleet's defeat at Tsushima, and ordered his ships to surrender, so that their crews might be saved.⁴ On trial after the Russo-Japanese War's end, Nebogatov argued that while it was in his power to order the fighting to continue, he could not justify the wasting of his 2,000 sailors' lives to no end.⁵ Loyalty, for him, had to be balanced upward and downward. In the end Nebogatov and three ship captains were sentenced to death, but Czar Nicholas II commuted the penalty to 10 years' confinement. Military observers knew of these events, and the German Navy internalized them.

By 1914 the East Asia Squadron constituted the largest overseas portion of the German Navy, based at the Empire's *Ostasiatische Station* in Tsingtao, and other Pacific colonial ports. After 1898, cruisers rotated through it, taking part in regional crises such as the Spanish-American War and Boxer Rebellion.⁶ With war's outbreak in Europe, Vice Admiral Maximilian Graf von Spee concentrated five of the East Asia squadron's six ships in the Western Pacific, with orders to attack merchant shipping, cut telegraph cables, and act as a "fleet in being" to distract Entente forces.⁷ (The sixth ship, S.M.S. *Emden*, raided in the Indian Ocean.) After several such raids, pressure from numerous British, Australian, French, Russian and Japanese units drove von Spee's ships to South America, where on 1 November 1914 the Germans fought a smaller Royal Navy squadron under Rear Admiral Christopher Cradock.

Two elements of this battle of Coronel, fought about 35 kilometers off the coast of Chile, stand out: first, at no German cost, the outmatched Royal Navy squadron decisively lost its two heaviest cruisers sunk, while the other pair of ships retreated to fight another day.⁸ The second feature was that no one of the two Royal Navy sunken ships, totaling 1,600 sailors, survived, including Cradock. At the time von Spee suggested the rough seas and darkness (the battle ended two hours after sunset) prevented him from lowering rescue boats. But desire to avoid surrender figured, as noted by the British official historian, Julian Corbett,

⁴ Ronald H. Spector, *At War At Sea: Sailors and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century* (New York and London: 2001), 20-21.

⁵ Afflerbach, 602-603. For Afflerbach, Nebogatov understood Carl von Clausewitz's "Die Streitmacht muß vernichtet, d.h. in einen solchen Zustand werden, daß sie in den Kampf nicht mehr fortsetzen kann. Wir erklären hierbei, daß wir in der Folge bei dem Ausdruck 'Vernichtung der feindlichen Streitkraft' nur dies verstehen werden." He cites as source Book I, Chapter 1 of *Vom Kriege*, but it's in Book I, Chapter 2. See also N. Wolz, "Und wir verrosteten im Hafen." *Deutschland, Großbritannien und der Krieg zur See 1914-1918* (München: 2013), 72-73.

⁶ Heiko Herold, *Reichsgewalt bedeutet Seegewalt: Die Kreuzergeschwader der Kaiserlichen Marine als Instrument der deutschen Kolonial- und Weltpolitik 1885 bis 1901* (Oldenbourg: 2012) and Volker Schult & Karl-Heinz Wionzek (eds.), *The German and Austrian Navies in the Philippines, and Their Role in the Spanish-American War of 1898: A Collection of Original Documents* (Manila: 2017).

⁷ David Stevens, *In All Respects Ready: Australia's Navy in World War One* (Melbourne: 2014), 48-49. See also Holger Afflerbach, "Der letzte Mann" *Die Zeit* (17 Dec. 1993), found at <https://www.zeit.de/1993/51/der-letzte-mann/komplettansicht>, accessed 7 April 2019.

⁸ Julian S. Corbett, *Naval Operations, Vol. I: To the Battle of the Falklands December 1914* (London: 1920), 354.

... in the [cruiser] *Monmouth* there was no such thought. From the earliest Tudor days British ships had established a reputation that they would always sink rather than surrender. In later times the tradition had not always been maintained, but in the present war there was in this respect, as in so many others, a reversion to the old indomitable spirit—not only it must be said, in our own Service, but in that of the enemy as well.⁹

This particular “spirit” was shown by H.M.S. *Monmouth*’s crew at Coronel, an attitude which made a strong impression upon the Germans. One junior officer on board the cruiser S.M.S. *Nürnberg*, Leutnant zur See Otto von Spee—son of the vice admiral—wrote in a letter:

It was terrible to fire on poor chaps who could no longer defend themselves. But the flag kept flying. Despite our also ceasing firing for some minutes, the flag was not hauled down. We therefore undertook to close again, and with our artillery fire capsized (the *Monmouth*). The ship sank with its flag flying.¹⁰

His captain, echoed the same observations in a personal diary.¹¹ These are the first recorded instances I can find of German sailors noting the willingness of a crew to fight beyond mission-oriented purpose, while linking that step to keeping to a ship’s ensign flying until destroyed. Eight years later, the German Navy’s official history also described how *Monmouth*’s flag flew, illuminated at night, as *Nürnberg* opened fire. That work echoed the younger von Spee’s description, citing the ship “mit wehende Flaggen unterging” (sank with waving flags). The author of that passage was *Kapitän zur See* Erich Raeder, future commander-in-chief of the German Navy from 1928 to 1943.¹²

Six weeks later Vice Admiral von Spee led his squadron against the British Falkland Island colony, hoping to find coal, wreck the telegraph station and further disrupt the Entente.¹³ Instead, the five German cruisers met a Royal Navy force of six, under Vice Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee. Worse, the two British battlecruisers, H.M.S. *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, were both faster than von Spee’s best, S.M.S. *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, considerably outgunning and outranging their armament. After a lengthy chase, Sturdee’s heavy ships caught and destroyed *Scharnhorst* and

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ As quoted in Nicolas Wolz, “Und wir verrosten im Hafen”: *Deutschland, Großbritannien und der Krieg zur See 1914 – 1918* (München:2013), 73.

¹¹ Kapitän zur See Karl von Schönberg, as quoted in Jack Sweetman, “Coronel: Anatomy of a Disaster,” in Gerald Jordan (ed.), *Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century 1900-1945: Essays in Honour of Arthur Marder* (New York: 1977), 71-72.

¹² E. Raeder, *Der Kreuzerkrieg in den ausländischen Gewässern. Erster Band: Das Kreuzergeschwader* (Berlin: 1922), 216-217. Raeder’s history is the sole strategic and analytical work written by a German Navy chief between 1871 and 1945. For a summary see Keith W. Bird, *Erich Raeder: Admiral of the Third Reich* (Annapolis, MD: 2006), 51-56.

¹³ On neutral ports’ closure to German cruisers, through British pressure, forcing von Spee to approach the Falklands, see Stellvertretender Chef des Admiralstabes der Marine an Chef des Admiralstabes der Marine, “Maschinenschrift,” 2 October 1914, as reproduced in Gerhard Granier (ed.) *Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Vol. 2 (Koblenz: 2000), 328.

Gneisenau, while his lighter cruisers sank S.M.S. *Leipzig* and *Nürnberg*.¹⁴ The action ended the German surface threat outside of European waters.

Reports of the Falklands battle initially only came from British sources. These emphasized the sacrifice of German crews during the action, although in contrast to Coronel, Sturdee's ships did retrieve about one-tenth of them as survivors. Five hours after being spotted by the pursuing British, von Spee ordered the three light cruisers to try to escape; the heavier *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* would sacrifice themselves in action against the battlecruisers. As Corbett described the choice:

Determined to sacrifice himself and his two heavy cruisers to save the rest, which after all could do the greatest service to his country in harrying our trade, he resolved for the honour of the flag and to facilitate their escape to accept action.¹⁵

After two more hours of shooting, with the *Scharnhorst* burning, her guns, in the words of *Inflexible*'s gunnery officer "suddenly shut up as when a light is blown out."¹⁶ Shortly before, *Gneisenau* had been ordered to try to save herself. At 4:17 pm *Scharnhorst* sank; both Corbett and Raeder noted "with flags waving."¹⁷ There were no survivors from the over 800 on board the flagship.

During parts of the action, flags played other roles. Twenty minutes before *Scharnhorst*'s sinking, concern had arisen on board *Gneisenau* that von Spee had been killed, as the admiral's ensign appeared to be at half-mast above the fire. Raeder reported a message exchange, in which the vice admiral responded he was well, and *Gneisenau* attributed her error to poor visibility.¹⁸ With her sister gone, *Gneisenau* fought alone for nearly two more hours. Prolonging the agony, the cruiser's crew kept shooting, albeit intermittently and without effect, forcing Sturdee's ships to resume firing despite thinking her ready to surrender.¹⁹ Her shells fully expended, the crew opened a torpedo tube to speed flooding, and abandoned ship after three "hurrahs" for the Kaiser and their vessel. Due to the fighting and icy water, fewer than a quarter survived, with Lieutenant Heinrich von Spee not among them. The first officer, Lieutenant Commander Hans Pochhammer, subsequently reported the cruiser capsized flying "all flags up to the foremast."²⁰

For the light cruisers, just S.M.S. *Dresden* escaped, only to be later sunk near Chile. To explain *Leipzig*'s fate, Erich Raeder quoted extensively from an account by one of her few survivors, Lieutenant Walther Koehler, the ship's navigator. Hit

¹⁴ Raeder, 269-341 and Corbett, 414-436. To write his books, Raeder employed Corbett's account, including its maps.

¹⁵ Corbett, 419.

¹⁶ Corbett, 423.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, Raeder, 288 and Wolz, 78. The plural refers to both foremast (the admiral's flag) as well as the gaff- and main-mast (navy ensign). Verging on mythmaking, Raeder reported a reserve flag from S.M.S. *Scharnhorst* stuffed into a 20.3 cm shell casing and later found, along with a sailor's corpse, washed ashore in Brazil. The relic was displayed in Berlin by the postwar *Reichsmarine*.

¹⁸ Raeder, 287. *Gneisenau*'s commander was the senior captain, and would have assumed squadron leadership upon von Spee's death.

¹⁹ Corbett, 425.

²⁰ Raeder, 292.

repeatedly by shells from two Royal Navy cruisers, the blazing ship stopped shooting at 7:10 pm, with only the foremast ensign still flying;²¹ the order to abandon ship came thereafter. As the crew assembled to do so, Koehler noted, their dying comrades asked whether the flag was still raised, only to be assured the ship would sink that way; at 9:23, she did, taking all but 18 of her crew.²² Two hours earlier *Nürnberg*, her masts shot away and with only a small boat ensign attached to a davit, had done so too. Immediately before sinking with the latter ship, four crew members waved a small flag in the air; the nine survivors, which did not include Lieutenant Otto von Spee, barely outnumbered them.²³ Corbett's official history does not record the last incident, instead indicating the ship succumbed after putting up a gallant fight.²⁴

The Cruiser Squadron's loss devastated Germans. Historian Mark Jones suggests that when added to the inactivity of the High Seas Fleet, the Falklands battle traumatized the navy, a negative impact magnified by 1914's contrasting social mobilization for war.²⁵ (Jones did not know the reason for the Imperial Navy's inactivity, unveiled by Jason Hines and Keith Bird elsewhere in this panel.) With only British accounts available, German newspaper reports crafted a mythology of the heroic last stand, with sacrificial flag imagery predominating.²⁶ Most poignantly, heroism quickly became linked to the flag: by late 1914 artist Hans Rohrdt painted "The Last Man" ("Der letzte Mann"), portraying a sailor from one of the light cruisers defiantly waving the Imperial flag as the sea was about to engulf his sinking ship.²⁷ The problem with this story was that it couldn't be proven; in 1934 the Navy wrote to all survivors and none could confirm The Last Man's identity.²⁸ Even von Spee's widow helped build myth, telling reporters "Isn't it beautiful, that my beloved children were allowed to be led by their own father first to victory, then to death?"²⁹ Finally, the well-known poet Hanns Heinz Ewers wrote "Drei Grafen Spee" about the late admiral and his sons, describing Coronel as the "first victory at sea for the black-white-red" flag.³⁰

Amongst the Navy leaders, the expectation for extreme self-sacrifice persisted through the war. By 1918, with Empire armies retreating from France and Belgium, blockade wrecking the home front, Communists in Russia, and other Central Power states collapsing, the Imperial Navy leadership sought one more redemption. The fleet commander, Admiral Franz von Hipper, planned an operation in the North Sea,

²¹ Corbett, 429.

²² Raeder, 304 and 306.

²³ Raeder 313-314.

²⁴ Corbett, 432.

²⁵ Jones, 188-189. See also Spector, 71-72.

²⁶ Jones, 193-196.

²⁷ Probably meant to be S.M.S. *Leipzig*. See Raeder, 314, f.n.1, and Jörg Hillmann, "Die Seeschlacht vor dem Skagerrak in der deutschen Erinnerung" in Michael Epkenhans, Jörg Hillmann and Frank Nägler (eds.), *Skagerrackschlacht: Vorgeschichte—Erignisse—Verarbeitung* (München: 2011), 325, f.n. 87. See also Holger Afflerbach, "Der letzte Mann," *Die Zeit* (17 December 1993).

²⁸ Afflerbach, "Der letzte Mann."

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ See Hanns Floerke and Georg Gärtner (eds.), *Unserer Flotte Heldentaten. Seekriegserlebnisse*. (München: 1915), 188-189. Raeder included an appendix, 417-420, listing all Cruiser Squadron officers and their fates; the vice admiral and his sons are each characterized as Graf (Count).

to send the High Seas Fleet on a one-way mission to fight the combined British and American fleet off the mouth of the Thames.³¹ In part, such a mission echoed the so-called “death ride” Hipper’s battlecruisers had conducted at Jutland, which charged the Grand Fleet to allow the heavier battleships to escape. The changed context however, of imminent national defeat, meant crews would not stand for such a fruitless gesture, and led directly to 1918’s widespread mutinies on Imperial Navy warships in Kiel and Wilhelmshaven.³² That the sailors tried to raise the red flag of revolution only added insult.

Despite those rebellions, the expected naval behavior of extreme self-sacrifice in defense of the flag retained favor after 1918. The leading interwar naval officers’ leadership book, Captain Siegfried Sorge’s *The Navy Officer as Leader and Educator*, published in 1936, explicitly cited recent examples of loyalty in the German people’s character:

... von dem “letzten Mann,” der die Flagge auf dem Wrack der *Nürnberg* hochhielt, bis zum Todeskampf des *Blücher* am 24. Januar 1915, zum Grafen Spee und seinen Männern und bis zu den beiden großen Deutschen Hindenburg und Hitler, deren ausgeprägtester Charakterzug der Treue ist.³³

[... of the “last man,” who held high the flag on the wreck of the *Nürnberg*, to the battle to the death of the *Blücher* on 24 January 1915 (*i.e.* the Battle of Dogger Bank), to Graf Spee and his men and to both great Germans, Hindenburg and Hitler, whose most pronounced character trait is loyalty.]

Twenty years after the events, the pedigree for expected German naval behavior, in the form of tragic self-sacrifice, had been established.

Germans also constructed memorials emphasizing death in battle. With public donations, and funding from the city of Kiel, the *Marine-Ehrenmal* was designed by architect Gustav August Munzer.³⁴ Inaugurated by Adolph Hitler on the 20th anniversary of Jutland, it stands 72 meters tall.³⁵ Exhibits in its hall of honor tied crews to their sunken ships. While the pages of handwritten books displayed fallen sailors’ names, in a room dedicated “Sie starben für uns” (“They died for us”), the same space also showed sunken ships’ silhouettes. In the books, sailors were grouped by ship—crew members even after death, de-emphasizing their individuality—while the sheer number of silhouettes showed what (not whom) the *Kaiserliche Marine*

³¹ Order reproduced in “Operationsbefehl des Kommandos der Hochseestreitkräfte: Operationsbefehl nr.19” 24 October 1918, in Gerhard Granier (ed.), *Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Vol.2 (Paderborn: 2000), 193-195. There is an extensive literature linking plans for the fleet attack to the ensuing mutinies.

³² See the High Seas Fleet’s reports in “Aufzeichnung des Kommandos der Hochseestreitkräfte,” 3 November 1918, in Gerhard Granier (ed.), *Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Vol.2 (Paderborn: 2000), 196-198.

³³ Siegfried Sorge, *Der Marineoffizier als Führer und Erzieher*. 3rd edition (Berlin: 1941), 119. Sorge attributes the “last man” painting to the wrong ship.

³⁴ Dieter Hartwig, *Das Marine-Ehrenmal in Laboe “Für die Ewigkeit, zeitlos, klar . . .”* (Hamburg: 2004) 14.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 22. The same reference suggests Adolph Hitler considered it emblematic of the bow wave of a ship.

had lost. A Skagerrack painting by noted artist Claus Bergen showed ships in action against the Royal Navy, with the Imperial *Kriegsfahne* shown improbably visibly in its center.

The same applied nearby at Möltenort, where the U-boat Memorial literally counted the dead:

Im Weltkrieg 1914-1918

Bleiben 5132 Helden

199 U-Boote

(In the World War 1914-1918 remain 5132 heroes—199 U-boats)

Möltenort explicit linked sailors and the craft in which they had died as well.³⁶

More public than the contents of a leadership guide, and more internationally visible than these monuments, the post-1918 German navies also named ships to evoke these excessively heroic connotations. A list of seventeen names used after 1920, largest to smallest, is as follows: [Slide]

<i>Scharnhorst</i>	<i>Gneisenau</i>	<i>Deutschland/Lützow</i>	<i>Blücher</i>
<i>Seydlitz</i>	<i>Leipzig</i>	<i>Seeadler</i>	<i>Condor</i>
<i>Königsberg</i>	<i>Cormoran</i>	<i>Nürnberg</i>	<i>Dresden</i>
<i>Emden</i>	<i>Cöln</i>	<i>Karlsruhe</i>	<i>Bremse</i>

It is worth noting that of these, six ships (names in blue) had few or no survivors: S.M.S. *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Blücher*, *Leipzig*, *Nürnberg* and *Cöln*.³⁷ Four sank during the Falklands battle, and the balance were sunk in action or scuttled. The latter included three new wartime vessels built and lost again when crews scuttled their successors at Scapa Flow in 1919; one of these was *Cöln*, commanded by Erich Raeder.³⁸ Another, S.M.S. *Emden*, was flagship of the interned German fleet at Scapa Flow; Admiral Ludwig von Reuter used her mast to signal his order to scuttle the ships.³⁹

Yet another ship-name, certainly the most reminiscent of the early sacrifices, was the “pocket” battleship *Admiral Graf Spee*, completed in 1934. The ship was trapped in Montevideo in December 1939 by Royal Navy cruisers after the River Plate engagement. Given the situation, Captain Hans Langsdorff ordered the ship

³⁶ Annerose & Jörg-Rüdiger Sieck, *Di U-Bootfahrer und das Ehrenmal in Möltenort* (Kiel & Hamburg: 2006), 36-37 and Michael Hadley, *Count Not the Dead: The Popular Image of the German Submarine* (Montréal: 1995), 57.

³⁷ (No author) *Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe: Namen und Schicksale* (Potsdam: 1941). This is a quasi-official work, as retired Rear Admiral Walter Lohmann contributed an extensive introduction.

³⁸ Friedrich Ruge, *Scapa Flow: Das Ende der deutschen Flotte* (Oldenburg and Hamburg: 1969), 211-212.

³⁹ *Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe*, 34. By way of comparison, the United States Navy has not named a USS *Arizona* or *Oklahoma* since they were destroyed at Pearl Harbor. The successor to the USS *Utah*, a target ship also sunk on 7 December 1941, took nearly 74 years to name. The Royal Navy has not had an HMS *Hood*, *Barham* or *Glorious* since 1941 either, although an HMS *Prince of Wales* is just now being built. I am indebted to my colleague Martin Murphy, for strengthening this point in a pleasant conversation on 8 April 2019.

scuttled, then shot himself while lying atop an Imperial Navy battle ensign. In the aftermath of this less-costly battle (*Admiral Graf Spee* lost 36 killed and 50 wounded), *Großadmiral* Erich Raeder ordered later that month: “A German warship’s crew fights to their utmost up to the last shell, until they win or go down under a flying flag.”⁴⁰ The expectation of extreme self-sacrifice had become an order.

Some of these German ships had scored important victories, but the list of other post-1920 vessel names magnified the importance of tragic sacrifice to the German Navy. Destroyers had been numbered in the Imperial Navy, but the *Kriegsmarine* started naming some of them for people:

<i>Leberecht Maass</i>	<i>Georg Thiele</i>	<i>Max Schultz</i>	<i>Richard Beitzen</i>
<i>Paul Jacobi</i>	<i>Theodore Riedel</i>	<i>Hermann Schoemann</i>	<i>Bruno Heinemann</i>
<i>Wolfgang Zenker</i>	<i>Hans Lody</i>	<i>Bernd von Arnim</i>	<i>Erich Giese</i>
<i>Erich Koellner</i>	<i>Friedrich Ihn</i>	<i>Erich Steinbrinck</i>	<i>Friedrich Eckholdt</i>
<i>Diether von Roeder</i>	<i>Hans Lüdemann</i>	<i>Hermann Künne</i>	<i>Karl Galster</i>
<i>Wilhelm Heidkamp</i>	<i>Anton Schmitt</i> ⁴¹		

Thirteen of these (again in blue) were named for individuals killed with their entire crews during the First World War. Two, Bruno Heinemann and Wolfgang Zenker, were officers who died on 5 November 1918 trying to prevent mutineers from raising the revolutionary flag on battleship S.M.S. *König* during the mutinies. Taken together, these destroyer names commemorated a decidedly grim record of crews killed while fulfilling their loyalty to the flag.⁴²

Other units served the same purpose. Despite being numbered, U-boats were not immune from drawing attention to extreme self-sacrifice. The force’s six post-1935 flotillas were named for First World War U-boat commanders, all killed in the line of duty:

1 st Flotilla:	<i>Weddigen</i>	2 nd Flotilla:	<i>Saltzwedel</i>	3 rd Flotilla:	<i>Lohs</i>
5 th Flotilla:	<i>Emsmann</i>	6 th Flotilla:	<i>Hundius</i>	7 th Flotilla:	<i>Wegener</i>

In further expression of duty to the flag, of these vessels’ total of 174 crew

⁴⁰ “Das deutsche Kriegsschiff kämpft unter vollem Einsatz seiner Besatzung bis zur letzten Granate, bis es siegt oder mit wehender Flagge untergeht,” as quoted in Michael Salewski, *Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung. Band I: 1935-1941* (Frankfurt am Main: 1970), footnote 140, 164-165 and Bird, 143.

⁴¹ *Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe*, 83-97. The practice of commemorating defeat lasted; after the invasion of Norway, one destroyer flotilla was named *Zerstörerflotille Narvik*, marking the ten German ships sunk there in April 1940. When the German OKW message reported the ultimate victory there, on 10 June 1940, it read “Über Narvik selbst weht endgültig die deutsche Flagge.” *Ibid*, 98.

⁴² Hans Lüdemann, was an engineer killed by a pre-war boiler explosion and naval reserve Lieutenant (j.g) Carl Hans Lody, was tried and shot in November 1914, the sole German executed by the British for spying during the world wars; see *Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe*.

members just six survived the war.⁴³

At the farthest extremity, even the officers' sail training ships of the post-1930 German Navy were named for fallen characters, albeit with progressively greater political implications: *Gorch Fock*, named for a sailor-poet killed during Jutland on board S.M.S. *Wiesbaden* (incidentally another ship lost with only one survivor), *Horst Wessel*, for the National Socialist Party thug killed in 1930, and the *Albert Leo Schlagetter*, another early NSDAP member shot by French occupation troops in 1923.⁴⁴ When one recalls that these ships were required duty for the youngest, and probably most impressionable, officers of the fleet, we can see yet more normalization of the expectation of extreme self-sacrifice.

To conclude, maritime tradition holds that a responsible commanding officer should go down with their ship, whether in cases of accident at sea or defeat in battle. The example of Captain Edward J. Smith, of R.M.S. *Titanic*, is probably the best-known case. Significantly, equally strong tradition also holds captains don't have to order their crews to go down with them at the same time. Given its short existence and lackluster performance before 1914, it was perhaps inevitable Germany's navies would highlight going down with the ship, flags flying, as the *sine qua non* of wartime service.

After 1933 the climate for German naval attitudes fundamentally transformed, heightening expectations to the point they became dire. Simply put, extreme self-sacrifice became acute when coupled to a regime which sought and expected both military victory and death in battle. In that sense, this sentiment of extreme self-sacrifice helps explain the high loss of life on board the Second World War's *Bismarck* (95% killed), *Scharnhorst* (95% killed) and among the U-boat arm (over 60% killed, or 26,000 out of 40,000 sent to sea). At the end, this sense of fatalism represents a sharp distinction with the prevailing Western military ethos of prioritizing mission, people, then self, in that order.

⁴³ Joachim Schröder, *Die U-Boote des Kaisers: Die Geschichte des deutschen U-Boot-Krieges gegen Großbritannien im ersten Weltkrieg* (Bonn: 2003), 435, 438-451.

⁴⁴ *Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe*, 112-114. For S.M.S. *Wiesbaden*, see also Andrew Gordon, *The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command* (Annapolis: 1996), 493.

VERSAILLES, IMPERIAL INTEREST AND NATIONAL DEFENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

Thean Potgieter (South Africa)

Introduction

Due to its unique history and diversity, the military and society in early twentieth century South Africa was vastly different from the situation in other European colonies in Africa. This was a society that was still being forged by colonialism, a mix of divergent cultural influences, conflicts, conquests and contradicting military, political and economic traditions.

Although the First World War was essentially a major clash between European powers, it involved Africa both directly and indirectly as the greater part of the continent was ruled by the European belligerents. As was the case with various earlier European conflicts this War also had an adverse effect on other parts of the world, and spilled over resulting in a number of campaigns being fought on African soil. As a British dominion South Africa had to participate in the First World War and also participated in the subsequent peace talks that culminated in the Treaty of Versailles.

The period immediately following the First World War was a time of change for the country, in the relationship with Britain and for the small South African military establishment. The military had to consider its most important role and purpose, identify its theatres of operation, and organisationally adapt to the post-War environment. However, militarily it was essentially a period of internal deployments and a time of neglect due to stringent budgets.

This paper will focus on South Africa and its defence establishment in the aftermath of the First World War. The discussion will provide brief notes on the historical context and South African participation in the War, while also highlighting a number of relevant aspects related to the Treaty of Versailles. Emphasis will then be placed on the demobilisation and reorganisation of the defence establishment, as well as on internal security and the anticipated role of the South African military.

Historical context and the First World War

The Dutch East India Company (the VOC) created a settlement at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652. As a halfway post on the sea route between Europe and the East it gained strategic importance to maritime empires during the age of sail. With the rise of the British Empire in the East, Britain conquered the Cape in 1795 and again in 1806. Simon's Town became a British naval base, and by 1914 Britain controlled the choicest strategic ports referred to as the 'keys which locked up the globe'.¹

In the meantime the settlement at the Cape of Good Hope expanded to become a colony and a melting pot of various cultures. The Dutch brought the Western military tradition to the Cape and established a local militia structure at the Cape,

¹ Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London 1986) 206.

but over time the development of a unique military system, known as the commando system came into being. Interaction with indigenous peoples brought both European authorities and settlers into contact and conflict with indigenous military systems. European settlement in the South African interior led to the creation of two so-called Boer Republics, in the territories known as the Transvaal and the Free State. The discovery of very rich gold deposits in the Transvaal Republic invariably resulted in the devastating Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) between 'Boer and Brit'. This was a defining clash in South African history as it settled the political, economic, military and cultural domination between two white groups in South Africa (the Afrikaners, or Boers, and the British). As Britain had now managed to militarily defeat and conquer the African kingdoms and chiefdoms, as well as the Boer Republics one-by-one, by the early twentieth century the whole of South Africa was under unfettered British control.

In 1910 the four British colonies in South Africa (Transvaal, Free State, Natal and Cape) were united at the political level into a single British dominion, the Union of South Africa. The Transvaal leader, General Louis Botha, became the first Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa. As he was determined to build a unified future along the principles of 'forgive and forget' he promised the loyalty and support to the British Empire.² Despite the efforts of the Black majority to be part of the political solution, within the context of broader Imperial objectives, Britain focussed on white unity and excluded Black South Africans from the political dispensation.

A unified defence structure, called the Union Defence Force (UDF), was created in 1912. It represented the white segment of the population only (British colonial interests and the Afrikaners segment of the population) and not the indigenous peoples. It consisted of a Permanent Force, Active Citizen Force, Coast Garrison Force, Cadet Organisation and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. It was commanded by a Commandant-General (the Active Citizen Force), an Inspector-General (the Permanent Force), and a Commandant of the Cadet corps. The UDF was directly and indirectly bound to British military traditions, values and conventions due to British military hegemony.³ No Navy was created, but in the Defence Act the dependency on the British Royal Navy for protection from foreign invasion was recognised. Soon after its creation (in 1913 and 1914) the UDF was deployed on the Witwatersrand as labour unrest and strikes (linked to mining, industrialisation and labour issues) resulted in the mobilisation of units of the Active Citizen Force and the Permanent Force.

When the First World War commenced in 1914, South African had to enter the War on the British side and was requested by Britain to conquered German South-West Africa. It immediately resulted in an armed rebellion as many of the Boers remembered German support during the Anglo-Boer War, had family in German

² D.W. Kruger, *The Making of a Nation: A History of the Union of South Africa, 1910-1961* (Johannesburg 1969) 3, 52-55, and 71.

³ Annette Seegers, *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa* (London 1996) 21; and Deon Visser, "British Influence on Military Training and Education in South Africa", in: *South African Historical Journal*, 46, May 2002, 64-65.

South West Africa, and did not want to get involved in the war fighting against Germany. The UDF suppressed the rebellion and proceeded to conquer German South-West Africa.

During the rest of the war South African troops also fought with distinction in East Africa, Palestine and France. On the Western Front South African troops participated in various battles of which Delville Wood (part of the Somme offensive in 1916) is most noteworthy and resulted in the decimation of the 1 SA Infantry Brigade.⁴ Numerous South Africans were also recruited into the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy, while others volunteered for service in Imperial units. A South African Native Labour Corps (SANLC) was created that consisted of unarmed Black servicemen. On 21 February 1917 the *SS Mendi*, transporting 913 members of the SANLC from Plymouth to France sank after a collision, with 607 of 802 members on board tragically going to their deaths in the brave tradition of warriors.⁵

Versailles – and the South African participation

General Jan Smuts was a proponent of a ‘softer’ peace agreement. As a member of the British War Cabinet, he proposed a comprehensive plan to create a League of Nations as a mandatory system, which in essence was aimed at securing world peace and amounted to support of the Fourteen Point Plan of Woodrow Wilson (American President).⁶ Although the idea of a League of Nations had existed for some time, Smuts influenced the debate on a post-war settlement by giving structure to these ambiguous ideas in a speech in the Central Hall, Westminster (14 May 1917),⁷ and in a paper (published 1918) entitled *The League of Nations, a Practical Suggestion*.⁸

The Treaty of Versailles resulted in the creation of the League of Nations as an international organisation, with objectives that included disarmament, preventing war through collective security, settling disputes between countries through negotiation, diplomacy and improving global welfare. As Smuts served on the committee formulating the founding principles of the League of Nations his proposals had a fundamental influence on its objectives and structures. With South Africa as one of the founding members it convened for the first time in London in January 1920. Although the League of Nations was a particular goal of Wilson and he campaigned hard to establish it, due to strong isolationist sentiments America did not join the League.⁹

Before Versailles Smuts was requested to outline the preparations for British participation in the peace conference and used the opportunity to press hard for the

⁴ Of the 3153 men that marched into Delville Wood (July 1916) only 750 assembled a week later. South African sources abound, see E.W. Nortier, *Major General Sir Henry Timson Lukin: The Making of a South African Hero* (Unpublished MMil Thesis, Stellenbosch University 2005).

⁵ J.S. Mohlamme, “Soldiers without Reward – Africans in South Africa’s Wars”, in: *Military History Journal*, 10(1), 1995, 3.

⁶ W.J. de Kock (ed.), *Suid-Afrikaanse Biografiese Woordeboek*, Deel I (Pretoria 1976) 777.

⁷ Jan Smuts, *War-Time Speeches* (New York 1917) 55-60.

⁸ David Hunter Hiller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, Volume II (New York 1923) 23-60.

⁹ Ben Cockram, “General Smuts and South African Diplomacy”, Address to the SA Institute of International Affairs, 16 September, 1970, 6.

separate representation of British Dominions at the conference. This was granted, which enhanced the status of these dominions. The South African Prime Minister, Louis Botha, and Smuts then joined the British delegation as representatives of the Union of South Africa at Versailles in 1919.

In the meantime Smuts became deeply dismayed by the revengeful Allied sentiments and the harsh terms they wished to impose on Germany. He did not wish to sign such an agreement and wrote several letters to the Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, criticising the harshness of the proposed peace terms. Smuts indicated that it could destroy Germany, while he thought that for peace in Europe it was important for Germany to maintain its status. Smuts emphasised that the Allies were morally committed to the Fourteen Points and warned several times that it only paved the way for another war, but to no avail. Smuts' contribution as a member of the British delegation had a serious result which he did not intend. In a legal opinion he provided, he indicated that the widow's pensions could form part of German reparations, but when the full reparation account to Germany was compiled later Smuts did everything in his power to decrease it, also without success.¹⁰

Botha shared Smuts' "...difficulties against the treaty", but he signed because as Prime Minister his signature was "necessary to make the Union a member of the League of Nations and secure her a new status in the world". Eventually Smuts also signed but issued a press statement on 28 June 1919 explaining that it was imperative to close the war as the world needs peace, but in his mind the "six months since the armistice... [were] as upsetting, unsettling, and ruinous to Europe as the previous four years of war."¹¹ In his private correspondence Smuts referred to the Treaty as the "cell of unrest and war in the future [and] ... it is a terrible document ... not a peace treaty but a war treaty, and I am troubled in my conscience about putting my name to such a document".¹² The memory of the Anglo-Boer War and the Peace of Vereeniging was still vivid, and Smuts saw no virtue in an agreement nurturing bitterness.

Initially South Africa wished to annex South West Africa, but as there was no general agreement on the issue, under the conditions of the Peace of Versailles it was handed over to be administered as an integral part of South Africa Union with full power of administration and legislation, in accordance with the mandate system of the League of Nations.

The South African defence establishment: demobilisation and reorganisation

Although the various campaigns fought on African soil during the war had little effect on the outcome of the war, it significantly impacted on Africa. More than a million Africans fought in the War and many more served as labourers resulting in

¹⁰ Naomi H. Coryell, *Jan Christian Smuts at the Paris Peace conference, 1919* (Unpublished Masters Thesis, University of Omaha 1963) 79-83 and 105-121.

¹¹ Trehwella Cameron, *Jan Smuts. An illustrated Biography* (Cape Town, 1994) 80-81.

¹² C.F.J. Muller, *500 Jaar Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis* (Pretoria 1980) 411.

more than 150 000 African lives lost, many wounded and disabled, while it also contributed to socio-economic upheaval in Africa.¹³ Although the War brought an end to the formal partition of Africa, questions about self-determination, the rights of Europeans to rule, and the accountability of colonial powers remained.¹⁴

More than a quarter of a million South Africans of all races served in uniform during the War (146 879 Whites, 25 000 Coloured and Indian, and 82 769 Blacks), with the largest percentage (about 20%) from the white male population.¹⁵ More than thirty thousand South Africans experienced the horrors of trench warfare on the Western Front, which was so different from the South African experience of low own force casualties, small wars and campaigns of pacification.

Former soldiers were honoured for their contributions after the War, but former Black servicemen were not awarded medals and resented the fact that their sacrifices were not sufficiently recognised.¹⁶ African memory was neglected, but as the passing of time also occasioned political change, greater focus was recently placed on the service provided by the Black non-combatants (such as the SANLC) and their sacrifices.¹⁷

After the end of the War, the UDF had to settle into its 'normal function', namely the preparation for war.¹⁸ This implied addressing core issues related to the role and function, force structure and organisation of the UDF. As Germany was no longer in Africa, and South West Africa was mandated to South Africa, it was thought that the geographical position distant from Europe, and the difficult terrain for military operations added to the security of South Africa. The presumption was that in case of war the Royal Navy (with a base in Simon's Town) would be able to counter a maritime threat, while the British Army could provide assistance against a landward-threat. The British Empire was therefore also looked upon as a military guardian.

However, the destructive legacy of the Anglo-Boer War still influenced attitudes as some Afrikaners had misgivings about Britain and its institutions, which included the British military establishment. As the British appreciated their terse foothold in South Africa they courted Afrikaner leaders and appreciated that creating a unified South Africa depended on balancing the interest of the two white communities.¹⁹

¹³ Michael Crowder, "The First World War and its consequences in Africa", in: UNESCO (eds.), *General History of Africa*, Volume VII (UNESCO 1985). Retrieved from <https://en.unesco.org/courier/news-views-online/first-world-war-and-its-consequences-africa>.

¹⁴ J. Brooks, The War to End all Wars, 11/11/1918 – 11/11/2018. 100 years later, World War I still holds a warning for our world, in: *Spectator*, 11 November 2018. Retrieved from <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-11-11-100-years-later-world-war-i-still-holds-a-warning-for-our-world/>.

¹⁵ W.A. Dorning, "A Concise history of the South African Defence Force, 1912 – 1987", in: *Militaria*, 17(2), 1987, 1.

¹⁶ Mohlamme, *Soldiers without reward*, p.3.

¹⁷ Thean Potgieter, "Creating a new military culture in South Africa – from conflict and diversity to integration", in: Ma Weifang et al (eds.), *Acta of the XLI Congress of the International Commission of Military History* (Beijing 2016) 478.

¹⁸ South African Military Archive, Departement van Verdediging. *Rapport voor het jaar*, 30 June 1921, 1.

¹⁹ Ian van der Waag, "South African defence in the age of total war, 1900–1940", *Historia*, 60(1), 2015, 132-133.

Unity and greater nationalism amongst South Africans were somewhat enhanced by the experience of the First World War, but what still hamper it was “Britishness” and notions of British superiority. Even during the War British officers distrusted or disliked their South African counterparts. For example in 1917, when Smuts was a member of the British War Cabinet, Brigadier-General Cavendish referred to him as “that modern miracle” who for the “beaten enemy ... had a very nasty knack of asserting himself at times”.²⁰

As part of the demobilisation the UDF had to cut costs and its size to roughly at its pre-war strength. The fifteen military districts of the Union were amalgamated and placed under the command of twelve district staff officers. Various posts were consolidated such as the Chief of the General Staff assuming the functions of the Commandant of Cadets in 1919, and the Inspector General post was abolishing in December 1921, with the Adjutant General taking over his responsibilities.²¹

The complex wartime accounts between Britain and the Union had to be settled and an important issue, that also had political implications, was the continued presence of the Imperial Garrison in South Africa. As South Africa was loyal and capable of defending itself, and a direct attack on South Africa was considered unlikely, Smuts thought the presence of an Imperial Garrison was unnecessary as it could signal that Britain did not fully trust her South African subjects. Britain decided to withdraw the Imperial Garrison on 1 December 1921²² and all grounds and buildings belonging to the British War Department and Admiralty were handed over to the UDF. As many of these facilities were in a poor state, the necessity to create a maintenance organisation led to the establishment of the SA Engineers Corps in 1923.²³ Despite the notion of an independent defence force, in reality regular military interaction on all levels ensued and the British military legacy remained strong.²⁴

Smuts always valued new developments and with the creation of the UDF in 1912 he was convinced that “flying is destined to play a very important part in military operations in future and it is impossible for any country to build up a completely successful system of defence without taking due account of this”.²⁵ Provision was made for a flying corps, called the South African Aviation Corps or Zuid-Afrikaanse Vliegenierskorps, and the first ten pilots were trained in Kimberley in 1913. South African pilots also trained in Britain and during the War some performed exemplarily in the Royal Flying Corps and in the Royal Naval

²⁰ Ibid. 138.

²¹ Dorning, A concise history of the South African Defence Force, 1.

²² South African Military Archive, DC Box 886, Transfer South African Military Command to Union Defence. Secretary for Defence - Headquarters, SA Military Command, 28 Sep 1921.

²³ Ian van der Waag, “The Union Defence Force Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1940”, *Scientia Militaria*, 30(2), 2000, 189.

²⁴ Visser, British Influence, 64-65.

²⁵ E.H. Ward, “Swifter than Eagles. A Brief History of the South African Air Force”, in: *Militaria* 1982, 18-19.

Air Service, serving on the Western Front, Southwest and East Africa, Russia, the Western Desert, Gallipoli and Palestine.²⁶

During 1917 Smuts served on the British War Cabinet and as London was attacked by Zeppelins and bombers, Lloyd George tasked him to produce a report on the air defences of British cities and the feasibility of a combined air force. Smuts quickly completed both, maintaining that “we can only defend this island effectively against air attack by offensive measures, by attacking his air bases on the Continent” which required the air services of the army and navy to be consolidated into one independent Air Force.²⁷ Smuts grasped that air power had both regular and irregular roles and stressed the importance of command and control mechanics. He concluded that a new combined air service should play a primarily and decisive offensive function, conducting “extensive operations far from, and independent of, both armies and navies” and as there is “no limit to the scale of its future use ... devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become the principal operations of war”.²⁸ As Smuts suggest to the War Cabinet the creation of an Air Ministry to control and administer air warfare and the legal constitution and discipline of the new Service, the report laid the foundations for creating the Royal Air Force on 1 April 1918.

Smuts was determined that South African should have an independent Air Force and discussed the matter with Lieutenant Colonel Pierre van Ryneveld in 1919.²⁹ Van Ryneveld was well respected due to an outstanding career in the Royal Flying Corps. He saw service in Egypt, Palestine and Salonika, amongst others, commanded 78 Squadron (British Home Defence and one of the first night-fighter units), and later the 11th Army Wing. After Britain donated about 100 First World War vintage aircraft to South Africa (including 48 DH9s, 30 Avro 504s and 22 SE5s) together with workshop machinery and spare parts, the Air Services of the UDF was created on 1 February 1920. Van Ryneveld was appointed as Director Air Services and the service was listed as a Permanent Force unit on 1 February 1923.³⁰ However, as a result of the global depression the SAAF was substantially scaled down due to severe budget in the early 1930s.

In times of crisis navies usually rely on part-time naval reserves for manpower. South Africa was no exception, but the difference is that naval volunteer units existed to serve British imperial interests before South Africa had its own navy. Naval volunteer units were created in Natal in 1885 and in the Cape in 1905,³¹ while the colonial governments also made direct annual contributions to the Royal Navy from 1898 onwards. In addition the Natal Colony provided coal, while the Cape Colony

²⁶ K.A. Maxwell and J.M. Smith, *SA Air Force Golden Jubilee Book*, (Pretoria 1970) 14-19.

²⁷ Cameron, *Smuts*, 78-79.

²⁸ Royal Air Force Museum, Report by General Smuts on Air Organisation and the Direction of Aerial Operations, August 1917. Retrieved from <https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/london/whats-going-on/news/read-the-smuts-report/>

²⁹ Maxwell and Smith, *SA Air Force*, 20.

³⁰ SAAF Museum Pretoria, *A short history of the South African Air Force, 1920-2010* (Unpublished manuscript, 2010) 1.

³¹ *Cape Colony Government Gazette*, 7 February 1905.

created a new dockyard for the Royal Navy in Simon's Town (with a 228 metre graving dock and a protected tidal basin). The Royal Navy showed some appreciation by naming two armoured cruisers *HMS Good Hope* and *HMS Natal*.³²

After the creation of the UDF in 1912 the two naval volunteer units were officially amalgamated into the *South African Division of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve*, RNVR(SA), on 1 July 1913.³³ Although the division was financially maintained by the Union Government and constitutionally formed part of the UDF, the Royal Navy assumed responsibility for its peacetime organisation, training, administration and discipline, while it had to be placed at the disposal of the British Admiralty in time of war.

As the Union of South Africa annually contributed £85 000 to the Royal Navy by 1913, Smuts wished to create a small indigenous South African Navy. The plan was interrupted by the outbreak of the First World War, and the maritime defence of South Africa and the Cape sea-route remained the task of the Royal Navy. During the War members of RNVR(SA) served on Royal Navy vessels and at shore establishments around the world³⁴ and Britain also requisitioned some South African registered ships for service during the war. Though many South Africans served on such vessels, they remained Royal Navy units. An important naval lesson of the First World War concerned the vulnerability of South African ports and approaches to mine warfare, as the German auxiliary cruiser *Wolf* effectively laid mines that sank a number of ships in Table Bay and off Cape Agulhas.³⁵

At the 1921 Imperial Conference Smuts placed emphasis on the issue of "separate Dominion Navies". As agreed to with the Imperial Government, South Africa would discontinue its annual contribution to the Royal Navy, establish a navy (responsible for general duties, minesweeping and hydrographic survey), expand the RNVR(SA) and further develop the Simon's Town naval base. On 1 April 1922 three small ships were commissioned by the South African Naval Service (SANS), which became a permanent unit of the Union Defence Force (on 1 February 1923) with its headquarters in Simon's Town.³⁶ However, the defence responsibility for the Cape Sea Route still rested with the Royal Navy. The small SANS was not meant to last and due to severe budget cuts linked to the economic depression, its ships were paid off in 1933-1934. Only a shore establishment with a skeleton staff and the part-time RNVR(SA) remained.³⁷

³² A.K. du Toit, *South Africa's Fighting Ships* (Rivonia 1992) xx.

³³ South African Defence Act 1912. (Act 13 of 1912).

³⁴ South African Military Archive, Departement van Verdediging, *Rapport voor het jaar*, 30 June 1921, 4.

³⁵ Thean Potgieter, "German Commerce Raiders in the Southern Oceans: Experiences from Wartime South Africa", in: Michael Epkenhans and Stephan Huck (eds.), *Der Erste Weltkrieg zur See* (Oldenbourg 2017), 125-132.

³⁶ J.C. Goosen, *Ons Vloot* (Cape Town 1973), 13-7.

³⁷ Thean Potgieter, "Maritime defence and the South African Navy to the cancellation of the Simon's Town agreement", in: *Scientia Militaria*, 30(2), 2000, 168.

Local security and further defence cuts

As the UDF had to manage various uprisings and labour unrest in the post-War era, contingencies to deal with internal threats remained an important military consideration. These manifested periodically but as a number of incidents in 1921 and 1922 showed, the lack of coordination and modern weapons made the outcome for those who challenged the state foreseeable.

The greatest internal crisis the South African government were confronted with after the 1914 Rebellion was the 1922 mineworkers strike on the Witwatersrand that developed into an insurrection. It was fuelled by the economic decline and inflation following the end of the War, weaker resource prices, smaller profitmaking, bankruptcies, budget deficits, unemployment, and wage cuts. A weaker gold price, lower production, and higher production cost specifically impacted on gold mining. Late in 1921 the Chamber of Mines proposed a wage cut for mineworkers, and changes to the so-called *status quo* agreement of 1918 (stipulating the ratio of white and black mineworkers in semi-skilled work). As these changes favoured the larger majority of black workers and implied retrenchments amongst white miners, it was not acceptable to them and they perceived themselves as being in a struggle against capitalism and competing, cheaper black labour. After wage cuts for coalminers in December 1921, coalminers and goldminers went on strike during January 1922. As no agreement was reached the strikers became more extreme, Marxist rhetoric were thrown around and in February 1922 some of the strikers organised themselves into military style 'commandos' calling for the violent overthrow of government and the creation of a republic.³⁸

Initially Smuts "let the situation develop... in the interest of the country", and in an effort to resolve it "peacefully" negotiated with both the Chamber of Mines and the mineworkers' representatives.³⁹ He thought that if the mineworkers "won" it would severely damage the gold mining industry, whereas if the Chamber of Mines had their way, they would return to their "dictatorial" approach towards workers.⁴⁰ However, no settlement could be reached between the two parties and on the insistence of the revolutionary Miners' Council of Action a general strike was proclaimed on 7 March. As the strike turned violent, Smuts mobilised the Active Citizen Force on 9 March and proclaimed martial law the next day. The Army and Air Force was deployed in Johannesburg and after violent street battles and the bombing of the miners' positions, the strike ended on 14 March as the red flag was removed from the strikers' headquarters. At least 153 persons lost their lives during the strike.⁴¹

Shortly after these shocking events, an armed rebellion by the Bondelzwarts tribe occurred in South West Africa (Namibia). The new Administrator of South West Africa, G.R. Hofmeyr, decided on punitive action against the Bondelzwarts, while the South African government availed a few aircraft to bomb the Bondelzwarts.

³⁸ Muller, *500 Jaar*, 413-415.

³⁹ T.R.H. Davenport, *South Africa. A Modern History* (Bergvele 1988) 282.

⁴⁰ De Kock, *Suid-Afrikaanse Biografiese Woordeboek*, 779.

⁴¹ Muller, *500 Jaar*, 416.

The use of aircraft was decisive and within a few days the rebellion came to an end with the loss of more than a hundred lives to the Bondelzwarts, and two amongst government forces. The incident raised much criticism, also in the League of Nations and although Smuts tried in private to restrain Hofmeyr's actions, he defended him publically at a cost to his own reputation.⁴² Smuts was heavily criticised for his hard-handed actions by opposition parties and it contributed to him losing the general election in 1924.⁴³

By the time General J.B.M. Hertzog became the South African Prime Minister in 1924, the unrest and the unsettling post-War period had passed. Defence spending was not a priority and Hertzog's government had to consider military roles and responsibilities in a climate of shrinking budgets. Due to the legacy and impact of the First World War, South African involvement in a British war was a sensitive issue, and the perception was that the country should not deploy in Europe as part of such a conflict. Sub-Sahara Africa was regarded as the most probable theatre for future operations, as the South African military was considered to have a technological advantage in Africa.⁴⁴

The Active Citizen Force was restricted to combating of internal uprisings while a special striking force, called the South African Field Force was created. Although small, this force was innovative due to its small mechanised nucleus and it was created more than two years before Britain's experimental mechanised force. The Field Force could be deployed at a moment's notice, and consisted of two squadrons of mounted riflemen, three field artillery batteries as well as an armoured car section of two vehicles with two machine guns each.⁴⁵

However, due to financial stringency and budget cuts a military reorganisation occurred in 1926. As more focus was placed on the air force, the Field Force, the last regiment of the SA Mounted Riflemen and the Brigade Head Quarters of the SA Field Artillery were disbanded. New Defence Policy placed emphasis on the following four areas: prevention and suppression of internal unrest; military training of a part of the young men of the Union; protection against an external threat; and preparations for an expedition force (in Africa) should South Africa become involved in a European War.⁴⁶

After further budgets cuts during the Great Depression, the economic recovery of the 1930s introduced some growth and a military reorganisation. However, as Smuts acknowledged in September 1939, the previous two decades was characterised by neglect, it lacked visionary leadership and a proper military intellectual discourse, with managers and the politically-willing holding sway, instead of grappling with the real issues that would dictate military theory, strategy and operations.⁴⁷

⁴² Davenport, *South Africa*, 282; and Muller, *500 Jaar*, 416-417.

⁴³ De Kock, *Suid-Afrikaanse Biografiese Woordeboek*, 778-779.

⁴⁴ Van der Waag, *South African defence*, 145.

⁴⁵ Van der Waag, *The Union Defence Force*, 201.

⁴⁶ Johan Ellis, "Oswald Pirow's Five- Year Plan for the Reorganisation of the Union Defence Force, 1933-1939", in: *Scientia Militaria*, 30(2), 2000, 221.

⁴⁷ Van der Waag, *South African defence*, 129.

Concluding remarks

Various components of the rich and diverse history of South Africa found expression in the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. However, Africans were left out of the political solution as well as the UDF (created in 1912) as the reconciliation between two white groups was most important. The first years of this force was indeed difficult as it had to quell large-scale internal unrest and then deploy to various theatres during the First World War – from former German colonies in Africa to the Western Front in France. South Africa was a signatory to the Treaty of Versailles and Jan Smuts did not only play an important role in the creation of the League of Nations, but also warned against the harsh terms that the Allies imposed at Versailles. He correctly indicated that it was not a treaty for peace, but rather paved the road for a next war.

The South African Air Force and a small naval establishment were created as part of the post-War demobilisation and reorganisation of the UDF. In defence terms the South African government had to prepare for war in region and saw sub-Saharan Africa as its theatre of operations. In reality, however, the UDF deployed internally to suppress uprisings in South Africa and in South West Africa (Namibia).

The UDF also suffered from severe budget constraints that led to neglect, downsizing and an inability to keep pace with technological developments. However, a positive outcome of the period following the First World War was important policy developments and a decisive shift away from the British Empire to a South African monopoly of military force within its borders. In structural terms the consolidation of permanent land, air, and naval forces with the regulatory and bureaucratic infrastructure to sustain it occurred. As many armed forces around the globe failed to apply some of the most appropriate lessons of the First World War on technological, tactical, operational and strategic level, they were not ready for the Second World War. South Africa was no different.

Friday, 23 August

RE-ESTABLISHING OF GERMAN – YUGOSLAV RELATIONS AFTER WWI

Col. Assos. Prof. Dr. Dalibor Denda (Serbia)

Close political and economic relations between Serbia and Germany after the German unification in 1871 and recognition of Serbian state independency in 1878 were not developed. They stayed on the level of simple bilateral relationship, mostly because of the lack of interest of the Second Reich for the Balkans during the Bismarck's era. At that time, during the rule of Obrenović dynasty (1858 – 1903), Serbia relied mostly to Austria-Hungary. The Danube Monarchy was not only the most important Serbian political, but also the trade partner, absorbing 86,5% of Serbia's exports. The situation has changed during the so called "Pig war" (1906 – 1911) between Austria – Hungary and Serbia that started on 1 March 1906 with the closing of the frontier for the trade. As a result Serbia found fresh markets, its foreign trade increased, credits for food and armament industry development were obtained from France and imports were arranged from Germany. At that period, top destination for Serbian foreign trade became Germany. German share to the Serbian exports rose from 5,63% in 1905 to 40,4% in 1907.¹ German economic circles had shown a great interest for economic penetration to the Balkans especially after the Serbian success in the Balkan wars 1912 – 1913.² Thanks to brilliant victories achieved on the battlefields of the Balkan wars, the prestige of Serbian army and especially its officer's corps rose within the German Military circles too.³ This was followed by the political interest that advised Austria-Hungary to try to find a peaceful and friendly solution for its disputes with the Serbian state.⁴

After World War I ended newly born Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, that was successor of Kingdom of Serbia in the international relations and Weimar Republic that was heir of defeated German Empire, were on the opposite side of world politics. Yugoslavia was part of the winning coalition that had a great interest to preserve international order established after Versailles peace treaty was signed. From the other side, Germany as a leading country of defeated Central Powers block was unsatisfied with so called "Versailles dictate" and advocated its revision. Having in mind that Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Weimar Republic did not share mutual borders, there was not direct conflict of interests among them regarding the territorial issues. After mutual experience as fair opponents in the First World War,

¹ About „Pig war“ see more: Vladimir Ćorović, *The Relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary in the 20th Century*, Belgrade, 2018, 105 – 140.

² Richard Bassett, *For God and Kaiser – The Imperial Austrian Army from 1619 to 1918*, New Haven and London, 2015, 422.

³ Auswärtiges Amt, Politisches Archiv – Berlin (further: AA PA), R-11517, Militärangelegenheiten Serbiens vom 16. Oktober 1912; Kaiserlich Deutsche Gesandtschaft für Serbien an dem Reichskanzler Herrn von Bethmann Hollweg, №22, Belgrad, den 1. März 1914. *Die Interpelation wegen Soldatenmisshandlungen in der Skupschtina*.

⁴ Чедомир Попов, *Грађанска Европа (1770 – 1914), Друштвена и политичка историја Европе (1871 – 1914)*, III, Београд, 2010, 298 – 300; See also: Andrej Mitrović, *Prodor na Balkan. Srbija u planovima Austro-Ugarske i Nemačke 1908 – 1918*, Beograd, 1981.

Yugoslav state and Germany began to harmonize dynamically their economic and political relations very soon. First Yugoslav ambassador to Berlin Rajko Vintrović was appointed in 1920.⁵ In 1921 followed the appointment of first German ambassador to Belgrade Friedrich von Keller.⁶ Soon after Keller's appointment, the Yugoslav Government led by Nikola Pašić started to think about establishment of more intensive mutual relations with Germany mostly because of economic reasons. Germany shared the same interest, but the main obstacle for fulfilling of that goal presented allied relations that Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had with the Entente countries, especially with the France. Yugoslav membership within Little Entente treaty was also problematic from the point of view of German interests, because Yugoslav main ally within the pact was Czechoslovakia strongly bounded with the France and together with Poland unfriendly oriented towards Germany and its territorial demands. During the talks led with German ambassador to Belgrade in summer 1921, Yugoslav Prime minister Pašić was convinced that future development of both countries demands establishing of good and close relations. In accordance with that aim Pašić took obligation to do everything possible to remove all political obstacles and to prepare gradually the domestic public opinion towards possible turn over of Yugoslav foreign policy.⁷ One of the results of this campaign was the book with the title "Under the Germans" written by Božidar Nikolajević. In that book published in 1923 German occupation of Serbia was characterised as more human and even friendly oriented towards local population, contrary to those implemented by Austrians and Bulgarians.⁸ This Yugoslav close approach towards Germany should be seen as a product of disappointment of Yugoslavs with the French policy, especially with the issues connected with the regulation of Serbian war loan payments.⁹ This was followed by the strong increase of economic cooperation between Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Germany. In 1922 Germany become forth trade partner of newly established Kingdom, with the share of 5.99% in whole Yugoslav export and third trade partner with the share of 8.47% in whole import of Yugoslav state. This was a great achievement having in mind that just a year before Germany took the 9th place as Yugoslav import partner and 7th place as export partner on Yugoslav market. This economic achievements were followed by wide spreading of German literature all over the country. The improvements of economic and cultural relations were evident. In accordance with that, the trade agreement between two countries was ratified by the both parliaments until the 10th of June 1923, and the Yugoslav government decided

⁵ Tobias C. Bringmann, *Handbuch der Diplomatie 1815 – 1963. Auswärtige Missionschefs in Deutschland und deutsche Missionschefs im Ausland von Metternich bis Adenauer*, München, 2001, 237.

⁶ *Ibidem*, 81.

⁷ *Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918 – 1945*. Serie A, Band V, Göttingen 1987 (further: ADAP/A V), 274 – 276; Der Geschäftsträger in Belgrad Keller an das Auswärtige Amt, Ganz Geheim, J.Nr. G 90, Bericht Nr. 925, Belgrad, den 9. September 1921.

⁸ Божидар С. Николајевић, *Под Немцима*, Београд, 1923.

⁹ Regarding the Serbian war loan payment problems see more: V. Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Francuska između dva svetska rata*, Beograd, 1985, 439 - 441.

not to implement the economical sanctions against Germany due to Ruhr crisis.¹⁰

In the same period Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes has shown the interest to build domestic industry of guns and ammunition relaying on Germany. Yugoslav representatives negotiated with the German side the building of armament factories with the aid of Krupp industry. The main goal for Yugoslavia was to get rid of dependency on French and Czechoslovak producers that, according to German reports, acted on the Yugoslav market as a cartel, selling the armament and ammunition for the prices higher then it was the case on the worlds market, and buying Yugoslav raw materials below the fair price. German MFA wanted to support this activity, but Krupp did not have enough capital for such an investment. They calculate with the support of British investors. Within German MFA there were also estimates that could stop this project. Namely, because of serious security treats from Italian side, Yugoslavia would be forced to relay on France.¹¹ This estimate was right and even in 1923 France managed to turn politics of South Slavs Kingdom in its favour by approval of the 300.000.000 francs high armament loan.¹² In the same year the bilateral relations with Germany got worse during the summer. In August Germany stopped to pay annual amounts of war reparations. Yugoslavia relied a lot on the reparation purchases from Germany in its program of industrialisation and reconstruction of road and rail network.¹³ After adoption of Dose's plan for reparation payments, in the summer 1924, the relations were normalised and economic interest on the both sides was crucial for future benefits. Yugoslavia was one of the countries with complementary economy to the German's, and the place where German industry could find raw materials and market for its products. The interest was mutual. About Yugoslav ambitions to make relations with Germany better, testifies also appointment of famous diplomat Živojin Balugdžić as an ambassador to Berlin in 1924.¹⁴ Balugdžić was a skilful diplomat and person of trust of King Alexander and Yugoslav Prime Minister Nikola Pašić.¹⁵ Importance of Yugoslavia for German economy influenced the decision of German Ministry of Foreign affairs from mid twenties, to create the instruction for diplomatic approach towards Yugoslav Kingdom. This instruction presented the base for implementation of German policy towards Yugoslavia within whole period between two world wars. According to it, the main German interest in Yugoslavia was economical one. Political interest counted on weakening the ties among the Little Entente members with the aim to isolate Czechoslovakia from Yugoslav and Romanian military and political help. The main arena for Yugoslav foreign policy according to German interests should become Balkans instead of Central Europe. One of the goals was also relaxation of Yugoslav relations with Hungary contrary to

¹⁰ *Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji* (priredio Živko Avramovski), I (1921 – 1930), Beograd, 1986, 104 - 105.

¹¹ ADAP/A, VII, Göttingen 1989, 326 – 328; Legationsrat Freiherr von Ow – Wachendorf an den Gesandten in Belgrad von Keller, Berlin, 9. März 1923, Ganz Geheim, Mit Kurier.

¹² Vuk Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Francuska između dva svetska rata*, Beograd, 1985, 45-47.

¹³ *Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji*, I (1921 – 1930), 176.

¹⁴ T. C. Bringmann, *Handbuch der Diplomatie 1815 – 1963, Auswärtige Missionschefs in Deutschland und deutsche Missionschefs im Ausland von Metternich bis Adenauer*, 237 – 238.

¹⁵ Miloš Crnjanski, *Embahade*, I, Beograd, 1984, 7 – 16, 50.

re-establishing of Yugoslav – Soviet relations what was not in favour for Germany. Reestablishment of Strong Soviet influence on the Balkans, as a traditional backyard of Russian foreign policy was directly against German economical and political interests in the region. The conclusion of the memorandum was that there was a great possibility of establishment of close and friendly relations in mutual interest if both sides would show full understanding and will to overrun negative heritage in bilateral relations caused by the War. The author of this plan was adviser of German Ministry of Foreign Affairs Werner Melchior baron von Ow-Wachendorf.¹⁶

New steps towards proximity followed. During the session of the League of Nations in March 1926 Yugoslav and German Foreign Ministers led the talks about establishing of nearer relations between Yugoslavia and Italy that worried Germans because of Italian interference in Austria. Yugoslav diplomats persuaded its German counterparts that main goal of these talks was the solution of border question. According to Yugoslav diplomats Foreign Minister Ninčić's visit to Rome was not connected with the Italian combinations against unification of Austria and Germany. After that, on 22 March 1926 German Foreign Minister Stresemann delivered the speech in the Reichstag regarding the German joining to the League of Nations in which he stressed the German wrong estimations regarding the Balkan countries before the WWI that were consequences of uncritical adaptation of Austrian attitudes. According to Stresemann that was the focal reason why this nations who shown the bravery worth of a hero, fought on the opposite side to Germany. After this speech Yugoslav foreign Minister Ninčić expressed personal satisfaction with the fact that Balkans and the Serbs were much better evaluated in Germany then that was the case before the Great War.¹⁷

However, these positive steps towards the deepening of the bilateral relations were temporary stopped, thanks to the question of war guilty. Mid 1926 Yugoslavs were heavy unsatisfied with the articles published in the magazine *Kriegsschuldfrage* that accused Yugoslav king Alexander I, that he was directly involved in the plot for assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. The Government of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes made a sharp protest by German Ministry of foreign affairs. German side offered apologizes, but Belgrade demanded the punishment for the journalist. Yugoslav demands were not in obedience with the German press law and soon after the same accusation also appeared in September issue of the Magazine.¹⁸ Yugoslav response was replacement of Živojin Balugdžić from the post of Yugoslav ambassador to Berlin with less influential Croatian politician Josip Smodlaka. From July 1926 until January 1927 there were no official contacts between Yugoslav ambassador Smodlaka and German MFA.¹⁹ The situation

¹⁶ ADAP/B III, Göttingen 1968, 43 – 45.; Doc. № 18; Das Auswärtige Amt an den Gesandten in Belgrad Olshausen, Berlin, den 2. Januar 1926.

¹⁷ ADAP/B III, Göttingen 1968, 179 – 181; Doc. № 95; Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretärs des Auswärtigen Amts von Schubert, Geheim, Berlin, den 23. März 1926, Напомене 3 и 4.

¹⁸ *Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji*, I (1921 – 1930), 385.

¹⁹ AA PA, R – 30303, Geheim - Akten, Abt. II - b, Politische Beziehungen Jugoslawien zu Deutschland vom September 1921 bis Dezember 1935, Berlin, den 21. Januar 1927, Telegram Belgrad № 15, Für Gesandten persönlich.

has changed at the beginning of 1927. Because of Italian treats to Yugoslavia, King Alexander wanted to establish better relations with the Germany as a counterbalance and was a champion of idea of its unification with Austria.²⁰ As a sign of good will Yugoslavs changed again the ambassador to Berlin. With the return of Balugdžić in February 1927, the political relations started to improve. According to Balugdžić's own words he was just a "king's man in Berlin" and *persona grata* by the Germans.²¹ During the same year, according to British diplomatic reports, King Alexander very often led long lasting conversations with German ambassador to Belgrade, Dr. Olshausen.²²

In December 1927, after French – Yugoslav treaty on friendship was signed, the main goal of Yugoslav King was to convince the German side that the agreement was by no means directed against Germany.²³ One of the most responsible persons for Yugoslav diplomatic success in Berlin was Yugoslav ambassador Živojin Balugdžić who stayed on the post until 1935. Balugdžić was very capable diplomat. He knew personally more than 100 parliamentarians from Reichstag, was a personal friend of German foreign minister Stresemann and frequent guest at the parties organized by his spouse.²⁴ There Balugdžić met most of the future Nazi elite prominent members, such as Herman Goering, Joseph Goebbels, Rudolph Hess and the others.²⁵ These contacts would play a great role during the Great economic crises that affected Yugoslavia after 1932. According to the memoirs of Balugdžić's press attaché, famous Serbian writer Miloš Crnjanski, his main thesis addressed to German public was that "Our people and the Germans were the opponents during the Great war, but not the enemies. We have to repeat this all the time. That's our politics. Germans treated us much better than the Austrians and Bulgarians. Our mutual relations are good. We should work on it to make much better atmosphere".²⁶ How successful in his work Balugdžić was, testifies the German instruction for Diplomats regarding the approach to the Balkan countries made in mid 30's, that contented this Balugdžić's word when it matters Yugoslavia.²⁷

During the 1920's both Yugoslav and German side managed to prepare base for future great economic cooperation that started at the time of the Great depression in the beginning of 1930's. The plan made by adviser of German Ministry of Foreign Affairs Werner Melchior baron von Ow-Wachendorf that was adopted in 1926 will be the guiding instruction for the implementation of German foreign policy towards Yugoslavia in the whole interwar period.

²⁰ Vuk Vinaver, *Svetska ekonomska kriza u Podunavlju i nemački prodor 1929 – 1934*, Beograd, 1987, 170.

²¹ M. Crnjanski, *Embahade*, I, 50.

²² *Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji*, I (1921 – 1930), 453 - 454.

²³ AA PA, R – 30303, Telegram № 174, Belgrad, den 13. Dezember 1927, Streng Vertraulich.

²⁴ M. Crnjanski, *Embahade*, I, 50.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, 104.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, 119.

²⁷ Bundesarchiv, Militärarchiv – Freiburg im Breisgau, RH 2/3003, r.b 200 – 201; Psychologische Laboratorium des Reichskriegsministerium Nr.14/36 g.Kdos.W.L./V; Berlin, den 5.3.1936. *Völkerpsychologische Untersuchung 9: Südosteuropa als einheitliche Kulturprovinz*.

THE EVENTS IN COLONIAL CYPRUS IN OCTOBER 1931: THE SUPPRESSION OF A REVOLT IN THE INTERWAR YEARS

Dr. Andreas Karios (Cyprus)

1. Introduction

The call to the Paris Peace Conference (1919) concluded the peace treaties that ended the Great War: these treaties regulated various territorial disputes and contributed to the dissolution of certain empires and the creation of new states. The call to a peace settlement was met with enthusiasm by the Greek majority in the then British colony of Cyprus, which the United Kingdom had unilaterally annexed in 1914: the dominant issue in Cypriot politics at that time was the demand for the termination of British colonial rule and the union of Cyprus with Greece (*enosis*).¹ Such an aim was directly linked to the principle of self-determination that had already been gaining international impetus since 1917. Nevertheless, the efforts of the Greek Cypriot delegation (comprised of Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative Council and presided over by the Archbishop Kyrillos III of Cyprus) to Paris and, later on, to London, did not result in the settlement of the Cyprus Question in the pattern of *enosis* because of Britain's decision to remain uncompromising regarding the prospect of Greek self-determination in Cyprus;² In the mind of Britain, the strategic value of Cyprus was closely linked to the security of British possessions in the Levant, especially given the potential of advances in aviation. Thus, Cyprus' geostrategic location was considered ideal as a base in the near future.³ The British stance hardened after the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, under which Turkey recognised the annexation of 1914. The island was declared a British Crown Colony in 1925.⁴ From the Greek perspective the Cyprus Question remained unresolved, despite the peace treaties under consideration at the Paris Peace Conference, the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the doctrine of self-determination.

In the late 1920s and the early 1930s, the Cyprus Question remained unsettled, as union with Greece remained a solid and direct demand of the Greeks in Cyprus.⁵ The

¹ For the full account of the departure of the Cypriot deputation to Paris to advance the cause of Cyprus as part of the Greek agenda for territorial claims see Christina-Evelyn Christodoulidou, "I Kypriaki Presvia sti Diaskepsi tis Irenis, 1918-1920", in: Giorgos Kazamias and Petros Papapolyviou (eds.), *O Elephtherios Venizelos ke i Kypros* (Athens 2008), 129-153.

² The Cyprus Mission went to London in January 1919 and stayed there for the rest of the year, endeavouring to persuade British officials to consider a discussion of *enosis*. Nonetheless, Britain remained opposed to the fulfillment of the Greek-Cypriot irredentist *desiderata*. See Giannis P. Pikros, *O Venizelos ke to Kypriako* (Athens 1980), 28, 35-42; Christodoulidou, "I Kypriaki Presvia", 137-139.

³ Robert Holland and Diana Markides, *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850-1960* (Oxford 2006), 181; Pikros, *O Venizelos ke to Kypriako*, 41-42; George Gordon Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus, 1939-1955* (New York and London 1990), 3.

⁴ William Mallinson, *Cyprus: a Modern History* (London and New York 2005), 11.

⁵ *Ibid.*

British opposition to *enosis*, and Greek complaints about the colonial administration on both political and economic grounds, led to the spontaneous uprising known as “Oktovriana” (the October Events) in 1931, when civil disturbances erupted in the island and Government House was burned down.⁶ The riots soon spread to other parts of Cyprus; the prompt reaction of the British colonial authorities, however, as well as the spontaneous and uncoordinated character of the revolt, brought about the complete restoration of British control over Cyprus and the onset of even more authoritarian colonial governance.⁷

The present study investigates the British campaign to suppress the Revolt of 1931, an event that stands out as a landmark in 20th century Cypriot History, the first effort of the Greek population of Cyprus to gain freedom by radical means. As it will be pointed out, the British response was not confined solely to normal policing: the colonial authorities did not appreciate the uprising as purely one of public disorder; on the contrary, they considered it far more serious and necessitating the engagement of both military and police forces. This study, therefore, concentrates on the interrelationship between, on the one hand, military matters and, on the other hand, public security, intelligence gathering, policing and public order relating to the October Events.

2. The Outbreak and the Spread of the Greek Cypriot Revolt

General displeasure increased in Cyprus when, in July 1931, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer declared the accumulated surplus – amounts the Cypriots were forced to pay to the British colonial authorities as tribute to the Ottoman Empire under the Cyprus Convention of 1878 – had been disposed of.⁸ The immediate reason for the outbreak, however, was the resignation of the Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative Council after the publication of an Imperial Order in Council, on 9 October 1931, introducing a new customs tariff, despite the opposition of the majority of the elected members of the Council to any fresh taxation: the Bishop of Kitium resigned on 17 October 1931, and three more members resigned on 19 October 1931⁹, only one day after a new organization, *Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis Kyprou* (EREK),¹⁰ proclaimed its existence and commenced its fanatical pursuit of union with Greece.¹¹ On 21 October 1931 the remaining members of the Legislative Council made their decision to resign known to the people of Nicosia (the capital city of Cyprus).¹²

⁶ *Historia tou Hellenikou Ethnous*, Vol. 15 (Athens 2000), 478-479; Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus* (Oxford 1998), 5-9.

⁷ Heinz A. Richter, *Historia tis Kyprou (1878-1949)* (Athens 2007) 486-507.

⁸ *Disturbances in Cyprus in October 1931. Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty*, (London, 1932), 2.

⁹ “Paretissis ke Diaggelma Metropolitou Kitiou”, newspaper *Eleftheria*, 21 October 1931; Petros Stylianou, *Ta Oktovriana: I Exegersi tou 1931 stin Kypro* (Nicosia, 2002), 54-55.

¹⁰ Initials stand for *Cyprus Nationalist Radicalist Union*.

¹¹ “Paretissis ke Diaggelma Metropolitou Kitiou”, newspaper *Eleftheria*, 21 October 1931. For a translation in English of the principles constituting EREK’s programme see *Disturbances in Cyprus*, 36-37.

¹² “I Exelixis tis Politikis Katastaseos”, newspaper *Eleftheria*, 24 October 1931; Stylianou, *Ta Oktovriana*, 60.

On the same day (21 October 1931), a huge crowd of between 5,000-8,000 assembled in the Commercial Club in Nicosia. Vivid speeches were delivered criticising the injustices of the British administration and hailing union with Greece. Soon, continual cries of “To Government House” arose. A large crowd marched to the Government House to deliver a resolution advocating *enosis* to Sir Ronald Storrs, the British Governor. The protestors aimed to send the Governor to Britain with the demands of the people of Cyprus ringing in his ears.¹³

Breaking through the police lines, the protestors besieged Government House. After throwing stones, the crowd set the building – the symbol of British rule in Cyprus – on fire.¹⁴ In the following days, the rebellion spread to many parts of the island.¹⁵ In the city of Limassol, the District Commissioner’s residence was also burned down.¹⁶ In general, the rebellion took the form of numerous demonstrations, acts of sabotage and defiance of law: plunder or destruction of public buildings and property, illicit removal of tax payments from tax collectors, raids on police stations and theft of arms, destruction of telegraph lines and cutting and blocking of roads.¹⁷ Nonetheless, despite its range, the uprising was suppressed by the colonial authorities by early November 1931.

3. The British Suppressive Reaction

Why did the British colonial authorities fail to predict the anti-colonial uprising and not undertake precautionary measures to “nip it in the bud” before it erupted? The British Governor of Cyprus explained to the Secretary for the Colonies that the growing manifestations of disaffection in recent years differed only in scale and intensity from those which had been tolerated by the colonial authorities on the island for over fifty years; therefore, experience from the past showed that such manifestations were not a likely prelude to any serious illegality. Storrs added that, after all, respect for law and order was deeply rooted in the Cypriot population.¹⁸ These perceptions were cause for more austere political measures, including preparations to dissolve the Legislative Council;¹⁹ no serious measures were undertaken, however, on policing grounds.

¹³ Stylianou, *Ta Oktovriana*, 60-64.

¹⁴ “I Exelixis tis Politikis Katastaseos”, newspaper *Eleftheria*, 24 October 1931. The newspaper *Eleftheria* estimated the cost of material destruction at £20,000. See *Ibid*.

¹⁵ Storrs reports that incidents were reported from 209 villages throughout the island: “There are 598 Greek-Orthodox villages and mixed Orthodox and Turkish villages in the island. Three hundred and eighty nine of these took no part at all in the disturbances”. See *Disturbances in Cyprus*, 28.

¹⁶ “I Exelixis tis Politikis Katastaseos”, newspaper *Eleftheria*, 24 October 1931.

¹⁷ Petros Papapolyviou, “Ta Oktovriana tou 1931 ke to Pissouri: Exegersi ke Katastoli stin Ypethro tis Apikiokratoumenis Kyprou”, in: Evripidis Andoniadis (ed.), *A’ Epitimoniko Symposio Pissouriou: Istoria, Kinonia, Politiki & Mea Epikinonias. Exegersis pou Simadepsan tin Istoria tou Sygchronou Hellenismou se Hellada ke Kypro* (Nicosia, 2018), 26.

¹⁸ *Disturbances in Cyprus*, 5-6.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

As soon as the Greek Cypriot crowd started marching to the Government House, the colonial police proved incapable of enforcing law and order. After his escape from the Government House to the Colonial Secretary's Lodge,²⁰ Sir Ronald Storrs appreciated the situation as very serious. He feared widespread anarchy was likely to follow in both urban and rural areas. The colonial police were trained almost exclusively in the prevention or the detection of crime; they were in no sense of the term a military force. The Governor, therefore, decided to engage not only police forces, but also the permanent military garrison comprising three officers and 123 servicemen stationed on Mount Troodos. In addition, he called for reinforcements from overseas, requesting from the General Officer Commanding British Troops in Egypt additional personnel to be sent by air, and from the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet an aircraft carrier or cruiser.²¹

Until the arrival of military reinforcements, Storrs instructed the District Commissioners to undertake precautionary measures in their districts and to maintain frequent communication with Nicosia. During the night policemen were commissioned to guard various posts around the capital city; by daylight on 22 October 1931, large printed notices announced to the citizens of Nicosia the imposition of a curfew as well as the prohibition of assemblies of more than five persons, the carrying of firearms and provocative conduct.²² Another measure which strengthened the position of the colonial government, one already in place, was the application of the Defence Order in Council of 1928, which granted the Governor with the power to deport individuals, impose censorship,²³ restrict movement, impose curfews and close places of public resort and entertainment.²⁴

Gradually, by noon of 22 October 1931, the arrival of the permanent garrison increased colonial military strength in Nicosia to three officers and 91 servicemen. Despite reports of excited gatherings within the walls of Nicosia, effective control had been imposed over the exits from the city and all important colonial government property had been protected. This allowed the colonial regime to focus on the disturbances beyond Nicosia. Consequently, two platoons were sent to the cities of Famagusta and Larnaca.²⁵

The factor which turned the tide in favour of the colonial authorities was definitely the arrival of reinforcements from outside Cyprus: on 23 October 1931 two cruisers

²⁰ "I Exelixis tis Politikis Katastaseos", newspaper *Eleftheria*, 24 October 1931.

²¹ *Disturbances in Cyprus*, 13.

²² *Ibid.*, 13-14; "I Exelixis tis Politikis Katastaseos", newspaper *Eleftheria*, 24 October 1931.

²³ Censorship was imposed to telegraphs, parcel post and newspapers and offenders could be given even a life sentence. See "Exousie Logokrisias", newspaper *Eleftheria*, 31 October 1931.

²⁴ "Prokyrixis tou Diatagmatos Peri Amynis Vrettanikon Ktiseon", newspaper *Eleftheria*, 28 October 1931; Vias Livadas, "I Teleftea Periodos prin tin Eksegersi", in: Vias Livadas, Giannis Spanos & Petros Papapolyviou (eds.), *I Exegersi tou Octovri 1931 (Ta Octovriana)* (Nicosia 2004), 185-186.

²⁵ *Disturbances in Cyprus*, 14. For the dispatch of troops to Famagusta and Larnaca see "Ek Larnacos", newspaper *Eleftheria*, 24 October 1931.

and two destroyers arrived on the island;²⁶ on the same day, an army company arrived by air at the emergency landing ground five miles west of Nicosia.²⁷

HMS “London” appeared off Larnaca on 23 October 1931.²⁸ The Rear-Admiral Commanding immediately landed two hundred men at Limassol, one hundred at Larnaca and up to fifty at both Famagusta and Paphos.²⁹ The marines promptly engaged themselves in internal security activities such as dispersing rioting crowds and protecting public buildings and property. While carrying out their mission, servicemen used their entrenching tool handles as batons; on some occasions they fired rounds at Greek Cypriot demonstrators, inflicting casualties.³⁰

While troops were deployed in the colony, a stern decision was put into effect by the Governor, and the Bishop of Kitium and the alleged lay ringleaders of the outbreak were arrested and removed to the warships “London” and “Shodshire” until arrangements could be made to deport them.³¹ Storrs argued on both legal and public security grounds that this measure was preferable to any other alternative.³² Such an initiative could also be perceived as an attempt by the colonial authorities to restore their battered prestige.³³

On 25 October 1931, HMS “Colombo” arrived and landed further reinforcements.³⁴ On its arrival the Rear-Admiral relieved the army platoons at Famagusta and Paphos, enabling the officer commanding the troops to concentrate his force at Nicosia and rapidly intervene in other districts as required.³⁵ Indeed, the colonial forces succeeded in imposing their control, though rather messily, in the island’s main towns by 27 October 1931. They were aided by the Defence Regulations,³⁶ which had been posted throughout Nicosia district that same day, and by the RAF day-bombers accompanying troops and overflying, without bombs, above the villages.³⁷

4. The Aftermath of the Revolt

²⁶ The Commanding-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet decided to send four vessels when only one had been asked for. Storrs commented that this was a “fortunate decision”. See *Ibid.*, 17.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 17. A Greek Cypriot newspaper reported that three British aircrafts flew in the sky over Nicosia on 23 October 1931. See “I Exelixis tis Politikis Katastaseos”, newspaper *Eleftheria*, 24 October 1931.

²⁸ “Ek Larnacos”, newspaper *Eleftheria*, 24 October 1931.

²⁹ *Disturbances in Cyprus*, 17.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 19.

³¹ These arrests were carried out between 24–26 October 1931. See “I Exelixis tis Katastaseos”, newspaper *Eleftheria*, 28 October 1931.

³² *Disturbances in Cyprus*, 20.

³³ Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, 4.

³⁴ *Disturbances in Cyprus*, 25.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 26.

³⁶ The Defence Regulations were also published in the press. See for instance “To Peri Amynis Vrettanikon Ktiseon Diatagma tou 1928”, newspaper *Eleftheria*, 31 October 1931.

³⁷ *Disturbances in Cyprus*, 26; Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, 4. The use of aircrafts was reported by the press too: see for instance the landing of troops, on 28 October 1931, nearby the village Voroklini “Apo tas Allas Polis: Ek Larnakos”, newspaper *Eleftheria*, 31 October 1931. Aircraft overflights were also reported on the following days, as for instance on 31 October and 1 November 1931: see “Apo tas Allas Polis: Ek Larnakos”, newspaper *Eleftheria*, 4 November 1931.

By the first week of November 1931 the situation had quieted, since effective control was imposed over the countryside as well as the cities. The police were now free to carry out investigations of agitators and bring them to court.³⁸ The British vessels off the coast of Cyprus sailed to Malta on 6 November 1931. Armoured cars, requested while the uprising was underway, eventually arrived from Egypt³⁹ and toured Cyprus in yet another display of power and authority; they were returned to Egypt, however, at the first available opportunity for steamship transport. As for the reinforcements from overseas, their number was progressively reduced, and the last parties departed the island on 31 December 1931; as of this day, the permanent garrison in Cyprus comprised four officers and 175 men.⁴⁰

Regarding the casualties for the Greek Cypriot side, there is some dispute over the figures provided so far. British official sources report that seven Greek Cypriots were killed and thirty wounded due to the disturbances in the colony.⁴¹ On the other hand, Greek accounts state that there were seventeen Greek Cypriots killed and numerous wounded.⁴² The police casualties were 38 policemen wounded (of which fifteen Greek Cypriots and 23 Turkish Cypriots).⁴³

Before summing up, the unusually firm policy enforced by the British colonial authorities in the aftermath of the October 1931 uprising should also be taken into account. The colonial administration's initiatives intended to secure British supremacy in Cypriot politics and counter any claim that the initiative had slipped from British hands.⁴⁴ In early November 1931, ten of the arrested ringleaders (including two prominent Greek Cypriot communists) were deported for life.⁴⁵ The British revoked the constitution⁴⁶ and abolished the Legislative Council (16 November 1931).⁴⁷ On 1 December 1931 three new laws were passed by the Governor: the unauthorised flying or exhibition of flags was prohibited, the ringing of church bells was restricted, and the power to appoint village authorities was now vested solely with the Governor. A Reparation Impost Law levied fines amounting £34,315 on towns and villages considered to be collectively responsible for seditious actions, and more than 2,000 persons were convicted for specific offences connected with the uprising.⁴⁸ The harsh

³⁸ "I Exelixis tis Katastaseos: Syllipsis dia ta Gekonota tis 21^{is} Octovriou", newspaper *Eleftheria*, 4 November 1931; "I Exelixis tis Katastaseos: Pious tha Varyni I Epanorthossis ton Genomenon Zimion", newspaper *Eleftheria*, 7 November 1931; *Disturbances in Cyprus*, 29.

³⁹ "Apo tas Allas Polis: Ek Larnakos", newspaper *Eleftheria*, 4 November 1931.

⁴⁰ *Disturbances in Cyprus*, 30-31.

⁴¹ Stylianou, *Ta Oktovriana*, 154.

⁴² Livadas, "I Teleftea Periodos prin tin Eksegersi", 192-193.

⁴³ Stylianou, *Ta Oktovriana*, 154 and *Disturbances in Cyprus*, 41.

⁴⁴ Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, 9.

⁴⁵ *Disturbances in Cyprus*, 30; "I Exelixis tis Katastaseos: Pious tha Varyni I Epanorthossis ton Genomenon Zimion", newspaper *Eleftheria*, 7 November 1931. For the names of the deported persons see *Disturbances in Cyprus*, 20 and Livadas, "I Teleftea Periodos prin tin Eksegersi", 194.

⁴⁶ Richter, *Historia tis Kyprou*, 520; François Crouzet, *I Kypriaki Dienexi 1946-1959* (Athens, 2011), Vol. 1, 42.

⁴⁷ *Disturbances in Cyprus*, 30; "Anagnosis ke Dimosiefsis ton Anikton Grammaton tis A.M. tou Vassileos", newspaper *Eleftheria*, 18 November 1931.

⁴⁸ *Disturbances in Cyprus*, 30. More information on the fines can be found in "E Epanorthosis

measures adopted over the following years, including open intervention in Greek Cypriot education and Church affairs, further widened the gap between Britain and the Greek Cypriot masses.⁴⁹ As for the Greek Cypriot demand for *enosis*, it “had been obscured, though not eradicated,” and remained so for the remainder of the decade; it was revived immediately after the outbreak of the Second World War.⁵⁰ Thus, a more serious insurgency (the EOKA⁵¹ insurgency of 1955-1959) exploded in Cyprus two-and-a-half decades later, eventually contributing to the termination of the British colonial rule.⁵²

5. Conclusion

The present study investigated the British reaction to the Greek Cypriot rebellion which erupted in October 1931 in the British Crown Colony of Cyprus. The scale of the civil disturbances, which soon spread to other parts of the island, and the destruction of Government House convinced the colonial authorities that if their response relied solely on the Police Force, anarchy would be *ante portas*, thereby jeopardising British sovereignty. Eventually, the use of military power brought about the complete restoration of British control over Cyprus and marked the beginning of even more authoritarian colonial governance. The British expected its stern response would halt the advance of the *enosis* movement in the colony and reestablish its battered prestige. The significant and lasting impact the October uprising had on British policy, however is acutely pointed out by leading British historian Robert Holland: “the Cyprus rebellion of 1931, and the burning down of Government House, was the most humiliating blow sustained by the British in any of their Crown Colonies in the years between the two world wars, and in a profound sense their position in the island never entirely recovered from the blow”.⁵³

dia tas Zimias tas Genomenas kata tas Telefteas Tarakhas”, newspaper *Eleftheria*, 24 December 1931. For a detailed list on the names of convicted individuals, as well as their offences and sentences see Livadas, Spanos & Papapolyviou, *I Eksegersi tou Oktovri 1931*, 368-378.

⁴⁹ Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, 9-10. For the colonial authorities’ measures directed against the Church of Cyprus see Richter, *Historia tis Kyprou*, 571-573. For the British effort to control the Greek Cypriot education see Ibid., 553-555, 568-571 and Crouzet, *I Kypriaki Dienexi*, 98-99.

⁵⁰ Holland & Markides, *The British and the Hellenes*, 215.

⁵¹ Initials stand for *Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston* (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters).

⁵² As a Greek Cypriot historian comments: “The October Events in 1931 were above all, the ‘introduction’ to the insurgency of April 1955”. See Papapolyviou, “Ta Oktovriana tou 1931 ke to Pissouri”, 38.

⁵³ Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, 4-5.

“THE BALKAN TANGLE” IN THE TRIANGLE OF INTERESTS IN THE 1930S

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In the early 1930s, the military, political and economic situation in the Balkans was characterized by extreme instability. The economic crisis was growing, Italy and other states raised claims to certain territories, the system established by Versailles was under threat of destruction. Under those circumstances the ruling circles of small states of South-Eastern Europe searched for the means ensuring their own security. This search was not through the system of guarantee pacts of the great powers, but through creating their own union of the Balkan countries. There was revived the idea of creating a Balkan union based on the Little Entente (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania).

The initiative to convene the Balkan conference belonged to the former Greek Prime Minister A. Papanastasiu, who came up with this idea in the spring of 1929. The conference was to discuss the creation of an organization promoting reconciliation, solidarity and mutual understanding of the Balkan peoples. The first general Balkan conference opened in Athens on October 5, 1930. It approved the previously prepared organizational status of the Balkan conference as a permanent organization of six countries – Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia. The conference was designed to promote rapprochement and cooperation between the Balkan peoples in their economic, social, cultural and political relations in order to direct this rapprochement towards the unification of the Balkan states. It was also to develop informal recommendations for governments concerning Balkan union projects.

In the early 1930s, Germany began to pose a new serious threat to the interests of the Balkan states. Even in the period of the Weimar Republic, it established economic ties with almost all the countries of this region, aimed to weaken the influence of France and undermine the Little Entente created under her patronage. The conclusion of the Austro-German Customs Union in March 1931 was of particular concern in the Balkan countries. This Union not only violated the Saint-Germaine peace treaty and the Geneva Protocol of October 4, 1922 on the independence of Austria, but also revived the Pan-German plans for Austria's accession to Germany. In response to this step, in December 1931, a conference of chiefs of general staffs of the Yugoslav, Romanian and Czechoslovak armies was convened in Prague, which reviewed operational plans in the event of an all-European war. The scare increased due to the fact that in 1932 revenge circles came to power in Hungary, openly raising the question of revising the peace treaties, thus joining with Italy and the German National Socialists.

The Soviet leadership was maneuvering in relations with the West and constrained by the dogmas of the Comintern, missed the opportunity to use the desire of the Balkan countries to unite in the interests of regional security and thus prevent the strengthening of the influence of revanchist states, primarily Germany, in the Balkan region – an important security zone of the USSR in the South.

Many researchers believe that the Stalin's "concept of peaceful coexistence" with capitalist countries adopted in the USSR in the mid-1920s made the reasons for the

distrust of the Soviet side to any attempts of both small states and the Western powers to create regional alliances. This concept was based on the “neutrality” of the USSR and the “neutralization” of small countries by concluding non-aggression pacts with them. This was done in order to oppose the threat from the capitalist environment – by splitting the unions of capitalist countries and promoting the contradictions between them.

The year 1931 became the starting point when the world inevitably began rolling into war. That year Japan captured Manchuria, thereby demonstrating that the Versailles-Washington system and the League of Nations did not make any real obstacle for aggression. But the darkest day in the history of mankind, as we know, was January 30, 1933, when Adolf Hitler legitimately took over as German chancellor.

By this time, the Nazi already had a ready-made program for conquering world domination and the “living space.” “Drive to the East” (*Drang nach Osten*) did not exclude a drive to the West. “We need,” wrote Hitler, “not a western or eastern orientation. We need an eastern policy aimed at conquering new lands for the German people.” To achieve this, it was necessary first of all to “destroy the French desire for hegemony in Europe”. With regard to France, Germany should move from “passive protection” to the final “active settling scores with the French.” Thus, the elimination of the status quo supported by France in Europe became a top priority in the Nazi programs. After that one could think of further expansion.

One of the goals of the Fuhrer’s secret diplomacy was to undermine the collective security system being created by France, under the pretext of demanding “equality” for Germany. At the same time Nazi tried to gain support of small European countries, especially for promises of territorial changes.

The Nazis’ main means and cover for the preparation of war was the declaratory fight against the “Russian threat”. Another means was to take advantage of ethnic and national problems, manipulating the principle of the “right of nations to self-determination”, restoring “historical justice” and revision of existing treaties and borders.

France made efforts to create a system of alliances in Europe that would prevent the German pressure. In the south of Europe, the all-Balkan bloc was to fulfill such task.

The main proponents of that idea were the French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou and the King of Yugoslavia Alexander.

According to Barthou’s plan, the all-Balkan bloc was supposed to include, in addition to Yugoslavia and Romania, also Greece and Turkey. Later, there was put forward the idea of bringing Bulgaria into the Balkan Entente. Particularly active implementation of this plan was promoted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania N. Titulescu. The condition for the inclusion of Bulgaria in this bloc was its rejection of territorial claims and of the revision of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine.

On January 20, 1934 the Bulgarian government declared that Bulgaria would not participate in the Balkan alliance, since it did not refuse to revise the treaties.

On February 9, 1934 the Balkan Pact was signed in Athens, and became a military-political union of Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia and Turkey. The member

states committed themselves to mutually guarantee the integrity of the intra-Balkan borders, to harmonize policies towards other Balkan countries. Article 3 of the Additional Protocol provided for assisting the victim of aggression being attacked by a Balkan state allied with a non-Balkan state.

The position of the Soviet leadership in this period was ambivalent. On the one hand, fearing the creation of a union between Germany, Japan and Poland, it intensified efforts to support the French idea of creating a collective security system, signed a non-aggression treaty with France in 1932, restored diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, expressed support for “Eastern Locarno” – a guarantee pact between the USSR, Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, the Soviet government expressed a frosty attitude to the Balkan Pact in terms of ensuring peace and security in Southeast Europe. It saw the anti-Soviet nature of the pact in strengthening the position of Romania, with which the USSR had a territorial dispute over Bessarabia. In the opinion of the Soviet leadership, the Balkan alliance was a tool in the hands of the Western imperialist circles.

The calls of some Soviet diplomats to intensify Soviet policy in the Balkans in order to weaken German influence were not heard in Moscow.

While Moscow was not particularly active with regard to the Balkan affairs, Germany substantially intensified its work in this region.

An irreparable blow to the French plans to create a collective security system was struck by the assassination of the French foreign minister Louis Barthou and the Yugoslav King Alexander on 9 October 1934 in Marseille. There is still a lot of mysteries around this event, as well as around the Sarajevo murder.

Despite the fact that the names of the direct killer and other participants in the assassination are known, there are several versions regarding the organizers of the murder.

Terrorist – a member of the Macedonian organization VMRO Velichko Georgiev (Vlado Chernozemsky) made a fatal injury. Among the organizers of the conspiracy, the leaders of the Croatian Ustashi A. Pavelic and E. Kvaternik are precisely identified. King Alexander had many enemies in his own country. The Yugoslav authorities had long been aware of the preparations for the assassination of the king by supporters of the WMRO right wing. As early as 1931, the headquarters of the Yugoslav Army received information from Paris about the attempts of the Macedonian center in the French capital to recruit for the assassination attempt a certain Alexander Sholansky, a Serb from Belgrade who had come to France to work. The report stated that the group that prepared the plot worked at the factory “Valtier et son fils”. Other addresses were also revealed.

The literature mentions involvement of Masonic organizations in the murder that allegedly sentenced King Alexander to death. In particular, according to the memoirs of the Bulgarian Tsar Boris, before his trip to Marseille, Alexander met him and said: “We will probably both be killed, but you are the first.” To which Boris asked: “Tell me, are you a mason?” “No, I am not a mason. I once visited Masonic lodge, but since the 1920s I have not maintained contact with it,” said Alexander. “Then you are the first in the line,” said Boris. “You are going to Paris soon, beware there.”

Other Yugoslav sources say that Great Britain did not like Alexander and his policy of rapprochement with France, because in 1933 the British looked for rapprochement with Germany, intending to sign a "Pact of Four".

The most well-founded version of the Marseille murder was put forward by the Russian historian Vladimir Volkov. On the basis of German documents opened in late 1950s, he proved that the initiators and organizers of the murder were Nazi leaders, including Hermann Göring. The direct organizer of the operation, codenamed "Teutonic Sword," was the assistant of the German defense attaché in Paris Captain Hans Speidel, who later made a Hitler's general, and after the war served as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Land Forces Central Europe. It was he who established contact with the VMRO far-right leader Vancho Mikhailov, and the latter found the murderer – the Vlado-driver. Beside that Mikhailov had connections with the Ustashes who agreed to participate in the murder of King Alexander.

But the main purpose of the conspiracy, according to Volkov, was the murder of the French foreign minister Louis Barthou, carried out by the hands of Macedonian terrorists and Croatian Ustashes, in order to disguise the German trail. This point of view is highly likely true. Moreover, terrorist acts had already made an integral part of the Nazi diplomacy: earlier, in December 1933 the proponent of collective security the Romanian Prime Minister Ion Duca was assassinated for his efforts to suppress the fascist Iron Guard movement. In July 1934, preparing the conditions for the Anschluss of Austria, the Nazi agents with the help of Austrian fascists assassinated the Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss.

All these assassinations in the tumultuous series of European events of the 1930s clearly show how, by the will of various "backstage" forces, the efforts of those who sought to avert the war threat were nullified. The murder of Louis Barthou and King Alexander greatly influenced the development of the situation in Europe and the Balkans. First, the new French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval headed for closer relations with Italy and Germany. The result was that the French closed their eyes to the Italian aggression in Abyssinia and gradually began to slip toward the policy of "appeasing" Germany. It is known that Barthou supported a close military alliance with the USSR. King Alexander despite his distaste for communism, gave support, albeit in a very cautious and hesitant way, to Barthou's plans to bring the Soviet Union to the front meant to contain Germany. However the Soviet-French agreement on mutual assistance signed in 1935, after his death, as the new French Prime-Minister insisted, had a number of "restrictive" articles.

Secondly, the Marseilles murder pursued far-reaching goals to undermine the bloc of the Balkan states. After the death of Louis Barthou, Yugoslavia and its allies in the Balkan Pact lost in the face of French diplomacy a clearly oriented anti-German support from one of the great powers interested in stability in Europe.

While the ruling circles of Yugoslavia were ambivalent, and France and Great Britain were increasingly losing interest in Southeastern Europe, the policies of the Third Reich in the Balkans could be described as "quiet expansion", carried out mainly by economic means.

In the mid-1930s, the foreign economic relations of Germany with the Balkan

countries acquired the character of a boom, their indices grew with unprecedented speed. First of all, that concerned Yugoslavia, which supplied the Germany military industry with the metals and raw materials it needed, and Romania with its large oil reserves. In turn, the Balkan countries readily used the chance to increase the volume of their foreign trade, since from a geographical point of view Germany was much closer than the raw materials markets in France and Great Britain. With the help of numerous agreements, Berlin managed not only to gradually weaken the influence of the Western powers in the Balkans, but also to penetrate the local capital market there. The lack of stability in this region was to contribute to Germany war preparations.

At the same time, the Nazi leadership intensified political and diplomatic pressure on the Balkan countries, increasingly drawing them into the orbit of their policies.

Of course, the small Balkan states had an alternative to the course of rapprochement with Germany – to turn towards the traditional historical ally in the face of the new Russia – the USSR, as did Czechoslovakia, which on May 16, 1935 concluded with the Soviet Union Agreement on mutual aid. But the main obstacle on this path was mutual distrust and fear, which were based on ideological and sociopolitical contradictions.

Despite the fact that in 1934 the USSR was admitted to the League of Nations, it still remained politically isolated by Western states, who were suspicious of the USSR's participation in creating a collective security system, fearing the strengthening of the international position of the Soviet Union as a great power with a different social order.

In the Balkans, the fear of the “Russian threat” has become widespread among the overwhelming majority of political elites. A significant obstacle to closer military-political relations with the USSR was, on the one hand, the presence of “white” emigration in these countries, and on the other, the activity of the Comintern carried out through local communist parties.

That was the case with mutual distrust that characterized Soviet-Bulgarian relations. In 1935, the Soviet government made no response to the request of the Bulgarian military attaché regarding the purchase of weapons in the USSR. The question of the weapons sale was repeatedly arisen in conversations between Soviet diplomats and Bulgarian statesmen and military leaders, but the matter did not go further than words.

The resulting vacuum in relations between the USSR and the Balkan countries was used by Nazi Germany.

Of course, the Soviet leadership saw the dangerous increase in the dependence of the Balkan countries on Germany. The Intelligence Directorate on routine basis informed about the military orders of a number of small countries that were placed in Germany.

Of course, Germany's intentions could be hardly explained by the “concern” about strengthening the security of small countries. At the very least, it was about turning these countries into Germany potential allies in a future war.

General Yan Berzin, the Head of the Soviet Military Intelligence Directorate wrote: “I would advise to expedite for us some necessary measures to counter the

attempts of Germany to introduce their weapons into the [Balkan] states and thus make them dependent on German supplies (munitions, motors, spare parts). Supplying our weapons to these countries could be among such counter measures”.

However, there was no reaction to these proposals from the top Soviet leadership.

Meanwhile, the situation in the world, as well as in the Balkans, was making more and more tense. Germany introduced universal conscription, and that gave the hope to the revanchist forces in the countries of South-Eastern Europe for a rapid collapse of the Versailles system. Regional security projects in the Balkans through the creation of the Danube and Eastern Pacts were cancelled. Moreover, Germany played an active role in stirring up antagonism among the countries of the region, especially between Hungary and Italy, Italy and Yugoslavia. The internal contradictions between the member states of the Little and Balkan Entente, as well as their relations with the great powers, caused a crisis of these organizations.

By 1937 Hitler rejected pseudo peace-loving declarations and headed for the implementation of the program to conquer “the living space in the East” i.e. in Russia. At the so-called “Hossbach” meeting on November 5, 1937 he outlined to the German military and political leadership plans for solving the economic problems of Germany.

Adolf Hitler: “The only and maybe impossible way to eliminate our difficulties lies in conquering a vaster living space.”

The goals of conquering living space meant to seize “mineral resources” and “fertile land” to ensure the survival of the German nation. The central role in those plans was assigned to “living space in the East”, i.e. in Russia. But to achieve the ultimate goal, the main suppliers of raw materials and food for that ultimate goal were the countries of South-Eastern Europe.

THE MILITARY DIMENSION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, THE MISSED OPPORTUNITY

Dr. Enrico Magnani (Italy)

Foreword

It is matter of fact that the League of Nations is considered the natural political son of the project forward by the US President Wilson, but, probably it is much less know, that the ones who set up the operational concept and implement it were two others, the South African Marshall Jan Smuts, and a British diplomat, Eric Drummond, who served as first Secretary-General of the organization¹.

They, the South African one initially, and the British one, later, bring in the idea of a new concept of international organization, which should move away decisively from the previous *Bureaux Internationales* established in the second half of the XIX Century and the beginning of the XX and bring in the global arena something totally innovative, a real international organization which would leave behind the idea of the diplomatic conferences.

The historiography was quite unfair with the organizations labelled to be inefficient, and almost useless. This paper want, humbly, would like to try to stress the problems which led the first political global international organization into to fail to address properly the main task, to preserve, promote and defend the international peace and security, and especially the aspect of the stabilization intervention in case of conflicts, or in other words, the peacekeeping capabilities (and missing the peace enforcement ones).

The military dimension of the League

Among the various proposal put forward by some Member States for the inclusion in the Covenant, the Magna Charta of the League, which in the failed of acceptance, the most important was the one focused into placing some form of military organization at the service of the new organization. For obvious reasons the main sponsor of it was France, which never ceased to fear attack across the Rhine. Despite the chairman of the French preparatory committee for the Covenant (which operated in the last months of the WWI), Leon Bourgeois was labelled as strongest pacifist, he prescribed a detailed proposal of military sanctions to be applied against any breaker of the peace. In this light he proposed the establishment either of an international force, or a force consisting of national contingents held at the disposal of the league. It proposed further the creation of a permanent international staff whose duties would be: A) to organize and train the international force or coordinate the training of the national contingents; B) to prepare and carry out military actions of the League, if required.

Despite this was the official opinion of France, Clemenceau and Bourgeois realized quickly that the proposal of an international force was untenable and they

¹ Between 1920-1933, the other two were Josphe Avenol of France (3 July 1933 – 31 August 1940) and Seán Lester of Ireland (31 August 1940 – 18 April 1946).

insist strongly for the establishment of an international staff and this this proposal was skilfully included in the article of the Covenant which called for the reduction armament of the member States of the League. According Paris view, an international military staff was necessary to plans collective military action, but it would be even more necessary to ensure the supervision by the League of the disarmament process. How could, it was said, any country consent of its own free will to reduce its defensive power unless it could be quite certain that its neighbours were carrying out their own commitment with equal good faith? France, was said, is not seeking to impose on other countries any obligation which herself would not ready to assume. The international military staff would be free to inspect French military installations and report their findings to the Council. But, unless the other countries were ready accept the same obligations, France will never accept any reduction of her military capabilities.

While some other countries were in principle in the same line of France, but the proposal found the strongest opposition of Britain and US. Wilson made clear that its country absolutely refuses to admit foreign inspection of American armaments.

The major factor of opposition was the predominant position at the time of the French armed forces, led by the *generalissimo* Marshall Foch, who was also (even nominally) at the last months of the war the commander-in-chief of all Allied forces. If any international staff were set up, France will fight to locate it in Paris and certainly Foch would be placed at its head. Neither the Americans, British nor any other allies would have given their full trust to an international staff of which he would be the head. But Foch, like most professional soldiers of that time, was profoundly hostile and sceptical towards the League idea. He firmly believed that the only insurance of France was the military power of the country.

In the year of the opening of the Disarmament Conference, France, with little conviction, reverted to the scheme for placing an international force at the disposal of the Council.

It is worth to recall that the issue of a military force at the disposal of the international organization was not only an issue for the League, but it was, and it is today a thorny problem of the United Nations and it run since 1945.

Giving that the idea of a real international military staff did not found the necessary political consensus, the negotiators move toward a 'light' version of it, establishing the Permanent Consultative Commission for military, naval and aeronautical issues. This it was perhaps the least known entity of the League. It was made up of three officers for each of the Member States (general/admiral and colonels for the larger countries and lieutenant-colonels/major for the minor ones) and the presidency was entrusted by rotation to the countries that sat on the Presidency of Council².

Like the UN, were the peacekeeping is not part of the UN Charter, also the League expanded progressively her range of actions on the field often with innovative ideas and establishing interesting precedents. The main answer was setting up and

² It is interesting to note that this small entity had its own small secretariat, which was formed not by international civilian personnel like the other bodies of the League, but by French military personnel (belonging the army), British (navy) and Italian (air force)

dispatching fact-finding entity, generally in small number and were diplomats of the Member States, military and medium-high ranks staffers of the Secretariat.

The birth of peacekeeping as a modern concept for the deployment of neutral multinational military forces to support a peace process endorsed by an international organization dates to the League of Nations. The League planned two military operations that were clearly different than the other post-war Allied plebiscite missions in that they included nominal neutral military forces and presented themselves as something other than a deployment of Allied soldiers contingents overseeing the plebiscites associated with the dismantling of the Central Powers after World War I and the normalization of disputed borders and mixed ethnic areas.

These operations are the foundations of what is commonly called peacekeeping under the UN and other international organizations³ in the second half of the 20th Century and beginning of the 21st Century. The two missions – the planned but not fielded 1920 Vilna International Force and the 1935 Saar International Force – are frequently confused and lost among the many other Allied powers plebiscite control forces fielded after WWI⁴ but should be seen for what they truly are – the birth of the modern concept of peacekeeping.

In the same vein the several military forces⁵ and commissions⁶ which occupied territories and monitored the disarmament of Central Powers forces after the Peace Treaties could be hardly considered peacekeeping forces even some time played a role of stabilization and interposition between warring parties and mediation. Those forces were often marked by divergent behaviour *vis-à-vis* with local population and authorities where they operated, like the contraposition between the British and Italian forces and the French contingent in Upper Silesia (with the latter in open support of the Polish armed elements). This finally, without mention the Allied expeditionary forces that operated aside the White Russian forces against the Bolsheviks in several fronts⁷ in real warfare operations.

A list of operations

- For Upper Silesia, facing the politico-military stalemate running since the beginning 1920, the Allied Council⁸, was unable to solve the issue of partition of the territory, also due to the victory of the German ethnic majority in the plebiscite of March 1921. In the August the Council of Ambassadors asked the League to find a solution, which proposed a partition plan for the area which worked very successfully. On the division of the territory between Germany and Poland, the international force,

³ Like the League of Arab States and African Union or OSCE

⁴ Upper Silesia, Schleswig-Holstein, Sopron, Allenstein & Marienwerder, Klagenfurt

⁵ Like in Memel, Rheinland, North Tirol, Hungary, Bulgaria, Constantinople and the Straits, Anatolia, Levant, Mesopotamia and other Afro-Asian colonies of Germany

⁶ Like the subsidiary bodies of IAMCC, which operated in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria

⁷ Eastern Siberia, Black Sea, Caucasus, Central Asia, Northern Russia

⁸ Split between France, outrageously favouring Poland stance, while Britain and Italy tried to be more balanced between Warsaw and Berlin

formed by overwhelming presence of French troops with smaller Italian and British contingents was disbanded without being put under the jurisdiction of the League, despite the wish of Geneva.

- Vilna, was the core of a very bitter confrontation between Poland and Lithuania, again due to the overlapping of ethnical, historical, political and strategic reasons. Initially, the Allied Council assigned the city to the re-established Baltic republic, regardless the overwhelming presence of Poles inhabitants. Poland forces take the control of the area in 1920 Again, the 9,5

- nce, Italy, Japan and Spain. They suggested, after convincing the parties to set up a demilitarized zone, to dispatch a military force tasked to secure the area, while a civilian body should carry out a referendum for the final fate of the area. It was decided to set up a force of 1,800 troops provided by Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden. The planning activities were assigned to France and the Generals Foch and Weygand worked on it, but Lithuania informed that the Soviet Russia would not accept an international military force near to her borders. The threat of Moscow was not considered as real one, giving the power of the capabilities of the Red Army; further, there were not any direct frontiers between Lithuania and Soviet Russia. Despite the pressure of Warsaw, that look for the international legitimization of her acquired *de facto* sovereignty over Vilna, the force was never dispatched, and the plebiscite did not take place. The reason that was used to kill the idea was the refuse of Switzerland to allow the right of transit of Italian and Greek troops across the Confederation.

- Bulgaria, was one the most successful, even among the less known operations of the League, which intervened, very rapidly in order to set up a limited border conflict, which potentially may escalate and destabilize again the Balkans (who recently move out of the Greek-Turkish war and the Albania borders issue). A small incident between Greek and Bulgarian soldiers on the frontier on October 1925 opened a crisis and Athens troops enter in Bulgaria. Sofia appealed to the League, which immediately requested both parties to respect their obligations under the League Covenant and exhorting them to stop all the military operation and re-deploy their forces at the original position and dispatched rapidly a commission of military observers formed by British, French and Italian officers tasked to monitor the situation. In November the commission report to the Council adopted the principal recommendations. The parties agreed to have Swedish two officers tasked to reorganize the frontier guards and chair a conciliation commission, to which an equal number of Greek and Bulgarian representatives should be included. The use of impartial military personnel to stabilize the truce and to make the first international-backed project of what it is called today as SSR (Security Sector Reform) were highly successful and paved the way for a normalization between the two countries. For the record there were other examples of similar initiatives in to establish and re-training armed and security forces, like in the Ottoman Empire, Crete, Albania, but those was set up within a multilateral initiative. Also, for the record, the League explored the possibility of naval demonstration to convince Greece to stop the military action, but it was quickly dismissed.

- Albania, in 1921, the Tirana government, dissatisfied of the management of the Conference of Ambassadors of the borders with Greece and Yugoslavia, bring the complaints to the League which dispatched a commission formed by Norwegian and Luxembourg military led a Finn legal expert. The commission was without any enforcing power and was not able to convince the Yugoslavia to withdraw the troops from Albania territory and, consequently was impossible to set up the planned 40 kilometres-wide de-militarized zone. The file, which was clearly much broader than a mere border issue, and the terms of reference of the Commission of Enquiry were enlarged to include assisting in the evacuation of foreign troops from the demarcation zone, monitoring that Albania's stability was not disturbed and provide suggestion for the avoidance of further problems in the area. The Commission was entrusted by the Council to cover a wide range of peacekeeping duties till 1922. The League was also in close contact with the Delimitation Commission, which belong to the aegis of the Conference of Ambassadors.

- Saarland. The operation in the Saarland it is knew as the largest, and the most successful stabilization operation carried out by the League. The Saar was subjected by the Treaty of Versailles to a peculiar regime. In fact, the sovereignty of the region, rich in iron and coal, which France wanted to annex as compensation for damage suffered during the First World War, should be defined by a plebiscite after 15 years of provisional administration by the International Governing Commission. It also set up a Technical Committee of eight nominated members, born and resident in the territory, whose duty was to give technical advice on all matters submitted to them⁹. And in this way the League of Nations step in in the very complex file of the temporary administration of a disputed territory¹⁰. The Saar, till 1920 was occupied by French troops. In that year the majority the contingent was withdrawn, but 2000 French soldiers remained till 1927 although until the Commission retained the right to recall them in the event of threats to public order which could not be dealt with the local police. From 1920 to 1930 operated an international railway police force set up for the occasion¹¹. The League of Nations, on the expiry of the transitional period, established a plebiscite management body, the Tripartite Commission (composed of Spain, France, Germany) and sent the 'Saarforce', an international military contingent with the mandate to watch over regularity of the plebiscite. The whole operation was very delicate as Germany itself had left the League of Nations in October 1933 (a withdrawal that was formalized two years later). The 'Saarforce', under the command of the British general John Brind, was made up of 1300 Italians (army and Carabinieri), 1500 British, 250 Swedish and 250 Dutch troops (Naval

⁹ The body, since 1920 subject to the supervision of the League of Nations was composed of five members, one appointed by France, one native German inhabitant of the Saar, and three by the Council of the League of Nations, which will select nationals of other Powers (other than France and Germany). In agreement with the Council, the Governing Commission decided that a way must be found of taking the opinion of the inhabitants, and for that purpose it set up, in March 1922, an Advisory Council consisting of thirty local representatives elected by direct, equal, universal suffrage, with the secret ballot

¹⁰ In much more intrusive way than the one applied for the Free City of Danzig

¹¹ With 800 men, 630 French, 70 Belgians and 100 British

infantry), was deployed at the end of December 1934. The 'Saarforce' positioned the headquarters in Saarbrücken and established a small international staff¹² (12). The force, which had a strong characteristic of internal security, it was also foreseen the participation of a contingent of Spanish Civil Guards, but Madrid's contribution to the operation did not materialize due to the difficult Spanish internal situation. The force was instructed to act with restraint and always to employ only the minimum force. The "Saar Force" was assisted by a contingent of civil police, unofficially called "Knox Armée" (from the name of the League Chairman of the Commission, the British diplomat Geoffrey Knox) and formed in large part by former members of the various English police forces. The mission also had a civilian element tasked to manage the voting operations¹³. The plebiscite, which took place on January 13, 1935, saw the massive victory of the German annexation element and the Saar returned to Germany; the international military force and civilian contingent withdrew in the spring of 1935.

- Spain. The entrance of the League into the specific aspect of controlling the withdrawal of foreign military personnel from Spain is perhaps the greatest failure of the Non-Intervention Committee. This theme, in fact, is in the institutional points of the London agreement and in the intentions of the English and the French. France sees with increasing concern the presence of forces from countries hostile to its southern borders and look with great interest the withdrawal of Italian and German forces from the Peninsula and surrounding waters. The Committee meets several times on the matter and comes to the definition of a financial plan for the operation (about two million pounds), the constitution of two military commissions (one for each side) and her activities. London politically influenced the initiative and obviously worked strongly in order to obtain the collaboration of the warring parties. Emerged, another time in this multilateral body, the lack of political will and cohesion from its members, as well the blatant rejection of cooperation from Spanish Nationalist and Republicans. Spanish President Juan Negrín, just to underline Madrid's disappointment with the multilateral body, based in London, on 21 September 1938 officially asked the League's Secretary-General, Joseph Avenol, to send a neutral military commission to monitor and verify the complete evacuation from Spain of the International Brigades, given that by now the conflict was clearly turning decisively in favor of the arms of the nationalist insurgents, following the decisive battle of the Ebro. The League gladly accepts, in return to the scheme of non-intervention that he would have liked to direct (and instead given that Geneva was not even called to be part of it, he always considered this multilateral body with open hostility) and established at the Palace of Nations, headquarters of the organization, within the Permanent Consultative Commission for military, naval and aeronautical issues, a planning cell made up of British, French and Iranian officers. An International Military Commission (IMC) is then established

¹² Formed of 100 officers, 40 British, 30 Italian, 15 Swedish and Dutch each

¹³ 40 electoral inspectors and 960 polling officers, as chairperson of the polling stations from neutral nations like Swiss, Swedish, Finnish, Norwegian, Dutch, Danish, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian and Luxemburg

and sent to Spain¹⁴. The Commission arrived in Barcelona in mid-October 1938 and began its work despite the heavy bombing of the city. The Commission staff managed to gather just under half (about 4,700 out of over 10,000, from fifty nations) of the soldiers of the International Brigades; they leave Spain before the fall of Barcelona in the hands of the nationalists, at the end of January 1939, while the remainder managed to abandon Catalonia for France in the early days of February, where they were disarmed by the French border authorities. Due to the widespread presence of foreign volunteers, about 6,000 (who took Spanish citizenship in order to stay and continue to fight), even in other regular Republican units, the Commission has many difficulties in identifying them and gathering them from different fronts in the five collection points and expatriation set up in the Barcelona area. In January 1939 the International Military Commission submits the first report to the League and the final one in June. In March 1939 the Commission abandoned Barcelona and, after the end of the fighting. Spain, now headed by Franco, on 8 May 1939, notifies the League of the decision to withdraw from the international organization. In their final report, transmitted to the Council of the League on 30 June 1939, international observers report about summary executions carried out by the winners after the conquest of the Catalan city, one of the last Republican strongpoints¹⁵. The structure of the IMC, extremely reduced facing the dimension of the task, was not able to cope with the massive task assigned.

- Chaco. On November 1933, after several weeks of negotiation between the League and the warring parties (Bolivia and Paraguay) a delegation formed by two diplomats (Italy, Spain), three military experts (France, Britain and Mexico) accompanied by two staffers of the Secretariat as political and legal advisers, arrived in Montevideo (Uruguay) in order to facilitate the a mediation and a cessation of the hostilities, ongoing since 1932. In February 1934 the delegation returned to Geneva without bring positive results due to the totally divergent positions of Bolivia and Paraguay and substantial lack of support of the International Conference of American States, the neighbour states and the US as well and the conflict was solved later thanks to a coalition of willing states¹⁶.

- Leticia. On the night of 31 August-1 September 1932, the Colombian village of Leticia came under the military control of a group of armed persons, including some

¹⁴ The IMC, which was equipped by a specific flag, was led a Finnish general, with two deputies (a British and a French General) and a French Colonel with the duties of Secretary. The Identification and collection of the personnel of the International brigades was carried out by three teams of three officers; in total were two Swedish, two Norwegians, two British, one Danes, one Latvian and one Iranian. Some, but very few other Cos and NCOs of the participating nations performed support functions for the central body and the teams on the field (drivers, interpreters, typists, clerks, logisticians). To the IMC were also attached with duties of liaison some personnel of the Spanish Republican armed forces ment of Burgos, Rome and Berlin

¹⁵ Almost at the same time as the repatriation of the soldiers of the International Brigades began, most of the Italian and German 'volunteer' contingents who had fought alongside the nationalists since December 1936 are part of an operation that took place on the basis of trilateral agreements between the provisional govern

¹⁶ US, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Peru

elements of the regular Peruvian army; this rapidly extended its control over the entire so-called 'Trapezium', an area about the size of Belgium between Colombia, Peru and Brazil¹⁷. After it, Colombia asked the Council to intervene. The Council put the matter on its agenda and appointed a committee of three (the Irish Free State, Spain and Guatemala). The committee acted promptly and advised: (A) The territory to be evacuated by Peru and a League Commission to take charge. (B) Order to be maintained in the territory pending *pour parlers* by the Commission through an international force drawn from the Colombian or such other forces as it deemed necessary. (C) The two parties to decide the method of carrying on the negotiations, the Council being ready to tender its good offices in case of disagreement. The Council endorsed the Report, asked for the support of the USA. While Colombia accepted immediately Peru accepted after some time. The Council decided to establish the Commission for the Administration of the Territory of Leticia consisted of three diplomats (US, later Chairman, Brazil, Spain), with a League Secretariat professional officer as secretary of the Commission. On 19 June 1933, they adopted a flag for the "League of Nations Leticia Commission" and decided that the Colombian flag should be flown beside their own; also to ask Colombia to provide an infantry company to garrison the area and which should answer directly to the Commission. The territory returned to Colombia on August 1933.¹⁸

- Mosul. The boundary between Turkey and Iraq, at time, British mandate was at center of dispute on the area of province of Mosul, which Ankara ask to be transferred from the British control for political, ethnic, historical and geographical reasons. Turkey, on September 1924, raised the issue at the League who set up an *ad hoc* commission formed by two diplomats (Hungary and Sweden), a military (Belgium) and a Professional staffer of the Secretariat as a secretary of the body. After extensive investigations, the Commission suggested that the territory should remain Iraqi, but the Turkey got an economic compensation with submission of oil amount.¹⁹

- China. China seized the league for the persistent attacks of Japan in Manchuria, especially the incident in Mukden in 1931). The Council established, upon the request of Japan a fact-finding commission, known as 'Lytton Commission', led by the British diplomat Victor Bulwer-Lytton²⁰. The group spent six weeks in Manchuria in spring 1932 (despite having been sent in December 1931) on a fact-finding mission after they had met government leaders in the Republic of China and in Japan. It was hoped that the report would defuse the hostilities between Japan

¹⁷ The boundaries in the area were already regulated by a treaty of 1922 between Lima and Bogota'. This was ratified and subsequently registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations. A commission was to be appointed to fix the boundaries as described in the treaty. Any dispute about its work was to be referred to The Hague Tribunal for arbitration

¹⁸ Again, the League had a very creative approach, using local troops under her direct control and established the practice of the use of the flag of national contingent under the one of the international organization

¹⁹ This reminding the compensation mechanism of the Sudan/South Sudan partition under UN aegis

²⁰ The Commission was formed by other two diplomats, one Italian and one German, and two military experts, two generals, one US and one French

and China and thus help maintain peace and stability in the Far East, instead was the trigger element of large-scale war. The Lytton Report went more broader of the original terms of reference (investigating about the cause of Mukden incident only) contained an account of the situation in Manchuria before September 1931, stressing the unsatisfactory performances of Chinese government, devoted particular attention to the origins and development of the State of Manchukuo, which had already been proclaimed by the time the Commission reached Manchuria. It also covered the question of the economic interests of Japan both in Manchuria and China as a whole, and the nature and effects of the Chinese anti-Japanese boycott. USSR interests in the region were also mentioned. Finally, the Commission submitted a study of the conditions to which, in its judgment, any satisfactory solution should conform, and made various proposals and suggestions as to how an agreement embodying these principles might be brought about. Despite some positive opinions on Japan, the Commission, in its conclusion of October 1932 stated that Japan was the aggressor, had wrongfully invaded Manchuria and that it should be returned to the Chinese sovereignty. It also argued that the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo should not be recognized, and instead recommended Manchurian autonomy under Chinese sovereignty. In September 1932, even before the official announcement of the findings of the Lytton Report the Japanese government extended official diplomatic recognition to Manchukuo. When the findings of the Report were announced before the General Assembly of the League of Nations, and a motion was raised to condemn Japan as an aggressor in February 1933, the Japanese delegation led by ambassador Yosuke Matsuoka walked out. Japan gave formal notice of its withdrawal from the League of Nations on March 27, 1933. The Lytton Commission was set up through the initiative of Japanese, making the whole commission questionable as Japan move in order to prepare and justify their eventual withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933.

- Armenia. Even if the whole military activities of the League are almost unknown, where all focused in that it is considered, with present wording, peacekeeping, peace-making and related matters. There was another attempt, which did not move out from the Assembly, for a peace enforcement operation, even more unknown. Armenia was part of the small group of small states emerged after the WWI in the region, together with Georgia, Azerbaijan and (partially) Kurdistan. All those, divide among themselves and internally, with the progressive stabilization of the situation in the subregion which was at the center or the diplomatic appetites of France and Britain or the programmes of other (Turkey and USSR), anxious to restoring their control over the lost territories due to the consequences of war and post war conflicts. The Supreme Council proposed the League to establishing an *ad hoc* mandate over Armenia, in order to protect Erevan from a clearly visible, joint, move Turkish-Soviet to take the control of the newly born state, but it remained without answer, despite on 19 January 1920 the League considered the then Armenian Government as Armenia's *de facto* government. At the opening of the first Assembly (15 November 1920) of the League it was noticed that Turkish troops already entered in Armenia in the month of September, allegedly committing atrocities against civilian populations.

The Assembly, stormed by a wave of sympathy, openly asked France and Britain, to carry out an action against the aggressor, in full adherence to the spirit and the letter of the Covenant. Paris and London, the only ones that have a credible military power, however warned that an 'international police action' could be done only by a large military operation and on indefinite duration and the proposal end up between cowardice and indifference. What it remained of the independent Armenia was under of pro-Bolshevik government, set up following the unopposed invasion of the Red Army in same November 1920, which suspended the application of join the League and eventually was absorbed by the USSR on 2 December of the same year.

- Aalands Islands. The small archipelagos, at the center of dispute between Sweden and Finland; the issue end up, under a very special status which protected the conditions of the Swedish-speaking population, as Finnish territory. One of the peculiarity of the agreement was the complete demilitarization of the islands (the fortification were built by Tzarist Russia during XIX Century) and the evaluation and monitoring of the dismantling of those was carried out by a small group of military officers dispatched from the Permanent Consultative Commission for military, naval and aeronautical issues.

Conclusions

Stabilization and multinational forces, provisional administrations, enquiry and/or fact finding and/or mediation commissions were not invented by the League of Nations; already in XIX Century there were some cases as well as mechanism of demilitarization. But the League move decisively, as concept, more than pure implementation, from the framework of the Concert of Powers (or gunboat diplomacy) to democratic, inclusive view and with efforts to establish the concept of peace as final aim. This made the difference from the past, especially after a self-destructive European/global civil war.

As above-mentioned, the League of Nations did not keep the promises on which it was based. The hopes of a better world after a global civil war were strong but the international community was not ready to adopt the constituent principles entirely. The problem was that the main enemies of the League were inside the organization as Member States, which never allowed any real expansion of the jurisdictional and real power of the League.

Especially the winner of the war, kept almost unchanged the decision-making structure of the Allied Supreme Council (were the US maintained an observer status) and the related, pivotal bodies, like the Conference of Ambassadors, the Reparation Committee, and more importantly, the Allied Military Committee²¹, which supervised the IAMCC (Inter-Allied Military Control Committee), tasked to monitor the disarmament of the Central Powers.

²¹ which replaced the Allied Military Committee of Versailles, AMCV; AMC was created by resolution of the Allied Supreme Council of the Peace Conference on 10 January 1920, the day of the promulgation of the Treaty of Versailles, which had been signed on 28 June 1919. Placed under the presidency of the Marshal Foch, he functions under this denomination, until 1931, when it was finally dissolved

Despite many defaults, the peacekeeping and peace-making architecture of the League, set up case by case, with her fact-finding bodies, observers' group, light troops deployments, paved the way, even may many be not aware till today, to the one of the United Nations.

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MUNICH AGREEMENT AND EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES

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To date, all aspects of the Western countries' policies of the Munich Agreement period, primarily of England and France, are studied quite well, as well as the methods by which Germany asserted its role as the arbiter of the small countries of Eastern Europe. On the one hand, these countries followed the Munich policy of the "peacemakers" of the West, on the other hand, with the help of Germany, they tried to achieve certain "benefits" and realize their own geopolitical interests at the expense of their neighbors. At the same time, authoritarian regimes in small countries in that situation did not see any other choice for themselves but to preserve loyalty towards Germany. Germany, in turn, actively pushed on them the conviction that the further development of conflict situations in the Balkans and the possibility of the "survival" of small countries will depend on her will.

A little-known page in the history of pre-war international relations in the Balkan region are the actions of the Soviet side. New facts are becoming public, showing how the Soviet leadership sought to prevent development of the situation in an undesirable direction, for example, to change the pro-German policy of the Yugoslav government of Stojadinovich. Thus, the former head of the 4th Directorate of the NKVD-KGB, P.A. Sudoplatov in his memoirs reported on many previously unknown details of this kind of activity.

Edvard Benes proposed to Stalin that the Soviet Union subsidize a coup in 1938 with the aim of overthrowing the Stojadinovic government in order to establish a military regime in Yugoslavia and thereby ease German pressure on Czechoslovakia.

The operation to transfer money to Yugoslav conspirators - Serbian officers, was to be carried out by the Soviet resident in Prague, Peter Zubov. However, the operation did not take place. After arriving at Belgrade, Zubov convinced of the unreliability of the Serbian conspirators selected by Czech intelligence for the implementation of the action and did not give them money (200 thousand dollars). Zubov himself, shortly after returning to Prague with money and reporting to the Center on the current situation, was arrested on Stalin's order for disrupting the mission¹. All this shows both the cooperation of Czech and Soviet intelligence services and the "special", trusting relationship of Stalin and Benesh. However, this relationship did not change the fate of Czechoslovakia. In the period of the Munich Agreement the government of Stojadinovic betrayed its ally in the Little and Balkan Entente, declaring the Sudeten Germans question an "internal affair" of Czechoslovakia.

Immediately after the announcement of the Munich Agreement in September 30, 1938, the governments of Yugoslavia and Romania informed each other that the Small Entente had ceased to exist due to a change in the international status of

¹ См.: Судоплатов П.А. Спецоперации. Лубянка и Кремль 1930-1950 годы. М., 1998. С. 99-100, 141.

Czechoslovakia. Thus, another obstacle to the establishment of German hegemony in the Balkans collapsed.

Despite some nuances, among most historians there is unanimity in the estimates of the Munich Agreement as a failure of attempts to create a system of collective security in Europe. The Munich Agreement destroyed the last remnants of the Versailles system and came from England and France as an “invitation” to Germany for further aggression, mainly in the East.

The result of the Munich Agreement was the undermining of the faith of small countries in the allied reliability of the Western powers in defense against aggression. In an atmosphere of complete unpredictability of the international situation, small countries of the Balkan region began to abandon any collective action, sought to stay “away from the conflicts of great powers”, and began to hold on the policy of maneuvering and staying on “neutral” course between the fascist states and the Western powers.

It is equally clear that the union of the great powers - the USSR, France, Great Britain - could become an alternative to the policy of N. Chamberlain and E. Daladier.

For many decades, historians have been trying to understand why Western countries and the USSR, which seemed to be jointly striving for peace, could not reach a compromise and unite efforts to prevent the actions of aggressive states - Germany, Italy, Japan?

When it became known about the existence of a secret annex to the Treaty of Non-aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of August 23, 1939, many historians began to build versions that Stalin used Hitler as his weapon for the interest of a long-term Soviet strategy aimed at turning a military clash between the two imperialist groups in the “revolutionary war”.

The most prominent supporters of this version in the West in the 70s-80s were Robert Tucker and Andreas Hilgruber. They believed that the collective security policy of the USSR seemed to be ambivalent, focusing on both Germany and the Western powers. Hilgruber believed that the pact between Hitler and Stalin on the part of the latter should not have prevented the war, but indirectly called it with the help of Hitler as the main actor who would ensure the outbreak of war².

Diametrically opposite is the version of the events of 1939-1940, according to which the Western powers tried to involve Germany and the Soviet Union in a war against each other. Their position put Stalin in the stalemate, finding himself in which he concluded a non-aggression pact with Hitler in order to prevent German aggression against the USSR and gain time. Close to this version is the concept that the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty with Hitler was dictated by the security interests of the Soviet Union. Both the fear of Germany and the threat of an agreement between the Western powers and Germany against the Soviet Union, as well as concerns about Japan's policy in the Far East, played a role. The territorial acquisitions of the USSR as a result of the non-aggression treaty were

² Die Zerst

explained by Soviet strategic interests, the desire to expand their zone of security at the expense of neighboring countries.

In Russia in the 90s, the collision of these concepts resulted mainly in controversy between the Russian defector émigré Victor Suvorov (V. Rezun) and the Israeli scientist Gabriel Gorodetsky, whose books were widely distributed. The first one lined up on the already known and published materials a hypothesis about “Stalin’s use of Hitler as an Icebreaker of the Revolution” and about the preparation by the Soviet side of a preemptive strike on Germany³. Gorodetsky, on the contrary, to refute Suvorov, got access to many documents of the Russian archives that were still closed to ordinary historians⁴. In his writings there are quite interesting new materials on the Balkans of the period 1939-1941.

Consideration of the pre-war situation in the Balkans is impossible without taking into account the role of the USSR and its impact on the overall development of the military-political situation. Despite the appearance of previously unknown documents and materials over the last decade of the twentieth century, the clarification of the true intentions of the Soviet leadership remains “an equation with many unknowns” primarily because of authoritarian methods of making decisions in an extremely narrow circle and Stalin’s “Byzantine” tricks. He tried not to leave “knots” to solve the goals of his actions.

A short period of time from the Munich Agreement to August 1939, i.e. until the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty, was marked by the departure of the Stalinist policy from the principles of collective security with the Western powers. This was the result of the Munich Agreement that gave rise to the Soviet leadership doubts about the possibility of reaching agreements with the West on joint collective actions against the aggressor.

On the other hand, Stalin, as well as the whole Soviet leadership, was well aware of Hitler’s main goal, which was to seize living space in the East. Characteristically, in two speeches in the Reichstag in front of his fellow party members in 1937 and 1938, Hitler publicly declared himself a supporter of a ruthless struggle against “Jewish-internationalist Moscow Bolshevism”, which he characterized as “the embodiment of human destructive mania”⁵.

It is now known that on January 11, 1939, Hitler, in an interview with the Commissioner of the “free city of Danzig” under the direction of the League of Nations, declared that he would resolve the issue of Danzig with the help of a military action against Poland, but he was annoyed by the fact that France and the United Kingdom bothered him.

³ Суворов В. Ледокол. Кто начал вторую мировую войну? М., 1992; его же. Последняя республика. М., 1995 и др.

⁴ Городецкий Г. Миф “Ледокола”. Накануне войны. Пер. с англ. М., 1995; его же. Роковой самообман. Сталин и нападение Германии на Советский Союз. М., 1999.

⁵ Цит. по: Вторая мировая война. Дискуссии... С. 448.

Adolph Hitler:

“All that I do is directed against Russia, and if the West is so stupid and blind that it does not understand and does not see it, I will have to agree with the Russians to break the West, and then after its defeat by all my combined forces fall on the Soviet Union. Ukraine is needed so that we cannot be starved, as it was in the last war. “⁶.

The main goal of Hitler was to seize the richest resources of the Soviet Union. No compromise could shake his desire to achieve it at all costs.

⁶ Там же. С. 448-449.

UNSETTLED PROBLEMS AFTER THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1919: BRITAIN, JAPAN AND THE BREAKING OF THE JAPANESE AIR BLOCKADE OF AUSTRALIA 1942-45

PhD Candidate Kevin Smythe (Australia)

One of the lesser known areas of World War Two (WW2) with a connection to unfinished outcomes from the Versailles Conference was the relationship between the British and the Empire of Japan.

Britain and Japan were Allies in world War One (WW1) but during the 1930s relations soured with disagreements in the League of Nations and Japans attack upon China. Britain was fundamental in helping Japan build its Navy and military strength through training programs, industrial relations and shared space in the Asia Pacific area. Both had colonies and resource and trade interests which intersected in South-east Asia where the British had much of its Empire.

By the mid-1930s Japan had fallen out with its Great War ally Britain along with its Commonwealth Dominions including Australia, Canada and New Zealand, as well as with Great Powers France and the USA. By 1933 Japan had resigned from the League of Nations and was on a path to War commencing with its attack on China. By December 1941 it was at war with the United States, the British and her Dominions including Australia as well as the Netherlands in her East Indies colony

Japan launched attacks upon the British colonies in Asia on the same day it attacked Pearl Harbour. This was 8 December 1941 on the western side of the international date line. Coincidentally, an Australian Hudson Bomber from 1 Squadron had shadowed the Japanese invasion force as it sailed across the Gulf of Siam *en route* to land troops in the British colony of Malaya and in Southern Thailand

By 15 February 1942 Singapore had fallen to the Japanese and Australia was cut off by air from its ally and protector the British beginning the blockade of Australia's western flank

Prior to the War, from 1938 onwards Australian airline Qantas had flown the Singapore to Sydney sector as part of the Empire Air Mail Scheme. This route connected Australia with the United Kingdom (UK) which guarantee Australia defence through its Singapore fortress. From 1939 when British pilots had been seconded to the War effort Qantas also flew the mail from Karachi to Singapore then onto Sydney.

Qantas used Empire Flying Boats to service the route but these aircraft were seconded to the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) once the War began in 1941 in Southeast Asia. Qantas was then left as an airline without aircraft and a major commercial challenge

Qantas therefore needed to get its planes back in the air, but it had no planes. It had crews, experienced long range over water crews who had also flown Catalinas to deliver the planes to Australia in late 1941

Qantas Managing Director Qantas Mr. (later Sir) Hudson Fysh was responsible for Qantas staying in the air as a commercial airline. Fysh was a Word War One (WW1) Australian Flying Corps airman who had flown in Palestine with the AFC.

Fysh and was a man of strong character who relished a fight. He was in the fight of his life so far as Qantas was concerned.

He was in a tough position. Not only was his airline grounded but Australia itself was blockaded with its western air approaches unable to operate due to the capture of Singapore. Singapore fell on 15 May 1942 and from that date onward no Qantas flights were able to progress towards Australia. While Singapore was now in Japanese hands the problem was greater than it seemed at first appearance.

Not only was Singapore under Japanese control but so was Malaya and much of the surrounding air routes. The Dutch East Indies was about to fall as well. The eastern approach to Australia lay open via Hawaii across the Pacific but any approach through British territory now held by the Japanese was impossible.



Figure 1. Extent of Japanese Air Cover 1942

New research has revealed that plans were developed by Australian authorities to break the blockade. Review of World War Two (WW2) archival material revealed that not only was the blockade broken but was done so initially through the deployment of United States Navy (USN) PBV (PBV was a designation for Patrol Bomber Consolidated - the manufacturing company) Catalina seaplanes. The same plane was used by Qantas to pioneer a route across the Indian Ocean around the blockade. Previous research indicates that a military solution was applied as a means to break the blockade but the new research revealed otherwise. This research was the subject of my dissertation at Curtin University in Perth Western Australia and has shed new light on the real reasons for developing the secret route that broke the Japanese blockade of Australia imposed after the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942.

My research focused on both Qantas and the USN planes. Both operated PBV5 Catalinas during the war from Perth. The USN arrived first in Perth in March of

1942 after a fighting retreat from the Philippines. The Japanese launched attacks on the USN's Asiatic Fleet which was stationed in Manila. The fleet was made up of outdated capital ships a number of submarines and the Fleet air element, Patrol Wing 10.

A Patrol Wing was a new naval concept which provided long range patrols for the Fleet in a pre-radar era. Patrol Wing 10 had only arrived in Manila in 1941 but by December of the year it was in action defending itself against the Japanese. The Japanese forces attacked Manila on 8 December 1941, the same Day that Pearl Harbour was attacked, that day being 7 December on the other side of the International Date Line. American forces were quickly overrun, Patrol Wing 10 dispersed to the Netherlands East Indies (NEI or Indonesia today) to the port of Balikpapan and General MacArthur made his stand on Corregidor eventually evacuating to Australia, Melbourne. Patrol Wing 10 was forced to retreat to Balikpapan in the NEI then Surabaya and finally Ambon.

It was attacked again in the NEI and fled back to Surabaya in Java. During this time the Wing had fought in combat losing much of its strength and many personnel. This was late February 1942. By the time the Wing arrived in Perth in March of 1942 it had only three remaining PBY Catalinas (from 28). It also had a number of smaller utility planes and three seagoing tenders. It had a fourth tender, the USS Langley, which was lost at sea in February 1942 while attempting to deliver P-40 USAAF fighter planes to assist in the defence of the NEI under the ill-fated American, British, Dutch, Australian (ABDACOM) force.

By March of 1942 Australia was now blockaded through its western flank and isolated by the Japanese. Its ally, the United Kingdom, was occupied with its own defence in Europe while colonial troops had been overrun in its colonies. The same fate befell the Dutch whose nation had been captured by the Germans while they also had a colony to defend against the Japanese. The USN forces and Qantas airlines were forced either into retreat or out of business and Perth Western Australia (WA) had become the only usable port for the initial defence of Australia should the Japanese attack. Japan had already launched attacks on Darwin and Broome in Australia's north. Perth also became the focus of the blockade breaking plans.

In the dark days of early 1942 the Japanese entered the Indian Ocean, but their objective was Colombo in Ceylon. Perth was spared.

15 February 1942 was in effect the commencement of the actual blockade. Australia's link with the UK had been cut when Singapore fell. Australia had no ally of size, no power as the British had guaranteed Australia's defence with its fortress Singapore strategy. Australia's relationship with the US was nascent and the arrival of Patrol Wing 10 was the beginning of a long term defence and strategic relationship that still exists today. It is known as the Australia New Zealand United States alliance (ANZUS). It is the cornerstone of Australian Defence policy to this day.

Within the same time frame Qantas was wrestling with the issue of keeping its airline flying. The popular contention in history circles was that Qantas was conducting some secret wartime operation in support of Australian-British efforts to combat the Japanese.

The Qantas flights were in effect little to do with wartime defence but they did ensure a breaking of the blockade imposed by the Japanese when they captured Singapore in 1942. Research focused on the story that brought Qantas into the war. Questions were posed concerning what did they do and why? What were the outcomes? Though Qantas succeeded in thwarting the Japanese blockade their reasons for doing so were in reality, strictly commercial.

Qantas was a private company albeit 50% owned by British Overseas Airways Company (BOAC). When WW2 struck the RAAF seconded its aircraft, the Short's C Class Empire Flying boats. This left Qantas as an airline but without long range aircraft. Qantas was an airline which was grounded. But they did have crews, ground staff, bases and experienced over-water pilots.

Hudson Fysh Qantas Managing Director knew that he had to get into the air and with a contract that paid hard currency. If not, Qantas was finished. Fysh called his senior pilots together. They planned what was to be known as the Indian Ocean Service, the IOS or what became known as the Double Sunrise Flights. The flights were Perth West Australia to Lake Koggala RAF base in Ceylon. Having planned the route Fysh then needed to sell it as achievable. His motive was the resumption of the EAMS and the continued payment of the mail contract Sydney to London. It had little to do with any military solution.

Qantas was developing a plan to thwart the Japanese but this was a commercial operation not a military one. However, Qantas' planes came directly from the Royal Air Force (RAF) which had acquired the planes under the American Lend-Lease arrangement and allocated them to BOAC who then sent them to Qantas. Five planes in all were supplied and all operated the Perth to Lake Koggala to Karachi and return run.



Figure 2. Qantas Route to Lake Koggala and Karachi

The flights were lengthy and the longest took 32 and a half hours Koggala to Perth all in a crowded and cold PBY. The Qantas flights were known as the Double Sunrise Flights as it took two sunrises to reach Koggala in Ceylon. Only 3 passengers could be carried but they were not the main priority, that being Mail. Other cargo

was carried and the planes operated at 35,000 lbs, 6,000 lbs over specified maximum takeoff weight.

The planes were stripped to bare minimum and extra fuel tanks were added for the distance covered. Through the Indian Ocean Service Qantas had broken the Japanese air blockade and at the same time resumed flying commercial operations which in effect gave them revenue and the ability to fly again as a commercial international airline. BOAC was instrumental in the process as it was a half owner of Qantas. The resumption of the Service solved BOAC and Qantas' revenue problems and at the same time broke the Japanese blockade of Australia's western air approaches.

While Qantas was breaking the Japanese blockade the US Navy was also hard at work pushing back the Japanese and breaking out to give Australia the defence it needed in early 1942. Research revealed that the USN's Patrol Wing 10 was also instrumental in defying the Japanese and showing that the loss of Singapore was not detrimental to Australia's defence. While Patrol Wing 10 has been researched, notably by American author Dwight Messimer in his book 'In the Hands of Fate', the research exposed a number of new areas of knowledge that were not previously disclosed.

Patrol wing 10's War Diaries were investigated to elicit the information which revealed how the Americans defended Australia, particularly Western Australia from the Japanese threat in 1942. Research showed that Australia and the USA had no official defence relationship at the outset of WW2 and that Australia's alliance was with Britain but with the fall of Singapore that alliance had proven to be fruitless. At the same time the Americans had been attacked and driven out of the Philippines. Thousands of soldiers were captured and the Asiatic Fleet either sunk or forced out to safer harbours in Batavia (Jakarta) or after that Perth and Australia's east coast.

Patrol Wing 10 had also arrived in Perth at this time. Over three months it had shuttled from Manila, to Balikpapan, to Batavia and then Surabaya and finally Ambon in the eastern NEI. The Japanese soon invaded the NEI (February-March 1942) and again Patrol Wing 10 was forced to retreat. This time it was to Perth, Western Australia. Patrol Wing 10 arrived in Perth on 7 March 1942 at a time when Australia's western coast was virtually undefended. Because of the blockade at Singapore and the advance to Java and the other NEI air bases such as West Timor and Bali the Japanese had extended their reach and widened their ring fence over Australia's western and northern coasts mounting raids as well as harassment of shipping, aircraft and local populations. Several Australian towns were attacked including Darwin, Wyndham and Broome.

The research revealed that the Americans used a number of operational objectives to mount their defence and eventual thrust northward to break the Japanese stranglehold. Operating under command of the 7th Fleet (effectively General MacArthur's command) Patrol Wing 10 patrolled, conducted missions behind enemy lines, escorted convoys, trained new inexperienced pilots and cycled planes and pilots back through active east coast units to attack the Japanese in New Guinea and the eastern

NEI island chains to open the way to the Philippines, MacArthur's sole aim.

Patrol Wing 10's role was effective with up to 70 Catalinas being cycled through Perth and the several forward bases established along the Western Australian coast. Its efforts thwarted any closer encroachment eastward by the Japanese and eventually broke the blockade as Japanese forces' reach was overcome and a perimeter of safe area operations was established within which Allied forces could operate with safety.

In summary, the research was based around the individual efforts of Qantas and the USN's Patrol Wing 10 to break through the defensive line established by the Japanese following the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942.

The situation with the Japanese and the British came to a head following the issues that arose after 1919 when Japanese expansion into China as an imperial power was opposed by the British and other League of Nations members. This unresolved conflict in part led to the Japanese initiating a broader campaign of regional expansion which drew them into conflict with their former allies the British.

The Japanese invaded Malaya and Singapore and these acts threatened Britain's Dominion, Australia, and showed the inability of the British to honour their defence commitments to Australia while they had their own homeland defence to conduct in war-torn Europe.

The research showed that in order to confront the Japanese and ensure that Australia's relations with Britain remained in tact and that Australia's west coast was defended two unique actions had to take place.

Qantas with BOAC help was able to pioneer a route across the Indian Ocean to Ceylon and onto the UK. This route was outside Japanese penetration and relinked Australia to Britain after the Singapore blockade. It was also a commercial act not a military solution.

The USA through the retreat of its Patrol Wing 10 found Australia's only safe west coast harbour in Perth and acted as the air force of Western Australia to ensure that the Japanese advance was halted. As the war progressed it was able to force the Japanese to abandon further incursions eastward and develop a safe zone in which allied ships and planes could operate with impunity from 1943 to 1945. The Americans also showed that Australia was not isolated and flew behind the lines' missions as far as the Philippines.

By 1943 Qantas and the USN's Patrol Wing 10 had broken Japan's air blockade of Australia. The blockade had come about through Japan's entry into WW2 an action which in part was based on the breakdown of their relations with the British and other World powers following 1919 the League of Nations and Japan's policies from 1933 onwards.

To wonder - Had Japan remained within the Western Allies' fold it was likely that their role in WW2 would have been in support of the Allies or at least as a neutral nation.

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RETHINKING THE UN FORCES DURING THE KOREAN WAR: NEW DISCOVERIES AND DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES

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I. Introduction

After the end of the Great War, representatives from major countries devised a way to prevent international conflict which would threaten the lives of human beings in the world. The League of Nations should be the solution for the expectations of many countries seeking world peace after the devastating war in 1919. However, the world watched the revival of a world war as well as the disaster even in bigger and wider scope with developed science and technologies like the nuclear bomb dropped in Japan.

The United Nations (UN) was another solution to substitute the League of Nations with stronger authorities. Due to the severe damage of World War II, the UN itself became the symbol of international efforts to bring peace to the world since the creation. Unlike the previous one, the UN made a great distinction by intervening in the Korean War as an institution to realize the ideal of collective security in 1950. Although, the UN had remained dormant in dealing with conflicts during the Cold War, the UN is the most influential international organization to cope with contemporary world affairs from humanitarian matters to environmental problems.

The UN had contributed to the settlement of the Korean War on the Korean Peninsula from June 1950 to July 1953. The UN had involved in the Korean War from the beginning. Since the new borne Republic of Korea did not have any capabilities to deal with North Korean invasion, the UN became the main body to deal with the occasion. The UN adopted the UN resolutions to condemn North Korean behavior as an illegal act. Including the United States, many countries had agreed on the decision of the Security Council on June 26, 1950 and followed the actions of the UN.

This paper will shed light on the UN Forces (UNF) during the Korean War focusing on individual efforts of each country to discover a large picture of the whole work of the UN. This paper explores the experiences of countries which dispatched troops to the Korean War. In general, historians have paid attention to the war efforts of South Korea, the United States, and some participant countries. However, the whole efforts in the name of UN had not been highlighted correctly. It is so important to discover a nature of the forces of the UN by focusing on individual efforts of the 16 countries in a big frame of UN efforts to conduct the Korean War.

In this regard, official records of South Korea will be consulted. This paper will have three chapters: the creation of UN and UNF, individual countries' experiences of recruiting and transporting soldiers to the Korean Peninsula, and efforts to form a unified force. In this way, this paper attempts to connect each country's effort to the cause and behavior of the UN and provides a perspective to understand the whole picture of UN's efforts for the war. This paper will contribute to the understanding of the Korean War by suggesting the overall view to see the war as the war of the UN.

II. The Creation of the UN and the UN Forces

Since the beginning of World War II, officials of the U.S. and United Kingdom had sought ways to build up a strong organization for collective security, and the first fruit was the Atlantic Charter.¹ On August 14, 1941, the representatives of the two countries agreed on the points of the charter, and ten countries including the Soviet Union supported the charter one month later.² With this, major countries reached a consensus to shape the United Nations to end war with collective measures.

On January 1, 1942, 26 nations declared principles to conduct World War II, including an agreement not to end the war with bilateral agreements. This can be regarded as a precursor of UN activities during World War II.³ Later, officials from the U.S., U.K., China and the Soviet Union gathered at Dumbarton Oaks near Washington D.C. to design the structure of the UN from August 1944. After two months' discussions, the members of Dumbarton Oaks were able to agree on the large picture of the organization.⁴ The final suggestion for the organization and the UN Charter were endorsed by countries in San Francisco on June 26, 1945, and the UN was established on October 26, 1946.

The most distinctive feature of the UN was to have an authority to use military power which was guaranteed by the UN Charter, chapter seven and article 43. The charter stipulates that every member state should provide armed forces when the UN requires it to protect peace and security. Even item two of article 43 describes that the UN has a right to designate required unit types, readiness, location, and military facilities. In addition, item 3 explains that details can be discussed with the initiative of the UN Security Council (UNSC).⁵

Ways for the construction of the UN forces were examined by Military Staff Committee which was in charge of military affairs of the UNSC. The committee began its function formally on February 15, 1946.⁶ The committee followed the suggestion of the U.S. for its organization and operation, because other countries had been reluctant to engage in the formation of the committee.⁷ The member countries of the committee were not able to reach consensus on the basic ideas of the UN forces. The final report of the committee in April 1947 just exposed different views and ideas of each country. The Soviet Union caused the major problem by sabotaging the committee; the representative of the Soviet Union had not submitted a proposal for

¹ U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers (hereafter FRUS) 1941, Vol. 1, General, The Soviet Union* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 360.

² Ibid.

³ Kyengho Son, "The Analysis on Characteristics of the UN Forces in the Korean War," *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 58, No. 3 (2018), pp. 145-146.

⁴ Jussi J. Hanhimäki, *The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction*, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 12.

⁵ Charter of the United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html> (accessed June 1, 2019).

⁶ *FRUS 1947, United Nations*, p. 447.

⁷ *FRUS 1946, United Nations*, pp. 728-729.

the structure of the UN forces in time intentionally and opposed to the most ideas of other countries'.⁸

Initially, there had been two different ideas about the formation of the UN forces. The Soviet Union suggested a standing air force for the UN, however, the U.S. opposed to the idea of a standing force. Instead, the U.S. argued that each member state should prepare its own force to be employed by the UN in the case of contingency. Specifically, President Franklin D. Roosevelt hated the idea of UN standing force. He might have concerned that the UN could be an absolute power to control individual countries using the armed forces on top of its legal and moral authority.⁹

However, the U.S. suggested a big army, navy, and air force for the UN forces. The U.S. government envisioned huge armed forces under the UN flag that can surpass any individual countries, so that the UN forces could overcome challenges of any country, even member states of the UNSC. For instance, the U.S. suggested 1,250 bombers and 2,250 fighters for the UN air force, 20 divisions for the UN army, and three aircraft carrier groups for the UN navy.¹⁰ The U.S. government argued that every member state should provide forces to shape the UN forces.¹¹ However, other countries were not eager to provide such a large force at the time of peace right after World War II. Eventually, the UNSC was not able to have its own armed forces to deal with global crises.

With the outbreak of the Korean War, the UN moved to create the UN Forces (UNF) to stop the invasion of North Korea. In legal terms, the UNSC Resolution 83 which recommended member states to support South Korean efforts to recover previous situation became a cornerstone to shape the UNF. UN Secretary General Trygve Lie cooperated with the US to designate the US Far East Command as the UNC. In fact, Lie intended to involve in the operation of the UNC deeply by organizing Committee on Coordination of Assistance for Korea. He argued that supreme commander of the UNC should report details of operations to this committee regularly.¹² However, based on the opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the U.S. rejected the idea.

The UNF was constructed in accordance with operational and political needs. At first, the US mobilized units in the Far East to the Korean Peninsula and requested armed forces to UN member states. The JCS of the US looked over conditions for combined operations in the Korean War and set the criteria of joining forces from other countries. The US JCS asked units with more than 1,000 men and a supporting artillery unit for ground forces.¹³ This would be the minimal request to secure operational efficiency. However, to secure legitimacy of the war, the US JCS changed its policy to accept every suggested force regardless of its size.

⁸ Joanne M. Fish, "The United Nations' Plan for Collective Security: Is It Relevant Today?" Thesis of Naval Postgraduate School (1993), pp. 25-26; Kyengho Son(2018), p. 150.

⁹ Kyengho Son(2018), pp. 147-148.

¹⁰ *FRUS 1947, United Nations*, p. 667.

¹¹ *FRUS 1947, United Nations*, p. 668.

¹² Trygve Lie, *In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations* (New York: The MacMilian, 1954), p. 333.

¹³ James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. III, 1950-1951, Part I, The Korean War* (Washington D.C.: Office of Joint History, 1998), P. 65.

III. Recruiting and Moving Troops to the Battle Field

Based on specific conditions, each country devised its own ways to build up units for the Korean War. In general, there were two kinds of methods to shape the required forces. First, countries designated certain regular forces to be dispatched to South Korea. The other way was to recruit volunteers from regular troops, veterans, and even civilians. Usually, countries which had large standing forces preferred to send standing units, and countries with small armed forces resorted to recruiting.

The US sent Task Force Smith consisting of one infantry battalion and one artillery battery on July 1, 1950. That was the beginning of huge forces of the U.S. in total for the three years of the Korean War.¹⁴ Great Britain decided to dispatch the 29th Brigade to join the war. The units of the brigade arrived at Busan Port from November 3 to 11, 1950. However, the British government had sent two battalions under the command of the 27th Brigade in Hong Kong in August to meet the urgent needs of war.¹⁵ In August 1950, the US and South Korean armed forces were pushed back to Busan Perimeter by North Korean forces.

The government of the Republic of Turkey designated the 241st Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Artillery Battalion under the 2nd Armor Brigade for the Turkish Brigade. The brigade consisted of civil engineer, transportation, medical, and communication attachments.¹⁶ Similarly, the Philippines selected the 10th Battalion which was the strongest unit of the country with additional supporting units with the formation of a battalion combat team. The Philippines arrived in Busan on September 20, 1950.¹⁷ The Kingdom of Thailand also dispatched one battalion with a medical detachment.¹⁸ Ethiopia was a rare case; it mobilized one battalion from Imperial Guard.¹⁹

Other countries recruited men and officers from various sources for the Korean War. In case of Australia, it recruited volunteers from regular forces.²⁰ Similarly, New Zealand created an artillery battalion, Kayforce, with officers and enlisted men from regular forces.²¹ The Republic of South Africa created a fighter squadron for the Korean War hiring volunteers from regular air force.²² Greece employed veterans of the civil war caused by Communists right after World War II. The Greek government shaped one infantry battalion.²³ Canada also created its expeditionary brigade from retired soldiers. It became the 25th Brigade.²⁴ Columbia, Netherlands, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg recruited warriors from regular forces, veterans and civilians.

¹⁴ Gukbangbu, *Hanguk Jeonjaengsa [The History of the Korean War]*, Vol. 11 (Seoul: Gukbangbu, 1980), p. 549.

¹⁵ Gukbangbu (1980), pp. 392-393.

¹⁶ Gukbangbu (1980), pp. 289-290.

¹⁷ Gukbangbu (1980), p. 71.

¹⁸ Gukbangbu (1980), pp. 225-227.

¹⁹ Gukbangbu, *Hanguk Jeonjaengsa [The History of the Korean War]*, Vol. 10 (Seoul: Gukbangbu, 1979), p. 403.

²⁰ Gukbangbu (1979), p. 32.

²¹ Gukbangbu (1980), p. 35.

²² Gukbangbu (1980), p. 164.

²³ Gukbangbu (1979), pp. 561-563. .

²⁴ Gukbangbu (1979), p. 250.

After the creation of units for the Korean War, many countries conducted trainings to prepare their soldiers to be ready for the war. Specifically, Colombia Battalion went through a twelve week US style training under the instruction of US Army officers.²⁵ The Belgium Battalion including Luxembourg Platoon had a similar training for one month near Namur.²⁶ The Turkish Brigade experienced most impressive training. During the sail for the Far East, they underwent marksmanship, trainings to handle US made weapons, and understandings of combined arms operations with the help of American officers. Interestingly, the officers remained to the brigade after the arrival in the Korean Peninsula, and functioned as liaison officers.²⁷

The time of arrival had been an important factor for the contribution to the war. United Kingdom had sent the troops from Hong Kong before the end of August 1950 to meet the urgent operational needs; the UNF were in dire situation to maintain Busan Perimeter to defend southeastern part of the peninsula against North Korean advance. After the arrival of the British forces, the Filipino 10 Battalion Combat Team landed on Busan on September 20, 1950. The Soldiers of the 10th BCT did not have time for refreshment and moved soon to the Busan Perimeter.²⁸ Ten days later, Australian regiment joined to the UNF. They took some rest at the UN Reception Center (UNRC) for three days and moved to the front line under the command of British 27th Brigade.

Following these countries, the Turkish Brigade arrived in Busan on October 20, 1950. Turkish soldiers had spent time for additional training at the UNRC by the middle of November of the year. The Turkish soldiers were able to join X-mas offensive of General MacArthur, and eventually experienced the second offensive of the Chinese Forces. They had played an important role to protect the withdrawal of the 9th Corps at Gunwoori. Majority of the forces arrived in Busan around the end of the year. Exceptionally, Ethiopian and Columbian units landed on Busan in May and June 1951, and they spent more than one month at the UNRC.

IV. Forming the UNF

The UNC had made great efforts to integrate coming forces into the UNF. It was very important not only to shape a unified identity but also to raise combat effectiveness. They had different organizations, equipment, and weapons even different language. These would make combined operations difficult. To deal with this problem, the UNC established a Committee for United Nations Policy and ran Joint Strategic Plans and Operation Group. These organizations produced a draft of policy for the integration on August 25, 1950. High ranking UNC staff members examined the draft and finally published “Policy for Integration of Forces into the United Nations Command,”²⁹

²⁵ Gukbangbu (1979), p. 352.

²⁶ Gukbangbu (1979), p. 163.

²⁷ Gukbangbu (1980), p. 291.

²⁸ Gukbangbu (1980), p. 71.

²⁹ US Army, Pacific, “Policy for Integration of Forces into the United Nations Command,” RG 550, Entry A1, Box 79, National Archives and Records Administration(NARA) College Park, MD; Eunhye Kim, “6•25Jeongaengsi UNgun Hyungseonge Gwanhan Yeongu [A Study on the

The integration policy of the UNC had three categories: command and control, operational policy, and logistics. First, every coming force became to be belonged to the UNC. In the case of the UK forces and other forces from Commonwealth of Nations, they shaped independent command. Other forces from small countries were accommodated to US army divisions or corps based on their size. With this effort, the UNC was able to establish a unified command structure.

Second, for operations, the UNC offered a direct access to the high rank military representatives of participant countries to the UNC headquarters to hear opinions about combat operations of their own units in the field and to arrange administrative affairs.³⁰ Fortunately, many countries accompanied high rank representatives to South Korea. At the same time, the UNC let participant countries run liaison offices in the UNC in Tokyo. The liaison offices belonged to Liaison Staff Section under the charge of a US colonel.³¹ Running the liaison offices brought flexibility to the cooperation between US forces and other units.

Third, the UNC took careful measures to maintain the UNF in terms of logistics. Basically, participant countries were required to send their troops with supply goods for 60 days. At the same time, the countries were in charge of resupply for their forces. However, the US took overall responsibility for the logistics of combat troops when each participant country was not able to support their own troops. In addition, the US provided weapons, equipment and vehicles if participant countries did not have capabilities to maintain them. To use their own weapons and equipment, units should carry spare parts and mechanics and establish resupply system.³²

For the supply of the war, the US enhanced its logistical system to accommodate participant countries' capabilities. The UNC renamed the Rear Area Base of the VIII Army as Japan Logistical Command (JLCOM) and changed it to the direct control of the UNC on August 24, 1950, before the arrival of other forces. The JLCOM had played a pivotal role to support combat forces during the Korean War. In South Korea, the 2nd Logistics Command had been charge of supporting all ground forces on the peninsula under the command of the VIII Army. There had been three kinds of supply systems: for US and the majority of UNF, forces of Common Wealth and ROK armed forces.³³

V. Conclusion

The outbreak of the Korean War made the UNF possible. The UNF was the brain child of the ideal of collective security. At first, the Military Staff Committee

Formation of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War],” Thesis of Korea National Defense University (2017), pp. 30-31.

³⁰ Eunhye Kim (2017), p. 32.

³¹ General Headquarters, Far East Command, Supreme Commander Allied Powers, and United Nations Command, “Plans and Actions, August 1950, RG 554, Entry 44, A1 Box 65, NARA, College Park, MD; Eunhye Kim (2017), p. 33.

³² US Army, Pacific, “Policy for Integration of Forces into the United Nations Command,” pp. 3-4. Eunhye Kim (2017), p. 34.

³³ Eunhye Kim (2017), p. 35.

had devised ways to establish UN forces to implement the UN Charter based on the requirement of collective security. However, due to the lack of cooperation of member states and the atmosphere filled with post war sentiment, the UN was not able to retain its own military forces. The eventual success was made by, ironically with the occurrence of the Korean War.

The 16 countries recruited Individual soldiers to shape expeditionary forces to be sent to South Korea. Some soldiers were regular troops who did not have a chance to make his or her own decisions whether to join the war or not. Some of them were pure civilians who were eager to pursue moral justice in the field of international politics, some were veterans who remembered the bitterness of victims of war from their wartime experiences, and some of them were regular or reserved ones who sought special careers. They arrived in South Korea at different times with different situation.

The units from 16 counties were integrated into a one big unit under the flag of the UN. The UNF became a unified force which had unified command and control structure, and an integrated logistical system with various channels of communication between participant countries and the UNC. The US provided physical foundation to build up this powerful organization with well advanced studies and policies. In these ways, the UN conducted war as an international body to realize the ideal of collective security.

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